Human Rights Situation in Türkiye (January – May 2025)

Introduction

In the first half of 2025, the human rights situation in Türkiye continues to raise serious concerns within the international community. Despite a constitutional framework that formally guarantees fundamental freedoms, the Turkish authorities have intensified restrictive measures targeting freedom of expression, press freedom, the right to assembly and association, as well as political opposition. In a context marked by the arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul and increased repression of protest movements, the executive branch appears to be systematically using legal and police tools to suppress all forms of dissent.

This report aims to provide a well-documented overview of the state of fundamental rights in Türkiye during the early months of 2025. Through the analysis of reliable sources, it highlights repeated violations of press freedom, restrictions imposed on civil society, cases of arbitrary detention, and police violence during demonstrations. Particular attention is given to the situation of journalists, women, and minorities, who are often the primary targets of this authoritarian drift.

At a time when democratic aspirations are increasingly stifled, this report seeks to contribute to the recognition of ongoing violations and to encourage advocacy for the respect of human rights in Turkey.

Freedom of Expression and the Media

As of early 2025, the state of freedom of expression in Türkiye remains deeply troubling. The government maintains tight control over traditional media outlets: the public broadcaster TRT and the Anadolu news agency broadcast official statements, and nearly all television channels and print media align with the executive (1). Independent media outlets, often small in size, survive mainly online. Authorities frequently invoke the Internet Law (No. 5651) to block websites and censor critical content. According to the NGO EngelliWeb, over one million websites have been blocked in Türkiye since 2007 (2). This pattern of internet censorship has continued into 2025: for instance, law enforcement authorities briefly suspended Instagram for eight days in August 2024 amid rising tensions in the Middle East (3).

Similarly, access to media content has been further restricted: the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), the audiovisual regulatory body, has increased sanctions. By the end of February 2025, RTÜK had issued at least six administrative fines to television channels, temporarily suspended critical programs, and even censored film posters (e.g., cancellation of the screening of “Yarasaların İstilası”, and the banning of the film “Oy’una Geldik” for “legal non-compliance”) (4). The body regularly threatens to revoke the license of any media outlet that “does not broadcast in accordance with the desired political direction.” Overall, the accumulation of judicial decisions and administrative sanctions against the media points to a pattern of systematic censorship of dissenting voices (4)(1).

Moreover, critical journalists continue to face legal prosecution. In the first quarter of 2025, courts opened over 55 investigations against journalists, columnists, or reporters—an unprecedented number over a three-month period—demonstrating the judiciary’s close scrutiny of independent media (4). Many are charged with “undermining public order” or “incitement to hatred” without substantial evidence, especially under vague terrorism-related accusations directed at critics of the government. For example, seven local representatives of the journalists’ union DİSK-Basin-Is reported being arrested at home on the evening of March 24 and charged with “violating the law on meetings and demonstrations” before being released under judicial control two days later (5)(4). These mass arrests of journalists during the late March protests were denounced by unions as an “assault on press freedom.”

Independent studies confirm the increasing pressure: the BIA Media Monitoring Report (Jan–Mar 2025) notes that many journalists have been harassed by both judicial and administrative proceedings. During this period, several prominent journalists prosecuted for their work were acquitted after years of detention (including reporters from Sözcü, Halk TV, etc.), underscoring the arbitrary nature of the original charges (4). Similarly, the 2025 Human Rights Watch report recalls that Turkish courts continued to ignore or reject rulings from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in favor of independent media (1).

In conclusion, press and expression freedoms remain severely restricted in Türkiye as of early 2025. Public authorities control most media, order internet site blockages, and escalate prosecutions against critical journalists (1)(4). The near-total absence of a media counterbalance fosters self-censorship, while social networks—one of the last spaces of relative freedom—are also heavily monitored and constrained, particularly through content blocks related to protests (6).

Treatment of Journalists

The treatment of journalists in Türkiye during the first half of 2025 is particularly alarming. Reporters covering political demonstrations or criticizing the government are confronted with criminal charges and reprisals. Among the most notable cases, seven journalists who reported on the protests following the arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul were prosecuted for “unarmed participation in an illegal gathering” (protest law) (7). These seven media professionals—ranging from AFP to Now Haber and the pro-HDP channel Tele 1—were briefly detained on March 25 on charges of “spreading fear” and “breaking the law,” before being released on conditional terms two days later (7). Local press organizations condemned these prosecutions as a “tool of pressure to silence” independent coverage of the events (8)(9).

