A/HRC/55/CRP.1
19 March 2024
English only
Human Rights Council
Fifty fifth session
Summary
The present conference room paper contains the comprehensive and detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, under international human rights law and, as applicable, crimes under international law. In its report (A/HRC/55/67) the Mission outlined its findings in the context of the protests that began on 16 September 2022, in what became known as the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement, especially with respect to women and children. This conference room paper provides contextual, factual, and legal analysis, on the egregious human rights violations committed against the protesters, including on the use of force, arrests and detentions, treatment in detention, digital space and legal proceedings related to the protests, as well as on the custodial death of Jina Mahsa Amini which triggered the protest movement. It concludes with an assessment of State responsibility for the violations established, and recommendations, including on accountability and reparations.
The Mission found that State authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran were responsible for serious human rights violations in connection with the protests that broke out on 16 September 2022. These include unlawful deaths, extra-judicial executions, unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment, rape, and sexual violence, enforced disappearances and gender persecution. Many of these serious violations of human rights amount to crimes against humanity, specifically those of murder, imprisonment, torture, and rape, and also persecution on the grounds of gender, intersecting with ethnicity and religion. These acts were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, namely women, girls and others expressing support for human rights.
Triggered by the death of the 22-year-old Iranian-Kurdish woman Jina Mahsa Amini, in the custody of the âmorality policeâ, the protests shook the Islamic Republic of Iran in an unprecedented manner in terms of their scale, reach and longevity, as well as the Stateâs violent response.
Ms. Amini was arrested on the evening of 13 September 2022 in Tehran and taken into the custody of the âmorality policeâ for what authorities perceived to be her wearing of âimproper hijabâ. That night, she was admitted to hospital brain-dead, and pronounced dead on 16 September 2022, three days later. The Missionâs investigations found that her arrest and detention were based on laws and policies governing the mandatory hijab that fundamentally discriminate against women and girls, and are not permissible under international human rights law. Based on the evidence, and patterns of violence by the âmorality policeâ in enforcing this law against women, the Mission is satisfied that Ms. Amini was subjected to physical violence that led to her death. On that basis, the State bears responsibility for her unlawful death.
The custodial death of Jina Mahsa Amini was a stark reminder of decades-long discrimination and violence against women in Iran. This was further evidenced by the images of countless courageous women and girls joining the demonstrations, and removing their hijabs in public, despite real risks to their safety, in order to protest the institutionalised discrimination which has for decades affected virtually every aspect of their lives. The protests galvanized strong societal support, including from men and young people, and from across diverse professional, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds, articulating long-standing grievances and demands for social and political reform.
The Government sought to repress the protests at any cost. The Mission established a pattern of the security forces shooting protesters with assault weapons, resulting in credible figures of up to 551 deaths among them at least 49 women and 68 children, in 26 out of the 31 provinces in Iran, in largely peaceful protests. Security forces used particularly brutal and militarized violence, causing higher numbers of deaths, in regions with minority populations, in particular in Sistan and Baluchestan province, the Kurdish regions of the country (Kurdistan and Kermanshah) and parts of Western Azerbaijan. On just one day, 30 September, 2022, âBloody Fridayâ, 104 people were killed during the protests following Friday prayers in Zahedan city, Sistan and Baluchestan province. The Mission found that the security forces had resorted to unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force, killing and injuring protesters who posed no imminent threat of death or serious injury, thereby committing unlawful and extrajudicial executions. The Mission acknowledged the Governmentâs claim that members of the security forces had been killed during the protests but despite detailed inquiries, never received any specific information in response.
Hundreds of people were injured during this wave of protests. The Mission established a pattern of security forces targeting the vital body parts of protesters and bystanders, including in the face, heads, neck, torso, and genital area, with firearms such as assault rifles, and weapons loaded with metal pellets.
A vicious pattern of ocular injuries inflicted by security forces on protesters and bystanders, including women and children, also emerged. Such injuries resulted in the partial or full loss of their eyesight, impacting their physical and mental health and, regarding children, their education. These distinctive injuries effectively âbrandedâ them for life as protesters and prevented many from seeking immediate medical care due to fears of arrest and criminal prosecution. Many were able to do so only after they left Iran, and having already developed serious infections, including recurrent ocular bleeding.
Security forces arrested protesters arbitrarily for a range of protected conduct, such as dancing, chanting, or writing slogans on walls and honking car horns. Beyond protest sites, some women were also arrested at their homes for participating in protests, suggesting that surveillance had been used to identify them. Women human rights defenders and those perceived as playing prominent roles in the protests were arrested or summoned to serve previously suspended sentences to prevent them from attending protests.
Upon arrest, security forces transferred protesters en masse in a coordinated manner to unofficial facilities. Detained protesters were held in inhuman conditions, and in solitary confinement for days. Many were deprived of contact with the outside world, and not allowed to contact a lawyer or their families for days and weeks, in conditions amounting to enforced disappearance. To extract confessions, punish and humiliate detained women, girls, men and boys, security officers subjected them to sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, gang rape, rape with an object, and forced nudity, as well as beatings, flogging and burning, the use of electric shocks, suspension, and stress positions, in acts amounting to torture. Security forces also equated womenâs participation in protests with their âwillingness to get nakedâ and characterised the gender-based violence inflicted on them as justified and being âthe freedom they wantedâ. Detained LGBTQI+ persons were subjected to similar abuse, forcibly undressed to check if they were âa boy or a girlâ and questioned on their sexuality.
Children were not spared from these brutal acts of violence. Girls and boys were arbitrarily arrested and detained during protests, often taken to unknown locations, leaving their parents to desperately search for them across police stations. In detention, they were held along with adult detainees, and several were subjected to severe physical, psychological and sexual torture, including rape.
The trials that followed these arrests and detentions were marred with multiple serious violations of fair trial guarantees. Most persons tried in connection with the protests were brought before Revolutionary Courts, where fair trial violations were further exacerbated, given the procedures applicable to national security offenses including additional restrictions regarding access to a lawyer, casefile material and even copies of judgments. Many detainees were tried in haste and behind closed doors. Judges manifested clear bias against protesters, relied on torture-tainted evidence, systematically dismissed complaints of rape, torture and ill-treatment, limited their access to a lawyer to a State-approved list, raising additional concerns over their independence. Protesters were also sentenced for expressing ideas and solidarity, and other forms of expression and conduct that are protected under international human rights law, including on vague charges of âcorruption on earthâ and âwaging war against Godâ.
At least nine young men were arbitrarily executed by January 2024, following hasty and flawed proceedings that disregarded basic fair trial and due process guarantees, creating terror among other protesters, and amounting to unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of their right to life and violations of the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment. By January 2024, Iranian courts had pronounced at least 26 death sentences against persons in relation to the protests.
The suppression of protesters was not limited to their acts in public spaces. Beyond the use of force against protesters, the Government also sought to suppress their speech and expression online, by monitoring and surveillance as well as intimidation of defenders on social media, and through internet shutdowns. Thus, the Government sought to quell all avenues of dissent, including in the digital space.
Acts of defiance did not decrease, however. Though large protests subsided after December 2022, online and offline acts of defiance by countless women and girls multiplied. In response, State authorities increased repressive measures to force women and girls into compliance, including by introducing repressive new draft laws, such as the Hijab and Chastity Bill, seeking to expand methods of enforcement of the mandatory hijab laws. These sought to expand the scope for criminal prosecution of women found to be non-compliant with the mandatory hijab and to coerce private individuals and businesses to enhance monitoring and ensure compliance. Women public figures and influencers with the ability to broadly influence, were punished harshly, including through court-mandated flogging and psychiatric intervention aimed at âcorrectingâ womenâs behaviour and appearance to enforce compliance. The Mission also received chilling reports of the use of artificial intelligence to monitor the movements of women who do not comply with the mandatory hijab, and reports of their being denied access to basic services, including in hospitals and courts, and to opportunities such as jobs in government or even in private offices.
A year and a half on since the start of the protests, accountability remains elusive for victims. The Government of Iran continues to take concerted measures to silence victims and families who tirelessly continue to seek truth and a modicum of justice. Security forces systematically threatened, intimidated, assaulted, or arrested family members who spoke out to demand justice, or denied their right to mourn their loved ones. Those supporting them, including lawyers and journalists, were also routinely arrested, and prosecuted.
For these reasons, the Mission underscores the need for accountability for the victims and their families, both at the domestic level in Iran, as well as by Member States who should exercise universal jurisdiction with respect to all crimes under international law without procedural limitations, as well as with respect to human rights violations in Iran described in the present document. Member States should also explore transformative reparations for victims, including through restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.
I. Introduction and contextual framework 6
A. Mandate 7
B. Engagement, cooperation and challenges 9
C. Methodology 11
D. Applicable legal framework 14
II. Socio- economic and cultural context and institutional framework 21
A. Historical overview of protest movements in Iran 21
B. Socio- cultural context 28
C. Economic context 31
D. Security context 33
E. Institutional framework 35
III. The death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini 52
A. Chronology and factual reconstruction of the events that led to the death of Jina Mahsa Amini 52
B. State response and investigations 56
C. Pursuit of truth and justice 59
D. Legal findings 61
IV. Context- the human rights situation of women and girls in Iran 64
A. Key aspects of structural and institutionalized discrimination and inequality in law and practice 68
B. Key features of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement 101
V. Repression of protests 102
A. Use of force 106
B. Arrests and detention in the context of the protests 153
C. Treatment and conditions in detention 167
D. Trials of individuals in connection with the protests 202
E. The use of the death penalty in the context of the protests 229
VI. Impact of the protests on ethnic and religious minorities 249
A. Legal framework 250
B. Structural factors underpinning marginalisation and discrimination in minority regions 251
C. Treatment of ethnic and religious minorities in the context of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests 261
VII. Digital space and the protests 286
A. Introduction 286
B. International legal framework 287
C. Lack of legal protection under domestic law 288
D. Internet shutdowns and restrictions to social media platforms and communication services 291
E. Surveillance and criminalisation of online expression 299
F. Use of surveillance technologies against the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement 304
G. Digital rights and gender 306
H. Findings 309
VIII. Repression of women and girls defying the mandatory hijab laws 310
A. Lack of protection under domestic law 311
B. Intensified crackdown on women and girls defying the mandatory hijab laws 320
C. Findings 332
IX. Repression of students and schoolgirls 334
A. Repression of students 334
B. Repression of schoolgirls: The âschool poisoningsâ 341
X. Repression linked to the protests and support for the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement 358
A. Legal framework 358
B. Groups targeted for protected expression and association 360
C. Groups targeted for seeking truth, justice and accountability 382
D. Other groups targeted 399
E. Overall findings 403
XI. Accountability 404
A. International Human Rights Law Violations 404
B. Crimes under international law 406
C. Persecution under international law 415
D. Responsibility 430
E. Victimsâ rights to equality, truth, justice and reparations 449
XII. Conclusions 474
XIII. Recommendations 477
A. To the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran: 477
B. Recommendations to Member States 478
C. Recommendations to the UN human rights system, including the Human Rights Council 479
D. Recommendations to the private sector 479
Annexes 481
I. Correspondence with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 481
II. Medical Conclusions on the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini 575
I. Introduction and contextual framework
1. On 22 November 2022, the Human Rights Council convened a special session and adopted Resolution S-35/1 on the deteriorating situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially with respect to women and children, and established the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran (hereinafter âthe Missionâ or âthe FFMâ).
2. In its resolution, the Human Rights Council expressed concerns about the violent crackdown on peaceful protests by security forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter âIranâ) following the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini, a young woman arrested for allegedly violating the countryâs mandatory hijab laws.
3. On 20 December 2022, the President of the Council appointed Sara Hossain (Bangladesh) as Chair, and Shaheen Sardar Ali (Pakistan) and Viviana Krsticevic (Argentina) as Members.
4. The Mission presented an oral update to the Human Rights Council on 5 July 2023 at its fifty-third session, providing an overview of human rights concerns and its preliminary observations regarding areas under investigation.
5. The main findings and recommendations of the Mission are contained in document A/HRC/55/67. The present extended conference room paper A/HRC/67/CRP.1 contains a more detailed description of its findings with respect to the patterns and incidents of human rights violations and potential crimes under international law investigated, as well as a full factual and legal analysis, with supporting information underpinning document A/HRC/55/67. Given the emphasis in resolution S-35/1 on the need to ensure accountability, the Mission sought to identify those responsible for human rights violations and crimes under international law and the linkages between these crimes and those responsible, including patterns in conduct, command structures, control and discipline.
6. The Mission is supported by a secretariat of professional staff recruited by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and consisting of a coordinator, five human rights investigators (including on open source and on sexual and gender-based violence), a child rights expert, a gender adviser, an analyst and reporting officer, a legal adviser, a political adviser, an information-management officer, a security adviser, a communications officer, two translators, and an administrative support staff. The OHCHR provided start-up support pending the recruitment of the Secretariat staff. By April 2023, the majority of the posts were filled, and the Secretariat was operational. Some important positions took considerably longer to recruit, while others were subsequently subject to the temporary regular budget hiring freeze imposed on the UN Secretariat in August 2023. The Mission expresses its gratitude to OHCHR for its support, as well as to UN Women for their secondment of gender expertise to the Secretariat.
7. Throughout the mandate, the Mission undertook a wide range of consultations with victims, civil society representatives, legal and medical experts and academics. In the wake of the one-year anniversary of Jina Mahsa Aminiâs death in custody, the Mission held two roundtables with victims and civil society representatives on the themes of freedom of expression and assembly in Iran and the impact of the protests on women and girls. In November 2023, the Mission undertook a visit to Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands where it engaged with various Government officials, legal experts, academics, civil society organizations and people who had recently fled Iran, with a view to informing its analysis and recommendations. Requests to visit countries neighbouring Iran regrettably remained unanswered.
8. The establishment of the Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran constitutes a critical step towards ensuring truth and accountability for human rights violations in Iran, linked to the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement and beyond. This report and its findings should also be considered in light of long-standing concerns expressed, and calls for accountability made, by consecutive United Nations Secretaries-General, High Commissioners for Human Rights, and UN Special Procedures, including the Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
A. Mandate
1. Origin of the mandate
9. The situation of human rights in Iran has been under close scrutiny by the United Nations since the early 1980s. From 1979 to 1985, concerns about the situation of human rights in Iran led to the adoption of numerous reports and resolutions by the then-Commission on Human Rights, eventually leading to the establishment of the mandate of the first Special Representative of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on Iran in 1984. The mandate of Special Representative was discontinued in April 2002 when Iran committed to extend a standing invitation to all thematic Special Procedures mandates. From 2003 to 2005, five thematic mandate-holders visited Iran. While the General Assembly continued to adopt resolutions on Iran, no report on the situation of human rights in Iran was presented by the Secretary-General until 2009. In 2011, following the persistent refusal of Iran to accept visits from thematic rapporteurs, as well as reported human rights violations committed in 2009, in the context of post-electoral protests across the country, the Special Procedure country mandate was reinstated. Since 2011, four reports in total are presented each year between the United Nations Secretary-General and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. An annual resolution is also adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Human Rights Council respectively. While the situation of human rights in Iran has been under close scrutiny by the United Nations for nearly five decades, the mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission on Iran is the first time that it has been the subject of an international and independent human rights investigation.
2. Interpretation of the mandate
10. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution S-35/1, the Mission was established with the mandate to:
(a) Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.
(b) Establish the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violations.
(c) Collect, consolidate and analyse evidence of such violations and preserve evidence, including in view of cooperation in any legal proceedings.
(d) Engage with all relevant stakeholders, including the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, relevant United Nations entities, human rights organizations and civil society.
11. Following the best practice of other investigative mechanisms, the Mission published its terms of reference in July 2023, as set out below.
Material scope
12. Resolution S-35/1, paragraph 7 provides for the mandate to investigate âalleged human rights violationsâ in the Islamic Republic of Iran ârelated to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and childrenâ and âto establish the facts and circumstances surroundingâ such alleged violations.
13. The Mission examined civil and political rights alongside economic, social and cultural rights as they pertain to the protests that began on 16 September 2022. In accordance with the resolution, the Mission considered all human rights violations by State agents or entities who are covered by international and national law, including violations that may amount, under certain circumstances, to a crime under international law.
14. In the context of its mandate to establish facts and circumstances surrounding the violations, the Mission endeavoured to identify root causes and consequences of the violations, as well as those responsible, and to make findings on measures for prevention, protection, to ensure accountability and the victimsâ right to justice, truth and reparations. It made recommendations to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to Member States, the UN human rights system and the private sector on measures to increase the respect and protection of human rights, to promote equality, truth, and justice and to support the design and implementation of reparations.
15. As part of its mandate to establish the facts and circumstances surrounding violations of human rights related to the protests, the Mission examined, inter alia, gender-discriminatory laws, policies and practices that affect all aspects of the lives of women and girls, underpin violations and impact on specific groups in the population. The Fact-Finding Mission examined the allegations of human rights violations perpetrated against, and affecting, women and children, conducted a gender and child sensitive analysis of the human rights violations examined and assessed their impact on women and children and the gendered dimensions of such violations. Adopting an intersectional approach, it paid special attention to discrimination on grounds of age, sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, socio-economic status, religion, ethnicity and nationality.
Temporal scope
16. Resolution S-35/1, paragraph 7 specifies that the Fact-Finding Mission is mandated to investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran ârelated to the protests that began on 16 September 2022â. The resolution further mandates the Fact-Finding Mission to establish âthe facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violationsâ. Investigations conducted by the Fact-Finding Mission therefore included of facts and circumstances that gave context or provided valuable analysis related to the root causes of the protest-related violence, provided that they related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022.
Geographic scope
17. Resolution S-35/1 lays out the geographic scope of the Fact-Finding Mission to investigate alleged human rights violations âin the Islamic Republic of Iranâ related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022. The Fact-Finding Mission thus investigated any such alleged human rights violations that are directly linked to events or actions that occurred in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran and established the facts and circumstances surrounding such allegations.
Mandate of collection, consolidation and preservation of information and evidence in view of possible cooperation with any legal proceedings
18. In fulfilment of this mandate, the Fact-Finding Mission collected, consolidated, analysed and preserved information and evidence of violations.
19. Consistent with relevant standards and methodology, the Fact-Finding Mission sought access to and engaged with a range of stakeholders to collect information and evidence. The Fact-Finding Mission organized, assessed and structured, as applicable, the information and evidence in its possession, including with a view to facilitating cooperation in any legal proceedings consistent with international standards, whether at national, regional or international levels. The Fact-Finding Mission applied all due guarantees in preserving, handling and storing information and the evidence it gathered, including all due guarantees of security and confidentiality and respect for the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, and ensured, to the maximum extent possible, an uninterrupted chain of custody, as necessary for the implementation of its mandate. All information gathered by the Mission was stored on safe platforms with strict and controlled access, applying best practices on digital security.
20. With respect to the collection, consolidation, analysis and preservation of information and evidence in view of possible cooperation with any legal proceedings. the Mission among other factors, considered and respected the scope of consent expressed by sources, the confidentiality of the information and evidence and the rights of victims and witnesses, alongside other factors applicable to sensitive information held by the United Nations. It assessed any protection and other relevant risks and concerns that may arise from the use of such information and evidence, applying gender and child competent, and victim-centred approaches. Furthermore, information and evidence is shared only with authorities and bodies, acting in accordance with international law standards, that credibly ensure and demonstrate that any use of such information and evidence is in accordance with international human rights law and standards, inter alia, the right to a fair trial and the rights of victims and witness protection. Consistent with United Nations policy, the Mission does not share information and evidence for use in criminal proceedings in which capital punishment could be imposed or carried out.
B. Engagement, cooperation and challenges
1. Engagement with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
21. The Human Rights Council requested the Fact-Finding Mission âto engage with all relevant stakeholders, including the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, relevant United Nations entities, human rights organizations and civil society.â It called upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to âcooperate fully with the Fact-Finding Mission, to grant unhindered access to the country without any delay and to provide the members of the Fact-Finding Mission with all information necessary to allow for the proper fulfilment of their mandateâ.
22. On 30 January 2023, the Mission requested the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for access to the country to meet with all concerned stakeholders, to receive any pertinent information and hear first-hand their evaluation of the evolving situation. The request for access to the country was repeated subsequently in numerous letters sent to the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations in Geneva, all of which went unanswered, depriving the Mission of first-hand interactions with key Government officials.
23. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, early on, rejected the mandate and indicated its intention not to cooperate. The Mission regrets the lack of meaningful cooperation from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite the multiple appeals made by the Human Rights Council, the United Nations Secretary-General and the Mission itself.
24. With a view to providing an opportunity to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide information on the areas under investigation, the Mission sent 21 letters to the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva (See Annex 1). Each time its members travelled to Geneva, the Mission requested a meeting with the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland. As noted, the Mission received no official response to its letters, including those requesting information or formal meetings with the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva. In order to elicit the views of the Government, the Mission therefore accessed through public channels and archives of UN human rights bodies 39 reports issued by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the 2022 protests, and its responses to specific cases.
25. Further, on 4 July 2023 and 29 January 2024 the Mission held virtual exchanges of views with the âSpecial Committee to investigate the 2022 unrestsâ (hereinafter “Special Committeeâ) established by the President of Iran. In addition, there was an exchange of correspondence between the Mission and the Special Committee regarding their composition, mandate and ongoing work. The Mission shared a draft of its main findings and recommendations with the Government prior to public release, providing the latter with an opportunity review the report ahead of its publication.
2. Cooperation with victims and witnesses
26. In March 2023, the Mission issued a call for written submissions in English, Persian and Kurdish from non-governmental and other organizations, victims and individuals interested in bringing information to its attention. It received 295 submissions through this call. The Mission is grateful to all the victims and witnesses who shared their stories and experiences with the Mission despite risks to themselves or their family members.
3. Cooperation with other stakeholders, including the UN human rights system
27. The Mission also exchanged information and held meetings with United Nations Member States, United Nations agencies, departments, and bodies as well as United Nations human rights mechanisms in relation to its investigations. It held numerous consultations with specialised NGOs and legal and other experts with knowledge of the events under investigation and related facts and circumstances. In this respect, the Mission also engaged with the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran and adopted an approach of complementarity, with respect to its focus on investigation within the terms of its mandate activities. The Mission expresses its gratitude to all those who engaged with the Mission and provided valuable contributions, including information and evidence, in particular to civil society organizations for their documentation of allegations of human rights violations and support to victims.
4. Challenges faced by the Mission
28. Significant constraints affected the Missionâs ability to gather information. The Mission regrets that it was not able to enter Iran, despite having sent repeated requests for permission to the Government of Iran. The Mission also faced constraints because of the restrictions imposed by the Government on online communications, affecting landlines and mobile networks, heightened electronic surveillance generally, and against human rights defenders in particular, and confiscations of electronic devices of high-profile individuals linked to the protests, including for purposes of verifying contacts with outside interlocutors. Victims, witnesses and their families inside and outside the country have been subjected to harassment and intimidations and many were afraid to speak with the Mission, even on a confidential basis, because they feared repercussions for themselves, or their family members based on their experiences and those of others within their communities. The pervasive fear of such repercussions deterred many people from engaging with the Mission.
29. Despite the above constraints, the Mission was able to gather sufficient information to enable findings to be made based on the standard of proof applicable and standard methodological requirements. The Mission stresses that the findings in this document, while well founded are non-exhaustive, taking into account the time frame of the investigation and the limitations placed on the development of our mandate. With additional time, further investigations could help document several of the areas within the scope of the mandate, where the Mission found indicia of the commission of grave human rights violations, and crimes under international law in the context of the protests that began in Iran on 16 September 2022 and beyond. Moreover, it could also help strengthen and complete its mandate to âcollect, consolidate and analyse evidence of such violations and preserve evidence, including in view of cooperation in any legal proceedingsâ increasing the possibility for victims to secure equality, truth, justice, and reparations.
C. Methodology
1. Investigation methodology
30. The Mission followed the best practices established for commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions, outlined in the 2015 OHCHR publication entitled International Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law â Guidance and Practice, and ensured that the principles of âdo no harmâ, independence, impartiality, objectivity, transparency, and integrity were strictly adhered to at all stages of its work.
31. The Mission considered the following primary sources of information: in-depth interviews with victims and eyewitnesses, verified digital information including photographs and videos, satellite imagery, recordings made by witnesses to events, medical reports, and judicial documents, including court documents, decrees, laws, regulations and directives issued by the Government; and publicly available, official statements, including statements made through State media outlets. Primary sources also include interviews with victims and witnesses conducted by reputable human rights organizations where the Mission was able to assess the methodology used by the organizations in question, to obtain, with the prerequisite consent, the statements/interviews and to authenticate them through direct contact with the concerned victims and witnesses. The Mission interviewed 134 victims and witnesses, including 48 women, one girl child and 85 men. The Mission also interviewed family members, lawyers, private sector actors, medical doctors, and representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with direct knowledge of the areas under investigation.
32. The Mission also collected information from secondary sources. Where the Mission relied upon information contained in secondary sources, such as reports, for corroborative purposes it sought to discuss the methodology, findings, and/or analysis with the author whenever possible. The Mission also sought expert analysis on medical and forensics, sexual and gender-based violence, child psychology, security, and technology related issues.
33. The Mission collected, reviewed and analysed information drawn from a variety of open sources, namely social media, news and media outlets, blogs and press releases. This information was used as both a basis for further investigations and to corroborate and verify information provided to the Mission through traditional human rights investigative practices, such as interviews with victims and witnesses. The Mission ensured that the authenticity, veracity and credibility of open sources was established through best practices of current open-source analytical methods. Findings were made using only those materials that the Mission was able to authenticate.
34. The Mission prioritized incidents of alleged violations for examination using criteria such as the gravity of allegations of violations; their significance in demonstrating patterns; access to victims, witnesses and supporting documentation; and the geographic locations of the incidents.
2. Standard of proof
35. Consistent with the practice of United Nations fact-finding bodies, the Mission employed the âreasonable groundsâ standard in making factual determinations on individual cases, incidents and patterns of conduct. This standard is met when, based on a body of verified information, an objective and ordinary prudent observer has reasonable grounds to conclude that the facts took place as described and, where legal conclusions are drawn, that these facts meet all the elements of a human rights violation and, as applicable, of crimes under international law. While the âreasonable grounds to believeâ standard of proof is lower than the standard normally required in criminal proceedings to achieve a conviction, it is considered sufficient to call for further investigations by a competent authority.
36. The Mission followed the established methodology for this standard of proof of requiring at least one credible direct source of information, independently corroborated by at least one or more additional credible sources of information, to consider individual incidents and patterns established and to reach factual conclusions. In cases where there was only a single credible direct source for an incident, if the incident fitted a pattern of incidents established by the Mission and for which it could identify similarities in various fields, such as the methods or modus operandi, the location, and/or the perpetrators, the Mission relied on corroboration by pattern.
37. Accordingly, the Mission has included in the present document and submitted to the Council incidents, patterns and legal findings, which meet the âreasonable grounds to believeâ standard. The Mission also refers to âcredibleâ reports or information where it has assessed the information as valid and the source as reliable and credible but has not been able to establish a fact on reasonable grounds to believe.
3. Victim-centred approach
38. The Mission strictly adhered to the principles and standards of fact-finding aimed at assuring the safety, security and well-being of victims and witnesses. The present document therefore includes information only where the sources of such information granted informed consent and where disclosure would not lead to any identification or result in harm to the source concerned.
39. In all its interactions, the Mission ensured that the perspectives, rights, needs, safety, dignity and emotional well-being of victims and witnesses were duly respected and sought to avoid their re-traumatization. The Mission also sought to capture the experiences and perspectives of victims and to duly reflect them in this document as illustrative examples. In line with existing United Nations policies on information sensitivity, classification and handling, information provided by witnesses and other confidential materials have been classified as strictly confidential and the Personally Identifiable Data (PID) of those concerned have therefore been withheld from the report in order to ensure victim and witness protection. These names are retained on a strictly confidential basis by OHCHR. Due to protection concerns, victims and witnesses declined to avail themselves of United Nationsâ procedures for the protection of human rights, but provided consent for the public use of their testimony as long as it was anonymized and identifying elements were not disclosed. Names and details of those concerned have been withheld due to fear of reprisals.
40. The Mission paid specific attention to the protection of victims and witnesses. Its initial protection assessment indicated that individuals who speak out about the human rights situation in Iran and who engage with United Nations mechanisms have been subject to reprisals. Significantly, in August 2023, the United Nations Secretary-General indicated that multiple United Nations actors had noted the shrinking of civic space, including undue State restrictions over digital space, and continuing repression and violence targeting civil society, lawyers, and journalists since the start of the protests in September 2022 inside and outside the country. The report notes that this context amplified the risks of engaging with the United Nations, including this Mission, leading to self-censorship on the part of many.
41. The Mission was therefore extremely cautious in all interactions with victims and witnesses, making constant assessments with respect to the need to establish contact with persons who could be placed at risk as a result, while respecting the individual agency of victims and witnesses who expressed their desire to share their accounts or information with the Mission. It established strict security protocols to guide these interactions and to ensure that they were conducted through means to mitigate risks. Contacts were not pursued if the Mission could not ensure the safety of the cooperating person, if the risk of harm was assessed to be too high, or if the Mission did not have sufficient information to make an informed determination on the level of risk involved in connection with such contacts.
4. Women and child rights focus and intersectional perspectives approaches
42. In accordance with the strong focus placed by the Human Rights Council on the situation of women and children, the Mission addressed the human rights violations perpetrated against, and affecting, women and children, during the protests and subsequent events, including discrimination, unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, executions, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, violations of the right to protest and freedom of expression, denial of fair trials, violations of the right to education, and infringement of the right to privacy, amongst others. The Mission also conducted a gender and child sensitive analysis of the human rights violations examined and assessed their specific impact on women and children and the gendered dimensions of such violations. It established the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violations. In doing so, it examined discriminatory laws and practices, in particular those that affect all aspects of womenâs and childrenâs lives and underpin violations and exacerbate the impact of violations. In addition to the general principles that guided the Missionâs work, when engaging with children, the principles of non-discrimination, right to life, development and survival, the best interest of the child and respect for the child`s views, were taken into consideration at all times.
43. The Mission also adopted an intersectional approach and examined the issue of discrimination on grounds of age, sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, socio-economic status, religion and ethnicity. Particular attention was also given to alleged violations of the rights of groups that have faced discrimination, exclusion and marginalization and the nature and extent of the impact and effect of such violations in the context of the protests that started on 16 September 2022.
D. Applicable legal framework
44. Facts were assessed in light of international law as applicable to Iran, including human rights law and international criminal law. The Mission also considered the rights guarantees under the domestic law of Iran, including Iranâs Constitution.
1. International Human Rights Law
45. Iran is bound by the United Nations Charter and the pledge to take action for the achievement of âuniversal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religionâ. Regardless of the extent to which Iran has ratified specific human rights treaties, it must respect internationally recognised human rights under customary law.
(a) Treaty Law
46. As of 1st March 2024, Iran has ratified five of the core United Nations human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Iran has also ratified the two optional protocols to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.
47. States parties to the ICCPR are under the general obligation to respect the Covenant rights and to ensure them to all individuals in their territory and subject to their jurisdiction âwithout distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property birth or other statusâ. The Human Rights Committee noted that this means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if not situated within its territory. The obligations of the Covenant are binding on every State party as a whole as all branches of government – executive, legislative and judicial – and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level national, regional or local, are in a position to engage the responsibility of the State party..
