{"id":1531,"date":"2026-07-27T08:32:18","date_gmt":"2026-07-27T06:32:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.zagros-centre.org\/en\/?p=1531"},"modified":"2026-07-27T08:32:18","modified_gmt":"2026-07-27T06:32:18","slug":"extrajudicial-executions-judicial-repression-and-the-erosion-of-the-right-to-life-in-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-between-1-january-20-may-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.zagros-centre.org\/en\/?p=1531","title":{"rendered":"Extrajudicial Executions, Judicial Repression, and the Erosion of the Right to Life in the Islamic Republic of Iran between 1 January \u2013 20 May 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

Human Rights Council
\nSixty-second session
\n15 June\u201310 July 2026
\nAgenda item 3
\nPromotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
\npolitical, economic, social and cultural rights,
\nincluding the right to development<\/p>\n

Written statement submitted by Centre Zagros pour les Droits de l’Homme, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*
\nThe Secretary-General has received the following written statement, which is circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996\/31.<\/p>\n

I. The Escalating Use of the Death Penalty<\/strong><\/p>\n

Since the nationwide protests that erupted in December 2025, the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran has deteriorated sharply. The period from January to May 2026 has been marked by a surge in executions carried out at an unprecedented rate \u2014 many in secret, and all following deeply flawed proceedings. Local documentation networks recorded approximately 700 executions in January and February alone: 341 in January and 353 in February. These figures represent minimum estimates. Communications blackouts systematically imposed by the authorities have severely constrained independent documentation, and the actual number of executions during the full reporting period is in all likelihood considerably higher. [1]\n

The right to life is protected under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran is a State Party. While Article 6 does not categorically prohibit the death penalty in States that have not yet abolished it, it demands in the strictest terms that capital punishment be applied only for the most serious crimes, following proceedings that fully satisfy fair trial standards, and never arbitrarily. As this statement documents, none of these conditions are met in Iran.<\/p>\n

II. The Principle of Legality and the Weaponisation of Security Charges<\/strong><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s Revolutionary Courts operate without judicial independence, under pervasive influence from security and intelligence institutions. They continue to try and sentence individuals on charges that bear no resemblance to recognisable legal definitions. Terms such as \u201ccorruption on earth,\u201d \u201cenmity against God,\u201d \u201cespionage,\u201d and \u201cacting against national security\u201d are applied in a deliberately open-ended manner to any form of dissent \u2014 civic expression, participation in protests, contact with independent media \u2014 that the authorities wish to suppress.<\/p>\n

This approach violates the principle of legality enshrined in Article 15 of the ICCPR and Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of which require that criminal offences be defined with clarity and precision. The vagueness of these charges is not incidental: by framing ordinary civic activity as an existential threat to state security, the authorities construct a legal pretext for the death penalty that international law does not and cannot recognise. At least ten individuals detained during the January 2026 protests have already been executed on such charges. [2] [5]\n

III. Rights of Detainees and Death Row Prisoners<\/strong><\/p>\n

Documentation gathered during the reporting period confirms a systematic pattern of violations against political detainees facing capital charges. Those sentenced to death were denied prompt access to independent legal counsel, in breach of Mandela Rules 61(1) and 119, which specifically require enhanced legal access for prisoners under sentence of death. They were subjected to prolonged incommunicado detention, in violation of ICCPR Articles 7, 9(1), 10(1), and Mandela Rules 43(1)(b), 44, and 58\u201363. They were interrogated under physical or psychological coercion, contrary to ICCPR Articles 7 and 14(3)(g). And they were deprived of regular family contact, in breach of ICCPR Article 17 and Mandela Rules 58(1), 59, and 106 \u2014 the last of which affords specific protections to prisoners facing execution.<\/p>\n

Taken together, these practices violate both the general safeguards applicable to all detainees and the heightened protections explicitly afforded under international law to individuals on death row.<\/p>\n

IV. Incommunicado Detention and Enforced Disappearance<\/strong><\/p>\n

As defined by the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, incommunicado detention constitutes a form of enforced disappearance when the State refuses to acknowledge a detainee\u2019s location or status. In Iran, this pattern consistently precedes execution. Detainees are transferred to undisclosed locations for days or weeks; relatives receive no information as to their whereabouts or legal situation. Families are frequently informed of executions only after they have taken place, denied a final visit, and refused the return of their relatives\u2019 remains. At least 26 political executions have been carried out in conditions of complete secrecy since 17 March 2026 \u2014 a figure that almost certainly represents a significant undercount given the scale of the communications blackout in effect during this period. [1] [3]\n