Additionally, foreign journalists have been imprisoned or expelled for their work. BBC correspondent Mark Lowen, present to cover the demonstrations in Istanbul, was arrested at his hotel on March 26 and expelled the next day on charges of “disturbing public order” (7). On the same day, Swedish journalist Joakim Medin (of the newspaper Dagens ETC) was detained upon his arrival in Türkiye to cover the protests. He was later imprisoned for “membership in an armed terrorist organization” and “insulting the president” (7), charges widely criticized on the international stage. AFP strongly demanded their release, and even the European Commission emphasized that Türkiye, as an “aspiring EU candidate,” must uphold press freedom (7)(10).

Other cases also illustrate the repressive climate: at the beginning of February, three investigative journalists (Elif Akgül, Yıldız Tar, and Ercüment Akdeniz) were imprisoned as of February 22 as part of an investigation into the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK, linked to the pro-Kurdish HDP party) (9). Several other reporters were placed under house arrest or prosecuted in the same case, merely for analyzing political unrest. These proceedings place a heavy burden on press freedom and are clearly intended to intimidate independent journalists.

Finally, the overall atmosphere is exacerbated by the fact that official media frequently label critical journalists as “terrorist propagandists.” For instance, in March 2025, state channels aired unsubstantiated accusations against correspondents from major international agencies. In parallel, the declining number of independent media outlets (due to administrative closures and intimidation) confirms that the entire profession now operates under constant threat. As a result, investigative journalism and critical reporting are becoming increasingly rare, which, according to NGOs, constitutes a serious violation of the public’s right to information (9)(10).

Freedom of Assembly and Association

The freedoms of assembly and association have been extremely curtailed during the first months of 2025. In response to the rising wave of protests, the authorities issued sweeping bans on demonstrations in major cities. For example, a provincial decree dated March 19 prohibited all protests in Istanbul (already suspended as of March 19), with similar bans enforced in Ankara and Izmir around March 21 (11). A heavy police presence, including checkpoints and vehicle inspections, was deployed to prevent gatherings from forming (11)(12)(13).

These bans specifically targeted demonstrations in support of the imprisoned Mayor of Istanbul, officially justified by the “risk of illegal activity,” but widely criticized as a shutdown of public space. Despite the ban, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets across Türkiye in late March to protest the opposition mayor’s arrest. Police responded swiftly and forcefully, deploying water cannons, tear gas, smoke grenades, and rubber bullets (13). The official report indicates that more than 1,133 people were arrested during the protests, according to the Interior Minister (13). Authorities claimed that those detained included individuals linked to “terrorist organizations,” thereby invoking anti-terror legislation to suppress political dissent. In reality, the majority of these gatherings remained peaceful, with footage showing widespread police violence: many protesters (and journalists covering the events) were injured by tear gas and rubber bullet fire (13)(11).

Repression also extended to civil society organizations. For instance, on March 26, the leaders of the Eğitim-Sen teachers’ union were placed under house arrest and charged with “incitement to commit a crime” simply for organizing a one-day strike in solidarity with protesting students (11). This judicial crackdown starkly illustrates the severe erosion of the right to strike and union action: any act of solidarity is now equated with “provocation.”

Furthermore, the government has moved against several local political figures: in February 2025, seven municipal officials were arrested, and two mayors were removed from office and replaced by state-appointed governors (14). This operation, conducted within the framework of an investigation into the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK), targeted political leaders affiliated with the pro-Kurdish left. In total, 51 activists linked to the HDK were detained (30 of whom were placed in pre-trial detention) in connection with this case (14).

These actions confirm a broader pattern: Turkish authorities enforce stringent judicial and administrative control over associations and political parties, especially those from minority or opposition groups, thereby violating the right of association and undermining democratic local representation (14)(11).