48. The legal obligation under ICCPR article 2 (1) is both negative and positive in nature. States parties must respect the rights enshrined in the ICCPR, that is, they must refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of the rights recognized by the Covenant, and any restrictions on any of those rights must be permissible under the relevant provisions of the Covenant. Where such restrictions are made, States must demonstrate their necessity and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights. Under the duty to protect, States must actively ensure that persons within their jurisdiction do not suffer from human rights abuses committed by others. Limitations and derogations under IHRL cannot involve discrimination based on race, sex, language, religion, social origin, among others. Article 2 also requires that States parties adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educational and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal obligations.
The ICESCR requires States parties to undertake steps, to the maximum of their available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. These include the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the right to work, the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, the right to social security, the right to education, and the right to take part in cultural life. States Parties to Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (article 2 (2)). They also undertake to ensure the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant (article 3).
49. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers that non-discrimination is an immediate and cross-cutting obligation in the Covenant and that article 2, paragraph 2, requires States parties to guarantee non-discrimination on in the exercise of each of the economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Covenant and can only be applied in conjunction with these rights. It notes that discrimination constitutes any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of Covenant rights. It further notes that States parties need to adopt an active approach to eliminating systemic discrimination and segregation in practice and thatâ[t]ackling such discrimination will usually require a comprehensive approach with a range of laws, policies and programmes, including temporary special measures.â
50. The preamble of the CRC recalls that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance. Under the CRC, a State party is under the obligation to respect and ensure the rights of children, meaning all persons under the age of 18 years, to non- discrimination (article 2). As a State party to the CRC, Iran has the obligation to respect and ensure the rights set forth in the Convention to each child within its jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status (article 2 (1)). Iran must take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members (article 2 (2)). Children also have the right to have their best interests taken as a primary consideration (article 3 (1)), to life, survival and development (article 6) as well as their right to be heard. Children also enjoy the rights to express their views freely in âall matters affecting the childâ, those views being given due weight (article 12), to freedom of expression, to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and to freedom of association and peaceful assembly (articles 13 to 15). Children have the right to protection from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury and abuse, including sexual abuse (article 19), to the highest attainable standard of health (article 24), to education (article 28), and the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, not to be sentenced to capital punishment and to be protected from unlawful or arbitrary arrest, detention or imprisonment (article 37).
51. Article 4 of the CRC requires States parties to take âall appropriate legislative, administrative and other measuresâ for implementation of the rights contained therein. The Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment 5 noted the utmost importance of fully aligning any domestic legislation with the provisions and principles of the Convention and making the latter directly and appropriately enforceable in the domestic system. As the primary duty bearer for the implementation of the obligations under the Convention, the responsibility to seek and engage all relevant sectors of the society including children themselves is incumbent upon the State.
52. In addition, the Committee on the Rights of the Child identified a wide range of measures that are needed for effective implementation of Convention rights, including the development of special structures and monitoring, training and other activities in Government, parliament and the judiciary at all levels. The Committee in its General Comment 5 underscored the development of a childrenâs rights perspective in respect of measures required for effective implementation of the Convention and in particular those provisions identified by the Committee as general principles (articles 2, 3, 6 and 12).
53. States parties to the ICERD condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races. In particular, they undertake to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation. They also undertake to prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization (article 2). Racial discrimination is defined as distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life (article 1).
54. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination notes that racial discrimination does not always affect women and men equally or in the same way. There are circumstances in which racial discrimination only or primarily affects women, or affects women in a different way, or to a different degree than men. Such racial discrimination will often escape detection if there is no explicit recognition or acknowledgement of the different life experiences of women and men, in areas of both public and private life. The Committee also notes that: âcertain forms of racial discrimination may be directed towards women specifically because of their gender, such as sexual violence committed against women members of particular racial or ethnic groups in detention or during armed conflict; women may also be further hindered by a lack of access to remedies and complaint mechanisms for racial discrimination because of gender-related impediments, such as gender bias in the legal system and discrimination against women in private spheres of lifeâ.
55. Under the CRPD, States parties undertake to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability (article 4). Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others (article 1). As a State party to the CRPD, Iran is required to prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds (article 5.2). Discrimination can be based on a single characteristic, such as disability or gender, or on multiple and/or intersecting characteristics. âIntersectional discriminationâ occurs when a person with a disability or associated to disability suffers discrimination of any form on the basis of disability, combined with, colour, sex, language, religion, ethnic, gender or other status.
56. Upon ratification of the CRC, the Government of Iran stated therein: âreserves the right not to apply any provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international legislation in effectâ. Equally, upon ratification of the CRPD, Iran made the following declaration: âwith regard to Article 46, the Islamic Republic of Iran declares that it does not consider itself bound by any provisions of the Convention, which may be incompatible with its applicable rules.â CRPD Article 46 provides that reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted. This article mirrors the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, applicable to both the CRC and CRPD, which provides that a State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
57. In relation to the reservation to the CRC and the declaration to the CRPD, it is worth noting that Iran has consented to be bound by the obligations articulated in these treaties and accepted that domestic laws and practice cannot be invoked to justify a failure to comply. Furthermore, under international law, a reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty if it affects an essential element of the treaty that is necessary to its general thrust, in such a way that the reservation impairs the raison dâĂȘtre of the treaty. The general nature of Iranâs reservation to the CRC and its declaration to the CRPD do not allow any determination of their scope in order to assess in particular compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. Indeed, the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its concern that the imprecise nature of Iranâs reservation to the CRC, which invokes âIslamic lawsâ in a general way, hampers the implementation of many provisions of the Convention and is not compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.
58. The Mission notes that reservations restricting the application of a human rights treaty on the basis of religious law may not be used to justify discrimination against women and children, or against religious, ethnic, and other minorities. Treaty bodies have found that similar general reservations on the purported grounds of incompatibility with the Islamic Sharia constitute an obstacle to the implementation of the relevant treaty as a whole. The Human Rights Committee considers that an unacceptable reservation will not be in effect for a reserving party and that the ICCPR will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.
59. Iran is not a party to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). While the Iranian parliament passed a bill to ratify the CEDAW in May 2003, the Guardian Council subsequently decided not to ratify CEDAW. All laws must be approved by the Guardian Council.
(b) Customary international human rights law
60. The UDHR is generally considered as an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions in the United Nations Charter. The UDHR sets out the fundamental human rights that are to be universally protected and many of its provisions, if not the document in its entirety, are reflective of customary international law. This means that States are bound by the norms captured in these provisions, regardless of whether they are codified in a binding treaty and ratified by the State concerned.
61. Some human rights provisions are also considered peremptory norms of international law, or jus cogens. These norms are accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as norms from which no derogation or limitation is permitted. It is commonly accepted that these include, inter alia, the prohibitions of the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, including rape as a form of torture, enforced disappearance, prolonged arbitrary detention, racial discrimination and apartheid, and crimes against humanity. Systematic gender discrimination has also been advanced as a peremptory norm of international law.
(C). Other instruments
62. In addition to the human rights treaties, a range of other instruments assist in understanding and delineating human rights obligations of States. These include, for example, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (âthe Mandela Rulesâ), the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (âthe Bangkok Rulesâ), the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
63. The 1979 United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms for Law Enforcement Officials provide guidance to States on the use of force and firearms by any law enforcement official. The Code of Conduct stipulates (article 3) that law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty. The Basic Principles set out the core parameters to determine the lawfulness of use of force by law enforcement personnel and establish standards for accountability and review. Any use of force by law enforcement officials should be in accordance with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, precaution and accountability. These instruments, and in particular the provisions regarding the use of force in relation to the right to life and physical integrity, are considered authoritative.
(d) Responsibility
64. Under international human rights law, States have the duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights in their territory and jurisdiction without discrimination, and are responsible for any violations committed by their organs or agents. Inherent in these duties is the obligation to guarantee the right to equality, as well as to prevent, investigate and punish the commission of violations, and to ensure that victims have accessible and effective remedies and reparations. Under certain circumstances, acts by non-State actors are attributable to a State and thus raise the responsibility of the State under international law.
65. Investigations into alleged violations must be carried out by independent and impartial bodies and be prompt, transparent, thorough and effective. A victim of any human rights violation is entitled to equal and effective access to justice, irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation; and to effective remedies, including truth, justice and adequate, effective and prompt reparation for any harm suffered.
(e) Crimes under International Law
66. Individual criminal responsibility can accrue under customary international law, where human rights violations rise to the level of crimes under international law. Such crimes include crimes against humanity, which are perpetrated when certain prohibited acts are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. International courts have interpreted the contextual elements of crimes against humanity as requiring an attack directed against any civilian population, defined as a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of prohibited acts against any civilian population; a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack, through which the State actively promotes or encourages the attack against a civilian population; that the attack be widespread or systematic, where âwidespreadâ refers to the largescale nature of the attack and the number of victims, and âsystematicâ refers to the organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random or accidental occurrence; an attack need be either widespread or systematic, not both, for the contextual element to be satisfied; a nexus between the individual act and the attack; and that the perpetrator acted with sufficient mens rea.
67. The Mission has in particular considered torture and enforced disappearance as crimes under international human rights law, as well as crimes against humanity. The Mission referred to the definitions of these crimes in the Convention against Torture, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and customary international law, as well as the interpretation of these definitions in the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. Legal conclusions are drawn where an objective and ordinary prudent observer would have reasonable grounds to conclude that the facts meet all the elements of a crime under international law.
2. Domestic law
68. Where relevant, the Mission also considered domestic law, in particular the 1979 Constitution as amended in 1989, the Islamic Penal Code and other domestic laws, and the extent to which it is in line with international human rights norms and standards.
69. Pursuant to its ratification of the ICCPR (article 2 (2)), CRC (article 3 (2)), ICERD (article 2 (1) (d)), and CRPD (article 4 (1) (a) and (b)), Iran is committed to adopting laws that give effect to the rights and protections guaranteed in these Conventions and bringing domestic laws and regulations in line with such rights and protections. By ratifying ICESCR, Iran also committed to taking steps with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures (article 2 (1)).
(a) 1979 Constitution as amended in 1989
70. The Constitution of Iran, under its Chapter III, guarantees a number of rights and fundamental freedoms. These include the right to equality, the right to life, freedom of expression, the right to privacy, freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, the rights to health care, education, adequate housing, not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, access to a court, access to a lawyer, the presumption of innocence, and not to be subjected to torture. According to article 20, all citizens ofâtheâcountry, bothâmenâandââwomen,âequallyâenjoyâtheâprotection ofâtheâlawâandâenjoyââallââhuman,âpolitical,âeconomic,âsocial,âandâculturalârights, in conformityâwithâIslamicâcriteria. According to article 21, theâGovernmentâmustâensureâtheârightsââofââwomenâinâallârespects,âinâconformityâwithâ Islamicâcriteria.
71. The Iranian constitution does not guarantee the rule of law or separation of power. The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive, functioning under the supervision of the absolute religious Leader and the Leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. Some constitutional rights provisions raise concerns including language that restricts the rights protected based on grounds not allowed under the treaties ratified by Iran, as well as for the lack of protection of several fundamental rights protected under IHRL. Article 20 of the Constitution limits equal protection of the law and the enjoyment of human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights to âcitizens of the countryâ rather than any individual on the territory or under the jurisdiction of Iran. Furthermore, several provisions are accompanied by a qualification referring to the enjoyment of the right âin conformity with Islamic criteriaâ, âprovided [it does] not violate the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republicâ, or with the exception of when it is âdetrimental to the fundamental principles of Islamâ. This applies for instance to Article 20, as well as Article 21 which refers to the rights of women, Article 26 on freedom of association and Article 27 on freedom of peaceful assembly. Equally Article 24 guarantees freedom of expression to publications and the press âexcept when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the publicâ. The Constitution does not define any of the above concepts that unduly restrict the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
72. Other provisions fall short of the protections under human rights law. While stating that torture is forbidden, Article 38 limits its definition to torture âfor the purpose of extracting confession or acquiring informationâ. It does not for instance prohibit torture for such purposes as punishment, intimidation, coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, as recognized under international human rights law. Equally, the provision does not prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment pursuant to the ICCPR (article 7).
73. Fair trial rights and due process guarantees, as well as the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the principles of non-discrimination and self-determination as enshrined in international human rights law are also not guaranteed under the Constitution.
(b) Islamic Penal Code
74. The Islamic Penal Code provides for punishments violating the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. For example, it provides for limb amputation, such as amputation of the full length of four fingers of the right hand or amputation of the left foot from the end of the knob, as well as stoning to death, crucifixion and flogging.
75. The Islamic Penal Code also provides for punishments such as shaving of the head that raise concerns in relation to the right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment, to security of person and to bodily integrity. Punishments such as banishment further raise concerns, in relation to the right to freedom of movement and not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment, to privacy and to family life.
II. Socio- economic and cultural context and institutional framework
A. Historical overview of protest movements in Iran
76. The âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement emerged against the backdrop of a long history of protest movements that have taken place in Iran since the 1977-1979 Islamic Revolution. The struggle of Iranian women and girls for their rights will be discussed in detail in Section VIII. This part of the report provides a brief overview of some of the key protest movements in recent decades, notably the protests against the Constitution which took place immediately after the Revolution, the 1999 students protests as well as the protest movements which took place in 2009, 2017-2018 and 2019. It further seeks to highlight the pattern of violent responses from State authorities to protests, impacting on civic and political space.
1. 1979-1990 – From opposition to the Constitution, to closure of political and civic space
77. In March 1979, State officials announced that a new political system, the âIslamic Republicâ had been established following a referendum ending the fifty-four-year rule of the Pahlavi dynasty. While women played a pivotal role in the Revolution participating in marches and demonstrations, the consolidation of Ayatollah Khomeiniâs power and the establishment of a theocracy was swiftly challenged by Iranian women and men from all walks of life and diverse political, ethnic and religious backgrounds. Hopes for a democratic process to prepare the future Constitution were rapidly extinguished, with the election of a smaller, cleric-dominated Assembly of Constitutional Experts in charge of preparing the Constitution. This election was met with large-scale voter boycotts from traditional political parties, and lower turnout compared to the March referendum.
78. The text of the Constitution proposed by the Assembly was considered by many as undermining national sovereignty. The main criticism focused on certain articles of the Constitution including the concept of velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the theologian (see Article 110 of the Constitution) granting unchecked power to unelected religious leaders and ultimate authority to the Supreme Leader on all State affairs. Those opposing the draft Constitution, among them followers of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, a supporter of the rule of law and popular sovereignty, were labelled by Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters as âenemies of the revolutionâ and violently repressed. Press closures, attacks on opposition meetings, summary revolutionary trials and executions were observed during this period.
79. The draft Constitution was put to the vote in a referendum on 2 and 3 December 1979. According to State media, the Constitution was adopted with 99.5 per cent of the vote. The referendum did not resolve the tensions. In Tabriz, East Azerbaijan province, anti-Constitution protest movements started on 6 December 1979. They were crushed by January 1980, after a massive crackdown and violence by armed revolutionary committees (which later became the Revolutionary Guards). Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who was openly critical of the referendum, was placed under house arrest, and reportedly refused medical care until he died six years later.
80. Between June 1981 and June 1982, mass executions of thousands of political opponents, including communists, socialists, social democrats, liberals, monarchists, as well as followers of the BahĂĄ’Ă Faith were reported. A total of 2,616 dissidents were reportedly executed following death sentences handed down in more than eighty-five cities across the country by the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, following convictions for spreading “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel arz), “espionage”, “terrorism”, or “enmity against God” (moharebeh). Most of those executed were reportedly young activists, aged between eleven and twenty-four years old.
81. In 1988, thousands were again executed across the country, this time most were political prisoners. In January 1989, the United Nationâs Special Representative on Iran referred to âinformation he received in September 1988 alleging that a large number of prisoners, members of various opposition groups, had been executed during the months of July, August and September 1988â. He also indicated that he had received more than 1,000 names, while pointing out that âthere were in all probability several thousand victimsâ. Most of the alleged victims were said to be members or supporters of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, and members of other opposition groups. Among the latter were reportedly members of leftist parties, as well as prisoners affiliated with Kurdish opposition groups. Since then, Special Procedures mandate holders have repeatedly expressed concerns and sought information on âthe 1988 massacresâ. In 2018, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran indicated in her report that even if the total number of persons who disappeared and were executed can be disputed, the overwhelming evidence shows that at the least thousands of persons were summarily killed. In 2021, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances expressed concerns about the ongoing concealment of burial sites of those forcibly disappeared and allegedly executed between July and September 1988 across the country.
2. The 1999 student protests
82. The 1999 student protests were a reaction to the closure of a popular reformist newspaper, Salaam, operated by the Association of Combatant Clerics, a political group supporting President Mohammad Khatami. On 8 July 1999, in response to student gatherings, security forces reportedly attacked a Tehran University dormitory, beat the students, and set several rooms on fire. The death of one student, Ezzat Ebrahim-Nejad, during the raid sparked widespread anger. Studentsâ protests subsequently spread across the country for a week.
83. By the end of the unrest, at least four male students were reportedly killed in the assault on the dormitory and three hundred wounded. An estimated 1,200 to 1,400 were detained, while others were reportedly disappeared. Some students testified to the torture and ill-treatment to which they were subjected while in detention. The United Nation Special Representative on Iran indicated that the attack on the student dormitories was a clear violation of the human rights of the students, and also of Iranian domestic law. He also cited the head of the Tehran Revolutionary Courtâs declaration that four of the students had been condemned to death. At least one detained student leader appeared on television, âconfessingâ to his role in the disturbances and to having been in contact with âforeign elementsâ. State television also broadcast videotaped confessions of activists, accused of being âcounter revolutionariesâ.
84. On 13 July, only five days after the start of student mobilisations, the Government quelled the protests by imposing a ban on rallies. Efforts by the family of Ebrahim-Nejad to shed light on the death of their son proved unsuccessful. The lawyer of the family, Nobel Peace prize laureate, Shirin Ebadi, was sentenced to a five-year prison term and her license to practice law was suspended for sending a video of a former member of the Ansar-e Hezbollah to President Khatami and the head of the Islamic judiciary, in which that person confessed to his involvement in the attack on the dormitory on the alleged order of high-level authorities. The studentâs family was also reportedly harassed and barred from Government offices. In October, President Mohammad Khatami declared that the events at the University of Tehran had been a âdisgraceâ.
85. The Special Representative on Iran highlighted the lack of accountability for the events.
3. 2009 â The âGreen Movementâ
86. In June 2009, protests demanding for a reform of the political system, known as the Green Movement, took place in Iran. The protests erupted after the official announcement on 13 June that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won the presidential election. Supporters of the two pro-reform presidential candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, took to the streets demanding the election results be annulled.
87. Millions of women and men demonstrated in Tehran under the slogan âwhere is my vote?â. Protests then spread to other cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz, and were reportedly violently repressed. As during the student protests of 1999, high ranking officials delivered harsh statements against protesters, labelling them âterroristsâ and asking the judiciary to “decisively and mercilessly deal with the leaders of unrest who are in the manger of America and Israel.” According to official figures, a total of 36 people were killed. Opposition and other sources communicated the figure of 72 people killed while noting that the actual figures could be much higher. . By mid-August 2009, the authorities indicated that around 4,000 people had been arrested, and that about 3,700 people had been released. Among them were scores of journalists, students, human rights defenders, womenâs rights activists, and lawyers.
88. Neda Agha Soltan, a young woman protester, was shot in the chest during a demonstration in Tehran in 2009. Her killing, which was captured on camera, shook Iranians to the core and she came to embody the 2009 protests. In 2009, several detainees died at Kahrizak detention facility in Tehran after being subjected to torture and ill-treatment. Taraneh Mousavi was reportedly arrested after participating in protests and died in custody. Presidential candidate, Mehdi Karroubi, denounced sexual violence but authorities denied any wrongdoing.
89. The role of social media in mobilizing and organizing dissenting voices in Iran first became central during the 2009 protests which led Iranian authorities to block satellite transmissions and access to the Internet, cut phone lines and close down other telecommunications such as SMS messaging. Iranian authorities also implemented new restrictions that required journalists to obtain explicit permission before leaving the office to cover any story. Journalists were banned from attending any unauthorized demonstrations. The authorities also sought to block the use of social networking and other websites that had been used to broadcast information and visual images of the protests internationally.
90. Through multiple statements issued over this period, United Nations human rights experts voiced grave concern about the use of excessive police force, including alleged use of live ammunition and rubber bullets to disperse protests, arbitrary arrests and killings, as well as ill-treatment of detainees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also expressed similar concerns, pointing specifically to reported acts of violence by members of the Basij militia.
91. In August 2009, a State mandated Special Parliamentary Committee in charge of investigating allegations of rape in custody and the detention conditions of those held during the post-election unrest announced that rape allegations had been found to be baseless. Another Committee appointed by the Head of the Judiciary at the end of the month came to similar conclusions two weeks later. In August 2009, over 100 protesters were paraded on state television to confess and apologize. Most, if not all, were deprived of legal representation and many were accused of vaguely worded national security charges. On 13 October 2009, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed serious concerns about the death sentences handed down to three individuals for their involvement in the protests and about the manner in which the trials of opposition activists were conducted.â In November of the same year, the Ministry of Justice issued a list of judgments of 89 cases involving post-election incidents. Five people were given death sentences while 81 were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to 15 yearsâ. A dramatic increase was recorded in the imposition of the death penalty during the reporting period, with a particular surge following the post-election unrest in 2009.
92. In October 2009, Iranâs Supreme Leader said it was a crime to cast doubt on the June elections. At the time of writing of this document, three leaders of the Green Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi, were still under house arrest, a measure imposed on them since 2011. A year after the crackdown on the 2009 Green Movement, the United Nations Secretary-General indicated that no comprehensive investigation had been conducted or accountability process launched for alleged violations in the post-election period.
93. Between 2013 and 2016, multiple strikes or protest movements, by workers, teachers and associations of civil society activists, continued throughout the country.
4. 2017- 2018 â The âanti-systemâ protests
94. From December 2017 to January 2018, people demonstrated in 75 cities across the country over a two-week period. The so called Dey protests, unlike the student protests of 1999 and the Green Movement, were triggered by economic factors, namely corruption, unpaid wages, and inflation, especially the high prices of basic goods and commodities. They were largely leaderless and disorganized and rapidly transformed into the first wave of anti- political system demands, with slogans against the Shiâa clergy, targeting both the government of President Hassan Rouhani and the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
95. Authorities labelled the protests as âseditiousâ. Iran’s Interior Minister warned that those who “disrupt the order and break the law must be responsible for their behaviour and pay the priceâ and that “fear and terror will definitely be confronted.â On 5 January 2018, four United Nations Special Procedures mandate-holders declared âunacceptableâ the Governmentâs reported instruction to the Revolutionary Guards âto hit hard against the protestersâ, and the judiciaryâs threats of harsh punishment. They also expressed concern at reports that the Government had blocked the Internet on mobile networks, and that social media and messaging services like Telegram had been shut down in an attempt to quell the protests. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, expressed concerns about the increasingly severe response to the protests, amidst patterns of violations of the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to a fair trial. He also pointed out the increasing number of human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and labour activists being arrested or harassed. After two weeks of protests, 100 protesters had reportedly been killed and more than 3,700 detained.
5. The 2019 Aban protests
96. The second wave of âanti-systemâ protests also known as the Aban protests started on 15 November 2019 when Iranian authorities announced a threefold increase in petrol prices. Similar to the Dey protests (December 2017 to January 2018), these demonstrations were triggered by economic grievances and had no clear leadership but their scale considerably differed. Within a week, the protests spread to 29 provinces (out of 31). According to official Iranian media, civil demonstrations sparked in more than 200 cities. Unlike another series of protests suppressed with violence in about 160 cities, from December 2017 into January 2018, mostly working-class individuals, the November 2019 demonstrations included people from all walks of life. As with the first nationwide protests, they constituted a turning point in Iran and were met with a deadly crackdown. In the days following the November demonstrations, footage and reports emerged of security forces using live ammunition against unarmed protestors. On 6 December 2019, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated that at least 208 people had been killed. She stated that âsecurity forces responded to unarmed protesters with water cannons, tear gas, batons and live ammunitionâ and that âaccording to some reports, the Basij militia and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps used live ammunition against demonstrators.â She also stated that âverified video footage indicates severe violence was used against protesters, including armed members of security forces shooting from the roof of a justice department building in one city, and from helicopters in another.â According to the statement, OHCHR had also received footage showing security forces shooting unarmed demonstrators from behind âas they ran away and other straight on âin other words shooting to killââ. On 16 November 2019, the Supreme National Security Council ordered the largest internet and mobile telephone shutdown in the country, with connectivity rates dropping to 5 per cent of their usual levels. Iranian authorities blocked social media platforms and messaging applications, like Instagram and forced users onto state-backed applications that use domestic severs, thereby increasing the ability of the Iranian authorities to both monitor users and control the flow of information. This shutdown was recorded as the most serious disruption recorded in any country in terms of technical complexity and scale. .Reporting on the November 2019 events was further restricted by Government censorship and harassment of human rights defenders and journalists.â On 19 November, the spokesperson of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the Government to immediately re-establish Iraniansâ access to the internet, as well as other forms of communication which allow for freedom of expression and access to information.
97. Several thousand protesters were said to have been arrested and detained, with the fate of many unknown. Reports also pointed out harassment of victimsâ families to remain silent, and/or to accept compensation and forgo demands for accountability.
98. The protest movements that have taken place over the last 45 years, together with the Stateâs responses, have shown some striking similarities. They have all been marked by unmet demands and unwillingness to concede on the part of the authorities. Moreover, there has been a pattern of delegitimization of protestersâ demands and their labelling as a threat to national security, counter-revolutionary, âagents of foreign âenemiesâ, and âarmed riotersâ. State authorities have responded to public demands with high levels of violence, large-scale arrests, torture and ill-treatment, violations of fair trial and due process rights, and waves of executions, that appear to have been imposed as a deterrent to those seeking to publicly voice opposition to State policies or the Government more generally. Similarly, arrests of those supporting or reporting on the protests and the judicial harassment of victimsâ families have been another hallmark of the Government response to the exercise of peaceful assembly. As the online tools used to organize protests and respond to repressive measures have evolved, more recent protest initiatives have also been met with severe restrictions on public space, internet disruptions and surveillance as well as censorship, especially since âthe Green Movementâ. Finally, as detailed in Section XI, there has been long-standing impunity with respect to human rights violations committed against protesters. Most notably, no senior official has ever been held to account in Iran for the grave human rights violations committed in the context of the protests that have taken place in Iran over the last 45 years, feeding into the cycle of impunity.
B. Socio- cultural context
1. A diverse society
99. The current population of Iran is 89,2 million. Iranâs demographic transition has led to age-structural changes in recent decades. As a result of the sharp fertility decline, the population age structure has shifted toward a young and middle-aged population, with the proportion of the population under 15 decreasing from 46 per cent in 1986 to 23 per cent in 2016. The decrease in population aged 0â14 and the transition to a higher age group have led to an increase in the number of the working-age population (ages 15 to 64). These profound demographic transformations and the significant population growth of the second half of the twentieth century have contributed to the rapid urbanization of Iran. The share of population living in urban areas rose from 31% in 1956 to 54% in 1986, and over 69% in 2006 and 74% in 2016. Iran now is one of the most urbanized countries in western Asia. A total of eight cities have over one million inhabitants, and another 18 cities have populations greater than half a million. With a population around nine million, Tehran, the capital city, is fast approaching the size of a megacity in which not only population but also employment opportunities, investment, scientific/technical resources and diverse services disproportionately are concentrated, thus exacerbating regional inequalities.
100. Iran is a diverse society, religiously, ethnically, culturally and politically. Its population is made up of Persians who account for 61 per cent of the population, followed by Azeris at 16 per cent, Kurds at 10 per cent, Lurs at 6 per cent, Baloch and Arabs at 2 per cent. Other ethnicities account for the remaining 21 per cent, including Arabs at 2 per cent, Turkmens and Turkic tribes at 2 per cent and other minorities such as Armenians and Assyrians, as well as the Afro-Iranian minority. While the majority of Iranians are predominantly Shiâa Muslims, followers of Sunni Islam account for 9 per cent of the population. Other religious groups include BahĂĄâĂ, Christians of various denominations, Zoroastrians, Jews, Sabean Mandaeans and Yaresans. According to a survey conducted in 2020 on Iranianâs attitude towards religion, a significant percentage of the population, 22 per cent identifies with atheism.
101. Before the Arab conquest of Iran in the 7th and 8th centuries, the official religion of the Sassanid dynasty (226-651 AD) was Zoroastrianism. Until the Safavid dynasty took power in 1501, the majority of the countryâs Muslim population was Sunni. It was only during the 16th century that Shiâism was imposed as the official religion and mass conversion campaigns were carried out by the Shiâa state. The âShiâiizationâ of Iran was accompanied by the creation of a Shia clerical body with strong powers.
2. Ethnic and religious minorities
102. Article 13 of the Constitution states that Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities who are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, within the limits of the law, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education. Article 14 guarantees protection for non-Muslims, provided they ârefrain from conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iranâ. The Constitution therefore leaves without guaranteed protection followers of other faiths, including the Sabean-Mandaeans, Yaresans, as well as members of the Bahaâi faith founded in Iran in the mid-1800s and which is believed to be the largest non-Muslim religious minority in Iran, with an estimated 300,000 followers and the most persecuted religious minority in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Religious conversion from Islam can carry the death sentence.
103. The severe human rights violations suffered by the Bahaâis has been extensively documented over the years. Bahaâis have been and continue to be barred from access to higher education and government employment , subjected to arbitrary arrests and detention, destruction of their gravesites, and governmental interference in private employment. Restrictions are placed on their rights to freedom of religion or belief.
104. Members of ethnic and religious minorities face layers of intersectional discrimination on the grounds of their ethnicity, religion, gender and socio-economic status. Major human rights violations against members of ethnic and religious minorities, especially those not expressly recognised in the Constitution have been documented and reported for years including by United Nations human rights mechanisms. Repression of regional demands for self-governance and of periodic episodes of protests, such as protests by ethnic Iranian-Arabs in Khuzestanâs capital, Ahwaz in April 2005 and protests against deteriorating living conditions in Khuzestan and several other provinces, including Isfahan, Lorestan, Eastern Azerbaijan, Tehran, and Karaj in July 2021 as well as arrest and detention of those defending the rights of minorities have also been documented.
105. Members of ethnic minorities face similar discrimination in terms of representation as senior judges, or in influential government positions and as members of parliament. The formation of political parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the constitutionally recognized religious minorities, is permitted provided they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the âcriteria of Islamâ, or âthe basis of the Islamic Republic.â
106. Ethnic and religious minorities experience significant discrimination and marginalisation, especially in terms of access to education, healthcare and other basic services. According to a UNDP report published in 2022, Sistan-Baluchestan is one of the poorest provinces in the country. Many other provinces with high concentrations of ethnic minorities, such as Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Ilam, and West Azerbaijan are impoverished and underdeveloped. During its latest review of Iran, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern that âcertain underdeveloped regions, including Sistan and Baluchestan, Khuzestan and Kordestan, continue to show high levels of povertyâ, that the province of Sistan and Baluchestan is characterized by the worst indicators for life expectancy, access to water and sanitation, and infant and child mortality and that there has been insufficient investment by the State party in the provinceâs health clinics and other facilities in remote rural areas. The Committee also expressed concern about poor living conditions in regions traditionally inhabited by ethnic minorities, in some cases completely without basic services such as electricity, plumbing, sewage systems, public transport, medical facilities or schools. Ethnic minorities, including Ahwazi Arabs, Azerbaijani Turks, Baluchi, Kurds and Turkmen and continue to face widespread discrimination, curtailing their access to education, employment, adequate housing and political office. Reported underinvestment in minority-populated regions exacerbated poverty and marginalization.