V. Disproportionate Impact on Ethnic Minorities<\/strong><\/p>\n

The death penalty continues to fall with disproportionate and documented force on marginalised communities, in particular Kurds, Baluchis, and Ahwazi Arabs. In Kurdish provinces, political prisoners and civil activists regularly receive death sentences on vague national security charges following proceedings that provide no meaningful opportunity for defence. Families are subjected to sustained intimidation and warned against communicating with independent media or human rights organisations. [3]\n

In Baluchi regions, available data indicate that drug-related charges are applied at a significantly higher rate against Baluchi detainees than against comparable populations elsewhere \u2014 raising serious and documented concerns that criminal prosecution is being used as a pretext for the execution of individuals from an already structurally marginalised community. Most of those executed come from contexts of deep poverty, limited access to legal services, and persistent institutional discrimination. Proceedings against them have been consistently characterised by expedited trials, restricted access to counsel, and reliance on contested confessions. [2] [4]\n

VI. Social Impact and the Silencing of Civil Society<\/p>\n

The cumulative effect of mass executions and arbitrary detention extends far beyond those directly targeted. Human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists who document or challenge these abuses face arrest, criminal prosecution, and professional restrictions. Public executions \u2014 and executions publicised by state-affiliated media \u2014 normalise state violence and function as instruments of collective deterrence directed at society as a whole.<\/p>\n

Families of executed individuals carry a particular burden. Before execution, relatives of death row prisoners endure prolonged uncertainty, without access to reliable information about proceedings or whereabouts. After execution, they continue to be silenced: documented testimonies describe intimidation, security summonses, restrictions on funeral gatherings, and in some cases the compelled signing of undertakings limiting public statements. Victims\u2019 families and human rights defenders continue to face major obstacles in accessing information, judicial remedies, or any official recognition of the violations committed against their relatives. [1]\n

VII. Impunity and International Responsibility<\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite persistent and well-documented reports of torture, enforced disappearances, forced confessions, and fair trial violations, no independent or transparent investigation has been initiated into officials implicated in these practices. Existing national mechanisms lack both the independence and the capacity required to ensure genuine accountability. Impunity is not a gap in the system \u2014 it is a structural feature of it, and it continues to fuel further violations.<\/p>\n

The Human Rights Council and Member States must urgently strengthen their response. International monitoring bodies require greater support to collect, preserve, and analyse evidence of violations. The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions should give sustained priority to Iran \u2014 with specific attention to the unprecedented rate of executions, the systematic use of forced confessions, mass arrests in connection with protests, and the documented vulnerability of ethnic and national minorities. Member States should support initiatives to reinforce international fact-finding and accountability mechanisms. Silence in the face of a state that deploys the death penalty as an instrument of political control is not a neutral position: it enables the continuation of these crimes.<\/p>\n

VIII. Recommendations<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Human Rights Council should call upon the Iranian authorities to immediately:<\/p>\n

\u2013 Establish a moratorium on executions with a view to the full abolition of the death penalty;<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2013 Guarantee the right to a fair trial and immediate access to independent legal counsel from the moment of arrest;<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2013 End the use of forced confessions and initiate independent investigations into all allegations of torture and enforced disappearances;<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2013 Cease the use of vague national security charges against civic activists, journalists, human rights defenders, and members of ethnic and religious minorities;<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2013 Ensure the effective protection of victims\u2019 families, lawyers, and human rights defenders from reprisals and intimidation;<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2013 Allow full and effective access to all relevant international human rights mechanisms and cooperate unconditionally with United Nations Special Procedures.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sources
\n[1] Zagros Human Rights Center \u2014 documentation and reports on executions and human rights violations in Iran, 2026.
\n[2] Local Iranian documentation networks \u2014 reports on human rights violations and testimonies from detainees\u2019 families, January\u2013May 2026.
\n[3] Local Kurdish reports \u2014 political prisoners and death sentences in the Kurdish provinces of Iran, 2026, including Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN).
\n[4] Local documentation \u2014 executions in Baluchi regions and proceedings linked to drug-related charges, 2026.
\n[5] Campaign to Free Political Prisoners in Iran (CFPPI) and Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI) \u2014 information and analyses on political prisoners and death sentences in Iran, 2026. Available at: https:\/\/cfppi.org<\/a><\/p>\n

https:\/\/documents.un.org\/api\/symbol\/access?s=A\/HRC\/62\/NGO\/217&Lang=E<\/a><\/p>\n