Moreover, NGOs and human rights organizations also face mounting pressure. Several leaders of the Human Rights Association (İHD) and various unions have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms, often for speaking out about the war in Kurdistan or criticizing national security practices (14). For example, İHD reports that several of its senior members have been imprisoned following trials deemed “political.” In an environment where the rule of law is severely weakened, even non-governmental organizations struggle to operate without fear of reprisals.

Arbitrary Detention and Political Imprisonment

The first months of 2025 have seen a marked increase in politically motivated detentions and imprisonments. A major warning sign came in late March, when an Istanbul court placed the city’s mayor and prominent opposition figure, Ekrem İmamoğlu, in pretrial detention under allegations of corruption. This measure, which effectively suspended him from his municipal duties, has been interpreted by numerous observers as a major political maneuver aimed at eliminating a key rival to President Erdoğan from the electoral arena (15)(16).

This event triggered the largest wave of political arrests in Türkiye in years. In addition to İmamoğlu himself, law enforcement officials detained 1,133 protesters across the country within one week (17). According to the authorities, some detainees were linked to “terrorist organizations,” but this characterization has been criticized as excessive by human rights organizations.

Among those detained were several opposition political and union figures. Senior members of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), along with personalities from the Kurdish left, were briefly imprisoned before being released under judicial supervision. Meanwhile, the government stepped up prosecutions initiated as part of the HDK investigation: between February and March, a new wave of police custody targeted various opposition members, often under charges of “terrorism financing” based on their participation in political or trade union meetings.

The precise outcome of these proceedings remains unclear, but local NGOs consider the judicial repression to be systematic and arbitrary. Legal guarantees appear severely undermined. Numerous political detainees have denounced the lack of serious investigation into the charges against them and the opacity surrounding their interrogations. Anti-terrorism courts, often used against opponents, routinely reject requests for release from pretrial detention, as evidenced by the case of the seven journalists discussed earlier.

Moreover, Türkiye continues to disregard judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). On several occasions in 2024, the Court had ordered the release of prisoners of conscience, but these rulings were ignored in 2025 (18). Prison conditions also remain a concern, with reports of inhumane treatment, chronic overcrowding, and abuse persisting. Some political prisoners have resorted to hunger strikes in protest against the authorities’ refusal to respond to their appeals for dialogue. As a result, Turkish prisons—particularly those designated for terrorism suspects—remain sites of grave violations of fundamental rights.

Rights of Women

The status of women in Türkiye in 2025 remains characterized by serious violations, despite the existence of protective legislation. Türkiye’s unilateral withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention (on protection against gender-based violence), officially finalized in late 2021, continues to fuel impunity. On March 8, 2025, the Women’s Human Rights Association (Kadının İnsan Hakları Derneği – KİH) filed a complaint before the ECHR, asserting that the withdrawal—carried out under pressure from nationalist and religious conservative groups—has led to a surge in attacks against women and the LGBT community (19).

Independent media figures highlight the scale of the issue. Bianet regularly publishes its monthly “Erkek Şiddeti” (Male Violence) monitoring reports. According to these sources:

January 2025: At least 28 women and 4 children (including one boy) were killed by men, mostly in the context of domestic or sexual violence. Additionally, 39 women were assaulted, and 13 children (both boys and girls) were sexually abused (20)(21).
February 2025: At least 17 women and 9 children were killed. 51 women were assaulted, while 5 children suffered sexual abuse and 8 women were victims of harassment (22).
March 2025: 24 women and 10 children (aged 4 to 11) were killed by men. In the same period, 59 cases of physical violence against women and 15 sexual abuse cases involving children (including boys) were reported (23).
April 2025: At least 36 women and 2 children were killed by intimate partners or relatives. Among them, several minors (including boys) were also sexually assaulted or murdered (24).

These figures indicate that within four months, nearly 105 women and 25 children were killed as a result of male violence in Türkiye. The perpetrators, often known to the victims (spouses, ex-partners, family members, or neighbors), frequently benefit from judicial leniency. Feminicide cases are dangerously normalized: courts routinely grant sentence reductions or even acquittals, citing motives such as “passion” or “honor” (27).

The recent re-criminalization of adultery (reintroduced in 2024) raises further concerns over impunity, as adultery has been used as a mitigating circumstance in several feminicide trials.