107. Discrimination and violence against members of ethnic and religious minorities have also been documented in every report of the United Nations Secretary-General and Special Representative and the Special Rapporteur on Iran. Most notably, ethnic and national minorities have been disproportionately subjected to executions. In 2021, the Secretary-General expressed alarm over the apparent surge in executions of members of minorities, in particular the Baloch minority. In 2020, Kurds charged with national security offences represented nearly half of all political prisoners in the Islamic Republic of Iran. .In 2020 and 2021, members of minorities continued to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention for engaging in peaceful advocacy for their rights and to arbitrary deprivation of life, with a disproportionate number of executions for national security-related offences .
3. The cultural revolution (Enqelab-e farhangi)
108. The Cultural Revolution was implemented during the first three years following the revolution. It primarily aimed at âIslamizingâ universities through the revision of academic courses and books and purging dissident professors, but also at countering possible secular, leftist, and Marxist opposition on university campuses. In April and May of 1980, following protests in several universities in Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Shiraz, and Ahvaz, a police directive banned gatherings in universities. Through active planning and involvement of the Islamic Associations, the revolutionary âCommitteeâ militias raided campuses in major cities including Tehran, Rasht, Ahvaz and Zahedan. At least 37 students were killed, and hundreds were injured and arrested.
109. In April 1980, the Revolutionary Council announced the closure of universities and the re-organization of the education system of the country based on revolutionary and Islamic standards. In a speech delivered in June, Ayatollah Khomeini indicated that the âRevolution should come about in all the universities throughout Iran, so that the professors who are in contact with the East or the West will be purged, and universities may become healthy places for the study of higher Islamic teachings.â Universities were closed from 1980 to 1983, and all independent student unions were reportedly banned and most university campuses were violently occupied.
110. On 3 June, 1980, the Cultural Revolution Panel or Setad-e Enqelab-e Farhangi appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini was given the task of “Islamicizing” the faculty, students and curricula of all primary and secondary schools and universities. Textbooks in law, social sciences and the humanities were rewritten purportedly according to Islamic canons. When the universities reopened, the authorities had reportedly banned many books and purged thousands of students and lecturers. Many of these academics were branded âlackeys of imperialismâ, âShah-loversâ, spies, Freemasons, Zionists, Baha’is, leftists and infidels. Upon the reopening of universities, the number of university lecturers and their assistants reportedly dropped from 16,877 in 1980 to 9,042 in 1983 and fell further to 8,000 a few years after the cultural revolution. Places were reserved for students ardently committed to the values of the revolution and the Islamic government.
111. Control was reportedly tightened over studentsâ and professorsâ behaviour, courses, interactions between genders, and cultural production. In 1983, a law for the mandatory veiling of women was passed (see Section IV). Men were encouraged to grow beards and pressured against wearing ties. These new dress codes became visible markers of state-sponsored masculinity and femininity under the Islamic Republic.
C. Economic context
112. Iranâs economy is characterized by its hydrocarbon, agricultural, and service sectors, as well as a noticeable State presence in most sectors of the economy including manufacturing and financial services. In 2021, Iran had the worldâs third-largest oil and second-largest natural gas reserves. In 2017, the private sector represented 25 per cent of the Iranian economy, while the public sector contributed 35 per cent to the Iranian GDP, and the semi-state sector approximately 40 per cent (this includes âbonyadsâ, which are âcharitable trustsâ and IRGC companies).
113. The IRGC is one of the dominant stakeholders in Iranâs economy through expanding its economic ventures in gas and oil projects, numerous industries, and the service and financial sectors. The IRGC dominates the countryâs key economic sectors, such as energy, construction, telecommunication, media, mining, electronics, automobile, banking, nuclear, and more. Overall, they are said to control between 10 and 33 per cent of the Iranian economy.
114. Economic activity and government revenues rely heavily on oil revenues and have, therefore, been volatile. The decline in Iranian GDP, since 2017, following the decline in oil export revenues, has led to a major budget deficit as Iran has historically relied extensively on petroleum export revenues. With the reimposition of United States sanctions, exports dropped to under 500,000 barrels per day in July 2020. In 2018 and 2019 alone, oil exports declined by 57 per cent, according to official Government figures, leading to significant shortfalls in the annual budget owing to the loss of revenue. Between 2019 and 2021, the annual loss from the drop in oil exports is estimated at around $56 billion. To compensate, the Government has greatly expanded the money supply. Excessive budget deficits in consecutive years since 2017 have caused a severe inflationary environment, which in turn, has taken a heavy toll on the purchasing power of the average Iranian family. Moreover, Iran faces intensified climate challenges, including from severe droughts, which are restricting agricultural production at a time when global food prices and food insecurity are on the rise.
115. The economy also continues to face growth constraints notably related to the economic sanctions, restricted access to external markets and to the latest technology, and much needed foreign investment. Until 2016, international sanctions decided by the UN Security Council targeted specific sectors of the Iranian economy (nuclear, missiles drones) or alleged human rights violators. In 2024, economic sanctions against Iran are mainly restrictive measures by Western states to limit trade relations between their respective countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
116. Between 2017 and 2019, poverty increased by over 6 percentage points. Recent revisions to the poverty estimates, which take into account spatial and temporal deflators, suggest an even steeper increase in poverty. The depth and severity of poverty have also increased. Iran’s increase in poverty reflects an underlying lack of economic growth as well as structural inequities. While the Iranian economy has continued its trajectory of economic growth post-COVID-19, historical patterns suggest this growth has not benefitted Iranian society as a whole, as some regions have fallen deeper into poverty over the last decade. The cost of living continues to increase, and the high level of unemployment among youth and low level of women participation in the labor force suggest that many are not able to take advantage of economic opportunities. Poverty has increased the most in rural areas, where agricultural workers have been affected by a decade long drought. According to the Iranian Parliament Research Center, approximately 11 million Iranians have plunged into poverty over the course of a decade.
117. In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic (2021/22), approximately one million jobs were lost, and labour force participation contracted by three percentage points. Iranian women were the most affected: two out of three jobs lost between 2019/20 and 2020/21 were previously held by women. The combined effect of school closures and unequal intra-household allocation of care responsibilities, associated with prevailing gender norms, pushed many Iranian women with children out of the labour force. (See Section IV).
118. The impact of economic sanctions, affecting trade and financial services, on the enjoyment of human rights by the Iranian people has been raised for many years by the United Nations Secretary-General. Most recently, the Secretary-General reiterated his concern that the complex regulatory process, limited access to non-sanctioned banking, shortages of foreign currency and overcompliance by potentially affected third parties have limited even humanitarian transactions. He further remained concerned that significant restrictions on the Iranian banking sector have had an adverse impact on the health sector and the delivery of humanitarian aid.
119. In 2022, Iran ranked 147th out of 180 countries in the Transparency International corruption perception index. The Revolutionary Guards have been widely criticized, as corruption scandals have multiplied, and for the favourable treatment they have been granted by the Government due to the lack of transparency of public procurement contracts.
120. In 2023, the United Nations system in Iran noted considerable progress in several areas in terms of access to education, health, energy and sanitation, alongside progress in providing social support and social protection âfloorsâ and in meeting the basic life requirements.
121. According to a survey conducted in 2021, 86 per cent of the population believe that the inefficiency of the authorities and corruption are the main causes explaining the deterioration of the economic situation of the country. Only about 10 per cent of respondents thought that sanctions and foreign pressure are at the origin of the current state of the economy.
D. Security context
122. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been the target of several attacks over the last decades. According to officials, during the last 45 years, security threats resulted in the death of 17,000 people. Since the beginning of the protests in September 2022, several such attacks have taken place and it has been claimed that some terrorist groups have used the distraction of security forces towards the protests to plan and carry out terrorist acts.
1. Attacks on Shah Cheragh mosque in Shiraz (October 2022 and August 2023)
123. On 26 October 2022, the Shah Cheragh mosque, a Shia pilgrimage site in Shiraz was the target of an attack, which Islamic state (ISIS) immediately claimed responsibility for on its telegram channel. According to the authorities âan armed terrorist opened fire on pilgrims and worshipers with a Kalashnikov rifleâ, killing 13 people and injuring 25. On the day of the attack, an Iranian media reported that the police commander of Fars province had arrested the perpetrator who was being interrogated. It further quoted the statement made by the Minister of Interior in a televised interview during which he blamed the terrorist movements for taking advantage of the unrest in the country to carry out the attack.
124. Another media referred to the declaration of President Raisi on the day of the attack, in which he said that: âexperience shows that Iranâs enemies, after failing to create a split in the nationâs united ranks, take revenge through violence and terror,â He added that âthis crime will definitely not go unanswered, and the security and law enforcement forces will teach a lesson to those who designed and carried out the attack.â
125. In a statement issued on 26 October 2022, the day of the attack, the UN Secretary-General strongly condemned the attack noting that âsuch acts targeting religious sites are especially heinous âand stressed âthe need to bring to justice the perpetrators of this crime against civilians exercising their right to practise their religion.â
126. On 7 November 2022, the Ministry of Information announced in State media that the perpetrators had been identified and arrested. The Ministry provided the figure of â26 Takfiri terroristsâ arrested so far and indicated that all the arrested people were non-Iranians with the nationalities of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
127. On 6 July 2023, State media announced that the death sentences of two men involved in the attack would be carried out soon. The article referred to the head of Fars judiciary, Hojjat al-Islam and Muslim Sayyed Kazem as saying that: âThe trial was conducted in strict compliance with the legal standards and the presence of the defence lawyers, and that the initial death sentences was issued for the defendants. He further indicated that the judgment had been issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Shiraz and re-examined by the Supreme Court which confirmed the death sentence. On 9 July, State media announced that two of the perpetrators of the terrorist attack were executed in Shiraz, in public in the presence of the Fars Central Prosecutor, a number of judicial and law enforcement officials, and a group of people and families of the victims.
128. On 13 August 2023, a second attack took place targeting the Shah Cheragh mosque in Shiraz. Quoted in Iranian media, the Commander of Fars Province Fajr Corps indicated that: âFour law enforcement officers were shot at the entrance of the shrine and one person was martyred. A terrorist armed with a long-barrelled gun and carrying 8 war magazines is shooting from outside the shrine.â In another media, he indicated that seven people had been injured.
129. On 16 August 2023, the members of the Security Council condemned in the strongest terms the heinous and cowardly terrorist attack on innocent people and pilgrims at the Shah Cheragh shrine in Shiraz, Iran, on 13 August. They stated: âThe attack was claimed by ISIL/Daâesh and resulted in the loss of lives of two Iranians and the injury of eight innocent people.â
2. Attack in Kerman (January 2024)
130. On 3 January 2024, twin blasts at a rally marking the fourth anniversary of the killing of General Qassem Soleimani claimed at least 95 lives. This attack, which was claimed by ISIS, was reported as being the deadliest one in Iran since the Islamic Revolution. The attack was widely condemned, including by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
131. According to a statement of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei âcruel criminals … must know that they will be strongly dealt with from now on and … undoubtedly there will be a harsh response.â A week after the attack, 35 were reportedly arrested across several provinces.
E. Institutional framework
132. The 1979 Constitution establishing the Islamic Republic created a political and security system based on a complex structure of overlapping institutions, all under the political control of religious Shiâa authorities. The Iranian political system is based on the theory of velayat-e faqih articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini, defined as the guardianship or vice-regency of an Islamic jurist. Under this system, decisions based on an interpretation of religious principles are taken by male political bodies created through the clergy. These decisions also supersede those of elected bodies, such as the President and the Parliament. It is important to note that all candidates for elected bodies have to be vetted before any election in Iran, by a body known as the Guardian Council (see below) based on criteria that excludes persons on various grounds including their political opinion.
133. Following is a summary description of the complex set of institutions with overlapping powers and functions, characterized by the lack of independence and impartiality of key State institutions, securitization of the state apparatus, over-reach of religious authority, infringement of the rights of women and girls as well as minorities, and limited participation of women and minorities as a result of institutional design.
1. The Supreme Leader
134. The Supreme Leader is a male cleric chosen by other clerics, also all male, who make up the Assembly of Experts, for a lifetime appointment to the highest religious and political authority in the country. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, now aged 84 years old, who has been in office since 1989, directly appoints the Head of the Judiciary, the six members of the Guardian Council, the commanders of the Armed Forces, Friday prayer leaders and the Head of state radio and television, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), and confirms the President in his office following his election.
135. The Supreme Leader has the following powers and duties:
1) Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation’s Exigency Council.
2) Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.
3) Issuing decrees for national referenda.
4) Assuming supreme command of the Armed Forces.
5) Declaration of war and peace and the mobilization of the Armed Forces.
6) Appointment, dismissal, and resignation of:
a. the religious men on the Guardian Council,
b. the supreme judicial authority of the country,
c. the head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
d. the chief of the joint staff,
e. the chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and
f. the supreme commanders of the Armed Forces.
7) Resolving differences between the three wings of the Armed Forces and regulation of their relations.
8) Resolving the problems which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the Nation’s Exigency Council.
9) Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council, and, in the case of the first term of a President, by the Leadership.
10) Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89.
11) Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation from the Head of judicial power.
(2) The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person.
136. As the supreme commander of the armed forces and the Police Forces, the Supreme Leader appoints, dismisses, and accepts resignations of the commanders of Army, IRGC, Basij and Police forces, as well as the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces, and supervises their affairs. The Leaderâs command over the Armed Forces is also stipulated under their respective governing laws.
137. The Supreme leader is supported by an Office (daftar or beyt-e rahbari) which supports the supervision of all aspects of the Supreme Leaderâs duties of directing general policies of the country. The Supreme leader and his Office are the most powerful institutions in the country.
2. The Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobragan Rahbari)
138. The Assembly of Experts in its current form was established in 1982. It consists of 88 “virtuous and learned” mojtahed (an authoritative interpreter of Islamic law and jurisprudence) elected by the public for an eight-year term. The Assembly of Experts is the deliberative body empowered to appoint and dismiss the Supreme Leader. . As with presidential and parliamentary elections, the Guardian Council determines who can run for a seat on the Assembly of Experts. It meets twice a year and does not have a role in day-to-day governance of the country. The Assembly of Experts has never been known to challenge any of the Supreme Leader’s decisions. No woman has ever become a member of the Council of Experts.
3. The Guardian Council
139. The Guardian Council is a powerful 12-member council with vast legislative and executive powers and forms a cornerstone of the Islamic Republicâs constitutional scheme. The Supreme Leader directly appoints half of the 12-member Guardian Council, while the Parliament appoints the other half from a list of male candidates selected by the Head of the Judiciary who is in turn appointed by the Supreme Leader. All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council for review within a maximum of ten days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the âcriteria of Islam and the Constitutionâ. If the Council finds such draft legislation incompatible with its interpretation of Islam or the Constitution, it will return it to the Assembly for review. The Council also examines and vets candidates, including the post of the President and parliament, to determine their fitness for office for various State bodies. Women have never been appointed as members of the Guardian Council.
4. The Expediency Council or the Expediency Discernment Council (Majma’ Tashkhis MaáčŁlaáž„at-e Nezam)
140. The Expediency Council is an advisory body for the Supreme Leader with powers to resolve disputes over legislation between Parliament and the Guardian Council. In 1988, when a stalemate between Parliament and the Guardian Council proved intractable, Ayatollah Khomeini created the Expediency Council and charged it with mediating disputes between the two bodies. The Supreme Leader appoints the Councilâs members, and in October 2005 gave it âsupervisoryâ powers over all branches of government. According to article 112, â[u]pon the order of the Leader, the Expediency Council shall meet when the Guardian Council judges a bill passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly to be against the principles of SharÄ«âah or the Constitution, and the Assembly, considering the systemâs interest, is unable to meet the expectations of the Guardian Council.â No woman has ever been appointed to the Expediency Council.
5. The Executive Power
(a) The President
141. The President is the highest-ranking official in the country after the Supreme Leader and is responsible for enforcing the Constitution. He is the head of the Executive, except for matters which directly relate to the person of the Supreme Leader. The President shall be elected from among distinguished religious and political personalities (ârajol-e siasiâ) of Iranian origin and nationality, and shall be efficient and prudent with a good reputation, honest and pious, faithful to the foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the country. Only Shiâa Muslims can run for presidency. Iranian women have sought permission to run for president since the late 1990s but have never been able to do so. The President is elected for a term of four years by direct vote of the people; and may be re-elected for a maximum of one more consecutive term. The current President, Mr. Ebrahim Raisi, was elected on 18 June 2021.
(b) The Cabinet
142. Cabinet ministers are nominated by the President and introduced to the Consultative Assembly for a vote of confidence. Eight Vice- Presidents serve under the President, as well as a cabinet of 22 Ministers. While women have been appointed as ministers in the past, there are currently no women ministers or deputies in President Ibrahim Raisiâs cabinet.
6. The Legislative Power (Majles-e Shoura-ye Eslami)
143. The Parliament or Islamic Consultative Assembly is a unicameral legislative body composed of 290 members elected by direct public vote every four years. Currently, only 16 women are members of the Parliament, or 559 per cent. Parliament drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties, and approves the countryâs budget. Parliament can adopt laws on all matters, within the limits of its competence as laid down in the Constitutionâ. All enactments of Parliament must be submitted to the Guardian Council for review within 10 days of receipt to ascertain whether or not they may be reconciled with the tenets of Islam and the Constitution. If the Guardian Council finds any enactment to be contrary to Islamic tenets and the Constitution, it may return them to the Parliament for reconsideration.
144. Candidates to the Islamic Consultative Assembly must meet certain criteria, among them believing in and practicing Islam, committing to the âholy state of Islamic Republic of Iranâ and âexpressing loyalty to the Constitution and the Guardianship principle (velayatee faqih).â Those elected to the five seats reserved for members of religious minorities recognised under the Constitution are required to have faith and practice their own religion. Individuals who played a role in the consolidation of the former monarchy system cannot be candidates. As mentioned above, candidates to the Islamic Consultative Assembly are vetted by the Guardian Council.
145. Religious minorities have by law a very limited number of seats in the Parliament. Zoroastrians and Jews each send one representative, and the Assyrians and Chaldeans together have one representative. Armenians in the north and south of the country each elect one representative.
7. The Judicial Power
146. Article 156 of the Constitution states that the judiciary âis an independent power [âŠ] responsible for the implementation of justiceâ. The Constitution also states in article 61 that â[t]he functions of the judiciary are to be performed by courts of justice, which are to be formed in accordance with the criteria of Islam, and are vested with the authority to examine and settle lawsuits, protect the rights of the public, dispense and enact justice, and implement the Divine limits [al-hudud al-‘Ilahiyyah].â
147. Pursuant to article 156, the Judiciary is entrusted with the duties of âinvestigating and passing judgment on grievances, violations of rights, and complaints; the resolving of litigation; the settling of disputes; and the taking of all necessary decisions and measures in probate matters as the law may determine; restoring public rights and promoting justice and legitimate freedoms; supervising the proper enforcement of laws; uncovering crimes; prosecuting, punishing, and chastising criminals; and enacting the penalties and provisions of the Islamic Penal Code; and taking suitable measures to prevent the occurrence of crime and to reform criminals.â
148. Article 157 of the Constitution provides for a Head of the Judiciary, who shall be appointed by the Supreme Leader and shall be âa just Mojtahed [an authoritative interpreter of the religious law of Islam] well versed in judicial affairs and possessing prudence and administrative abilities as the head of the judiciary power for a period of five years who shall be the highest judicial authorityâ. The five-year term is renewable. Since 2021, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejehi has been the Head of the Judiciary. The Head of the Judiciary is responsible, inter alia, for the employment, dismissal, appointment, and transfer of judges, and their assignment to particular duties and their promotions.
149. The Minister of Justice is appointed by the President from a list of individuals proposed by the Head of the Judiciary. The Minister of Justice reports to the executive and legislative branches on behalf of the Judiciary. The current Minister of Justice is Mr. Amin Hossein Rahimi, who was appointed on 11 August 2021.
150. The constitution provides for a Supreme Court âfor the purpose of supervising the correct implementation of the laws by the courts, ensuring uniformity of judicial procedure, and fulfilling any other responsibilities assigned to it by law, on the basis of regulations to be established by the head of the judicial branch.â The Chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General are nominated by the Head of the Judiciary for a period of five years..
(a) The court system
151. The Judiciary comprises courts with various areas of specialization. Jurisdiction of courts that try criminal offences is determined by the severity and nature of crimes within the Iranian legal system. In addition to public or general courts with general jurisdiction, the court system includes specialized courts such as Revolutionary Courts, Military Courts, the Special Clerical Court, the High Tribunal for Judicial Discipline and the Court of Administrative Justice with jurisdiction over particular offenses and disputes.
The General courts (dÄdgÄhe âomĆ«mÄ«)
152. The general courts include Criminal Court One (dÄdgÄh-e keifarÄ« I), Criminal Court Two (dÄdgÄh-e keifarÄ« II) and the Juvenile Courts. The capital of each of the 31 provinces in Iran houses a Criminal Court One. In addition, such courts may also be set up in smaller cities or counties at the discretion of the Head of the Judiciary. According to article 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over crimes punishable by death; life imprisonment; amputation or intentional crimes against bodily integrity with compensatory payments equal to, or exceeding one-half of the compensatory payment for a wrongful death; category three or higher taâzÄ«r punishments ; and political and press crimes. It is worth noting that political and press crimes are frequently qualified as security offences and thus heard before Revolutionary Courts. According to the Law on Political Crimes, âoffencesâ such as âinsultingâ authorities other the Leader, as well as âinsulting heads of other Stateâ who have entered the territory of the countryâ, and certain offences pertaining to political parties and elections are considered âpoliticalâ when that they are committed âagainst the management of the country and its political institutions and domestic and foreign policies with the intention to reform the affairs of the country, provided that the offender has not intended to harm the basis of the establishmentâ. In turn, the Press Code lists various conduct, including publication of classified material, encouraging people to commit crimes against national or external security through the media, âinsulting Islamâ through the media which may amount to âapostasyâ, and âinsulting the Supreme Leaderâ and countryâs religious figures. Trials for press crimes as well as political offences should be held in the presence of a jury, and in the case of press crimes in open public sessions.
153. Each sub-provincial judicial district (shahrestÄn) has a Criminal Court which, according to Article 301 of the Criminal Procedure Code, has jurisdiction over all crimes, except those for which another authority is designated by law. This includes jurisdiction over all criminal offenses that are not within the jurisdiction of Criminal Court One, the Juvenile Court or the Revolutionary Court, including taâzÄ«r offences of degrees V to VIII. Its jurisdiction, in particular, covers morality offenses such as violations of the mandatory hijab and dress code, sexual offences falling short of adultery and rape, and non-penetrative homosexual acts. The appropriate appellate authority for Criminal Court Two is the Appeal Court of the relevant province.
The Islamic Revolutionary Courts (dÄdgÄh-e enqelÄb)
154. On 24 August 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the establishment of the Revolutionary Courts through a decree. The decree ordered the Prime Minister to convene, through the Judiciary, a revolutionary court to give the âheads of state agencies, and security and military departmentsâ the âjust deserts for their criminal acts [sic]â which are âsubstantiated with well-documented and compelling evidence and reasonsâ and âlegally and religiously warrant punishmentâ. The decree notes that â[t]heir trial must not last longer than two days. They are [already] convicted but their trial must be held in the presence of domestic and foreign reporters.â Although initially intended as a temporary emergency measure to try high-level officials of the Palhavi monarchy, the Revolutionary Courts became institutionalised through the 1979 Administrative Regulations Governing the Revolutionary Courts and the 1992 Law on Public and Revolutionary Courts. Notwithstanding their origins and original purpose, the Revolutionary Courts remain in existence and operating today, four decades after their inception.
155. Islamic Revolutionary Courts and their powers are not reflected in Iranâs Constitution. Their jurisdiction and powers were however elaborated in the Criminal Code of Procedure in 2015. They have jurisdiction over national security crimes or âserious security-related crimes, such as offences against the internal and external security of the State, conspiracy, carrying arms, sabotage, use of terrorism, espionage and smuggling. Each province, and, at the discretion of the Head of the Judiciary, some sub-provincial judicial districts (shahrestÄn), have an Islamic Revolutionary Court. In the absence of a branch of the Revolutionary Court in a city, a criminal file is referred to the Revolutionary Court in the nearest city. Islamic Revolutionary Courts have jurisdiction over all offences against the internal and external security of the country, including âwaging war against Godâ (mohÄrebeh) and âcorruption on earthâ (efsÄd fe-l-arz). The following offenses also fall under their jurisdiction: âinsulting the founder of the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leaderâ; conspiracy against the Islamic Republic, carrying arms, resorting to terrorism or destruction of buildings to undermine the Islamic Republic’s system; engaging in espionage for foreigners or foreign entities; and drug smuggling and trafficking.
Children and Juvenile Courts
156. Article 298 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for at least one branch in each sub-provincial judicial district (shahrestÄn) serving as a Children and Juvenile Court. Article 315 then specifies that in cases where a juvenile under the age of 18 commits a crime within the jurisdiction of Criminal Court One or the Revolutionary Court, a special juvenile division within Criminal Court One will hear the case. According to this provision, the defendant is to be afforded all protections offered at the Children and Juvenile Court. Juvenile Courts have jurisdiction over offenders under the age of 18. Children are criminally liable from the age of 9 lunar years for girls and 15 lunar years for boys. Once children reach this age, they are generally judged to have full criminal responsibility and may be sentenced to the same punishments as adults, including the death penalty.
Courts of Appeal (dÄdgÄh-e tajdÄ«d-e nazar)
157. Depending on the subject matter of the case and the severity of the offence, parties may appeal against judgments by first instance courts either before the Court of Appeal or before the Supreme Court, in each case within 20 days. Pursuant to article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no appeal will lie against a sentence of degree VIII of any taâzÄ«r punishments, or sentences in which dÄ«yeh (blood money) is payable equal to or less than 1/10 of a full dÄ«yeh. These offences, which are considered minor and thus not subject to appeal, include those that are punishable by imprisonment of up to three months, monetary fines of up to ten million rial, and flogging of up to 10 lashes.
158. Pursuant to article 434 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, judgments can be appealed based on any the following legal grounds: the judgment contradicts the law, the court did not consider important evidence, documentation or testimonies relied upon in the judgment were incorrect or falsified, the court lacked jurisdiction, or the judge should have been barred on legal grounds from hearing the case. On 21 July 2019, the spokesperson for the Judiciary stated that the Supreme Leader had agreed to a request by the Head of the Judiciary to temporarily eliminate the rights of the defendant, plaintiff, or their legal representatives to be present at appeals hearings as provided for in article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Appeals Courts are no longer required to hold hearings before issuing judgments. The capital of each province houses a Court of Appeal. Appeals Courts may either confirm or annul the impugned judgment and issue a new ruling. Upon confirmation, the case is remanded to the first instance court for enforcement.
159. Pursuant to articles 474 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, judgments by the Appeals Court may be appealed before the Supreme Court including in case where the Appeals Court judge made an obvious error of law, new evidence has emerged since trial, or if the conduct in question is not a crime or the punishment imposed exceeds the law.
The Supreme Court (divÄn-e âÄlÄ«-ye keshvar)
160. The highest court in Iran, the Supreme Court, supervises the correct application of laws by all courts and ensures uniformity of precedent and supervision of the correct application of laws by courts, and fulfils any other responsibilities assigned by law. The Head of the Judiciary appoints the Head of the Supreme Court for a five-year term. In August 2023, Mohammad Jafar Montazeri was appointed as the Head of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has over 40 branches located in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad. Conflicting decisions on identical issues by different branches of the Supreme Court may be reviewed by the General Board of the Supreme Court, which will issue a binding âjudgment of unified precedentâ (raây-e vahdat-e ravÄ«yeh).
161. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals against convictions in cases decided by Criminal Courts, Revolutionary Courts and Military Courts, where the following punishments have been imposed: . death, amputation of limbs, life imprisonment, taâzÄ«r punishments of degrees I to IV, and blood money for intentional homicide or bodily harm equalling or exceeding one third of a full dÄ«yeh, as well as judgments for political and press offences. All death sentences must be approved by the Supreme Court.
162. The Supreme Courtâs authority is generally limited to rejecting or upholding an appeal. In the latter case, it will remand the case to the first instance or another lower court, depending on the grounds on which the appeal was allowed. A lower court may replicate its initial ruling in a new ruling, which can then be appealed again before the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Courtâs branch concerned disagrees with the new ruling, it will send the case to the General Board of the Supreme Court to issue a binding decision.
(b) Judges
163. Article 163 of the Constitution provides that the conditions and qualifications to be fulfilled by judges in the Islamic Republic will be determined by law, in accordance with the criteria of fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence.
164. According to the Law on the Qualifications for the Appointment of Judges, candidates for judgeship or prosecutorial positions are required to âhave faith, be just and possess a practical commitment to Islamic principles and loyalty to the system of the Islamic Republicâ. Candidates, namely Muslim men between 22 and 36 years of age, are vetted through the gozinesh process, which reportedly includes investigations by the Supreme Selection Council and the Ministry of Intelligence into the applicantâs personal history, religious beliefs, political opinions and affiliations, and repentance of any former political opinions and affiliations set forth in the Selection Law based on Religious and Ethical Standards of 1995. Under the Law on the Qualifications for the Appointment of Judges of 1982, Shiâa Muslim women may be appointed as advisory judges, but may not preside over a court. Pursuant to Note 5 (amended in 1995) to the Law on the Employment of Judges, women may act as advisors to family courts or as assistant or deputy prosecutors.
165. The single article of 2 May 1982 to the Law of the Qualifications for the Appointment of Judges requires that judges in Revolutionary Courts be recruited from among students in religious seminaries with the equivalent of a high school diploma, whose qualifications are approved by the Supreme Judicial Council. Moreover, in 1986, the Consultative Assembly approved a law authorizing the appointment of persons, who have been working in Revolutionary Prosecutors’ offices in judicial positions for more than three years, as judges of the Prosecution Offices and Courts, without regard to the Legal Bill on Qualification of Judges. The conditions are that they possess at least the high school diploma or are approved by the Supreme Judicial Council, and that they are able to pass an examination on the Civil Procedure Code and the Islamic Penal Code. The Speaker of the Consultative Assembly later clarified that even if a man has been appointed to a Revolutionary Prosecutors’ office for less than three years he may still be appointed as a judge. The 2013 Law on Guidelines for the Recruitment, Selection and Apprenticeship of Applicants for Judgeship and Employment of Judges promulgated by the Judiciary further formalized the criteria.
166. Based on these laws, judges may either be approved by the Head of the Judiciary or hold a degree in law or theology from the college of Judicial and Administrative Studies or from the college of high judicial studies or Qom. Religious seminary students may also serve as judges. The judicial system therefore includes both legally trained and religiously educated judges.
167. Article 164 of the Constitution provides that a judge cannot be removed, whether temporarily or permanently, from the post they occupy except by trial and proof of their guilt, or in consequence of a violation entailing their dismissal. However, in 1990, the Head of the Judiciary reportedly recommended in his correspondence to the Head of the Guardian Council, that the dismissal of a judge “without his consent” is permissible “in the interest of the society”. The âinterest of societyâ is not defined in law. Moreover, the law establishing the High Tribunal for Judicial Discipline provides that the Head of the Judiciary may recommend judges for dismissal on the basis of âreligious considerationsâ. According to the law, this recommendation will be examined by an investigatory committee composed of the Judicial Disciplinary Prosecutor, the Parliamentary Deputy to the Minister of Justice and the Judicial Deputy to the Chief Prosecutor. Upon receiving the opinion of the investigatory committee, the High Tribunal comprised of the Head of the Judiciary, the President of the Supreme Court, the Chief Prosecutor, the Judicial Disciplinary Prosecutor and the Head of the First Branch of the Judges’ Disciplinary Tribunal shall make a decision by majority vote, with the Head of the Judiciary having a veto right. The law neither provides for any appeal against such decision, nor defines the term âreligious considerationsâ.
168. Article 167 of the Constitution provides that a judge is bound to endeavour to judge each case on the basis of the codified law. In case there is no such law, he shall deliver judgment on the basis of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwa. In 2014, the Special Rapporteur on Iran following a review of judgments of Revolutionary Courts and reports from lawyers, noted that judges, particularly those in Revolutionary Courts, made decisions almost exclusively on the basis of reports submitted by the Ministry of Intelligence, and, if available, confessions.
169. The laws and practices applying to the Judiciary in many respects do not respect the basic requirements of judicial independence under the ICCPR, as reflected in the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 and 40/146. Principle 2, for instance, provides that the judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. Yet, the process of vetting a candidateâs religious beliefs and political affiliations, and in particular the procedure of dismissal of a judge “in the interest of the society” and on the basis of religious considerations without any possibility of appeal, constitute threats to a judgeâs ability to decide the matter before them without improper pressure and interference.
170. Principle 4 provides that everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction of ordinary courts or judicial tribunals. Yet, individuals tried before Revolutionary Courts are deprived of that right as the decree establishing the Revolutionary Courts is explicit in describing its extraordinary nature and the lack of a need for such court to follow due process. Moreover, the Constitution does not refer to the Revolutionary Courts and provide for their jurisdiction.
171. Principle 10 states that persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status. In addition to the lack of accountability in and transparency of the selection process for judges in Iran, the qualifying requirements and the vetting process are inherently discriminatory, including on the basis of sex, religion and political opinion, arbitrary and promote appointments on the basis of broad, ambiguous and religious criteria. Moreover, waiving the requirement for appropriate training or qualifications in law not only fails to meet the standard of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, but also raises further concerns of judges being appointed for improper motives. The more so as the Head of the Judiciary, who is responsible for the employment and appointment of judges, is himself appointed by the Supreme Leader.
172. The vetting process for judges raises an additional concern. Principle 8 provides that members of the judiciary are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, provided that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. Therefore, taking into account the religious beliefs and political affiliations of judges in their appointment, interferes with a candidateâs and a judgeâs right to freedom of expression, belief and association and thus the principle of independence.
173. According to principle 12, judges shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists, and according to principle 18, judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties. Moreover, principle 19 states that all disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct, and principle 20 provides that decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. Dismissing of a judge “in the interest of the society” or on the basis of religious considerations without any possibility of appeal is arbitrary due to the broad nature of these standards, and lack of legal clarity, predictability, proportionality, reasonableness and due process of law, and does not respect the principles on the independence of judges.
(c) Office of the Public Prosecutor (dÄdsarÄy-e âomĆ«mÄ« va enqelÄb)
174. Since 2004, the Iranian judicial system has a General and Revolutionary Prosecutorâs Office, which is responsible for the preliminary investigation of criminal matters. The Prosecutor General (dÄdsetÄn-e koll), who is nominated by the Head of the Judiciary and must be a âjustâ mujtahid well versed in judicial matters, presides over the Prosecutorâs Office. There is a Prosecutorâs Office branch in each court district, which is composed of a prosecutor, investigating judges, assistant prosecutors and administrative staff.
175. With the exception of special cases, which are directly investigated by the court, including crimes against chastity (jarÄâem-e monÄfÄ«-ye âeffat), the Prosecutorâs Office generally is the first judicial office to deal with a criminal case that falls under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts and Revolutionary Courts. Pursuant to article 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, investigations are initiated by the prosecutorâs order or approval, where in certain cases, an investigation has been launched by an investigator.
176. Depending on its type and importance, a criminal case will either be handled by an investigating judge or an assistant prosecutor within the Prosecutorâs Office branch. Investigating judges lead the investigation. This includes specifying questions to ask at the interrogation, attending the crime scene to collect evidence, calling witnesses, and taking statements. They have power to summon the accused and potential witnesses, to order temporary detention of an accused or to order release on bail. They may delegate the gathering of information and evidence to the law enforcement agencies, except in relation to crimes defined by article 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is crimes punishable by death, life or long imprisonment or amputation. Pursuant to article 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge shall write a decision summarizing the preliminary findings of guilt on the basis of which the prosecutor will decide whether to prosecute a suspect. In practice, significant cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts are handled by designated investigative judges, who are closely associated with the Ministry of Intelligence.
177. The conditions for women becoming prosecutors in Iran are such that according to Islamic law, judging and issuing judgments for women is not permissible, and only men can pronounce judgments. Therefore, women can only serve as deputy prosecutors and judicial assistants in the courts.
178. The assistant prosecutor (dÄdyÄr) acts on behalf of the prosecutor in the investigation of a crime. Pursuant to article 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor has to authorize all the decisions of the assistant prosecutor.
179. In practice, judicial law enforcement officers conduct investigations in conjunction with Prosecutor’s Offices, including general law enforcement officers (police), and specialized law enforcement officers, such as those from the Ministry of Intelligence, the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence officers, and Basij.
180. During the preliminary investigation phase, all inculpatory or exculpatory material related to the case remains confidential. Once the preliminary investigation is completed, the prosecutor will decide, pursuant to article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whether to issue a bill of indictment and forward it to the competent court.
(d) The prison system
181. The State Organization for Prisons and Correctional and Educational Measures is an organization that functions under the direct supervision of the Head of the Judiciary and oversees prisons and detention facilities.
182. Under the 2021 Executive Regulations for the Prisons Organization and the Country’s Corrective Measures, establishing and management of all âpenal facilitiesâ is entrusted to the State Organization for Prisons and Correctional and Educational Measures. The law, article 3, states that establishing prisons and detention centers exclusively by judicial, executive, security, military and police bodies is prohibited. The note to the article, however, states that establishing âpolice and securityâ detention centres fall under the special bylaws governing them. A second note to the article obligates the Prisons Organization to dispatch inspection committees to security, police and military detention centres at least every three months for unannounced visits. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operates its own separate network of detention facilities, both formal and informal, which are effectively outside the jurisdiction of the State Prison Organization. For example, it controls Ward 2A and Section 325 within Evin prison, the Touhid Detention Centre, and Prison 59 (Eshratabad) in Tehran. Many individuals, particularly those accused of national security-related offences, are reportedly detained in secret facilities operated by intelligence entities such as the Ministry of Intelligence.
183. In November 2006, the Head of the Judiciary passed the Executive By-law for Management of Security Detention Centres revoking all previous agreements between the Prisons Organization and security bodies. This allowed for the detention of individuals accused of national security offences in special detention facilities established in the central prisons of each province. It but also provided that, if the establishment of such facilities was not possible to due to lack of space or âappropriate conditionsâ, security bodies, such as the Ministry of Intelligence, and the intelligence departments of the Revolutionary Guards, the police forces and the armed forces, with the approval of the Prisons Organization, could allocate space for such purpose in their own facilities.
184. Article 2 of the 2013 Executive By-law for Formation and Management of Police Detention Facilities and their Supervision, provides for the establishment of police detention centres in provinces upon the request of the provinceâs police chief, on confirmation of the need for such facilities by the local prosecutor, and after the approval of the Head of Provincial Prisons. Police detention centres are under the responsibility of the Prisons Organization, and may only be used to hold individuals who are kept in police custody for investigation by order of the judicial authorities. Pursuant to article 7, the duration of custody in such cases must be specified by the judicial authorities, and according to article 9, the accused may not be interrogated in police detention facilities.
8. The security system
185. Iranâs dual governance structures are most pronounced in the area of national security and defence. Many institutions oversee the same security matters. These overlapping tasks and power structures are an asset to supervise the intelligence services but are a hurdle for the efficiency of the system.
(a) The Supreme National Security Council (ShowrÄye Äliye Amniyate MellÄ«)
186. The Supreme National Security Council is responsible for âsafeguarding national interests and preserving the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity and national sovereignty.â âThe Council consists of: heads of the three branches of government, chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces, the officer in charge of planning and budget affairs, two representatives nominated by the Supreme Leader, ministers of foreign affairs, interior, and information, a minister related with the subject, and the highest ranking officials from the Armed Forces and the IRGC.â
(b) The Ministry of Interior (VezĂąrat-e Keshvar)
187. The Ministry of Interior is in charge of organizing elections and supervising the police forces at an operational level. Although the National Police (NAJA) (see below) is affiliated with the Interior Ministry, the Minister of Interior is responsible only for logistical issues, such as maintaining equipment and facilities. Although Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the only Supreme Leader since NAJAâs founding, usually designates the Minister of Interior as his stand-in on NAJA affairs, the chief of staff of NAJA is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader and in turn appoints the higher echelons of police officers. Iran’s interior ministers usually have a strong security background.
(c) The army (Artesh)
188. Constitutionally, the army is responsible for guarding the independence and territorial integrity of the country, and the State of the Islamic Republic. The Army must be an Islamic Army, i.e., committed to Islamic ideology and the people, and must recruit into its service individuals who have faith in the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to the cause of realizing its goals. No foreigner may serve in the security forces.
(d) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami)
189. Established immediately after the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a paramilitary military organization, tasked with safeguarding the Islamic Republic of Iran and the ideals of the Islamic Revolutions. The IRGC is composed of 190,000 Revolutionary Guards, divided in five branches: land forces (150,000), navy(20,000), aerospace force (15,000), Al Quds (5,000) and the Basij. Its anti-riot units are reported to be the countryâs most important units to suppress public protests and riots. As noted above, the IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operates its own separate network of detention facilities, both formal and informal. All commanders are appointed by Iranâs Supreme Leader and answerable only to him. Article 12 of the Statute of the Islamic Republicâs Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC Statute) states: âIn accordance with Article 110 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the supreme leadership of the Revolutionary Guards belongs to the Leader.â Articles 28 and 29 of the Statute clearly stipulate the chain of command within the IRGC.
190. The demarcation of operational responsibility between the IRGC and the Artesh is vague and IRGC commanders publicly define the IRGC’s mandate as flexible. IRGC messaging emphasize that the Guards have a mandate to intervene in any sphere, including those areas which are officially the responsibility of other security forces such as the army, Intelligence Ministry and law enforcement. As Major General Yadollah Javani, adviser to the Supreme Leader’s representative at the IRGC, has pointed out, the IRGC âis not merely a military organization like the army,â adding that the IRGC is âtrans-factionalâ and âhas a place within the power structure.â The IRGC is a multifaceted entity which in addition to being a military organization, has entrenched political, cultural, ideological and economic dimensions. As discussed above, the IRGC controls a large segment of the Iranian economy. From 1980 until 2023, âof the 296 individuals who have served as ministers, 83 (28 per cent) had served in the Revolutionary Guards.â Hosein Salami has been the IRGC Commander-in-Chief since 21 April 2019.
(e) The Basij
191. The Basij, formally known as the Organization for the Mobilisation of the Oppressed, was created as a paramilitary volunteer militia by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and constitutes a powerful information gathering, social influencing and paramilitary policing tool. Basij volunteers may number in the millions, with one million active members. In 1981, the Basij was incorporated into the organizational structure of the IRGC. After the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, the Basij developed its countrywide network of volunteer âresistance basesâ (Paygah) in most cities and villages, including in mosques, public institutions such as universities and places of higher learning; the civil service and state-owned economic enterprises such as factories, totalling at least 22 branches. In 2005, the Basij consolidated its units that are open to women under a single umbrella organization, the Womenâs Society Basij Organization (Sazeman-e Basij-e Jameh-e Zanan). The formation of the WSBO is responsible for coordinating all activities related to womenâs issues within the broader Basij structure.
192. The Basij came under the formal authority of the IRGC commander in 2007 and was incorporated into IRGC ground forces in 2008. Although Basij forces are not considered part of Iranâs regular armed forces, several laws and regulations have recognised them as a law enforcement force, granting them the same authorities and privileges. Plainclothes Basij forces are often dressed uniformly in black shirts and pants.
193. Basij have a presence in every Iranian university to monitor peopleâs dress and behaviour. They are closely affiliated to the countryâs hard-line factions. The Student Basji Organization (SBO) is a branch within the Basij that is active on university campuses which was formed in November 1989 under the purview of the IRGC to promote official doctrines across universities and to control studentâ movements. On 9 November 2009, the Head of the SBO announced the formation of 6,000 Basij units in primary schools (which teach children up to the age of eleven).
(f) The Police (Farmandehi-ye Entezami-ye Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye Iran, or FARAJA)
194. The law enforcement force of the Islamic Republic (FARAJA), or police force, is one of the three main branches of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic, which is under the supervision of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic (who also holds the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces). It was established through merging different law enforcement forces in 1990.
195. The Supreme Leader appoints the commander-in-chief of the National Police who in turn appoints the higher echelons of police officers. On 7 January 2023, Ayatollah Khameini appointed Ahmadreza Radan, an IRGC officer who was transferred to police forces many years ago, as the country’s new Commander-in-chief of Law Enforcement Force replacing Hossein Ashtari. Although the national police is affiliated with the Ministry of Interior, the Minister concerned is responsible only for logistical issues, such as the maintenance of equipment and facilities.
196. Each province has a single command headquarters that controls all police stations within it. âEach city in turn has one disciplinary district (nahieh-e entezami) that manages local police stations, usually called kalantari in urban areas and pasgah-e entezami in rural areas. Despite certain local differences, a typical Iranian police station will have a deputy of prevention, a deputy of intelligence, a deputy of inspection, a deputy of operation, and a judiciary police official, among other personnel.â
(g) Intelligence agencies
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
197. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader; its head is a cleric chosen with the approval of the Supreme Leader (not the President). Esmaeil Khatib has been serving as the minister of intelligence since August 2021. According to the MOIS foundation law of 1983, the Ministry is charged with the “gathering, procurement, analysis, and classification of necessary information inside and outside the country.” Since 1983, the Intelligence Ministry has been overseeing the activities of the security units âHerasat âwhich are present in every civilian organization and university in the country. The Herasat units, created in 1979 were originally tasked to ensure physical protection, protection of classified documents, personnel protection, and protection of personalities. In 1981, the Government tasked them to deal with the conspiracy of “enemies” and “the influence of their agents and to prevent their destructive actions in various political, economic, social, and cultural sectors of the country.
The Intelligence Organization of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
198. After the Green Movement (2009-2010), Ayatollah Khamenei empowered the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has become one of the most powerful intelligence organizations in Iran, alongside the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. The organization âprotects against terrorist attacks and foreign political interference. It represses demonstrations and unrest and monitors online activities of Iranians. The IRGC-IO counters influence operations from Iranâs Western adversaries. It has also detained dissidents, including Iranians, dual nationals, and foreignersâ. In June 2022, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Kazemi, the director of the IRGC Counterintelligence Organization, was appointed head of the IRGC-IO. The IRGC-IO chief is chosen by and reports to the Supreme Leader. The previous IRGC-IO chief was Hojatoleslam Hossein Taeb (2009-2022), a mid-ranking cleric.
The Intelligence and Public Security Police (polis-e ettelaat-e omumi) or PAVA
199. The Intelligence and Public Security Police (PAVA) is a branch of the Police (NAJA), the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic. Both of them are directly or indirectly overseen by the Supreme Leader.
The Moral Security Police (police-e amniyat-e akhlaghi)
200. The Moral Security Police is a sub-branch of the Intelligence and Public Security Police, with a mandate to âfight evil and corruptionâ and enforcing related morality laws, including the mandatory hijab. Although the Police have always maintained units dedicated to morality policing, the Moral Security Police itself was formally created in 2007 by the Policeâs Commander in chief, following the 2006 Law, to grant greater autonomy and authority to morality policing activities within the Police Force. The Moral Security Police supervises the Guidance Patrolâs activities, which consists of officers patrolling the streets of Iran.
201. Not all police stations in Iran house a dedicated unit of the Moral Security Police. The Commander in Chief of the Police is responsible for determining whether a given police station anywhere in the country requires a moral security police unit. In Tehran, there are at least ten moral security police units within the regular police stations.
The guidance patrols âGasht-e-Ershad,â (also known as the âmorality policeâ)
202. The âGasht-e-Ershadâ (literally âGuidance Patrolsâ) referred to in public discourse as the âMorality Policeâ, has existed in some shape or form since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
203. Shortly after the Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took steps to consolidate and organize the existing âKomitehâ under his leadership as the official law enforcement agency tasked with upholding the standards of the Revolution, including Islamic regulations on social behaviour. Roughly 1,000 Komiteh units operated in Tehran, arresting anyone they deemed a threat to the Republicâs socio-political order. In 1983, when the requirement of mandatory hijab was adopted, its enforcement fell under the purview of the Komitehs.
204. In 1991, the Government adopted the Law on the Formation of the Police Force, which formally established a new, overarching police force. Its duties included to âfight evil and corruptionâ (Article 8) and to engage in the âdetection of crimesâ, including breaches of the mandatory hijab. The Policeâs leadership created the Guidance Patrols as street patrols to fulfil this mandate.
205. The Guidance Patrol does not have a dedicated legal foundation document that explicitly outlines its role and functions, including the procedures and methods for enforcing the mandatory hijab. The exact scope of its activities and authority is principally shaped by Government acts and internal regulations adopted by the Police Commander in Chief. In 2006 a resolution was adopted by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution titled âResolution on the Implementation of Strategies for the Development of the Culture of the Chastity and Hijabâ, which empowered police officers to âdeclare the limits and legal definition of modesty and standards of improper hijabâ and to âtake legal steps to confront individuals with improper hijabâ. In May 2007, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution adopted the Moral and Social Security Promotion Plan, approved by the Supreme Leader. The Plan explicitly stipulated that agents of the Guidance Patrol have the authority to determine âthe instances of good hijab and its limitsâ and address offenses according to their discretion.
206. In April 2016, the police chief of Tehran announced the establishment of an âundercover morality policeâ which authorized 7000 Guidance Patrol- Morality Police officers to âinvisiblyâ operate in Tehran and identify women who were either not wearing the hijab or were deemed to be wearing it âimproperly.â27N
III. The death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini
207. Jina Mahsa Amini (hereafter Jina Mahsa) was a 22-year-old ethnically Kurdish woman from Saqqez town, Kurdistan province. Jina Mahsa played the violin and performed in the local theatre. She enjoyed dressing up in traditional Kurdish clothes, singing, and would often go hiking and play tennis during her free time. After obtaining her degree in pharmacy, she had been admitted to study microbiology at the Faculty of Medicine at the Urmiah University, West Azerbaijan province. She was due to start in late September 2022. She had chosen this field because she wanted to help mitigate the pain and suffering of others.
208. In the late summer of 2022, Jina Mahsa travelled from her hometown with her mother, father, and 17-year-old brother to visit family in Tehran. On the evening of 13 September 2022, while on her way to a department store, Jina Mahsa got off at the Shahid Haqqani metro station in Tehran city. There, she was arrested by the âmorality policeâ for allegedly wearing an âimproperâ hijab and, in turn, taken into custody. Three days later, on 16 September 2022, Jina Mahsa died in a hospital in Tehran city. More than one year after her death, Iranian authorities have not only failed to address womenâs and girlsâ demands for equality and human rights, but instead exacerbated patterns of violence and implemented additional measures to force them into compliance.
A. Chronology and factual reconstruction of the events that led to the death of Jina Mahsa Amini
1. Arrest
3. On 13 September 2022, at or around 6:30 p.m., after she exited the Shahid Haqqani metro station in Tehran city, Jina Mahsa and her brother were stopped by the âmorality policeâ. Jina Mahsa and her brother argued with the police over her arrest. When her brother pleaded with the police to release her, he was also threatened with arrest.
209. Credible information received by the Mission indicated that the âmorality policeâ officers were equipped with body cameras during the arrest.
210. Testimonies received by the Mission described how âmorality police” officers were always present at the Haqqani metro station in Tehran city. One witness recalled that every time she went to this area, she would have âtroublesâ with them. She was herself violently arrested by the morality police for âimproper hijabâ prior to the protests in September 2022. Another woman noted that âwomen from Tehran know that the Haqqani metro situation is full of morality police officersâ and that âtwo white vans are always parked there.â Conscious of the consequences that a potential encounter with the morality police may entail for any woman or girl found to be in violation of the mandatory hijab laws, the witness noted that, in her view, âno woman in Tehran gets off at that exit [where Jina Mahsa Amini was arrested] because they know that the morality police would be present, every day, between 4 pm and 10pm.â
211. Regarding the reason for arrest of Jina Mahsa Amini on the evening of 13 September, the Police Commander of Greater Tehran stated on 19 September, that âher clothes were not appropriateâ, and that âMs. Amini asked our colleague what is wrong with her appearance and our colleague responded that there was a problem with her trousers and her manteau â. Witnesses explained that the âmorality policeâ assessed that her hijab was âimproperâ on the basis of âher trousers being visible, and some of the buttons of her manteau undoneâ. Separately, witnesses told the Mission that Jina Mahsa Aminiâs attire appeared rather âconservative,â ânot inappropriate,â and âproperâ. In a media interview, her father also confirmed that âthere was nothing wrong with her clothingâ, casting doubts on the justification for her arrest.
2. Detention
(a) Inside the van of the âmorality policeâ
212. Following her arrest, Jina Mahsa was taken in a white van that belonged to the morality police. Her brother was meanwhile told by the officers that she would be taken to the Vozara detention facility, located some six kilometres from the Haqqani metro station, to undergo a âre-education classâ. The van reportedly remained stationed at the Haqqani metro station for some 15 minutes longer while the âmorality policeâ arrested another three women for wearing âimproper hijabâ. The van departed at or around 6:50 p.m., with a total of seven women detainees, including Jina Mahsa Amini, as well as at least four officials from the âmorality policeâ, at least one of whom was a woman.
213. Credible information indicated that inside the van Jina Mahsa protested her arrest. This led to an argument between her and an official of the âmorality policeâ. Although she was conscious after the incident, she reportedly appeared physically lethargic.
(b) Inside the Vozara detention facility
214. The Vozara facility, a detention centre described by women as a âplace for hijab-related violationsâ, is a detention facility placed under the authority of the Public Security Police. It operates at least 12 cells located underground, where women found in violation of the mandatory hijab laws are held. Women detainees are registered upon arrival, have their mugshots taken, and are then released only after a family member goes to collect them with a proof of their identity, and with a âproper attireâ . The time till release may therefore vary from several hours to days depending on when a family member is able to collect them from the Vozara. Women, including girls, reported witnessing and/or being subjected to physical violence in the custody of the “morality policeâ while in the Vozara detention facility.
215. Audio messages published by the media on 16 September 2023, indicated that, after Jina Mahsaâs arrest, her brother followed the van to the Vozara detention facility on a motorcycle. Once in front of Vozara, he joined a crowd of people who had gathered at the gate in front of the building, in anticipation of the release of other women who had been transferred to Vozara earlier that day. Her brother asked several guards about his sisterâs whereabouts, and showed them a picture of her, which he had taken few days prior.
216. Open-source information reviewed and analysed by the Mission indicated that one woman saw Jina Mahsa upon arrival to Vozara. She described her as appearing âpaleâ and âunwellâ, before witnessing her collapse on the ground. Seeing her on the floor, some of the other women who were held in Vozara asked for a doctor, a request that the police reportedly denied. As they persisted, the police reportedly pepper-sprayed, beat some of the women and confiscated their phones.
(c) Outside Vozara detention facility
217. As people remained waiting outside Vozara detention facility, they heard screams from inside. One woman came out of the building and reportedly said to them that âthey killed someone in there.â Fearing for the women inside, family members then attempted to cross the gate and enter the Vozara building. Credible information obtained by the Mission indicated that, to prevent people from coming closer, the police beat and pepper-sprayed some of them, including the brother of Jina Mahsa. Shortly thereafter, an ambulance arrived and took one person away. In response of queries by the crowd as to why the ambulance came, the police explained that it had come for a guard who had fallen sick. Her brother, meanwhile, continued waiting for Jina Mahsa in front of Vozara.
3. Death in custody
218. Jina Mahsa was transferred to Kasra hospital in secrecy. It was only some 20 minutes after the ambulance departed that the police told her brother that she had been transferred to the emergency unit (ICU) at Kasra Hospital, a private medical facility located near Argentine square in Tehran city, some 500 meters from the Vozara detention facility.
219. On 17 September, Kasra Hospital published a statement on Instagram confirming that Jina Mahsa had been admitted at the hospital at 8:22 p.m. âin a comatose stateâ and âbrain-dead upon arrivalâ. The statement further indicated that âdespite efforts to resuscitate her, Jina Mahsa died on 16 September 2022.â The post was deleted on the same day, only one hour after it was published.
220. Her parents were not informed by the âmorality policeâ of her arrest, or her subsequent admission to the hospital. Her brother rushed from the Vozara detention facility to the Kasra hospital after having been told by a guard at Vozara that she was indeed the person transferred in the ambulance he had seen earlier.
221. Meanwhile, Jina Mahsa was admitted to Kasra Hospital. Medical staff, observing her critical state and not knowing who she was, called to inform the police about her admission. An officer from the police station then went to Kasra Hospital, and made a police report of her hospitalization, dated 13 September 2022 at 8:36 p.m., in the presence of Kasra medical staff. In the report, the officer noted that an âunidentified womanâ had been admitted to the ICU âwith three per cent consciousness following injuries sustained in Vozaraâ. The report further stated that âan officer from the morality policeâ had come with Jina Mahsa to the hospital but âbore no identification card or a badge and did not answer questions from the Policeâ. It was only after Jina Mahsaâs brother arrived at the hospital, around 30 minutes later, that medical staff and the police were informed by Jinaâs brother of her identity. Jina Mahsaâs brother then called their parents, who joined him in Kasra hospital.
222. That night, as the family awaited news, they were informed by the hospital staff that Jina Mahsa had been transferred from Vozara with a delay, had suffered cardiac arrest and was transferred to the hospital too late. Her parents were allowed to see her on at least one occasion and hold her hand. Credible information received by the Mission indicated that Jina Mahsa bore bruises on her body and blood was visible around her ears.
223. Jina Mahsa remained in a comatose state over the following two days. On 15 September, her parents confirmed to the media that she was still alive and under observation at the ICU in Kasra Hospital. Meanwhile, security officers were deployed inside the hospital and to the area around the building, and intimidated the family. In an audio message released on 16 September 2023, Jina Mahsaâs brother said: âanywhere we go, there are two police officers following us.â
224. On the morning of 16 September, reportedly at around 9:00 am, Jina Mahsa died, and her body was subsequently transferred for forensic examination to the Legal Medicine Organization in Kahrizak, Tehran province. Despite requests to medical doctors, the family did not receive any of the medical reports from Kasra Hospital. Credible information received by the Mission indicated that the medical staff was threatened by the security forces to not release medical reports the family. Later that day, as the news of her death in custody emerged on social media, people gathered in front of Kasra Hospital, near Argentine square. A young woman reportedly removed her hijab in an act of defiance to protest her death.
225. Credible information received by the Mission also indicated that the family was not allowed to see Jina Mahsaâs body until it arrived in her hometown of Saqqez on the early morning on 17 September. As many people travelled to Saqqez to pay their respects, the family was urged by security forces to proceed with the funeral earlier, prior to the ceremony that had been planned for 10 a.m. The family however refused, and around 10 am that morning, Jina Mahsa was buried in Aychi cemetery, Aychi village, some eight kilometres away from Saqqez town. Her death certificate, issued at the Saqqez civil registry office on 21 September 2022, noted that she had died of âunknown causes.â
B. State response and investigations
1. Official statements
226. On 15 September 2022, Iranâs Police Information centre said that Jina Mahsa had suffered a sudden cardiac arrest while in custody. On the day after, 16 September, State TV published time-stamped CCTV video footage without audio, which showed Jina Mahsa inside the Vozara detention facility. No footage from her time spent inside the police van was released. The footage broadcast showed her exiting a white van of the âmorality policeâ, along with six other women, and then entering the Vozara building one by one in a line at 7:28 p.m. Three individuals, who appeared to be âmorality policeâ officers, were also shown on the footage, including one woman who ushered them in. The footage shows Jina Mahsa walking into a large hall where women were already awaiting processing following their arrest. She can then be seen remaining seated for approximately 30 minutes, and then speaking to a female police officer, who pointed towards her clothing. Following this, at 7:56 p.m., Jina Mahsa is shown holding her head before collapsing on the ground. The emergency medical service then arrived at 8:06 p.m., and performed CPR on her at 8:09 p.m. The footage then cuts to 8:10 p.m., where several men are shown carrying a person on a stretcher whose face is not visible. The ambulance is then seen departing the Vozara detention facility at 8:27 p.m., which is later than, and therefore inconsistent with, the 8:22 p.m. time reported of her hospital admission.
227. On 16 September, President Raisi tasked the Ministry of Interior to open an investigation into the death of Jina Mahsa. On 16 September, Parliament member Jalal Rashid Kuchi also called for investigation into the case. On the same day, General Hossein Rahimi, commander of the police forces in Tehran announced that though the âmorality policeâ officers were generally equipped with body cameras, this was not the case during the evening of the arrest of Jina Mahsa. Gholamhossein Ejei, Head of the Judiciary issued an order for another investigation also on the same day. General Hossein Rahimi, commander of the police forces in Tehran stated that investigations conducted by him and âspecial teams” had shown that âthere was not even the slightest misconduct or wrongdoings by the officersâ. He further described the police forces as faultless and added that the news about the cause of the death of Jina Mahsa circulating on the internet were âliesâ. On 19 September, local media published that, following orders of the Commander of FARAJA in Tehran, General Rahimi, the head of the âmorality policeâ, Colonel Ahmed Mirzaei, has been suspended from his position. On 29 January 2023, official media announced that General Rahimi himself was moved to Chief of Economic Security from overseeing police forces in the capital of Tehran to a newly established branch of the police, namely the economic security police unit. On 4 October, the Supreme Leader gave (his first) public remarks referring to a âbitter incidentâ, noting âthe upsetâ it caused.
228. On 21 September, Mahdi Forosh, the Director General of Forensic Medicine in Tehran published a statement in which he stated that âno signs of injuries to her body nor bleeding or rupture to her internal organs had been observed during the autopsy, including to her head.â He further noted that more time was needed to âestablish the cause(s) of death and to issue the final report.â On 2 October 2022, the Parliamentary spokesperson said that the head of the parliamentary commission which was entrusted with the investigation into the death of Ms. Amini, will present his report by the end that week.
229. The following month, on 7 October, the Legal Medicine Organization, a body operating under the authority of the Judiciary, stated that her death was not caused by âblows to the head or any vital organs or parts of the body.â Rather, it claimed that it was due to complications arising from an underlying condition, namely a disorder in the hypothalamus-pituitary axis and the gland, including the adrenal and the thyroid gland. The disorder allegedly resulted from a craniopharyngioma surgery to remove a brain tumour when Jina Mahsa was eight years-old, for which she was still under medical treatment with hydrocortisone, levothyroxine, and desmopressin drugs. These complications, the statement continued, had left her without the âability to cope or get hold of the situationâ and, she subsequently developed a cerebral hypoxia due to a sudden heart rhythm disorder and decreased blood pressure. The Legal Medicine Organization pointed out that it had come to this conclusion after reviewing medical records, computed tomography (CT) scan images of her head and chest, results of physical examination, autopsy, and pathology tests, some of which were published by official media. On 8 October, the Legal Medicine Organization announced that the decision was informed by a commission of 19 doctors.
230. The Mission notes that, though clearly in the possession of the State, none of these documents have been shared with Jina Mahsaâs family nor with the public. The Mission requested but has not received these documents from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran till the time of reporting.
2. HCHR Reports on the Death of Ms. Mahsa Amini & Ensuing Events
231. To date, none of the above-mentioned bodies tasked with investigations into the death of Juna Mahsa Amini, have issued a public report detailing their findings. In addition to the statement issued by the Legal Medicine Organization on 7 October 2022, the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter, HCRC) issued two reports, one of which is not public, pertaining to the death of Jina Mahsa. The Missionâs analysis over these reports is provided below.