Beyond lethal violence, other violations undermine women’s dignity and freedoms. Feminist activists and journalists face prosecution on charges such as insult or “terrorist propaganda” for denouncing widespread sexual harassment and assault (sometimes attributed by the state to terrorist groups in order to deflect attention).

Campaigns against female genital mutilation and child marriage—increasingly visible within civil society—receive no formal backing from the government, which remains largely silent on these issues.

Additionally, the prevailing Islamist-conservative climate influences public discourse against contraception and women’s freedom of dress, eroding social secularism and creating a hostile environment for reproductive rights (26).

In summary, women’s rights in Türkiye remain under severe threat. The withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, compounded by the lack of effective investigations into gender-based crimes, has contributed to a situation in which, according to civil society activists, a woman is killed every two to three days in 2025 (25). Authorities show little political will to reverse this trend; on the contrary, repressive legislative initiatives—such as the abortion ban proposed in March 2025 (later abandoned following protests)—illustrate a dangerous conservative shift (28).

Local observers have concluded that in Türkiye, “women are being killed with impunity,” underscoring the state’s failure to protect its most vulnerable populations.

Children’s Rights

The situation of children in Türkiye between January and May 2025 is deeply alarming, both in terms of physical security and fundamental freedoms.

With regard to safety, monthly reports on so-called “male violence” (see previous section) indicate that at least 25 children were killed during the first quarter of 2025 by adults—often their own fathers or close relatives (29)(30). These tragic incidents affected both boys and girls, some as young as four or six years old, and many were found murdered by stabbing or drowning.

Moreover, numerous minors were victims of sexual abuse or severe physical harm. According to Bianet, five children were sexually abused in February and fifteen in March alone (31)(32). These figures reflect a critical lack of child protection mechanisms: the authorities appear reluctant to conduct independent investigations into such abuses, and sentences handed down to perpetrators remain disproportionately lenient.

Beyond domestic violence, Turkish children endure various forms of rights deprivation. The sporadic resurgence of the Covid-19 pandemic in the winter of 2024–2025 did not lead to specific sanitary measures in schools. Many institutions remain poorly equipped in terms of infrastructure and personnel.

Despite a general increase in the national education budget, as noted by Freedom House’s 2025 report, resources remain unevenly distributed. Children from impoverished families are increasingly dropping out of school to engage in child labor. The number of children working on the streets or in informal workshops remains high, and the government has yet to launch any substantial campaign against child labor.

From a legal standpoint, the low minimum age of criminal responsibility (14 years) allows adolescents to be tried as adults, even though the judicial system lacks mechanisms suited to minors.

Cultural and linguistic rights are also restricted. Although legislation nominally permits Kurdish language instruction in primary schools, its implementation remains symbolic at best. As of early 2025, only a handful of schools offer Kurdish-language courses due to a lack of volunteers or infrastructure. Meanwhile, official rhetoric increasingly opposes multilingual education, fostering a hostile environment for minority language instruction.

Similarly, Roma and Alevi children continue to face marginalization and discrimination in both educational settings and access to healthcare, without any targeted protection from the state.

The situation of migrant (refugee) children is equally concerning. Türkiye hosts more than 3.5 million migrants, predominantly Syrians, and many of their children live in precarious conditions. NGOs have denounced severe deficiencies in mental health services, particularly for those who have fled conflict zones. The formal education system accommodates only a portion of these children: many do not attend school or are enrolled in overcrowded, under-resourced classes. Although Türkiye is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the institutional frameworks to uphold these rights remain largely inadequate.

In summary, children’s rights in Türkiye—in terms of physical safety, access to education, and judicial protection—have been gravely undermined during the first half of 2025. Family violence statistics point to a deadly epidemic targeting minors (33)(34), while broader fundamental rights continue to be overlooked by public authorities. Child protection organizations continue to urge the government to adopt an ambitious social policy agenda, but no tangible improvements have yet materialized.