(a) Preliminary Report on the Death of Ms. Mahsa Amini & Ensuing Events
232. In its first report, published on 27 October 2022, the HCHR reported that five separate investigations into the custodial death of Jina Mahsa had been launched, namely: (i) an investigation squad formed by the Minister of Interior as per the Order of the President and under the supervision of the Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Enforcement Affairs as well as the Secretary of the State Security Council; (ii) a probe team assembled by Tehran Prosecutor General; another inquiry team put together by the Tehran Province Justice Administration within the Office of Civil Rights Protection of the Judiciary; (iii) an investigation team formed by the Legal Medicine Organization comprising of experts; (iv) and a probe team formed by the Parliament. Furthermore, (v) a medical committee consisting of the Deputy Minister for Treatment of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Education, the Vice Chairman of the Health Commission of the Parliament, the Head of the Legal Medicine Organization, the Head of the Medical Council, the representative of the Heart Association, the representative of the Neurosurgeon Society, and the representative of the Society of Radiology. The report does not offer clarity as to when the investigations began, their anticipated duration, composition, staffing, mandate, and the respective tasks of each investigation or probe team, and how they relate to each other.
233. The report further confirmed that a criminal case was filed in the Tehran Prosecutorâs Office based on the order of the Head of the Judiciary to investigate Jina Mahsaâs death. The Tehran Prosecutor General then issued an order to open an investigation, which prompted the Tehran Province Chief Justice Administration to task the Citizenship Rights Monitoring Board to immediately launch an investigation and called upon the Legal Medicine Organization and the Ministry of Interior to promptly submit their final report to the Judiciary.
234. Regarding the cause(a) and circumstances of the death, the report cites a media interview given by the Director General of the Tehran Legal Medicine Organization in which he noted that âno signs of injury on the head and face, bruises around the eyes and fracture of the cranial base were found in the physical examination and autopsy conducted on the deceased.” In a subsequent statement dated 23 September 2022 and cited in the report, the Minister of Interior referred to a âsecond phase of investigationsâ, suggesting that, by then, the first phase may have already been completed.
(b) Report No. 4, Pertaining to the Death of Ms. Mahsa Amini & Following Events
235. In its second report, the HCHR provided no update or other information on the results of the investigation by the Ministry of Interior and the Parliament, except for a brief mention of a judicial investigation, though without explaining what it referred to, or what the results were. The report notes the statement made by the Legal Medicine Organization confirming that âher death was not caused by blows to the head or any other vital organs or parts to the bodyâ . The results of the investigation specifically into the reported beatings in custody were not made clear and are not public to date. The conclusion on her suffering a heart attack does not, furthermore, negate the existence of the reported violence she suffered, as noted above.
236. As in Report no.1, no additional information was provided to support the conclusions made by the Legal Medicine Organization, including the medical records and the post-mortem report, or any other information which may have been used to reach conclusions as to the cause of her death. Moreover, authorities did not indicate whether the family had been provided with any of this information.
C. Pursuit of truth and justice
237. Victims of human rights violations and their families have a right to truth, justice and reparations. The right to know the truth extends to society as a whole, given the public interest in the prevention of, and accountability for, international law violations. The right to know includes information held in a stateâs records that pertains to serious violations, even if those records are held by security agencies or military or police units.
1. Familyâs access to information and redress
238. Several days after the death of Jina Mahsa, her family filed a complaint against the police through their lawyer in which they requested a thorough investigation into her death. The complaint was filed before the Criminal Branch of the Office of the Prosecutor, District 27 in Tehran city.
239. Between October and December 2022, the family filed a number of requests to access the investigation case file and/or supporting documentation pertaining to the death. The family requested access to, inter alia, the results of the investigation by the judiciary, medical and police reports, full CCTV footage and/or footage from policeâ body cameras, and a request to cross-examine the six women held alongside Jina Mahsa in the van, and the âmorality policeâ officers reported to have carried out the arrest. The family and their lawyer neither received the records from the State, nor was this information made public. This is despite the said records being available to the State given that they formed the basis, in part or in full, of the conclusions of the death of Jina Mahsa, as noted by the Legal Medicine Organization and referred to by the HCHR. In January 2023 that familyâs lawyer stated in a media interview that the family had still not received information on the progress of the investigation.
240. Following the statement by the Legal Medicine Organization on 7 October 2022 relating to her death, the family filed an objection before the Investigative Judge of the Office of the Prosecutor, Branch 1, District 27 of Tehran to contest the Organizationâs findings. The requests noted that prior medical reports of Jina Mahsa were provided to the Organization by her family, which confirmed that she was healthy, and had been adhering to her hormonal treatment regimen, noting that it was unlikely that she suffered from an adrenal crisis. The request by the family and their lawyer to establish a medical commission with known doctors in the Iranian medical community, was also denied.
241. In a public letter on 18 September 2022, 56 lawyers expressed their condolences and noted readiness to provide legal assistance to the family of Jina Mahsa Amini.
2. Arrest and detention of those reporting on or seeking accountability for the death of Jina Mahsa Amini
242. One year after the death of their daughter, the family of Jina Mahsa remains without answers regarding why she died. Instead of receiving support or information, her father was interrogated on several instances by the intelligence services and even asked to refrain from commemorating the first anniversary of her death on 16 September 2023. Reportedly, when he refused, the family was placed under house arrest, and security officials surrounded their home in Saqqez between 16 and 19 September 2023. The uncle of Jina Mahsa, meanwhile, was arrested on 5 September 2023 by the intelligence officers in Saqqez and released after around 40 days. His family was not informed of his fate and whereabouts during the time of his detention. On 10 February 2024, he was sentenced by a criminal court in Saqqez to five years in prison and a travel ban, a ruling he has since reportedly appealed.
243. The family of Jina Mahsa was also prevented from travelling to Strasbourg, France, to receive the prestigious European Parliament 2023 Sakharov Price for Freedom of Thought awarded jointly to Jina Mahsa Amini and the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement which was catalysed by her arrest and death in custody. On 8 December 2023, her mother, father, and brother were stopped at Tehran Airport by security forces as they prepared to board on a flight to France. Their passports were confiscated, and a travel ban was reportedly placed on all three of them. The familyâs lawyer, Mr. Saleh Nikbakht, represented the family during the Sakharov award ceremony in Strasbourg on 12 December 2023.
244. Mr. Nikbakht was summoned in March 2023 by the IRGC intelligence service, and subsequently interrogated. On 29 August and 2 October 2023, the Revolutionary Court, Branch 28, in Tehran held hearings against him on charges of âspreading propagandaâ after he questioned in media interview(s) the State conclusions on the cause of death, and asserted that she was in fact beaten in custody. On 17 October, 2023, Mr. Nikbakht was convicted and sentenced to one yearâs imprisonment. He has reportedly appealed.
245. Moreover, two women journalists were arrested after reporting on the death of Jina Mahsa. Niloofar Hamedi, who worked with Shargh Daily, was arrested on 22 September 2022, six days after she took a picture of Jina Mahsaâs parents hugging each other in the hallway inside Kasra hospital. Elaheh Mohammadi, who worked for the Ham Mihan, was arrested on 29 September 2022, after she wrote an article on her funeral. The two journalists underwent in camera trials in May and in July 2023, respectively, on charges of âcollaborating with a hostile government,â âgathering and colluding with intent to commit crimes against national security,â and âpropaganda activity against the systemâ. Both were denied access to their lawyers, and their families were prevented from attending their hearings. On 22 October 2022, the Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced Elaheh Mohammadi to six years in prison for âcollaborating with the hostile government of the United States,â five years for âconspiring and colluding to commit a crime against national securityâ and one year for âpropaganda against the Islamic Republic,â a total of 12 years. Niloofar Hamedi was convicted on the same charges, although her prison sentences totalled 13 years. On January 14, 2024, both journalists were granted temporary release on bail from Evin prison (Tehran), where they had been held for the last 14 months, pending an appeal.
246. Another journalist, Nazila Maroofian, whose interview of the father of Jina Mahsa was published on Mostaghel online on 19 October 2022 under the title âThey are lyingâ (later removed), was arrested on 30 October 2022, and held in Evin prison before being transferred to Qarchak prison and released on bail on 9 January 2023. On 28 January 2023, she was sentenced in absentia to two years imprisonment suspended sentence, a fine and a five-year travel ban on charges of âpropaganda against the systemâ and âspreading lies in order to disturb the public opinionâ.
D. Legal findings
1. Arbitrary arrest of Jina Mahsa Amini
247. The Mission emphasizes the arrest and detention of Jina Mahsa Amini, pursuant to fundamentally discriminatory laws and policies governing the mandatory hijab, is arbitrary in nature and, as such, not permissible under international human rights law. The deprivation of liberty is rendered arbitrary if it has resulted from a violation of the right to equal protection of the law and freedom from discrimination under article 7 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or it constituted a violation of international law on prohibitive grounds of discrimination. On this basis, the Mission finds Jina Mahsa Aminiâs arrest and detention, preceding her death in custody, constituted a violation of her right to liberty of person, liberty and equality under the law.
2. Cause of the death of Jina Mahsa Amini
248. When a person is injured or dies in a place of detention, there is a general presumption of State responsibility, owing to the control exercised by the State over those it holds in custody. The presumption of State responsibility for prisoner deaths until such responsibility is refuted has been firmly established under international human rights law.
249. Based on the evidence as detailed above, including expertsâ medical assessment, alleged complications arising from Ms. Aminiâs surgery in childhood can be excluded as the immediate cause of her death. The Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that Jina Mahsa Aminiâs death was brought about by external causes. The Mission established the existence of evidence of trauma to Ms. Aminiâs body, inflicted while in the custody of the âmorality policeâ. Based on the evidence and patterns of violence by the âmorality policeâ in the enforcement of the mandatory hijab on women and girls, the Mission is satisfied that Jina Mahsa Amini was subjected to physical violence that led to her death. On this basis, the State bears responsibility for Jina Mahsa Aminiâs unlawful death.
250. Due to the refusal of the Government of Iran to disclose key documents including police and medical reports, the Mission is not in a position to determine the immediate cause(s) of death, that is the diseases or conditions directly leading to Jina Mahsaâs death. Nevertheless, the Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that Jina Mahsaâs surgery can be excluded as immediate causes of her death and that her death was brought about by external causes.
3. State investigations into the death of Jina Mahsa Amini
251. The Mission now turns to assessing the investigation(s) conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran into the death in custody of Ms. Amini. Beyond the factual findings as noted above, the Mission further reviewed and analysed the two reports issued by the HCHR, in which the State provided a modicum of information as it pertains to its internal investigation into her death. It is on this basis that the Mission concluded that the investigation conducted by the State into her death failed to meet international standards for the investigations of potentially unlawful deaths, as set out by the United Nations Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (1989) and the supplementary Manual on the Effective Prevention of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions of 1991, also known as the Minnesota Protocol. The Mission therefore finds that the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to comply with its duty to investigate a potentially unlawful death promptly, effectively and thoroughly, with independence, impartiality and transparency as detailed below.
(a) Promptness of the investigations:
252. Five separate and simultaneous investigations were announced shortly after the death of Ms Amini. Already in its first report issued on 27 September 2022, the HCHR stated that the Legal Medical Organization confirmed that âno signs of injury on the head and face, bruises around the eyes and fracture of the cranial base were found in the physical examination and autopsy conducted on the deceased.â According to the HCHR, on 23 September 2022, seven days after the death, the Minister of Interior, already referred to âsecond phase of investigationsâ having referred to a preliminary report of investigations being concluded, which found âno assault, battery or brain haemorrhageâ. No further information was provided as to the basis of these conclusion, until 7 October 2022, when the Legal Medicine Organization issued a statement in which it noted that her death âwas not caused by blows to the head or any vital organs and parts of the bodyâ. The separate findings of each of the investigations, including the full report of the Legal Medical Organization, have not been shared with the public or with the family of Ms. Amini. In this regard, the Mission notes that, though investigations were announced early in time, which may in principle comply with the criteria of promptness of investigations, State authorities appeared to have made conclusions in a rather hastily manner and too early, without making a serious and meaningful attempt to uncover what happened. It is for this reason that the Government failed to promptly investigate the death in custody of Ms. Amini.
(b) Independence and impartiality of the investigations:
253. In relation to at least two investigation teams, serious concerns arise as to their institutional independence. One of the investigation team was formed by the Legal Medicine Organization, which is placed under the Judiciary. Another investigation team was formed by the Ministry of Interior, which has authority over the Public Security Police. This investigation was thus carried out the investigation by the department which oversees the morality police officers who had subjected Ms. Amini to physical violence. The Judiciary is not only in the reporting line of one of the investigations, but also due to receive the final report(s) of all of the five separate investigations launched into the death. The Chief of Judiciary, moreover, issued an order to investigate the death in custody of Jina Mahsa, which forms the basis of a criminal case filed in the Tehran Prosecutorâs Office.
254. No information was made available on the composition of investigative bodies, including whether they included independent medical experts. No terms of reference were provided, and as such no information was available on the scope, methods of work or standard of proof applied. No other information is given to indicate exclusion of any prejudice or bias by the members of the investigation and no guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect are offered. The report does not include the final report to the Judiciary, nor the post-mortem examination, the hospital file, medical records, and expertsâ opinions relied on, which may have included relevant information. Based on the available information, it cannot be concluded that the investigation is independent and impartial.
(c) Effectiveness and thoroughness of the investigations:
255. The HCHR reports do not provide any material in support of its assertions in relation to Jina Mahsa Aminiâs health, injuries and death. In fact, the report does not explicitly say that Aminiâs body showed no injuries at all, rather they opine only that the death was not caused by an injury. No information is given as to the process of excluding injuries as a cause of death. Moreover, the reports do not provide any information on the underlying or contributory cause(s) of death. In the absence of the terms of reference, a concluding report summarizing the results of the investigation(s) or any other type of relevant information, it is not possible to determine how the investigation was conducted and whether the investigation determined the cause and manner of Ms. Aminiâs death. No information is given on the rights of the victimâs family, the extent of their participation in the investigation, and on any support or protection for them, including protection from reprisals. Based on the available information, it cannot be concluded that the investigation was conducted in an effective and thorough manner.
(d). Transparency of the investigations:
256. As mentioned, with one exception, no information was made available either on the composition of the investigations established by the Government, or their terms of reference, methods of work and procedures. No information was given on whether Ms. Aminiâs family was able to participate freely in the investigations and updated on the process or its progress. The final report was not shared with OHCHR (nor the post-mortem examination, the hospital file, medical records, including records prior to the death, and expertsâ opinions on which it relied). No information has yet been received as to whether the findings will be made public, including their factual and legal basis. Based on the available information, it cannot be concluded that the investigations into the death of Ms. Amini were conducted in a transparent manner.
257. In addition, the Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that the Iranian authorities took active steps to suppress the right the truth about the death of Jina Mahsa Amini to her own family and to the general public. This was carried out through various means including by exerting pressure on Jina Mahsaâs family to remain silent and to not seek redress, arresting and prosecuting some of her family members, prosecuting the familyâs lawyer and journalists who reported on her case, and prohibiting them from travelling to receive the Sakharov price awarded post-mortem to Ms Amini.
258. The Mission also finds that the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to abide by their obligations to take reasonable measures to protect the life and physical integrity of Jina Mahsa Amini, as well as her right to equality, freedom of expression and autonomy-privacy, which could have had a real prospect of preventing the death of Jina Mahsa Amini. Instead, the State pursued a repressive discriminatory policy to punish women and girls for not complying with the mandatory hijab laws including through introducing new draft legislation and exacerbating previous patterns of violence against them in those acting in solidarity.
259. By not responding to the Missionâs repeated requests for information, the Government has further failed to fulfil its duty to cooperate internationally in an investigation into potentially unlawful death, concerning allegations of an international crime namely extrajudicial execution.
IV. Context- the human rights situation of women and girls in Iran
260. Iranian women have broken many barriers and glass ceilings both domestically and globally. Iranian women have acquired an impressive array of awards and prizes for their excellence in a range of professional fields, including in science, arts and literature, human rights, and sports, among others.
261. Iran is one of only two countries with two women Nobel peace laureates, namely Narges Mohammadi (2023) and Shirin Ebadi (2003). Lawyer Shirin Ebadi received the prize in 2003 for her fight against child abuse, and for womenâs rights and the fair treatment of political prisoners. Journalist Narges Mohammadi received the award in 2023, while in prison, for her efforts in promoting women and human rights in Iran. Iranian womenâs struggles and activism were also recognized through the award of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, to human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh in 2012, for defending religious minorities, women, children and many political prisoners. In 2023, the Sakharov Prize was awarded to Jina Mahsa Amini and the “Woman, Life, Freedom Movement” in recognition of âtheir struggle and to continue to honour all those who have paid the ultimate price for libertyâ.
262. In 2014, Maryam Mirzakhani, an Iranian mathematician, became the first woman to win the Fields Medal, a prestigious mathematics award. Yusra Sulaimani, a young girl, has represented Iran in international mathematics competitions and won several prizes.
263. Iranian women artists have also gained international recognition. Samira Makhmalbafâs talent as a film director was acknowledged in film festivals. Despite censorship guidelines regarding women actors and the depiction of women on screen, many women actors have emerged in Iranian cinema and garnered international recognition such as Taraneh Alidoosti who presented Leilaâs Brothers at the 2022 Cannes Film Festival and Zar Amir-Ebrahimi who won the Cannes Film Festival Award for Best Actress in 2022 for the movie Holy Spider. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, women have been banned from singing in front of male audiences or in public if it is âwith the objective of seducing the listenerâ unless women are part of a choir of mixed voices. This effectively means women cannot pursue singing as a profession within Iran. Many Iranian women continue to sing outside Iran, notably singers such as Googoosh and Parissa.
264. Prominent Iranian women writers Simin Daneshvar, Azar Nafisi, Shahrnoosh Parsipoor and Zoya Pirzad received great critical acclaim inside and outside of Iran and are amongst the most read writers in Iran. Simin Daneshvar was forbidden from writing after the Islamic Revolution and Parsipoor was jailed several times and later left for the USA.
265. Iranian women have also distinguished themselves in sports, in spite of many obstacles faced by women athletes. For example, Kimiah Alizadeh, a Taekwondo Olympic champion, reportedly left Iran in 2020 because of the discrimination she faced as a woman. Iranian women also excel in chess, yet several women players were sanctioned by the Iranian authorities or the national federation for competing without the mandatory hijab.
266. Domestically, Iranian women and girls have made considerable strides in various areas, in particular in education, with a literacy rate of 85 per cent, nearly 99 per cent finishing primary education and 91.4 per cent secondary education. There has been almost no gender gap in primary or secondary school enrolment for over a decade and women represent the majority of university students.
267. Besides the level of education achieved by women and girls in Iran, other indicators reveal progress by women such as a higher average age of marriage and lower birth and maternal mortality rates.
268. These advances are highlighted by the Iranian authorities including in a report published by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran titled Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran in February 2023. The report includes four tables with a list of womenâs achievements in employment and economic participation, education and political participation and the governmental measures that have purportedly supported such achievements.
269. At the same time however, Iran is among a small minority of countries that is not party to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). During Iranâs Universal Periodic Review in November 2019 and the adoption of the outcome of the review in March 2020 by the Human Rights Council, the Government of Iran rejected recommendations of other member states to ratify CEDAW.
270. There had been several attempts by earlier administrations to ratify CEDAW. Under Article 77 of Iranâs Constitution, âtreaties, conventions, contracts, and international agreements should be ratified by the House of Representatives.â President Rafsanjani and President Khatami’s attempts to spearhead a law allowing for the ratification of CEDAW were blocked by the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution. Later, a law adopted by Parliament in May 2003 was formally rejected by the Guardian Council in August 2003. At that time, the Secretary-General of the Guardian Council, Ahmad Jannati claimed that âthe proposal of the government to join this convention is against the essentials of Islam, contrary to the principles of Islam and contrary to several principles of the Constitution.This echoed the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic and the first Supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, that the âconvention contradicts some of the essentials of Islam, such as inheritance, retribution, dowry, divorce, martyrdom, age of puberty, mahram and non-mahram, hijab, polygamy, etc.”
271. In December 2022, Iran was removed from the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), the first ever state to face such an action, due to âserious concerns over the actions of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran since September 2022 to continuously undermine and increasingly suppress the human rights of women and girls [âŠ] by administering policies flagrantly contrary to the human rights of women and girls and to the mandate of the Commission on the Status of Womenâ.
272. Despite the advances highlighted by the Government and the high literacy rates, women and girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran face a plethora of challenges in claiming their human rights. They are confronted on a daily basis with discrimination in law and in practice in virtually all aspects of their private and public lives. Their participation in the state apparatus, including legislative bodies, the judiciary, local authorities and law enforcement is more tokenism than actual equality, effectively depriving them of major decision-making roles both in the public and private spheres. Women and girlsâ education, professional careers as well as their access to public services and to public spaces, freedom of movement, right to health are conditioned by their adherence to mandatory hijab laws. Womenâs and girlsâ access to sexual and reproductive rights is underpinned by the Stateâs ideology with respect to family and its insistence on the primacy of womenâs reproductive role. This is well reflected in the 2023 World Economic Forumâs global gender gap index with Iran ranking 143rd place, making it fourth from last, globally.
273. Iran is a predominantly urban country with a 23 per cent rural population. Like a number of countries in the Middle East and South Asia, Iran displays varying trends in its diverse population – divided by urban-rural; ethnicity; religion; socio-economic background and political affiliation. A highly educated polity (male and female) co-exists with non-literate communities. Extremes of wealth and affluence also exist in stark contrast to impoverished sections of society. Ethnic and religious minorities live in constant threat to their livelihoods, worsened by climate change. Discriminatory laws and socio-legal systems exacerbate the above. Women and girls from ethnic and religious minorities, those from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, and women and girls whose sexual orientation, identity or choices do not conform to social norms, face intersectional discrimination and are subjected to multi-layered human rights violations. For example, the highest unemployment rates are found in provinces where the majority of the population is from ethnic and religious minorities. Near absence of fundamental rights especially of women and girls, ethnic and religious minorities as well as those who do not conform to the dictate of the government are some of the causes leading to periodic resistance from the Iranian people.
274. This section provides an overview of what the Mission considers were among the root causes of the protests that began on 16 September 2022 and the enabling factors that led to the violent response by the Iranian authorities. This section provides an analysis of the discriminatory laws and policies that have led women, men and children to take to the streets in September 2022 and the important events and developments that served as their precursor.
A. Key aspects of structural and institutionalized discrimination and inequality in law and practice
âThe enemy has always been falsely accusing the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of being prejudiced against women. This is slander, which they have been saying since the beginning of the Revolution, even though there were so many prominent women who appeared during the Revolution but were absent prior to it.â
Ayatollah Khamenei
1. The role of women in the Islamic Republic of Iran
275. While the Constitution of Iran guarantees the right to equality before the law between men and women, article 20 contains a significant proviso, making this right subject to âcompliance with Islamic criteriaâ. Similarly, article 21 sets out the obligation of the state to secure the rights of women in all respects, according to the Islamic criteriaâ. Further, Article 4 of the Constitution empowers the Guardian Council – an all-male body (amongst which six clerics are designated by the Supreme Leader) â to determine and define âIslamic criteriaâ or standards. Shariâa serves as the central and predominant foundation and justification for legislation, but several laws examined by the Mission appear to reflect the ideology of the Islamic Republic rather than Shariâa. Two other documents set out the rights of women, the 2016 Charter of Citizenship Rights and the Charter of Women’s Rights and Responsibilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 2004 but contain similar caveats.
276. Motherhood is an important tenet of Iranian womenâs role under the Islamic Republic. It is linked to womenâs role in safeguarding the family, which is the central unit of Iranian society according to the Constitution.
277. The Constitution assigns to women a maternal and child-bearing and rearing role. It also sees women as needing protection rather than as equal to men with the establishment in Article 21 of the Constitution of a special insurance for women without guardians. This Article reflects a patriarchal mentality where women are not considered as independent adults and require a guardian. Women without a guardian are seen as vulnerable. It further bestows the custody of children to qualified mothers (emphasis added).
278. The Constitution states that âthe family is the primal unit of society and the essential center for the growth and grandeur of men. [âŠ] In accordance with this view of the family unit, women are emancipated from the state of being an âobjectâ or a âtoolâ in the service of disseminating consumerism and exploitation, while reclaiming the crucial and revered responsibility of motherhood and raising ideological vanguards. Women shall walk alongside men in the active arenas of existence. As a result, women will be the recipients of a more critical responsibility and enjoy a more exalted and prized estimation in view of Islamâ.
279. In addition to the Constitution, Iranâs legal framework appears focussed on the preservation of the family and the chastity of women, including personal status laws and criminal law, in effect maintaining the dominance of males, subordination of women and denial of their autonomy. For example, article 1105 of the Civil Code bestows the legal status of âhead of the familyâ exclusively on the husband, and makes him responsible for maintenance of the wife, including âthe dwellings, clothing, food, furniture […] âIf the wife refuses to fulfil duties of a wife without legitimate excuse, she will not be entitled to ⊠maintenance.â In doing so, the law links maintenance of the wife to her fulfilling her obligations, including sexual intercourse as part of the duty of obedience or tamkin. Article 1114 of the Civil Code states that the âwife must stay in the dwelling that the husband allots for her. Moreover, the Civil Code allows for the husband to âprevent his wife from occupations or technical work which are incompatible with the family interests or the dignity of himself or his wife.â
280. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Supreme Leader have stressed the importance of the patriarchal family which is reflected in the post-revolutionary legal framework. The Family Protection Act and Law adopted in 1967 and 1975 respectively granting women the right to divorce and to child custody and abolishing polygamy were repealed immediately after the Islamic Revolution. There is pervasive discrimination against women and girls in personal status family law in relation to the age of marriage, the right to marry and rights during marriage, divorce, guardianship and child custody, and to inheritance. Under the Civil Code, the age of marriage is 13 for girls and 15 for boys. Girls can marry before the age of 13 with permission from a judge at the request of the father or grandfather. A bill banning the marriage of girls below 13 sponsored by the womenâs faction of the Parliament was rejected by Parliament in 2018. The increase in child marriages in recent years has been attributed to increased poverty and government-backed marriage loans. Permission to marry for women and girls must be granted by her father or paternal grandfather or a judge if the father or paternal grandfather donât have a justifiable reason not to grant permission. Under the Civil Code, Iranian women need the governmentâs permission to marry a non-Iranian. Polygamy is allowed in Iranian law. In addition, men can enter an unlimited number of temporary marriages. Women and girls in temporary marriages are vulnerable as they are not entitled to maintenance or inheritance and may face difficulties registering children born out of such marriages. Spouses do not have equal rights to divorce. There are limited grounds for divorce for women whereas a man has an unqualified and unilateral right to divorce. The Family Protection Law of 2013 established family courts with the mandatory presence of female advisory judges.
281. Children born to Iranian fathers have ipso facto Iranian citizenship. A recent amendment in 2019 allows Iranian women married to non-Iranian men to apply for Iranian nationality for their children aged under 18 years if there is no security problem as determined by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Intelligence organization of the IRGC:
282. In 2021, alarmed by the decreasing birth rate and an ageing population, the Iranian authorities adopted a number of pro-natalist policies and laws. The Rejuvenation of the Population and Support of Family Law adopted in November 2021 by the Majles marked the culmination of a legislative and policy shift started a decade earlier which further entrenched discrimination against women by reinforcing their primary roles as being wives and mothers.
283. The law ended access to free-of-charge birth control in public medical facilities, instructed pharmacies to only sell contraception with a prescription, banned vasectomies and tubectomies, further limited access to abortion only to situations where the pregnancy would endanger a womanâs life and the only way to save the mother is abortion provided that the foetus is in the first four months of gestation, and further criminalized abortion providers (including those selling abortion âdrugsâ), and those disseminating information on abortion. In the extreme case where abortion is lawful, the woman would need to obtain a license issued by a commission of three experts, including a judge, a medical expert and a forensic doctor. Under the fallacious understanding that C-sections impact womenâs fertility, the law seeks to limit the number of C-sections by forbidding insurance payments for the procedure and encouraging hospitals, through financial incentives, to increase their natural childbirth rates. Limitations on C-sections could endanger the lives of women and children. Against the backdrop of the economic crisis in Iran, the termination of free-of-charge birth control dealt a severe blow to marginalized women and women and couples with low incomes.
2. Discriminatory laws and practices against women and girls
284. The pervasive discrimination against women and girls that prevails in Iran is also enshrined in criminal law and criminal procedure. The Mission highlighted below the areas of discrimination in law and in practice most relevant to its mandate. The Islamic Penal Code contains several provisions that treat women and men differently, in areas ranging from criminal responsibility to financial compensation for harm and the value of testimony. Other provisions are only applicable to women such as the criminalization of the lack of hijab or improper hijab while some morality-related offences such as adultery, sexual misconduct, or prostitution penalize women disproportionately. Punishments amounting to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment such as flogging and stoning disproportionately affect women.
(a) Criminalization of rights and conduct that affect women adversely
285. Articles 221 to 232 criminalize consensual sexual relations outside marriage. Article 225 specifically criminalizes adultery which is punishable by death by hanging or stoning. Sexual relations between consenting adults of the same sex are also criminalized.
286. In November 2023, the announcement that a woman had been sentenced to death for adultery was a stark reminder that women continue to face punishment for adultery. The case also highlighted the harsher punishment of women as in this case the woman was reportedly sentenced to death while the man involved was sentenced to lashes. Similarly, the death sentences against Zahra (Sareh) Sedighi Hamadani and Elham Chobdar spotlighted the risks faced by LGBTQ+ people in Iran.
287. The Islamic Penal Code contains other morality-related offences that affect women particularly such as article 639 which criminalizes âencouraging people to prostitution and corruption âtashvÄ«q-e mardom be fahshÄ va fesÄdâ. This article has been relied on to prosecute some of the women who defied mandatory hijab laws (see Section VIII). The Computer Crimes Act (Law No. 71063) of 2010 contains a Chapter 4 dedicated to Crimes against Public Morality and Chastity.
288. The Mission is deeply concerned at provisions in the Islamic Penal Code that provide for mitigating circumstances for so-called âhonour killingsâ for a husband finding his wife committing adultery (in flagrante) or father or grandfather. A spate of so-called âhonour killingsâ has outraged Iranians. In 2020, 14 years old Romina Ashrafi was murdered by her father for eloping with a much older man from a different religious group. Romina was reportedly decapitated with a sickle during her sleep. In 2021, Ali Fazeli Monfared was reportedly decapitated by his half-brother and two cousins for being a gay. They had found out about his sexual orientation through his military exemption card. Mona Heydari was reportedly murdered in a so-called âhonour killingsâ by her husband in the city of Ahvaz in 2022. This event shook Iranian public opinion due to the particularly gruesome circumstances of the killing as the 17-year-old girl was beheaded and her corpse paraded on the streets by her husband. According to the medical journal The Lancet, there were at least 8,000 âhonour killingsâ in Iran between 2010 and 2014, of which only a few were reported. It is estimated that between 375 to 450 âhonour killingsâ occur annually.
289. The killing of Romina Ashrafi prompted Masoumeh Ebtekar, the then Vice President of Iran for Women and Family Affairs to request an investigation and to expedite a bill to strengthen the punishment for the so-called honour killing of children, which the majority of the members of Iranâs parliament, the Majlis, voted for. The law titled Law on Protection of Children & Adolescents was enacted on 12 May 2020, but falls short of addressing the discriminatory and low age of criminal responsibility for girls, child marriage and the imposition of the death penalty against children.
(b) Violence against women and girls
290. Crimes committed in the name of so called âhonourâ also put a spotlight on other forms of endemic violence against women and girls in Iran and the ambiguous response of the authorities.
291. In spite of 2019 legislation imposing tougher sentences for acid , in October 2020, Aliyeh Motallebzadeh was reportedly sentenced to two years in prison for advocating for women victims of acid attacks and Negar Masoudi.
292. In a 2004 national study, 66 per cent of married women polled had experienced domestic violence at least once in their lives, and of these 30 percent had experienced physical violence and 10 percent had experienced physical violence with lasting harm. According to an official with Iranâs Legal Medicine Organization, in 2021, about 75,000 domestic violence cases were investigated, accounting for 37% of all examinations. These statistics only reflect cases reported to authorities and referred to Forensic Medicine to verify the severity of the assault or identify other mental and physical injuries. Despite these high figures and underreporting of cases of violence, the government response is woefully inadequate. The infrastructure to protect women against violence is extremely limited with only approximately 27 womenâs shelters in the country, with a capacity for five persons at each shelter. The World Bank put the percentage of women who have experienced intimate partner violence at 31 percent, above the world average.
293. Domestic violence in Iran is compounded by laws that do not adequately criminalize violence against women when they are not sanctioning or facilitating such violence. Under the current Penal Code, violence against women falls under the general assault and battery provisions. In addition to a restrictive definition of rape (see Section V section on SGBV), marital rape is not criminalized as women are subjected to tamkin and the obligation of a wife to satisfy the sexual needs of her husband. Divorce is discouraged by the authorities and women can ask for divorce in limited circumstances as explained above. There is no comprehensive law on violence against women , no criminalization of domestic violence and inadequate protection against sexual harassment and violence.
294. A bill on violence against women has been in the making for more than a decade. A comprehensive bill on violence against women was completed under the stewardship of the Vice Presidency for Women and Family Affairs. The cabinet has been reviewing the draft âProtection, Dignity and Security of Women against Violenceâ bill since 17 September 2019, after the judiciary announced that it had completed its review and submitted the bill back to the cabinet. However, after much back and forth between various government bodies and the watering down of the bill, the chair of the womenâs faction in the Parliament announced in February 2023 that they were reviewing a bill titled âPrevention of Harm against Women and Increasing Womenâs Security in the Face of Mistreatment.â This new bill, which fails even to mention the word violence, passed the initial review by Parliament in April 2023 and is scheduled for a full vote by Parliament. It frames the protection of women as a necessary act in defense of the sanctity of the family. The law penalizes sending vulgar messages to a woman which may cause psychological harm and men who evict their spouses from the home are criminally liable. While it offers material support to injured women (i.e. free medical treatment, employment incentives, counselling centres) and states that family members cannot coerce women into marriage to settle disputes, the law does not clearly define domestic violence. Harassment and humiliation, marital rape are not covered by the law and physical harm is presented as the only outward sign of domestic abuse.
(c) Employment and access to livelihood
295. The Iranian Civil Code sets out that the husband has the authority to prevent her from taking up employment that he considers incompatible with family interests or harmful to his or her reputation. According to a human rights organization, during divorce, court proceedings, husbands frequently try to gain an advantage by accusing their wives of working without their consent or in jobs they deem unsuitable.
296. Iranâs labour laws provide that âall individuals, men and women, are entitled to equal protection of the law and can choose any profession they desire as long as it is not against Islamic values, public interest, or the rights of others.â However, women are excluded from some professions, notably women cannot be judges on equal footing with men. In addition, the authorities have also encouraged women to fill some positions over others such as gynaecology and social work. Some jobs are not deemed suitable for women and a preference for men over women is given in hiring processes both in the private and public sector. âWomenâs employment policies in the Islamic Republic of Iranâ approved by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution on 11 August 1992, classifies jobs into categories: category A entails jobs deemed desirable for women such as midwifery, medicine and teaching; category B includes jobs that âmatch the characteristics of women – mentally and physicallyâ such as laboratory research sciences, electronic engineering, pharmaceuticals, assistants, translators; category C covers jobs in which there is no preference for male over female employees and for which selection is based upon competence and experience, not gender such as simple labor and finally, category D that includes jobs deemed unsuitable for women either due to prohibitions in Sharia or harsh working conditions, or owing to religious (cultural and social) values, such as justice and firefighting.
297. In spite of a law guaranteeing equality of wages, women reportedly earned 41 per cent less than men for the same work.
298. With a view to protecting the family, the State has enacted laws in relation to maternity leave, accommodations of working times to support mothers with childcare responsibilities, early retirement and social security benefits.
299. Women, especially from ethnic minorities, in many of Iranâs less economically developed provinces struggle to find employment. According to reports, Sistan and Baluchestan has one of the highest rates of unemployment and poverty along with a growing number of women-headed households. The province also has the highest number of households headed by girls under the age of eighteen.
300. Another example is that of Kurdistan and Kermanshah provinces, which have Iranâs highest unemployment rates in 2021, at 18.8 percent and 18 percent, respectivelyâtwice the national average. The compounded discrimination based on gender and ethnicity by women from ethnic minorities mean that women in provinces with large ethnic minorities, especially border provinces, face even greater barriers.
(d) Womenâs role in the judiciary
301. In the early 1980s, women were banned from acting as judges and were discouraged from becoming lawyers. The first article of the law of 4 May 1982 titled “Law regarding the conditions for the selection of judges” states that “Judges are selected amongst the following qualified men”. Article 163 of the Constitution says the selection criteria of judges should be legislated based on Sharia principles. The ban was relaxed on 14 February 1985 but women are still barred from being judges on equal footing with men. Women can be appointed as advisory judges, investigating judges, oversee proceedings, sit on three-member appeal panels. Womenâs participation in family courts have been made mandatory; the Family Protection Law of 2013 made the participation of women advisory judges in family courts compulsory. However, even in this role women judges are prevented from rendering a judgment.
(e) Participation of women in public life and political decision-making
302. One of the areas where the position of women as subalterns is evident is that of participation of women in the public life of Iran and political decision-making. A combination of laws and practices excluding women from some positions, the Guardian Councilâs screening out of women candidates for political office as well as the fact that some positions are elected or appointed among clerics de facto excluding women translate into insurmountable hurdles for women to overcome.
303. Women in Iran acquired the right to vote and to run for parliament in 1963. While several laws in favour Ayatollah Khomeini did not restrict womenâs right to vote in light of the pivotal role they could play in elections.
304. Almost no women are represented in senior decision-making positions; the positions of Supreme Leader, President or Head of the Judiciary have never being held by a woman, no woman has ever been appointed to the 12-member Guardians Council, the Assembly of Experts or the Expediency Council. The Iranian authorities in their report to the UN Human Rights Committee noted that women are eligible to run for the Assembly of Experts. Yet, until now, the Guardian Council has rejected women candidates on the ground of their lack of qualifications in Fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence.
305. According to Article 115 of the Constitution, one of the criteria for a presidential candidate is being rajol-e siasi, an Arabic term which may be interpreted in Persian as a âpolitical manâ or a âpolitical personality.â Since Persian is a gender-neutral language, it is not clear whether this phrase is intended to restrict presidential candidates to males or to encompass both male and female candidates and the Guardian Council has resisting clarifying the provision. Yet, Iranian women have sought permission to run for president since the late 1990s. In 1997, Azam Taleghani, then a 53-year-old womenâs rights advocate, made history by becoming the first woman to register as a candidate for president with the intention to press the Guardian Council to clarify the provision of the Constitution.
306. It was only in the mid-1990s that a woman was appointed deputy minister. Then, in 1997, President Mohammad Khatami named Masoumeh Ebtekar as one of his vice presidents in charge of environmental affairs, Aazam Nouri as deputy culture minister for legal and parliamentary affairs and Zahra Shojai as Iranâs first director-general for womenâs affairs. However, in the face of conservative backlash, during his second term, then President Khatami did not appoint any women to ministerial posts.
307. In 2009, President Ahmadinejad nominated three women to his cabinet, but only one, Marzieh Vahid-Dastjerdi, received parliamentary approval. President Rouhani, on the other hand, renegaded on his election promise to appoint women as cabinet ministers and instead named several women as vice presidents, including Shahindokht Molaverdi as vice president for women and family affairs , Masoumeh Ebtekar as vice-president for the environment and Laaya Joneidi as vice president for legal affairs.
308. Iran ranks 174th out of 184 for the number of women in Parliament. Iranian women may be elected to the parliament provided their candidacy is approved by the Guardian Council. At the time of writing, elections had taken place in March 2024 but the final results were not yet public. Against the backdrop of increasing acts of defiance of mandatory hijab by women and girls, women who did not adhere to mandatory hijab laws were reportedly not barred from voting in the March 2024 elections. At the time of writing, of some 15,200 candidates running for seats, only around 12 percent were women, according to interior ministry figures. According to media reports, 11 women garnered enough votes to enter parliament in the first round of the elections. In September 2022 at the start of the protests, there were 16 women members of Parliament making up 5.5 percent of Parliament. For the 2016 elections, women organized to increase their number in Parliament and 17 seats. Prior to that, the Parliament elected in 2012 included nine women and 281 men. In the 1980 legislative elections, the Islamic Republicâs first, only four women earned seats. Serving alongside 270 male counterparts, these female members of parliament compromised slightly more than 1 % of representatives.
309. The criteria for the selection of candidates by the Guardian Council are not always made clear. In some cases, candidates were able to run but their ballots were annulled, or they were elected once and forbidden from running again. During the 2014 parliamentary elections, re-elected female candidate Mino Khaleghi saw her ballots annulled by the Guardian Council. Elaheh Koulaei who was elected in 2000 was the first member of parliament to appear wearing a headscarf as opposed to a chador, she was barred from participating in the following elections and to this day the selection criteria of the Guardian Council have not been made public .
310. Womenâs participation in local councils is even more limited with 3.2 per cent of elected seats held by women in deliberative bodies of local government. While the number of women in political office is very low, women make up 48% of voters showing very active participation in political affairs.
(f) Access to education
311. While women and girls have made significant strides in education, they still experience discrimination. The Islamic Republic of Iranâs education policies have revolved around the Islamisation of education with changes to the curriculum, gender-segregated classes, mandatory hijab, and the channeling of women into âfeminineâ majors that prevent the pursuit of certain careers.
312. In the years following the Islamic Revolution women were barred from 91 fields of studies out of 169 until the courses were modified and deemed suitable for women. These included law, engineering and agriculture. It also introduced gender segregation in schools and to some extent in universities.
313. These restrictions were lifted in 1993 only to reappear in 2012. Under President Ahmadinejad, the authorities sought to reduce the number and proportion of female students in higher education by imposing quotas to limit the number of women in some courses or excluding women. On 20 August 2012, the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology announced that 36 universities banned women from 77 fields of study. The announcement came after the publication of the results of university entrance exams with women outnumbering men in higher education. The fields chosen include most sciences and engineering. In addition, courses such as womenâs studies were amended to remove any focus on womenâs rights under international law and reflect womenâs âtraditionalâ roles and responsibilities within the family as wives and mothers and Islamic values.
(g) Access to public spaces
314. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 re-introduced degrees of gender segregation in education and public places. All schools (both primary and high schools) remain segregated by sex for students and teachers. In universities, varying degrees of segregation are enforced. Women and men must sit separately in the classroom and some facilities such as dormitories, libraries and restaurants are fully segregated by sex. Some universities, such as Tabriz Islamic Art University are completely gender segregated. All sports complexes, swimming pools, and water parks are segregated and until recently women were barred from attending sports events in stadiums. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses and women have dedicated cars in the metro. Mixed gatherings and parties are banned.
315. The mandatory hijab is a key tool in the hands of the Iranian government to control and subjugate women and girls in Iran.
3. The centrality of mandatory hijab
3. History of the mandatory hijab in Iran
“The issue of hijab is not intended to isolate women. Those who have such a perception of hijab are mistaken. The purpose of the hijab is to prevent men and women from interacting with each other without observing any boundaries. Such an interaction would be detrimental to society and both men and women — particularly women. Hijab helps women reach the lofty moral position they deserve and prevents them from moral deviation.”
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
316. The mandatory hijab is one of the most central tenets of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In many ways the mandatory hijab has become a symbol of the Islamic Republicâs rule, and the âmorality policeâ the instrument of its enforcement. Since September 2022, the Supreme Leader, the President and the Head of the Judiciary have emphasized that mandatory veiling laws are âirrevocableâ and promised to âcreate fearâ for those who âfight Godâs lawâ. Earlier, in April 2022, the Minister of Interior had described the hijab as an essential element of Islamic law and that as such it would remain one of the key principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
317. Iran has a long and fraught history around veiling. The dress code and the hijab in particular, and its presence or absence, have been a political marker and symbol of different systems of governance. The cultural and political significance of the dress code and in particular the hijab have evolved and transformed significantly through the 20th century in Iran. For more than a hundred years, under different systems of governance, the hijab (or the ban on hijab) has been at the center of power struggles and a symbol of the ruling system.
318. The decision to impose the mandatory hijab for women was taken early following the establishment of the Islamic Republic. .
319. While the hijab has existed in Iran for centuries and is ostensibly a religious symbol, it had cultural, social and political significance. It has multiple manifestations: the roosari (headscarf), the chador (a cloak, which is black for formal occasions and in public spaces, and colourful and patterned for more informal occasions or inside the house), and the maghnaeh. Hijab cannot be understood only through the prism of religion. Hijab intersects with questions of state sovereignty and bodily autonomy and choice and has been central to the struggle between national sovereignty, âwesternisationâ and âanti-imperialismâ.
320. In 1848, under the Qajar Dynasty, TĂĄhirih Qurrat al-ÊżAyn, a poet theologian and disciple of the BĂĄb, was the first Iranian woman to publicly unveil herself in front of a male audience during the Badasht conference. She was reportedly sentenced to death in 1852 at the age of 35 for the offence of corruption on earth â efsad-e fel-arz . By some accounts, she was the first woman in Iran to have been executed on such a charge.
321. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, also under the Qajar Dynasty, established a Persian parliament and led to the promotion of womenâs and girlsâ education. Women actively participated in political campaigning by organizing meetings and creating secret societies, yet the issue of the hijab did not feature prominently.
322. In 1928, during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi (from 1925 to 1941) the Majles outlawed ethnic and traditional clothing through the Uniform Dress Law which required all male Persians to dress uniformly in Western style. Earlier in 1927, the “Pahlavi cap” was made mandatory for all men, and later replaced by a European felt hat, further signaling a Western anchorage.
323. In 1935, the Kanun Banovan (Ladies Centre) was founded to positively influence and steer women towards unveiling. That same year, state officials were penalized when their wives appeared at functions wearing a veil. Enforced unveiling in schools from 1935-36 led to violent outbreaks in the conservative city of Mashhad.
324. On 8 January 1936, a decree was passed âKashf-e Hijab (the mandatory unveiling law)â providing for mandatory non-hijab or unveiling of women in Iran. This step was taken in opposition to the influence of the clergy and was largely welcomed by the middle and upper classes. Women were forbidden from walking on the streets with headscarves and chadors and many accounts suggest that the police enforced this law through physical violence. Reforms targeting the hijab and ethnic clothing had a disproportionate effect on the lives of people from low-income groups, particularly in the provinces and on those from minority groups as they were also compelled to give up traditional clothing which was part of their culture and could not afford to buy the âWesternâ clothes imposed by the authorities. At the same time, women were able to access universities (in 1935, the first group of women was enrolled at Tehran University). In 1963, women obtained the right to vote and in 1968, the first woman Minister of Education, Farrokrooh Parsa, was appointed in Iran.
325. Since the first quarter of the twentieth century, womenâs dress code has been employed as a political tool and arguably, as a tool of social engineering for bringing women into the public sphere of life. This simplistic approach ignored the nuances inherent in a diverse population who had never known any other dress code but the chador – also considered as a symbol of appropriate apparel and appearance in a public space. During the reign of Reza Shah, the head covering (mostly in the form of the chador), was actively discouraged and then banned through a Kashf-e-hijab law in 1936. This was the beginning of the âhijabâ as a symbol of resistance in that while some women welcomed it others were uncomfortable in giving it up.
326. Reza Shahâs successor, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, relaxed the Kashf-e-hijab law in 1941, resorting to more subtle and politically less controversial ways of undermining and discouraging the hijab/chador. The elite and middle classes, including some professional women by and large embraced the idea of de-veiling by giving up of the chador/hijab, whereas those on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder and rural women mostly continued to wear it. However, as political opposition to Reza Pahlavi heightened, memories of police stripping women of their chadors on the streets of Tehran and other towns and cities were revived in the public consciousness. Middle class women, both secular and religious, started wearing the hijab as a symbol of opposition to the Pahlavi government, culminating in the (black) chador becoming an important symbol of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
327. From 1941 onwards, unveiling was no longer enforced although the Kashf-e Hijab decree was still in force. Wearing the hijab in cities and workspaces was poorly regarded and could hinder promotions in workplace for women and men alike, as men also faced discrimination if their female relatives wore the veil. Many women from conservative backgrounds withdrew from public life for years, reportedly as they perceived not wearing a hijab as a form of enforced nudity.
328. Throughout the Revolution of 1979 against the rule of Reza Pahlavi, left political parties, and the clergy invoked anti-imperialist rhetoric and promoted the hijab as a visible manifestation of an anti-imperialist stand. Different political groupings used different forms of the hijab. When women members of the Communist Party, Tudeh, started wearing headscarves they tied them differently to their counterparts in the Mudjahideen-e Khalgh party to distinguish themselves. The black chador, which used to be formal wear for women, was widely adopted by followers of the clergy and was worn closed (while earlier it had usually been worn open, similar to an overcoat).
329. Women were amongst the first to be targeted by the restrictive laws after the arrival of the clergy into power in 1979. In 1979, within a week of International Womenâs Day, Ayatollah Khomeini abrogated the Family Protection Law as well as the right to abortion, lowered the age of marriage for girls to nine, dismissed women judges and made hijab mandatory in the workplace. Mandatory hijab was enforced immediately for civil servants. The rally planned in celebration of womenâs rights on 8 March effectively became a rally in opposition to the mandatory hijab with chants such as “Freedom is not western or eastern, it is international”. Men were encouraged to grow beards and pressured against wearing ties. These new dress norms became visible markers of state-sponsored masculinity and femininity, to differentiate itself from the West and from the former political system.
330. Three months after the arrival in power of Khomeini, Shahr-e No, the red-light district of Tehran was bulldozed, and sex workers were executed on the street and made a public example.
331. The provisional government as well as left-leaning parties did not engage in open confrontations with Ayatollah Khomeini and further restrictive laws infringing on womenâs rights and civil liberties were adopted progressively. During the writing of the Constitution, the provisional government led by Banisadr was more openly critical of the infringement of civil liberties as outlined by the text, but to no avail.
332. In 1983, article 102 of the Penal Code criminalized women who did not wear the hijab with up to 74 lashes for disrupting âpublic moralityâ. This law effectively rendered the hijab mandatory. At the time and in subsequent decades, a dichotomy emerged between women who wore the chador and women who practiced bad-hejabi, incorrect hijab.
333. Homa Darabi, a child psychiatrist and member of the Nation Party of Iran, faced increasing discrimination at work for allegedly wearing improper hijab. She complained about being continuously harassed at work and was ultimately fired from her university in 1991, and then forbidden from returning to work even though she won a court order in 1993 to be reinstated. In 1994, she self-immolated and died on the Tajrish Square in protest after taking off her chador and reportedly screaming “Death to tyranny, long live freedom, long live Iran”.
334. In this climate, debates emerged around the harshness of the imposition of the hijab and in 1996, the punishment for not observing proper hijab was reduced from flogging to imprisonment of between ten days to two months or a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 rials (Islamic Punishment Law, Note to Article 638).
(a) Hijab laws and regulations post-Revolution
335. The failure to wear the hijab or âproper hijabâ is criminalized in the Islamic Penal Code and offenders face fines and imprisonment.
336. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran claims that âthe phrase or the concept of âmandatory hijabâ does not exist in the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as âcoercion/compulsionâ is basically inherent in all laws. What is important is the legitimacy and acceptability of the laws, which have been observed in the hijab law due to the fact that it was approved in the parliament and that the majority of Iranian people are Muslims. âHijabâ is a concept proposed in the approved law based upon the Iranian societyâs cultural and religious characteristics.â The Government has likened the wearing of the mandatory hijab to wearing âseatbeltsâ or âface masksâ.
337. The Islamic Penal Code criminalizes the lack of hijab or improper hijab. Article 102 of the Islamic Penal Code of 1983 introduced the criminal offence of not wearing hijab as a Taâzirat offence. Article 638 of Iranâs Islamic Penal Code of 2013, Book V sets out that:
âAnyone in public places and roads who openly commits a harÄm (sinful) act, in addition to the punishment provided for the act, shall be sentenced to two monthsâ imprisonment or up to 74 lashes; and if they commit an act that is not punishable but violates public decency, they shall only be sentenced to ten days to two monthsâ imprisonment or up to 74 lashesâ. It also contains a note introduced in 1996 that deals specifically with the hijab and sets out that âWomen, who appear in public places and roads without wearing an Islamic hijab (hejab-e-sharâi), shall be sentenced to ten days to two monthsâ imprisonment or a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 Rials.â
338. While the article imposes an obligation on women to wear the hijab in public places and roads, it does not refer to girls specifically. The obligation to wear the hijab is however considered as applicable to girls aged nine and above as the age of criminal responsibility in Iran is nine for girls. In practice, the mandatory hijab appears to apply to girls as young as seven-years-old when they start school. Furthermore, the provision applies to all women in Iran irrespective of their religious beliefs or of their citizenship.
339. The text of the article in the Islamic Penal Code does not mention men, making it intrinsically discriminatory as the mandatory hijab is only applicable to women and girls. In practice. men are also subjected to an obligation of modesty. Men are not allowed to wear shorts or sleeveless T-shirts and could be harassed because of their hairstyle or long beards.
340. Under the Islamic Penal Code, no legal definition is provided for what constitutes a âproperâ hijab, leaving it up to law enforcement officers to act based on their own interpretation of the mandatory hijab provisions. Judges can rely on Shariâa law to interpret the provision on mandatory hijab. In July 2022, The Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice sought to provide guidance as to what constitutes proper hijab.
341. Other provisions of the Islamic Penal Code, in particular articles 639 and 640, have also been used to prosecute women repeatedly flouting hijab laws or advocating against mandatory hijab. According to article 639, anyone who âestablishes or directs a place of prostitution or corruptionâ and âanyone who facilitates or encourages people to prostitution or corruption will be sentenced to one year to ten yearsâ imprisonmentâ. Article 640 criminalizes âanyone who [âŠ] displays and shows to the public, or produces or keeps any writing or design, gravure, painting, picture, newspapers, advertisements, signs, film, cinema movie, or basically anything, that violates public decency and moralityâ and sets for a penalty of three months to one year of imprisonment and a fine of one million and five hundred Rials to six million Rials and up to 74 lashes.
342. Women who flout mandatory hijab laws or advocate against mandatory hijab may also be subject to a laundry list of charges under articles 638, 639 and 640, but also under article 43 related to âfacilitating the commission of a crimeâ (Article 43 Islamic Penal Code) as well as national security-related charges under article 500 on âpropaganda against the Stateâ, article 610 on âgathering and colluding against national securityâ (Article 610) and article 618 on âdisturbing public orderâ.
343. Lastly, under the Computer Crimes Law, women may face penalties for âinsulting morality and public decencyâ and âpublishing immodest pictures on social mediaâ with non-compliance with mandatory hijab online and punishment such as bans on media and online social activities.
344. Other penalties can be imposed based on article 23 of the Islamic Penal Code allowing a judge to add âcomplementaryâ sentences for âhadd, qisas, or taâzir punishments from sixth to first degree, that are âproportionate to the crime committed and the characteristics of those sentences,â such as exclusion from some professions, travel ban, house arrest, dismissal from public employment, ban from having a check book, driving ban, and compulsory education. It also envisages as complementary sentences community service. Crimes such as disturbing/committing an outrage on/offending public order and/or public modesty fall under the taâzir category of punishments, enabling the judge to increase further sentences against women and girls charged for not wearing the mandatory hijab. Substitute punishments such as supervised periods, unpaid public services and deprivation of social rights can also be imposed under Chapter nine of the Islamic Penal Code. In addition, article 3 of the Law on Certain Government Revenues and its Use, imprisonments provides that penalties under 91 days imprisonment are converted to financial fines of up to 1,000,000 rials. Law on alternative sentences allows for community service.
345. Beyond provisions of the Islamic Penal Code, other laws and regulations govern mandatory hijab. Indeed, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution had over the years directed every public institution to develop bylaws and policies on compliance with mandatory hijab. The provisions of the Islamic Penal Code are supplemented by numerous regulations that determine by law the way women and girls must dress in schools, universities, in public services, including hospitals as well as courts, in public buildings, in public transports, in planes and even in their cars which are not considered as private spaces. For example, to access court buildings or to work in a court, women are required to wear the chador and the maghnaeh which cover not only the head but also the forehead, the chin and the chest. Some universities, including the University of Tehran, require female students to wear a maghnaeh while the University of Qom makes the chador compulsory for female students.
346. Under such regulations, women and girls may be expelled or suspended from educational facilities for improper hijab or lack of hijab or lose their jobs.
(b) Policies of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution related to mandatory hijab.
347. While the Islamic Penal Code is succinct on mandatory hijab for women and girls, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution as well as the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice have devised several documents which set out the priorities and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding mandatory hijab.
348. The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution established in 1984 by Ayatollah Khomeini was a new iteration of the pre-existing Council of Cultural Revolution. Among other tasks, the Supreme Council is mandated to oversee the implementation of the principles of hijab and chastity by governmental entities. With a view to spreading the culture of hijab and chastity, the Supreme Council promulgated a number of binding policies and decisions that led to the creation of the âMorality Policeâ. This included, the1998 Guiding Principles and Strategies on the issue of promoting hijab and chastity laid out 16 principles for promoting hijab and chastity and the July 2005, âStrategies for the expansion of the culture of chastity and hijabâ.
349. This latter document provided some foundation for the creation of the Morality Police in as much as its article 26 set for the establishing groups of missionaries who are familiar with the principles and foundations of the culture of chastity and hijab and the proper methods of promoting it and using them optimally in religious and spontaneous public gatherings.
350. In January 2006, the Supreme Council endorsed a Resolution on Policies and Solutions for the Promotion of Culture of Hijab and Chastity (âthe Resolution on Hijab and Chastityâ). Notably, this is the first use by the Supreme Council of the term bad-Hejabi or âimproper hijabâ. The Resolution lays out further measures for enforcement, including in a wide range of public spaces, such as shops, shopping malls, parks, movie theatres, sports venues, living complexes, beaches and airports, among others, and enlists all state institutions in the development of laws and regulations regarding mandatory hijab and their enforcement. It suggests enforcing the law against women driving cars without proper hijab and recommends hiring experienced women, able to arrest women offenders. The Resolution empowers police officers to âdeclare the limits and legal definition of modesty and standards of improper hijabâ and to âtake legal steps to confront women with improper hijabâ. In 2013, it was reported that the Ministry of Interior had taken control over the âmorality policeâ.
351. A supplementary set of executive measures expanded the culture of chastity and hijab. It outlines the responsibility of different state organs in the enforcement of the mandatory hijab and details which public spaces fall under each organ or entity.
(c) Enforcement of mandatory hijab laws
352. The law does not define âproper hijabâ, allowing for considerable discretion to be exercised by those enforcing the relevant laws and regulations, including security and enforcement authorities and judicial officials. This inevitably allows for arbitrariness in its enforcement. As described above, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution and the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice have played key roles in devising policies on the implementation and enforcement of mandatory hijab. The Guidance Patrols under the Public Security Police, and the Basiji under the command of the IRGC have been the two entities primarily responsible for enforcing mandatory hijab laws.
Enforcement before establishment of the Gasht-e Ershad (âmorality policeâ)
353. In the 2005 “Plan for the Development of the Culture of Hijab and Chastity”, nine disciplinary forces were charged with the task of announcing the limits of modesty and standards of improper hijab in society with the aims of recognising its manifestation and holding unions, guilds and associations responsible to combat improper hijab practices and individuals.
354. The responsibilities allocated to these disciplinary forces included: 1) âwarning individuals with improper hijab and confronting them in public in accordance with the laws,â; 2) âproposing bills to policymakers regarding proper coverage while driving a vehicleâ and 3) âsupervision as well as legal and fundamental supervision of recreational and public spaces such as parks, cinemas, sports facilities, mountains, beaches, islands, free trade zones, airports and terminals.â
355. The âMorality Policeâ or Guidance Patrol was first deployed in 2005 under President Ahmadinejad. The Guidance Patrol does not have a legal foundation document that explicitly outlines its role and functions, including the procedures and methods for enforcing the mandatory hijab. The exact scope of its activities and authority is primarily shaped by the Governmentâs acts and internal regulations adopted by the Police Commander-in-Chief and since 2013 by the Ministry of Interior.
356. The Morality Security Police (police-e amniyat-e akhlaghi) is a sub-branch of the Intelligence and Public Security Police, charged with upholding the mandate to âfight evil and corruptionâ and enforcing related morality laws, including the mandatory hijab. Although the Police have always maintained units dedicated to morality policing, the Morality Security Police itself was formally created in 2007 by the Commander in Chief of the Police, following the Supreme Councilâs 2006 Resolution, to grant greater autonomy and authority to morality policing activities within the Police Force. The Morality Security Police supervises the Guidance Patrolâs activities, which consists of officers patrolling the streets of Iran.
357. Iranâs âmorality policeâ both conduct mobile patrols and operate “checkpoints” to enforce dress codes. Women make up less than a quarter of the squadron but frequently accompany their male counterparts, who often arrive in unmarked vans and pour out into the streets in green uniforms. The women, meanwhile, wear black cloaks that cover them from head to toe.
358. While the Guidance Patrolâs role is not limited to enforcing hijab rules, other law enforcement bodies can also enforce rules on hijab.
359. In cases reviewed by the Mission, women stopped by the “morality police” were given a notice or, in some cases, taken to a so-called âEducation and Advice centerâ or a police station, where they are required to attend a mandatory lecture on the hijab and Islamic values. They then have to call someone to bring them “appropriate clothes” in order to be released. The Mission also received credible information that women are asked to sign a pledge/undertaking that they will adhere to hijab rules before their release.
Enforcement of mandatory hijab by Basij forces
360. The Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice was founded in 1994 with the stated aim of upholding Fariza, or the duty in Shia Islam . In April 2015, a Law Supporting the Protection of those Engaged in the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice was adopted by the Majles. Article 17 permits all members of the Basij Forces to verbally promote virtue and prevent vice, essentially sanctioning abuses against women and girls. The law is vague on what promotion of virtue and prevention of vice entails in practice, while simultaneously calling on citizens to engage in enforcing this conduct by âheart, verbal, written, and practical actionâ. Under Article 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code (adopted in 2014) trained and qualified officers of the Basij Forces are considered judicial officers with the power to arrest and carry out judicial police tasks. In conjunction with policing, the IRGCâs Basij undertake propaganda campaigns and recruit and train citizens to promote and facilitate vigilante enforcement of the mandatory hijab and women Basij have been enlisted into enforcing mandatory hijab.
Enforcement of the mandatory hijab by vigilantes and ordinary citizens
361. In October 2014, a spate of acid attacks on women in the city of Isfahan allegedly linked to their improper hijab put the spotlight on violence by vigilantes. In his report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the UN Secretary-General stated that âthe acid attacks in October 2014 against six women for allegedly wearing improper hijab in Isfahan, Kermanshah and Tehran highlights the risks to health and safety run by women. The incidents drew considerable attention both domestically and internationally, with concerns being expressed that the attacks might be linked to the approval of the plan on the protection of promoters of virtue and preventers of viceâ.