Rights of Minorities and Vulnerable Populations

The rights of ethnic, religious, and social minorities continue to be widely violated in Türkiye. The most striking example concerns the Kurdish populations in the eastern provinces: Kurdish mayors and political representatives (affiliated with the HDP) have been extensively targeted by emergency procedures. At the beginning of 2025, two municipalities governed by opposition parties lost their elected mayors following accusations of “links with terrorism” (35). The government subsequently appointed “special administrators” (kayyum) to replace them, effectively stripping thousands of voters of their democratic choice. This precedent confirms Türkiye’s ongoing policy of governance through mandate suspensions and state trusteeships, flagrantly contradicting local democratic freedoms.

Moreover, Türkiye is home to several religious minorities (Alevi, Christian, Aramean, Yazidi, etc.) and ethnic groups (Greek, Armenian, Jewish), all of whom report continuous discrimination. Their right to association is restricted: for example, Christian minority schools face administrative hurdles, and certain municipal regulations have sought to limit the display of non-Muslim religious symbols. No tangible improvement has been observed for these communities, whose situation remains stalled under a prevailing nationalist atmosphere that often regards them with suspicion or as foreign elements.

Sexual minorities (LGBT+) have likewise been subjected to symbolic and legislative attacks. Under the pretext of safeguarding the “traditional family,” the government introduced a highly repressive bill targeting LGBT individuals in late February 2025 (36). This draft legislation proposes the inclusion of the concept of “biological sex” in the penal code and imposes stringent restrictions on gender transition procedures, adding coercive medical requirements and even a humiliating administrative path. It would even criminalize symbolic same-sex marriage ceremonies. In practical terms, a transgender person in Türkiye would now be required to prove sterilization and undergo mandatory medical procedures to gain legal recognition of their identity. This dehumanizing policy has been strongly condemned by LGBT and international organizations.

This initiative is part of the government’s “2025: Year of the Family” campaign, which conflates LGBT rights with so-called “foreign propaganda.” Public displays of intolerance have also increased: in Istanbul and Ankara, all LGBT public events (symbolic pride marches, cultural gatherings) have been systematically banned or attacked in 2025. Nationalist groups have physically assaulted participants in such events, emboldened by the authorities’ failure to intervene (37)(38).

This situation confirms the assessment of civil society: Türkiye is undergoing an “unprecedented regression in LGBT+ rights.”

Among other vulnerable groups, Roma communities and persons with disabilities continue to face neglect and stigmatization. Roma individuals are frequently arrested for begging or petty offenses, while government aid camps established for them are being closed. Children with disabilities receive minimal educational support despite the existence of relevant legislation. NGOs also report persistent discrimination against non-Syrian migrants and asylum seekers. Iranian Kurdish and Ahmadi communities, for example, have claimed to be targeted by local authorities, who allegedly expel them and seize their property without due process.

Ultimately, whether ethnic, religious, or sexual, the collective and individual rights of minorities in Türkiye are gravely threatened. The state promotes national homogeneity and a majoritarian vision of society, systematically attacking dissident identities. Numerous observers have concluded that “no minority is safe” in Türkiye, owing to the state apparatus’s persistent refusal to acknowledge societal pluralism. These pressures range from verbal harassment to judicial persecution, forming part of a clear policy of cultural and political uniformity.

The Peace Process Between Türkiye and the PKK in 2025

After four decades of conflict that claimed over 40,000 lives, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced a unilateral ceasefire on 1 March 2025, in response to an appeal for peace and democratic coexistence by its imprisoned founder, Abdullah Öcalan (39). The PKK’s executive committee, based in northern Iraq, declared that no armed actions would be taken unless attacked, marking a major step toward the cessation of hostilities (39).

This development followed four months of dialogue between Turkish authorities and the main pro-Kurdish party, DEM. From his prison on Imrali Island, Öcalan urged the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, declaring the era of armed struggle over and assuming historical responsibility for this call (39).

On 12 May 2025, the PKK officially announced its decision to disarm and dissolve, stating that it had fulfilled its historical mission by paving the way for a political resolution to the Kurdish issue (40). This declaration was welcomed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who underscored its significance for national security and regional peace, while emphasizing that the process would be closely monitored to prevent setbacks (40).

Despite these advances, uncertainties remain regarding whether this decision will extend to PKK-affiliated groups, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which have not yet agreed to disarm. The Turkish government insists that disarmament must include all PKK-affiliated branches (40).