362. Mandatory hijab laws have enabled not only state agents but also vigilantes who feel they have the duty and right to enforce the Islamic Republic’s values to harass and assault women in public.
The Summer of 2022
363. On 6 July 2022, President Raisi ordered more forceful implementation of the 2005 Development of Hijab and Chastity Plan, earlier approved by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, several women who spoke to the Mission mentioned the ensuing crackdown on women and girls for improper hijab by the morality police in the summer of 2022.
364. A woman from the Kurdistan province explained to the Mission that in her region and community, while women usually do not wear hijab, she was compelled to wear the hijab at university. She described how, one month before the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, she was herself arrested by the morality police in Kermanshah, although she was wearing a hijab, and her father had to fetch her. The morality police were violent and dragged her on the ground and threw her into a van. The woman noted that âthey [the morality police] treated her as if she had gone to the street nakedâ. She explained that she had been arrested because, according to the morality police, her manteau was too short and open. She also said that a couple of months before the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini, the authorities doubled down on their enforcement of the mandatory hijab on women in cities such as Kermanshah and Sanandaj. âBefore that, people could hang out without the hijab but one or two months before the death of the young woman, the morality police increased the pressure on women in these cities.â
365. Under President Raisi, who came to office in 2021, the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, a government body responsible for enforcing the mandatory hijab laws was reportedly given a budget of 1,180 billion rial (3.8 million euros) for the fiscal year 2022-23. In July 2022, the Headquarters then began issuing regulation for enforcement further restricting womenâs dress in government workplaces, such as mandating women to also cover their neck and shoulders, and, reportedly, directing the responsible authorities to be âfirm in upholding the lawâ and to apply it as ârigidly as possibleâ. Also in July 2022, President Raisi reportedly issued an order to 26 executive bodies indicating that the Regulation on âHijab and Chastity,â first proposed in 2006, would be fully implemented. The bylaw also empowered the âmorality policeâ to âdeclare the limits and legal definition of modesty and standards of improper hijabâ and to âtake legal steps to confront individuals with improper hijab,â rendering the âmorality policeâ the adjudicator and enforcer of hijab regulations. In August 2022, the Headquarters introduced its Chastity and Hijab Project, declaring its primary objective to be âcleansing society of the pollution caused by non-conformity with Islamic dress codes,â to âbuild a model of an Islamic society regarding chastity,â and to âpreserve values and the fight against cultural invasionâ.
366. In the face of mounting defiance of the mandatory hijab laws, the authorities have responded with a new Bill on chastity and hijab (see Section VIII). The Bill brings together in a single document several existing measures devised by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution and other bodies. The vision and policies underpinning the bill were outlined in a 119-page policy document prepared by the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in 2023. The document acknowledged the gap existing between the authoritiesâ policies and laws on the hijab and ordinary Iraniansâ rejection of or lack of support for the hijab. It recommended a comprehensive plan to uphold mandatory hijab and strengthen its enforcement.
A recent pattern of arrest and violence prior to the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini
367. Several incidents of violence against women and girls by the morality police, other security forces or vigilantes were reported following the establishment of the morality police, reminiscent of the practices that have led to the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini.
368. The Mission reviewed and analysed few videos footages, one dating back to 2018, which depicted security forces, including the âmorality policeâ, harassing, kicking, hitting, and otherwise beating women and girls alleged to be in violation of the mandatory hijab mandate. In 2018, a video was published online showing a woman being publicly beaten by the âmorality policeâ after she protested the beating of another woman, reportedly for violating the mandatory hijab laws. In another video published on 13 October 2021, two men and a woman from the âmorality policeâ in Tehran were shown immobilizing and arresting a woman with a dog-catching pole, pulling her by the hair and shoving her violently into a white van as her head smashed against the vehicle . Also in 2021, a man was shot four times in front of his toddler by a member of the âmorality policeâ, after he entered into a verbal altercation with him over the alleged âimproper hijabâ of his wife.
369. Violence has also been perpetrated by private citizens acting as vigilantes. On 16 August 2022, a woman without a hijab was violently slapped, kicked, and pushed to the ground by a man on the street in Tehran.
370. One witness described that in Western Azerbaijan province she had been identified by a CCTV camera on a busy street without a hijab on, while riding in the car of a friend. They were stopped by the police who took them to a police station. Once there, a police officer showed them a CCTV image capture and said âLook at you, you are not wearing a hijab.â Both women were subsequently sent to a âre-education class,â designed to âre-educateâ women to comply with the mandatory hijab. The witness described the class as being attended by six women and led by two women officers from the âmorality policeâ. At the end of the class, she was forced to sign a pledge committing herself to not going outside without a hijab again. The document did not refer to a legal basis upon which the class was imposed. Moreover, her friendâs vehicle was confiscated by the police for three months and she was forced to pay for its release.
371. Women and girls defying the mandatory hijab have been reported since at least 2007. Notably in 2007, a young woman was reportedly arrested in a park in Hamadan by the Basij forces. Two days after she was detained, officials at the detention centre announced her death, saying she had committed suicide by hanging herself. The family reportedly refuted this statement, recalling that they had seen bruises on her body and blood around her ears and face.
372. A witness also recalled that in 2017, she was arrested after she climbed on a utility box on Enghelab Street in Tehran and waved a white scarf on a stick to protest the mandatory hijab. Around 45 minutes later, the police arrived, and one member of the security forces fractured her thumb as he was pulling her down. She was first taken to a police station where police officers asked her to confess and apologize, which she refused to do. As a result, she was brought to the Vozara detention centre where she remained for four days. There, police officers confiscated her phone, questioned her about her activism, and held her in an underground cell with another young woman, also detained for not adhering to the mandatory hijab laws.
373. Another witness described her arrest in 2019 after a video was published of her without the mandatory hijab in a metro station in Tehran province. Following her arrest, she was transferred to Vozara detention centre, which she described as a âplace for hijab violations.â While there, she was held in unsanitary conditions, forced to sleep on the floor in a small cell, which she described as âfilthy and smellyâ to the point that it often made her nauseous. During the two weeks of her detention, she was also denied access to her lawyer and contact with her family.
374. Another woman recalled her arrest by the âmorality policeâ in 2019 near the Haqqani metro station in Tehran where Jina Mahsa Amini was arrested in September 2022. . She recalled that, although she was wearing a âscarf, a large winter cap down to her neck, not a strand of hair was showing, [and how her] neck was completely covered by the scarf, and a large jacket,â she was nevertheless stopped by a patrol and questioned on her attire. When she argued, two members of the âmorality policeâ grabbed her, threw her to the ground, and told her that she had been dressed inappropriately because she had gone to a protest. As she was shoved into a van, she was also told that she would be filmed by a camera placed inside the van. To protest her arrest, she removed her hijab and, in response, the âmorality policeâ beat her, before taking her to a room, where she was beaten further by one man and one woman who she noted were members of the âmorality policeâ. On the following day, she was transferred to the Vozara detention facility where she was confined for four days. During that time, she was kept handcuffed to a chair for hours, and referred to as âhijab-removing girl.â She was beaten by a police officer every time she asked what was wrong with her hijab, and when questioning the grounds and reasons for her arrest. When she asked one interrogator for water, he told her that âwe don’t give water to women who remove their hijab.â
375. In another case, in July 2022, a woman was arrested after an altercation with a woman hijab enforcer on a bus for not wearing a âproper hijabâ. Later in July 2022, she was reportedly forced to confess on state TV. She was charged with âassembly and collusion against national security through contacts with individuals abroad,â âpropaganda against the Islamic Republicâ and âencouraging (moral) corruption and prostitution.â
4. The womenâs movements in Iran; the precursors of theâ Woman, Life, Freedomâ Movement
376. Women in Iran have a long history of activism and demands for gender equality and womenâs rights in the face of institutionalized discrimination enshrined in discriminatory laws and practices at the heart of the Islamic Republic. Challenges faced by women and girls were compounded by prevailing patriarchy and the social and cultural conservatism of parts of the population.
377. Iranâs womenâs rights movements have been active for several decades. Some of its demands were articulated around hijab as highlighted in the sub-section on the history of the hijab.
378. The womenâs movement first emerged around the Iranian Constitutional Revolution between 1905 and 1911. During this period, women staged street demonstrations, demanded the right to public education, aspired for the right to vote and protested against the hijab. They obtained that the Fundamental Law guarantees women’s right to education. Several associations were set up to promote womenâs rights. The National Ladyâs Society (a prominent womenâs constitutionalist organization) was set up in 1910 to advocate for womenâs social and political demands as well as to mobilize Iranians around nationalism. The Womenâs Freedom Society was also founded to encourage womenâs involvement in socio-political matters and to familiarize members with cross-gender political debate and discussion The 1910âs saw the first women-led newspapers such as Danesh and Shokufeh. In 1918, the first public schools for girls were opened.
379. During the period under the Pahlaviâs rule, in a top-down approach, women gained important rights. Under the Family Protection Law adopted in 1967, women obtained the right to divorce and made significant strides in education as part of an overall effort to modernize and westernize Iran. Kanun Banovan (Ladiesâ Center) launched a campaign against the hijab and promoted its abolition. As mentioned earlier, a 1936 decree known as kashf-e hijab banned the hijab and chador. In 1955, the Womenâs League of Supporters of the Declaration of Human Rights was founded and in 1959 the High Council of Womenâs Organizations was established. The Womenâs Organization of Iran, established in 1966, brought together Iranian women from diverse regional and social backgrounds. Women were admitted to university. In 1963, women acquired the right to vote and run for parliament. In 1979, 22 women sat in parliament and 333 women served on elected local councils. Two million women were in the workforce, more than 146,000 of them in the civil service.
380. Women played an important role in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, yet they were immediately targeted by a range of decisions imposing mandatory hijab, rescinding the right to divorce for women, excluding them from some professions, and enacting discriminatory laws (see sub-section on discriminator laws). In March 1979, women protested in masses against mandatory hijab and the womenâs movement started to articulate its demands around legal changes to discriminatory laws. However, women did not limit their claims to gender equality and the end of discriminatory laws and practices, many participated in virtually all protests challenging the policies of the Islamic Republic as citizens concerned with broader democratic aspirations and human rights for all.
381. Over the last 40 years, the womenâs movement has been strategic and formed alliances with other movements. Over the last decades, the womenâs movement has increasingly cooperated and joined forces with other groups targeted for repression or discriminated against by the Iranian authorities such as students, LGBTQI+ people, and trade unions. These alliances have widened and expanded with time.
382. Against the backdrop of discrimination against ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, the womenâs movement has also been more attentive to grievances and demands of minorities, especially women, who have faced intersectional discrimination and have suffered multi-layered violations. It has tried to transcend the class and urban/rural divides. For example, women activists have worked with sex workers, drug users, and victims of domestic violence, including by providing legal services.
383. The womenâs movement has included human rights defenders, trade unionists, lawyers, journalists, artists, political figures, academics and writers among others.
384. Women activists have shown great strategic skills and used a range of tactics to press for gender equality and their fundamental rights from legal strategies focused on changing discriminatory laws, to grassroots initiatives to mobilize people against polygamy and discrimination, to actions to claim public space by challenging gender segregation in stadiums or incidents of street sexual harassment. The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Shirin Ebadi in 2003 was a testament to the struggle of women in Iran and their activism. In 2023, the Nobel Peace Prize was again awarded to another Iranian woman, Narges Mohammadi who came to epitomize the ongoing struggle of women in Iran and their determination to end discrimination.
385. Under President Khatami, from the mid-1990s, womenâs organizations, especially service providers, were able to register and operate. From the mid-2000s, the Iranian authorities increasingly denied registration to NGOs, blocked their activities and funding and cracked down on independent civil society organizations, including human rights organizations In response, women activists favoured informal organizing, loose networks and civic initiatives.
386. Following the intensified crackdown on civil society under President Ahmadinejad, especially in 2009 around the protests against the contested results of the presidential elections, many activists were jailed, harassed or forced into exile. Collective activism was virtually impossible. Women lawyers and journalists remained a stronghold of resistance.
387. The womenâs movement then shifted its focus to gaining access to public space and participating in public life. Women sought to achieve better representation in elected positions (and indeed women did gained extra seats in parliament â See sub-section on womenâs political participation), access to sporting events and denounced sexual harassment in the streets and at work.
388. With the rise of social media, women have also engaged in individual forms of activism rather than collective action. The internet offered new spaces for women and girls to express themselves, shape public discourse, including against forced hijab, demand their rights, tackle taboo issues such as sexual harassment, and organize themselves. Their focus has also shifted to personal freedoms. Individual acts of resistance against mandatory hijab spread online and offline.
389. While some improvements in womenâs participation in society have taken place, these have resulted from the persistent activism by women to create space for themselves in spite of gender-discriminatory laws and practices.
390. Over the last two decades, several womenâs initiatives have mobilized a significant number of people and attracted State repression. The womenâs movement sought to be grassroots and avoid perceptions that it was concentrated in Tehran and dominated by upper-class women lawyers, journalists, students, and professors. Several initiatives are outlined below, noting the issues highlighted, innovative approaches used, and their impact.
(a) One Million Signatures Campaign or Change for Equality
391. In 2006, a grassroots campaign was launched by Iranian feminists from various backgrounds: “One million signatures against discriminatory laws”. The campaign specifically targeted the end of discrimination against women in marriage, equal rights to divorce for women, end to polygamy and temporary marriage, an increase of the age of criminal responsibility to 18 for both girls and boys, right for women to pass on their nationality to their children, equal diyah (compensation for bodily injury or death) between women and men, equal inheritance rights, reform of laws that reduce punishment for offenders in cases of so-called honour killings, equal testimony rights for men and women in court, and other laws which discriminate against women. The abolition of mandatory hijab was not an explicit demand but was implicit in their demand for the end of discriminatory laws. In a bottom-up approach, the campaign aimed at collecting one million signatures from Iranians to support the demand for changing discriminatory laws against women through grassroots activism and awareness raising. The campaign engaged a new generation of activists who had never earlier joined the womenâs movement and allowed ordinary citizens to engage in action to end gender inequality. The movement was grassroots and sought to mobilize the Iranian public.
392. The strategy chosen was one of challenging from within and obtaining changes in law. The Campaign created strong bonds among students and labour activists and trained a generation of activists in legal advocacy.
393. The authorities blocked the website of the campaign, harassed and arrested dozens of members.
394. At the time, the UN Secretary General of the United Nations expressed his concerns at âan increasing crackdown in the past year on the womenâs rights movementâ and that âwomenâs rights activism is sometimes presented by the Iranian government as being connected to external security threats to the country. For instance, the main organizers of the âone million signaturesâ campaign reportedly faced arrest and intimidation by the authorities.â The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences noted that âPeaceful demonstrators have been arrested, detained and persecuted with prison sentences having been imposed on many of themâ. The suppression of the Green Movement and its aftermath as well as the shrinking of civic space marked the end of the One Million Signatures Campaign.
(b) Stop Stoning Forever Campaign (2006)
395. The âStop Stoning Forever Campaignâ was begun in 2006 by women’s rights activists in partnership with the Volunteer Lawyers’ Network, a group of pro bono lawyers in Iran. It was formed in reaction to the case of Ashraf Kalhori, who was then detained in Evin prison and had received a 15-day notice of her death sentence by stoning, and to the execution by stoning in Mashhad of two men, Abbas Hajizadeh and Mahboubeh Mohammadi. The campaign was aimed at documenting cases where stoninghad been imposed as a sentence,, identifying lawyers willing to represent the accused, and working towards the abolition of stoning, a punishment that disproportionately affected women. It also aimed to discuss the taboo topic of stoning and to raise awareness about the institutional discrimination suffered by women convicted of adultery. Amplified by lawyers, human rights defenders and journalists, the campaign sought transnational support. The campaign was successful in obtaining reprieves for women sentenced to death by stoning. While the punishment continues to be imposed by courts, there is a de facto moratorium on executions by stoning.
(c) Open Stadiums
396. A football match between Ireland and Iran in 2001 in Azadi stadium put the spotlight on the ban on Iranian women attending such matches, while foreign women were permitted to do. Women activists started a wave of protests, and ultimately in 2005, after the Iran-Bahrain match, Iranian feminists launched a campaign titled âWhite Scarvesâ, to demand womenâs right to attend football games in stadiums. Renowned Iranian director Jafar Panahi made a film, âOffsideâ about womenâs effort to gain access to stadiums. Iranâs discriminatory ban on women attending menâs football matches dates to 1981.
397. Women organized in a variety of networks and initiatives to challenge the ban on women attending football games in stadiums. In 2012, authorities extended the ban to volleyball matches and the campaign gained a new momentum. In response, Iranian women campaigned and lobbied parliament to reverse the ban. Some also dressed as men to avoid these discriminatory restrictions, while others staged protests in front of stadiums or posted online. Ghoncheh Ghavami and several other Iranian women were arrested as they attempted to attend one of the volleyball matches at Azadi. Iranian women and rights organizations also targeted the International Federation of Football Associations and the International Volleyball Federation (FIVB). Several women were arrested for protesting in front of stadiums or seeking to enter stadiums.
398. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran, in March 2018, as many as 35 women were reportedly arrested for seeking to attend a match and in August 2019 at least four women were arrested and held for several days after attempting to enter a stadium dressed as men. A woman arrested for protesting in front of a stadium recounted to the Mission that womenâs access to stadiums epitomised gender segregation and was part of a broader effort by women to gain access to public spaces and challenge gender segregation in different spaces including universities. In 2019, Sahar Khodayari (known as Blue Girl because of the colour of her favourite football team) set herself on fire in front of a court as she stood trial for entering a stadium dressed as a man and feared being sentenced to a prison term.
399. Under domestic and international pressure, the authorities announced in 2019 that a 5% quota of women spectators would be allowed into stadiums. In December 2023, some 3000 women (out of 87000 seats) were allowed into Azadi stadium to attend Tehran Football Derby â a match between two Iranian teams, Esteghlal and Persepolis.
(d) Me Too Iran Movement and other initiatives against sexual harassment
400. Sexual harassment and violence against women have been a consistent issue of concern for the womenâs movement, although shrouded in stigma and denial. Around the 2010s, at least two groups emerged that worked on harassment, Harasswatch modelled after Harassmap in Egypt and Free Harassment Workplace. Harasswatch was established as an interactive site that enabled women in Iran to report harassment in public. Its goal was to âchallenge abusive social stereotypes and confront the normalization of harassment and intimidation based on gender, race, religion, etc., in public spacesâ. Free-Harassment Workplace was an independent initiative established in 2016 that worked to create safe workplaces free from harassment and discrimination and to preserve women’s dignity in the workplace. They developed training materials and conducted training sessions within the workplaces at employee, middle management and leadership levels on what sexual harassment is, and how to report and investigate allegations of abuse.
401. Several initiatives against sexual harassment in the streets and at work gained further momentum in August 2020 when a MeToo movement emerged in Iran after a Twitter account âEmanelâ shared sexist advice for men about âhow to connect and have sexual intercourse with girlsâ. It sparked outrage and women, including some journalists, started to share their experiences of sexual harassment and sexual violence. The Iran MeToo movement spread on social media with thousands of ordinary women sharing online their experiences of sexual harassment and sexual violence, protected by the anonymity that social media offered. They used hashtags such as #Me_Too_Iran, #rape (#Tajavaz), #sexual harassment (#Azar-e Jensi), and #perpetrators (#Motajaves).
402. In 2022, a movement more specific to the world of cinema and theatre was sparked by a letter signed by 800 women, denouncing systemic sexism, sexual violence and underfunding of women in the Iranian cinema industry. Women participating in this campaign as well as activists behind the MeToo Iran Instagram page faced threats and were arbitrarily detained.
403. Iranâs MeToo movement and similar initiatives were a transformative form of resistance, with ordinary Iranian women of various backgrounds breaking taboos and sharing their experiences of sexual harassment and assault on social media, becoming engaged as cyber activists. Survivors including LGBTQI people shared accounts, exposed perpetrators, especially public and high-profile figures and connected survivors. The womenâs movement was supportive and provided space for the publication of accounts and information on how to address sexual violence-related trauma and to provide legal advice to the survivors.
404. The pervasiveness of sexual harassment and the outrage it sparked forced the authorities to take action. In 2020, the authorities arrested and tried Keyvan Emamverdi for drugging and raping at least nine women and he was subsequently convicted of corruption on earth and sentenced to death. Iranâs Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, Masoumeh Ebtekar, publicly saluted the courage of women speaking out and called for prosecution of offenders. Simultaneously, the authorities harassed and arrested activists believed to be behind the movement (see also Section VII) and sought to depict the women as agents of foreign states to discredit their activism and dismiss their demands. An activist described to the Mission her multiple interrogations during which she was accused of espionage for foreign nations and was accused of collaborating with the USA on a security project which was known as the gender violence project, and also known as âMe Tooâ.
1. The daily acts of resistance of women and girls
405. A campaign, âMy Stealthy Freedomâ, was launched by US-based activist and journalist Masih Alinejad in 2017, encouraging women in Iran to share online pictures of themselves taking off their hijab. The campaign relied heavily on Facebook, Instagram and other social media to connect activists inside and outside of Iran. The campaign then evolved into “White Wednesdays” which consisted of wearing a white hijab or white clothes on Wednesdays as a sign of protest. As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights, the videos and images were distributed on the Internet, allowing women an avenue to express their cultural rights concerns and dissent. As a result, contact with Ms. Alinejad is now understood as a criminal act under article 508 of the Islamic Penal Code and the head of the Tehran Revolutionary Court declared in July 2019 that anyone sending her such a video could face up to a 10-year sentence. Ms Alinejadâs brother was arrested. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran noted that women who have publicly supported the online campaign against compulsory veiling âMy Stealthy Freedomâ or given support for the White Wednesdays campaign (which uses the social media hashtag #whitewednesdays to protest against the mandatory dress code imposed on women) continued to be harassed by the authorities, including taken in for questioning and made to sign a declaration that they would not go out without a proper hijab.
(a) Girls of Enghelab Street
406. The movement called âGirls of Enghelab Streetâ designates several acts of civil disobedience, which started in 2017 and 2018 in Iran. It was kickstarted by Vida Movahed who unveiled in public and stood on top of an electrical box in Enghelab Street in Tehran, having tied her hijab to a wooden stick. Vida Movahed was detained for a month. She later spent a year in prison for continuing to protest in 2018. Other women were arrested for not adhering to the mandatory hijab rules, and distributing flowers in the metro on International Womenâs Day. A woman who also removed her hijab and stood on Enghelab Street recounted to the Mission how the Iranian authorities initiated legal proceedings against her and used her ex-husband to reopen the case of her divorce and the custody of her daughter. She explained that what happened to her was the very reason she protested in the first place, the injustice women face, the struggle to obtain a divorce although her husband was a drug addict, the fear of losing her daughter, the daily discrimination against women.
407. Nasrin Sotoudeh, a recipient of the Sakharov Prize for Human Rights of the European Parliament, represented some of the women in court and was later herself sentenced to imprisonment and lashes for appearing without hijab and for âencouraging corruption and prostitutionâ, in connection to her work defending women arrested for peacefully protesting mandatory hijab.
408. The Girls of Enghelab Street action marked a shift from legal campaigning and collective action to individual acts of defiance and appropriation of public space to exercise personal freedoms. It also marked a shift from online activism to reclaiming public space by direct offline action. Such actions resonated with the younger generation.
(b) Solidarity of men
409. Activism against mandatory hijab has not been undertaken only by women and girls. Men have showed solidarity with women challenging mandatory hijab by for example, sharing photos of themselves wearing a hijab. Reza Khandan and Dr Farhad Meysami were sentenced to six years in prison on being convicted of assembly and collusion to act against national security and of propaganda against the regime, for creating a pin with the slogan âI oppose mandatory hijabâ.
410. Peaceful forms of activism were criminalized and civic space shrunk again after a small opening under President Rouhani. Over the years, women involved in the womenâs movement and their supporters have faced multiple human rights violations as well as smear campaigns, harassment and morality-related charges, including accusations of promoting prostitution. They also faced torture and other ill-treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence and unfair trials. The authorities have sought to delegitimize womenâs demands by claiming that they are carrying out a foreign agenda or accusing them of promiscuity. In the summer of 2022, the authorities intensified their crackdown on women defying mandatory hijab eventually leading to the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini and the emergence of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.
B. Key features of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement
411. Women were the first to mobilize after the announcement of the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini following her death in custody. The first call for protests was on 19 September 2022, and was issued anonymously by a group of womenâs rights defenders inside Iran. At the outset of Woman, Life, Freedom movement, women activists not only articulated their demands for gender equality, the end of discrimination and forms of gender segregation but also put forward broader demands together with other movements such as studentsâ movement and trade unions. The Woman, Life, Freedom movement has been considered as the first feminist protests. The centrality of protestersâ demands for gender equality and the end of mandatory hijab coalesced with other longstanding demands on living conditions, poverty, corruption, democratic space and the end to human rights abuses. It also had some unique characteristics, as follows.
1. Transcending ethnic and class divides
412. The âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement brought together Iranians in virtually all provinces of Iran. Iranians from different ethnicities, religion, gender, socio-economic backgrounds came together as illustrated by the slogan âWoman, Life, Freedomâ. The slogan Jin, Jiyan, AzadĂź finds its roots in Kurdish movements. It signifies that womenâs struggles are essential to the liberation of Kurdish people and pays homage to the particular role of Kurdish women. The slogan was first used in Kurdish on the day of Jina Mahsa Aminiâs burial in Saqqez on 17 September. Almost immediately, the slogan was echoed in Persian âZan Zendegi Azadiâ and used across Iran. One of the characteristics of the 2022 movement has been its ability to transcend ethnic, language, religious and other divides and the slogan captured the unity of people against the government. The strengthening of networks of solidarity across Iranian regions, and cultural and ethnic groups became one of the markers of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement. The slogan has since featured in several songs dedicated to the movement and has become associated worldwide with Iranian womenâs struggle. The slogan became a rallying cry during the protests which occurred in Iran as a response to the death of Jina Mahsa Amini.
413. A veteran woman human rights defender described to the Mission how she and her fellow activists immediately wanted to visit the family of Jina Mahsa Amini upon the announcement of her transfer to Kasra Hospital. âOur Kurdish sister had been killed and we had to go out and protestâ. Regardless of their ethnicity or affiliations, several women with whom the Mission spoke highlighted that they or their daughter or their sister could have faced the fate of Jina Mahsa Amini. In the words of another woman, âJina Mahsa Amini was a woman first and foremost in Iran and then a Kurd. All women in Iran have a similar experienceâ.
2. Transcending gender and age divides
414. Women, men, girls and boys protested together and all chanted the same slogans in support of womenâs rights. The âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement had a transformative impact on changing patriarchal attitudes and menâs perception of women, especially among the youth. A young woman protester, interviewed by the Mission, noted that many middle-aged women and older women participated as well as men and boys. She noted that before the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, âyoung men were looking down on young womenâ while after the protests started, she never experienced any bad looks from the men. She explained that the way men looked at women changed. As a result, she felt very secure. Iranian men were supportive of women protesters and sought to protect them when security forces forcefully dispersed protests.
3. Involvement of Generation Z, schoolgirls and women students
415. While university students have been at the vanguard of protest movements in Iran and have faced arrests, prison, disciplinary measures and university bans, the 2022 protests were marked by the unprecedented participation of Generation Z and schoolgirls. Teenage girls were seen removing their mandatory hijab or maghnaeh, tearing apart or defacing pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini or of the current Supreme Leader, defying school authorities and teachers seeking to prevent them from participating in protests and taking parts in protests. They indicated how deep challenges to the Islamic Republic run. Such scenes were not limited to privileged neighbourhoods of Tehran but erupted across the country. Girlsâ disobedience came at a high cost as authorities violently repressed protests.
4. International Solidarity
416. Despite the official narrative of the Iranian authorities that the 2022 protests were fomented by hostile states, the protests that rocked the country in 2022 were homegrown and were fueled by accumulated and ignored grievances regarding abuses by the morality police, as evidenced by the long history of these movements and acts of defiance by women in Iran in relation to demands for greater equality and rights. However, the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini and the ensuing protests captured the imagination of Iranians outside the country and led to an outpouring of solidarity with protesters. It also led to an outpouring of international solidarity and calls for accountability.
V. Repression of protests
âMe or my sister could be the next (Jina) Mahsa.â
A woman protester
The issue is not just the hijab, it is the oppression and cruelty that the State is subjecting the people to, in all aspects of their lives.â
A woman protester
417. The protests that swept Iran after the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini brought to the streets women, men, and children of all ages. Her death in the detention of the âmorality policeâ epitomized decades long institutionalized discrimination and violence against women and girls, vividly manifested through the violent enforcement of mandatory hijab laws. Many described the outrage they felt at a young woman losing her life over a piece of clothing, highlighting how it was symptomatic of the oppression and violence the people, in particular the youth, were subjected to on a daily basis. Many highlighted the broader context of impunity by saying that they or their loved ones could be the next to face the fate of Jina Mahsa Amini.
418. The rallying slogan âWoman, Life, Freedomâ, succinctly encapsulated the demands for a range of civil and political rights as well as social, economic and cultural rights essential for a life with dignity and free of violence and discrimination. The protests that started in September 2022 were characterised by the leading role played by women and girls of all ages, including schoolgirls, and the prominence and centrality of their demands for equality. From the very start, LGBTQI+ people joined the protest, and the rainbow flag was waved in support in some areas.
419. Even though the protests were sparked by violence and discrimination against women and demands for gender equality and an end to mandatory hijab remained at their core, the movement brought together different communities with an array of grievances and demands. Joined under one umbrella, protesters demanded an end to oppression, injustice, impunity and the denial of basic rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression. Protesters consistently expressed their demands for change, including fundamental change of the political structure.
420. A child protester highlighted how the many demands of people coalesced, saying that they had âa thousand reasonsâ to protest. He highlighted that as young people, they wanted to live freely and went to the streets to seek a better future for themselves and their children. He emphasised how entrenched discrimination including on the basis of ethnicity, was a driving factor, intersecting with gender discrimination. Many women from ethnic minorities felt especially compelled to protest as the death of Jina Mahsa Amini in custody epitomized the multiple layers of discrimination they faced as women and members of an ethnic minority. A witness described a sense of unity between those who had been marginalised, a manifestation of intersectionality and unity between Kurdish and Baloch women Kurdish women were the most radical activists of all, she stated. In Sistan and Baluchestan, protests were sparked by reports of the rape of a 15-year-old Baluch girl by the local police chief, once again illustrating the intersection of violence and discrimination on the grounds of gender and ethnicity.
421. Witnesses also expressed deeply rooted frustrations and grievances over corruption, the economic crisis, increasing inflation and the cost of living. A witness described how the cost of basic items including food continued to rise over the years while the authorities and those close to them financially benefitted from corruption.
422. This Section provides the Missionâs detailed findings on the treatment of protesters, bystanders and others, from the use of force, to arrests and detention, including their treatment and criminal and other proceedings, including the use of the death penalty, in the context of the protests.
423. The right to peaceful assembly is severely restricted under Iranian law. The organization of and participation in protests is effectively criminalized in relation to public gatherings considered critical of the Islamic Republic. The authorities persistently referred to the protests as âriotsâ and labelled protesters in the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement as âriotersâ or âenemy agentsâ, framing conduct protected under international human rights law as threats to public order or national security.
424. While international human rights law allows for restrictions on grounds of national security and public order, such measures must be the least intrusive possible, must not be disproportionate to the legitimate aim the measure achieves and are only very exceptionally permissible in relation to peaceful protests.