In addition, the Turkish National Security Council stated that it would closely oversee the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK and its affiliates, affirming that the goal of a terror-free Türkiye would further strengthen national unity and solidarity (41).

This peace process represents a historic opportunity to end a long and bloody conflict. However, its success will depend on the effective implementation of the commitments made, the resolution of outstanding issues concerning affiliated groups, and the political will of all stakeholders.

Racism

In 2025, racism in Türkiye continues to fuel significant social and political tensions. Although the Turkish Constitution formally guarantees equality among citizens regardless of origin, numerous reports point to systemic discriminatory practices and increasingly aggressive public rhetoric targeting ethnic, religious, or migrant minorities.

First and foremost, xenophobia toward Syrian refugees and Afghan or African migrants has intensified since the beginning of the year. Numerous incidents of racist violence have been reported, including attacks on Syrian-owned businesses in Ankara, Konya, and Istanbul (42). Calls for mass expulsions are frequently echoed on social media by far-right figures, while some local officials have publicly demanded the forced return of refugees to their countries of origin, in blatant disregard of international law.

At the same time, Kurdish citizens continue to be stigmatized in pro-government media and official discourse, which routinely associates them with terrorism. In January 2025, several elected Kurdish mayors were dismissed by executive decree for “separatist propaganda,” without prior judicial review. The Newroz celebrations were once again heavily policed, and numerous mass arrests occurred, often followed by prolonged detentions without concrete evidence (43)(44).

Armenian, Jewish, and Greek communities in Türkiye, although small in number, remain targets of symbolic hostility. Hate speech online, including conspiracy theories associating these groups with “enemies of the nation,” circulates without legal consequences. In April 2025, a synagogue in Istanbul was vandalized, and antisemitic graffiti was found at an Armenian cemetery in Van (45).

The Roma population continues to face deeply rooted social discrimination. In several provinces (notably in the west), Roma families are denied access to rental housing or municipal jobs. Educational discrimination persists: Roma children are placed in segregated classrooms under the pretext of “linguistic adaptation” (46).

In May 2025, Human Rights Watch and several local NGOs condemned the issuance of an administrative circular allowing provincial governors to restrict the movements of populations considered “problematic” without judicial oversight. Though not explicitly racial in nature, this measure effectively targets neighborhoods with predominantly Roma or Kurdish populations, reinforcing allegations of structural discrimination (47).

The escalation of racism is further exacerbated by the lack of effective anti-discrimination legislation. While Türkiye is a signatory to several international conventions, it has no specific law protecting against systemic racism or hate speech. The few complaints filed for incitement to racial hatred are usually dismissed—unless directed at political opponents. Numerous civil society organizations, including the Human Rights Association (İHD), decry a double standard in the application of the law.

Conclusion

In 2025, the human rights situation in Türkiye remains deeply concerning. Although certain legal frameworks still exist on paper, their enforcement is severely undermined by authoritarian governance, the instrumentalization of the judiciary, and an increasingly repressive political climate.

Ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities face systemic exclusion policies, while the rights of women and children are routinely violated, often met with institutional indifference or complicity. Gender-based violence, in particular, has reached alarming levels, with high rates of femicides and assaults against minors. Kurdish, LGBT+, Roma, Alevi, refugee, and disabled communities are marginalized, frequently denied fundamental protections, and exposed to public stigmatization.

Moreover, the fragility of the rule of law—evidenced by the politicization of the judiciary, the criminalization of dissent, and the curtailment of freedoms of expression, press, and association—gravely undermines the protection of fundamental rights. Independent media, NGOs, trade unions, and lawyers are under constant surveillance and judicial harassment.

Despite repeated warnings from local and international organizations, the Turkish government continues to pursue a policy of cultural and ideological homogenization, in open defiance of basic democratic principles. In the absence of deep structural reforms, Türkiye is moving further away from international human rights standards.

It is incumbent upon the international community, European institutions, NGOs, and citizens themselves to maintain pressure, document abuses, and support dissenting voices. Today, no minority is safe, and the principles of equality, freedom, and human dignity are in jeopardy.

Zagros Human Rights Center NGO with consultative status with ECOSOC