425. The Mission is aware of allegations regarding the death and injury of security forces during the policing of protests and found instances of violence by protesters (addressed below). It has requested the Government of Iran for substantive information in this regard. It found, however, a pattern of a large majority of peaceful protests, and of a disregard by security forces for the general principles of use of force, including that of precaution. In the individual cases of use of force investigated and reflected in this document, the Mission systematically reviewed, analysed and reported on information regarding the protestersâ behaviour imminently before the use of force incident, per human rights standards. It drew patterns from a multitude of those individual cases. The Mission notes that beyond its relevance for the case-by-case assessment in the context of the right to life and personal security, including adherence to the use of force principles (legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination), and in the context of the right to liberty, the behaviour of protesters does not give rise to human rights concerns that fall within the mandate of the Mission. The Mission recalls that its mandate relates to alleged human rights violations, that is acts that are attributable to a State and constitute a breach of an international obligation rather than any act by an individual that may be criminalized under domestic law. Lastly, the Mission notes that international human rights law and standards applied by the Mission in this document were precisely developed to be applied to all situations, including protests.
1. Legal framework â The Right of Peaceful Assembly
426. States have an obligation under international human rights law to respect, protect and fulfil individualsâ right to freedom of peaceful assembly (ICCPR, article 21; ICERD, article 5, CRC, article 15; see also UDHR, article 20).
427. ICCPR in article 21 protects the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Protests are also protected by the right to freedom of association, the right to freedom of expression and the right to participate in public affairs (ICCPR articles 19, 22 and 25). Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly regardless of their status. The protection continues whether the protest is in support of âcontentious ideas or goalsâ or not (CCPR, General comment 37, CCPR/C/GC/37, para. 7).
428. CRC article 15 provides the right of a child to freedom of association and to freedom of peaceful assembly. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
429. The Human Rights Committee noted their right is subject only to limitations provided by human rights law. First, limitations must pass the test of legality, meaning that they are laid out clearly in the laws, in advance and according to the appropriate procedures, and that they do not confer unfettered or sweeping discretion on those charged with their enforcement. In addition, as set out in ICCPR article 21, they must be for legitimate purposes, including national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Any restrictions imposed must be the least intrusive among the measures that might serve the relevant protective function, and must not be disproportionate to the legitimate aim the measure achieves (CCPR, General Comment 37, CCPR/C/GC/37, paras. 36-40).
430. The Human Rights Committee has noted that if the conduct of participants in an assembly is peaceful, the fact that certain domestic legal requirements pertaining to an assembly have not been met by its organizers or participants does not, on its own, place the participants outside the scope of the protection of article 21. It further stated that: âthere is not always a clear dividing line between assemblies that are peaceful and those that are not, but there is a presumption in favour of considering assemblies to be peacefulâ. The Committee states: âisolated acts of violence by some participants should not be attributed to others, to the organizers or to the assembly as such. Thus, some participants in an assembly may be covered by article 21, while others in the same assembly are not.”
2. Lack of protection under domestic law
431. Under Article 27 of the Constitution, âPublic gatherings and marches may be freely held, provided arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islamâ. However, there is no definition of the âfundamental principles of Islamâ, rendering the article open to wide and discretionary interpretation.
432. Other domestic laws further restrict the right of peaceful assembly. The 2016 Law on Operation of Political Groups and Parties, requires political parties to seek permission prior to holding an assembly. The Human Rights Committee has found that requiring a permit to hold an assembly is permissible to the extent necessary to assist the authorities in facilitating the smooth conduct of peaceful assemblies and protecting the right of others. Moreover, this means that the only avenue to seek a license to hold an assembly, is through established political parties. The law stipulates a strict eligibility criterion for forming a political party which effectively excludes individuals including on the ground of their political opinion. This includes âworldviews, ideologies and beliefs” falling within Islamic principles.
433. In addition, vaguely worded and broadly defined national security charges further allow for restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly and association. Notably, article 610 of the Islamic Penal Code states that âWhen two or more individuals collude and conspire to commit crimes against the national or foreign security of the country or prepare the facilities to commit the aforementioned crimes [they] shall be sentenced to two to five yearsâ imprisonment.â This effectively prevents any type of gathering aimed at opposing the Government or public advocacy, which as discussed in this section, are considered by nature as national security matters by the authorities, including prosecutorial and judicial officials.
434. Other provisions further allow for prosecution of persons in connection with the exercise of their right to peaceful assembly, for instance, article 618 of the Islamic Penal Code which criminalises âdisrupting public orderâ and carries a sentence of up to one year imprisonment and up to 74 lashes.
A. Use of force
435. On 22 November 2022, noting the critical situation emerging in connection with the protests that spread countrywide, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights referred to the rising number of deaths of protesters in Iran. In a public statement, he noted that since 16 September âover 300 people have been killed, including more than 40 childrenâ and urged the Government of Iran to address the demands for equality, dignity and rights instead of using unnecessary or disproportionate force to suppress the protests. Special Procedures mandate holders also referred to âcontinued reports of deliberate and unlawful use by the Iranian security forces of live ammunition, metal pellets and buckshot against peaceful unarmed protesters in breach of the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, non-discrimination and proportionality, applicable to the use of force.â
436. Reports on the death and injury of protesters were, moreover, quickly followed by allegations that protesters had been denied emergency medical assistance and treatment at hospitals. . Deeply concerned by the scale of âviolent repression of protestersâ, the World Medical Association adopted a resolution in October 2022 on human rights demonstrations in Iran, calling on the Iranian authorities to, inter alia, â[r]espect the autonomy of physicians and in particular their ethical duty to provide care to anyone on the basis of medical need aloneâ.
437. Various United Nations entities, including the Secretary General and human rights treaty bodies, also noted the issue of impunity in relation to the protests that began in September 2022.
438. The Mission analysed information from Government sources and interviewed witnesses on the use of force by security forces in the context of the protests. It also obtained, verified and analysed official documents, medical documents, death and/or burial certificates, military analysis, forensic pathologistsâ reports, images and video footage of injuries, including open-source material. On medical assistance received in the context of the protests, the Mission interviewed victims and witnesses and analysed medical information regarding a number of them, including photographs of injuries, x-ray images, and medical reports.
439. The Mission investigated a number of protests in which use of force by law enforcement forces resulted in injuries and deaths. The Mission investigated cases in the provinces of Alborz, East Azerbaijan, Gilan, Kermanshah, Khorasan Razavi, Khouzestan, Kurdistan, Mazandaran, Qazvin, Sistan and Baluchestan, Tehran, West Azerbaijan a northern and a southern province. Due to constraints on of time and/or resources, access and availability of information, the Mission focused its investigations on certain geographic areas and individual cases. This should not be understood as a lack of evidence in relation to other provinces and individual cases as they require further investigations.
440. For these cases, the Mission gathered and analysed a wide range of information, including interviews of victims and witnesses, official information published by the various State institutions, including forensic reports from Iranâs Legal Medicine Organization. The Mission then assessed these against independent medical expert reviews of medical files containing CT scans, x-ray and injury images and hospital records. The Mission further reviewed available death and burial certificates issued by the State authorities; court judgments and prosecutorial orders; a wide-range of open-source material including photographic and audio-visual material, verified and authenticated by the Mission to the extent possible; including media coverage of the events, as well as reports made on social media platforms by victims, witnesses and their families. The Mission further received and analysed accounts by victims and their relatives originally collected by civil society organizations, whose information the Mission assessed to be credible.
441. Based on the body of evidence, the Mission is satisfied that the first use of force by the security forces was on 16 September 2022 during the protests in front of Kasra hospital, Tehran city, hours after the news of the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini spread on the media (see Section III). Moreover, injuries as a result of the use of lethal force by the security forces took place as early as 17 September 2022 while the first deaths of protesters caused by the use of lethal force occurred on 19 September 2022. The Mission then established several time periods during which a marked increase of deaths and injuries was recorded. For example, between 19 to 22 September 2022, the use of force resulting in injuries and killings increased. The Mission also established that periods with an increase of the use of force coincided with calls for nationwide protests including on 40th day commemoration of Jina Mahsa Aminiâs death, the period of 8 to 15 October, and the anniversary of November 2019 protests. While the protests became sporadic and different in nature after 8 December 2022 following the first protest-related execution (see Section V. E), they nevertheless continued regularly in Sistan and Baluchestan province after Friday prayers and were, in turn, met with force by security forces well into October 2023.
442. This Section contains an overview of the patterns on the use of force, established on the basis of the Missionâs investigation into incidents across 14 provinces covering the period from 16 September 2022 and 21 November 2022. It includes patterns established in relation to women and child protesters, highlighting emblematic cases. Some emblematic cases related to the use of force are contained in the following Section on the situation of minorities in the context of the protests and a full description of facts relating to individual protests and cases are organized in Annex III, in a chronological manner and representing several successive periods of intense protest.
1. International legal framework
443. The right to life is recognized as a norm of jus cogens and is enshrined in regional and international treaties to which Iran is a party. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that no one âshall be arbitrarily deprived of his lifeâ and provides that this right is non-derogable. States have an obligation to respect the right to life, that is a duty to refrain from engaging in conduct resulting in arbitrary deprivation of life, and must also ensure the right to life and exercise due diligence to protect the lives of individuals. Deprivation of life involves intentional or otherwise foreseeable and preventable life-terminating harm or injury, caused by an act or omission. Under international human rights law, the permissible grounds under which deprivation of life could lawfully take place are strictly limited. Deprivation of life is, as a rule, arbitrary if it is inconsistent with international or domestic law.
444. Under international human rights law, States are obligated to take all necessary measures to protect the right to life including by ensuring that the conduct of law enforcement officials strictly complies with the relevant international standards. International human rights law and standards impose stringent restrictions on the use of force due to the serious risk it poses to the life and physical integrity of individuals. Any use of force by the State including by its law enforcement officials must strictly adhere to the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability. On precaution, law enforcement policies, instructions and operations must give special consideration to those who are particularly vulnerable to the harmful consequences of the use of force in general and to the effects of specific less-lethal weapons; such persons include children. Law enforcement must use force in a manner designed to minimise damage or injury and respect and preserve human life and ensure that assistance and medical aid is provided as soon as possible to those injured. Unnecessary or disproportionate use of force may amount to torture or other ill-treatment.
445. The use of potentially lethal force for the purpose of law enforcement is an extreme measure that must only be resorted to when strictly necessary to protect life or prevent serious injury in the face of an imminent threat. Accordingly, law enforcement officials are only authorized to use firearms under extremely limited conditions and circumstances. Every effort should be made to exclude the use of firearms, especially against children. Moreover, applying an even higher threshold, intentional lethal use of firearms, i.e. shooting to kill, may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life. The âprotect-lifeâ principle stipulated under these principles means that the threat imposed to life must be so imminent that the use of lethal force is strictly unavoidable to protect life. In any other case, this would amount to an arbitrary use of force and, in certain circumstances, could constitute an extra-judicial execution.
446. Only the minimum force necessary may be used where it is required for a legitimate law enforcement purpose during an assembly. Firearms are not an appropriate tool for the policing of assemblies. They must never be used simply to disperse an assembly. In order to comply with international law, any use of firearms by law enforcement officials in the context of assemblies must be limited to targeted individuals in circumstances in which it is strictly necessary to confront an imminent threat of death or serious injury. It is never lawful to fire indiscriminately or to use firearms in fully automatic mode when policing an assembly.
447. Firearms and ammunition that cause unwarranted injury or present an unwarranted risk should be prohibited. Certain types of weapons and ammunition should not be used as their use does not comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality. This includes metal pellets and multiple kinetic impact projectiles. Rubber-coated metal bullets are particularly dangerous and should not be used. Moreover, it is unlawful to use weapons or ammunition categorized as less-lethal outside of the less lethal parameters as defined by 2020 United Nations Human Rights Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement. Weapons that may have a legitimate law enforcement purpose, for instance loaded with less-lethal ammunition containing a single projectile specifically designed for crowd control, including those referred to as rubber or plastic bullet, may be used, subject to strict requirements of necessity and proportionality. These weapons may only be used in situations where other less harmful measures have proven to be or clearly are ineffective to address the threat. Where absolutely necessary, such ammunition could only be used with precision to target the individual posing the imminent threat of injury. They cannot be randomly and indiscriminately shot at crowds. To avoid causing serious injury, permissible projectiles should only be fired from the distance that is prescribed according to the type of ammunition that is being used. Permissible projectiles can only be aimed at lower extremities and should not be targeted at the head, face or neck as they can result in skull fracture and brain injury, eye trauma, including permanent and complete loss of vision, or even death. Similarly, targeting of the torso may cause damage to vital organs and can be lethal.
448. Weapons with wide area effect such as chemical irritants and water cannons tend to have indiscriminate effects and should only be used in situations of more generalised violence only as a measure of last resort and following a verbal warning, and with adequate opportunity given for assembly participants to disperse.
449. In the context of protests, the State and its law enforcement officials should seek to de-escalate situations that might result in violence. Non-violent means must be exhausted first and force of any kind may be resorted to when there exists no other means available that are likely to achieve the legitimate objective. Where it becomes absolutely necessary to use force, prior warning should be given unless doing either would be manifestly ineffective.
450. International law requires States to ensure that their public agents and/or those acting with their express or tacit consent take all reasonable precautions to protect life. International human rights standards establish the criteria and strategies that should guide public authorities in the use of force during public demonstrations, even when these turn violent. The public authority, or whoever holds it with its express or tacit consent, should use non-violent means insofar as possible before resorting to the use of force. The State is also responsible for violations of the right to life committed by non-State actors acting on behalf of the government or with its knowledge or consent. States must protect and guarantee the right to life, inter alia, by exercising due diligence to prevent arbitrary deprivations of life by private actors.
451. The obligation to protect the right to life also includes the obligation of States to investigate in line with international law all cases in which there may have been suspected extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions. This includes investigating independently and impartially with a view to identifying, prosecuting and, where evidence exists, convicting, those responsible for these crimes. Investigations and resulting prosecutions should be carried out in accordance with international standards and should aim to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice, including by considering the possible responsibility of superiors for violations of the right to life committed by their subordinates.
452. Ensuring access to essential and emergency healthcare is part of the duty to respect and ensure the right to life and personal security and respect the right to health. The right to life as enshrined in the ICCPR article 6 concerns the entitlement of individuals to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or may be expected to cause their unnatural or premature death, as well as to enjoy a life with dignity. The obligation to respect and ensure the right to life extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life and there may be a violation of article 6 even if such threats and situations do not result in loss of life. The duty to protect life includes measures ensuring access without delay by individuals to essential healthcare, and bolstering effective emergency health services and emergency response operations, including ambulance services.
453. Moreover, pursuant to article 12 of the ICESCR, which recognizes the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and establishes obligations of States parties to protect, respect and fulfil this right, States must refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health. Violations of this obligation to respect include the denial of access to health facilities, goods and services to particular individuals or groups as a result of de jure or de facto discrimination. States have the core obligation to ensure the right to access to health facilities and services on a non-discriminatory basis. The principle of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights protected under the ICESCR, including on grounds of sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status is indeed enshrined in article 2(2) of the Covenant.
454. The duty of States to protect includes acceptability of health care and requires health facilities, goods and services to be respectful of medical ethics. The Special Rapporteur on the right to health highlighted that refusal to treat persons wounded in situations of conflict, including protests, constitutes a direct violation of the right to health. Healthcare workers are essential for ensuring availability of healthcare services and States have an immediate and continuous obligation to provide healthcare workers and humanitarian organizations with adequate protection. Intimidation, harassment, threats, arrests and other forms of attacks against healthcare workers not only violate the right to health of people affected by situations of conflict, including protests and riots, but may also damage the healthcare system as a whole.
455. The infringement on the confidentiality of personal health data by security forces is a violation of the right to privacy in article 17 of the ICCPR. In addition, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stressed that health services must be designed to respect confidentiality, and that accessibility of health-related information should not impair the right to have personal health data treated with confidentiality. The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health noted that impartiality of medical facilities is often compromised by the constant presence of security forces in hospitals and intimidation of patients and health-care workers in hospitals and clinics. The persecution of injured protestors in health facilities violates the right to health of persons by impeding their access to quality health services.
456. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also noted that the right to health was closely related to and dependent upon the realization of other human rights, including the rights to human dignity, life, non-discrimination, equality, the prohibition against torture, privacy, access to information, and the freedoms of association, assembly and movement; these and other rights and freedoms addressing integral components of the right to health.
2. Lack of legal protections under domestic law
457. Under article 4.3 of the Police Forces Law, the police forces in Iran are tasked with âensuring the security of assemblies, gatherings, demonstrations, and of legal and permitted activities and preventing any kind of unpermitted associations, demonstrations and gatheringsâŠâ The law therefore authorizes law enforcement to prevent any peaceful assembly which has not received prior permission and a licence from State authorities.
458. Moreover, the 1994 Law on the Use of Firearms by Armed Forces in Necessary Incidents, which is the domestic law regulating the use of force, allows for the use of firearms in a range of circumstances which do not involve protection of life or prevention of serious injury in the face of an imminent threat. The law does not incorporate the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability under international law. Under the law, firearms may be used in the context of âillegalâ assemblies, namely those that have not received a prior licence from the State. Article 4 of the Law stipulates that, armed forces may resort to firearms in order to âreturn order, control illegal assemblies, and quench riots, turmoil and unrests where their control is deemed impossible without the use of arms.â In such circumstances, prior to the use of firearms, law enforcement must ensure that other means were used to no avail and that an ultimatum was given to the âriotersâ and âagitatorsâ. The law therefore allows the security and armed forces to use firearms to block, disperse or disrupt assemblies that are deemed illegal. In addition, law enforcement may resort to firearms for, inter alia, protecting buildings belonging to the police such as headquarters, police stations, weapons and armoury storage and training grounds; for protecting the weapons they hold for carrying out their Mission; and for arresting a âthiefâ, a âbanditâ, or a person who has committed an assassination or âdestructionâ or has used explosives and is fleeing. The law entails circumstances where the use of firearms is permitted by law enforcement for the purposes of self-defence and protecting others from both armed and unarmed individuals. However, even in such circumstances the threshold of an imminent threat is not stipulated.
459. Furthermore, neither the 1994 Law on the Use of Firearms by Armed Forces in Necessary Incidents, nor any other publicly available laws in Iran regulate the use of less lethal weapons including kinetic impact projectiles, chemical irritants, hand-held kinetic weapons such as batons, electric shock weapons and water cannons.
460. In relation to the domestic legal regime on the use of force by law enforcement officials, the Mission notes that it has requested in its 27 June 2023 letter that the Government provide the following: the directive by the Commander-in-Chief of the Law Enforcement forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran referred to in a report by Iranâs High Council for Human Rights; a copy of the ânotification appertaining to the ânon-use and non-carrying of any firearms in dealing with the riotsââ, reported to have been signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on 21 September 2022; a copy of the ânotice concerning âthe prohibition of using firearms of any kind to deal with the rioters and control street riots and the need to the use other police tactics and equipment at disposal for managing street gatherings and riotsââ, reported to have been signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and a copy of the 23 September 2022 notification from the Countryâs Security Council. The latter, according to the report emphasised âwhen dealing with riots, only special anti-riot forces, who are equipped with non-lethal and authorized equipment and have received the necessary training related to compliance with relevant laws and regulations and observance of citizen’s rights, should be usedâ. In its March 2024 report in reaction to the report of the Mission, entitled âExamining the inauthentic, non-legal and political report of the so-called Fact-finding Missionâ, the High Council for Human Rights in Iran yet again referred to the above mentioned documents without providing further details.
461. The Mission further requested detailed information and material on the domestic legal regime on the use of force by law enforcement officials and on preparedness and planning of law enforcement tasked to police protests, generic contingency plans and training protocols, as well as details on instructions and equipment and the deployment of all relevant officials and units. It requested, in particular, detailed information with regards to all weapons referred to in a report by the High Council as “âanti-riotâ and non-lethal used by various security and law enforcement bodiesâ. As of 15 March 2024, no response or information was received by the Mission.
3. Security forces involved in policing the protests
462. The Mission established that various branches of the Stateâs security forces were deployed to protest sites across the country as covered by this document and used force:
– The Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA) and the various forces under the Command including its regular forces, as well as various units of its Special Forces (Yegan-e Vijeh);
– The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the various forces and units falling under its auspices;
– The Basij paramilitary force; and
– Plainclothes security forces.
463. With regard to security forces in plainclothes, witnesses stated that they were generally able to recognize that they were State agents even when not uniformed, given the manner of dress and/or the tactics used to conceal their identity. Witnesses noted that agents remained identifiable to each other and to other security forces broadly, for example by covering the plates of their motorbikes with medical masks or by wearing certain colours on some days, or a bag across their chest.
464. Witnesses reported that in protests across the country, including, but not limited to protests in Tehran in September and October 2022, and in Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan province in October 2022, Mahabad in October 2022, and Gilan in October 2022, plainclothes agents who used force were deployed alongside uniformed State forces and regularly acted in unison and together with them including those belonging to the FARAJA and its Special Forces. The Mission also analysed video footage of protests including in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchestan in September 2022, and Baneh, Kurdistan, in October depicting plainclothes and uniformed forces operating in concord and in close proximity to each other.
4. Weapons and methods used in policing protests
465. State authorities used a combination of weapons and ammunition in the context of the protests. This includes firearms, ammunition containing multiple projectiles including birdshot, and weapons and ammunition categorized as less lethal used outside less lethal parameters, increasing the risk of causing severe and irreversible injuries and even death. As detailed below, security forces deployed such weapons without any consideration given to the significant presence of child protesters.
466. Iranâs High Council for Human Rights asserted in a November 2022 report that Iran had adopted âa policy of not using weapons and lethal force for dealing with the riots and illegal gathering in order to protect the lives of citizens and minimize casualties.â The report referred to a statement by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran, dated 22 September 2022, noting that the use of âcombat firearmsâ by its officers policing the protests was forbidden. In âvery rare and necessary casesâ the use of ânon-lethal weapons such as paintballs and gas launchersâ was authorized. Officials have generally and publicly denied the use of firearms by State forces. In November 2022, for example, the Governmentâs spokesperson stated that âit would have been as easy as drinking water for the Government to allow the police to use combat bullets [live ammunition], shoot at anyone who took to the streets and frighten the people⊠but it would never do soâ.
467. However, in several instances the use of firearms and pellets have been confirmed by officials. Notably, on 28 October 2022, referring to the killing of several protesters in Mahabad, Kurdistan province, in a media interview, Mahabadâs Member of Parliament stated âI have an objection to the security forces, why do they use [combat bullets] live ammunition in peaceful protests?â Similarly, in November 2022, Chabaharâs Member of Parliament stated that âcombat bulletsâ had been used in Sistan and Baluchestan including in Zahedan on 30 September 2022. The use of pellets have similarly been confirmed by several officials. In October 2022, a Member of Parliament referred to reports by the commander of FARAJA denying the use of âcombat weapons had not been usedâ stating that only âpellet and paintball gunsâ had been used during the protests. In the same month, Hossein Ashtari, FARAJAâs commander stated that the police was armed with ânon-lethal and pellet gunsâ during protests. In November 2022, a Member of Parliamentâs board of speakers stated that the police had used âpaintballs and pellets which do not result in serious injuries.â
468. Moreover, three official documents analysed by the Mission explicitly confirmed that state security forces including FARAJA and the IRGC were armed with and /or used assault rifles, pistols, and ammunition containing multiple projectiles, in the context of the protests. Orders and judgments by Military Offices of Prosecutors and Courts respectively analysed by the Mission further confirmed that security forces, including the Special Forces of FARAJA possessed and also used weapons loaded with metal pellets against protesters. In one document, based on an official communiquĂ©, officials from the judiciary confirmed that over the course of one evening on 21 September, the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij forces had fired over 300 live ammunition cartridges and over one dozen blank cartridges, using weapons such as AK-47s, MP5s (submachine guns) and pistols, nearly 300 cartridges loaded with multiple rubber pellets and 40 rubber bullets. According to the document, security forces further used chemical irritants and acoustics (also referred to as stun grenades or sound bombs that are used reportedly for purposes of disorienting protesters) and smoke grenades. The official records stated that lethal force was used to âcontrol the riotsâ and that the âdispersal of the rioters would not have been possible without the use of armsâ.
469. On the basis of official documents, witness accounts, medical documents, forensic pathologist reports, as well as death and burial certificates, analysis of audio-visual evidence including injury photos as well as verified video footage and expert analysis by a military and weapons expert, the Mission is satisfied that the following weapons and ammunition were used by the security forces in the context of the protests:
– Handguns, including pistols (commonly using 9 mm calibre ammunition);
– Heckler & Koch G3 (Gewehr 3) (a military grade weapon which uses the standard NATO 7.62×51 mm ammunition and is capable of single, semi-auto or full-auto firing);
– AK-47 (a calibre assault rifle that uses the 7.62Ă39mm calibre cartridges and can fire single rounds or on automatic) and other calibre assault rifles;
– Dragunov Sniper Rifle;
– UZI (a submachine gun);
– Heckler & Koch MP5 (a submachine gun firing 9x19mm Parabellum cartridges with cyclic rate of 800 rounds per minute);
– Shotguns and other weapons loaded with pellets;
– Ammunition containing multiple projectiles of difference sizes and material, including metal pellets such as birdshot (smaller pellets) and buckshot (larger pellets) ammunition and rubber pellets (multiple projectiles);
– Kinetic impact projectiles, such as rubber bullets (single projectile);
– Paintball guns and other launchers loaded with paintballs and kinetic impact projectiles, referred to as rubber bullets;
– Chemical irritants, in particular tear gas;
– Grenades or projectiles containing smoke and acoustic grenades;
– Striking weapons, in particular batons;
– Electric shock weapons including stun guns;
– Water cannons.
470. Ballistic expertise confirmed that a large number of the weapons used to supress the protests, such as AK-47, G3, or MP5, are military grade weapons designed for use rather in times of war. In addition, the Mission reviewed evidence showing that heavy weaponry, including the Degtyarov-Shpagin Krupnokaliberny (DshK), was deployed in Kurdish-populated cities, including in Salas-e Babajani, Javanroud, and Piranshahr. The DshK is a heavy machine gun which is primarily used as an anti-aircraft (AA) gun, with 12.7mm x 108mm calibre ammunition and a maximum range of 1005 meters. It is therefore used against infantry and light armoured forces and thus in combat operation, and, as such, cannot be used in the context of law enforcement operations. Witnesses also described seeing armed forces, whom they described as snipers, stationed on the rooftop of buildings.
4. Injuries and killings resulting from the use of force at protests
(a) Context
471. In its November 2022 report, Iranâs High Council for Human Rights reported that the peaceful gatherings that took place across the country after the death of Jina Mahsa Amini morphed âinto riots and vandalismâ and referred to the duty of the police âto maintain order and security in societyâ in cases of violence. The Mission established however that force was used by State security during the very first peaceful protests that took place in front of Kasra Hospital in Tehran city, where Jina Mahsa Amini died on 16 September 2022. As the protests swiftly spread within the Kurdish provinces first, and then across the entire country, various branches of State security forces were mobilised and deployed to protest sites across the country.
472. State authorities have alleged that protesters committed âwidespread violenceâ resulting in the killings and injuries of security forces and ordinary citizens. In its statement delivered during the 53rd session of the Human Rights Council on 5 July 2023, the Government of Iran stated that “[d]uring the three months of unrest, more than 75 law enforcement forces and people were martyred by the rioters, and over 7000 law enforcement forces were also injured.â In its March 2024 report in reaction to the report of the Mission, entitled âExamining the inauthentic, non-legal and political report of the so-called Fact-finding Missionâ, the High Council for Human Rights in Iran provided two different figures for the number of security forces killed. One figure stated that 79 members of the security forces were killed while later in the same report, it is stated that â[a]s a result of the widespread violence of rioters and terrorists, 25 people and 54 law enforcement officers were martyred. Iranâs High Council for Human Rights reported on âmajor damages caused by riotsâ, which include allegations of 180 instances of banks being set on fire or destroyed, 21 instances of fire or destruction to religious places, 385 instances of fire or destruction to cars, 461 fire or destruction to motorcycles and 152 instances of fire and destruction to other places.
473. In its 27 June 2023 letter to the Government, the Mission invited the Government to share information on the protests that the Islamic Republic of Iran has qualified as characterized by widespread and serious violence, as reported by Iranâs High Council for Human Rights, and a detailed explanation of the legal and factual basis used for such assessment. The Mission requested information on reports of death or injury of security forces and on instances in which law enforcement officers used force in self-defence or the defence of others to save lives. The Mission also requested supporting material in relation to the alleged acts of arson, assault and fatal assault as reported by the High Council. Moreover, in response to the seizure of weapons as reported by the High Council, the Mission requested the Government to provide information on where they were seized, from whom, under what circumstances and on their provenance.
474. In addition, the Mission asked the Government to âprovide information on any practices of recording and reflecting promptly in a transparent report the use of force by law enforcement officials during the protests that began on 16 September 2022, including where injury or damage occurred, the recording of the details of the incident, including the reasons for the use of force, its effectiveness and the consequencesâ.
475. As of 15 March 2024, no response or information was received by the Mission from the Government of Iran. The Mission notes that besides any material available in open source, only the Government is in possession of any details of allegations of violence by protesters and the killings and injuries caused to members of the security forces, including information on the location, time, context of the specific protests, the forces deployed, weapons and ammunition used by security forces, as well as any video footage, witness statements, and ballistic and forensic reports.
476. In one instance, the Mission investigated the case of several protesters accused of the fatal shooting of two members of Basij and a member of the police forces in Isfahan. The proceedings in the case, which came to be known as the âHouse of Isfahan caseâ resulted in the execution, in May 2023, of Majid Kazemi, Saleh Mir Hashemi, and Saeed Yaghoubi. The authorities accused the protesters that, âon 16 November 2022, and following calls by the enemies and the hypocrite grouplet for nationwide riots and rebellions on 15, 16, and 17 November, and the mobilization of armed thug and hooligan groups, in order to cause unrest and insecurity in urban areas, they had participated in [protests] and that following the shooting of firearms by some of them, three members of security forces were martyred.â Following examination of the judgment, the Mission found that it did not include any detailed information on the alleged incident. For instance, while it states that security forces had been deployed to the protests to restore order, no details on the composition of the forces, their weapons and whether and/or what forces was used by them are found in the Jugement. Nor does the judgment clarify the precise allegations made against each defendant and the exact role the authorities alleged they played in the killing of the security forces. The lack of detail provided by the judicial authorities indicates that the defendantsâ guilt may not have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The court further relied on evidence obtained in violation of international law, including confessions extracted under torture to convict the men of the vaguely worded charge of âmoharebehâ (âwaging war on Godâ).
477. The Mission took note of an NGO report listing, based on statements by the authorities and the State media, 61 deceased persons identified by the State as security forces. Human rights organizations have stated that some individuals identified by the State as members of its forces may have been protesters and that in some circumstances, plainclothes forces among protesters may have been shot dead by security forces.
478. The Mission emphasises that the above mentioned reports from Government sources on alleged violence by protesters do not connect specific instances of use of lethal force by law enforcement to an incident where such force was absolutely necessary for prevention of imminent threats of death or serious injury to law enforcement or any other individual.
(b) Scope
479. As early as 23 September 2022, the Minister of Interior, Ahmad Vahidi, acknowledged that people had been killed during the protests, including by security forces. However, State authorities have not provided detailed figures and disaggregated data on individuals killed in the context of the protests, and their general figures on deaths vary. On 24 November 2022, in a media interview, the Political Deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs denied the reported killings in the context of the protests and stated, the figures given by human rights organizations were âcertainly not trueâ. He stated that a committee had been established under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior to arrive at an accurate figure. On 28 November, Amir Ali Hadjizadeh, the Commander of the Revolutionary Guardsâ Air Forces stated that over 300 people had been âkilled and martyredâ over the previous two months. On 3 December 2022, the Country Security Council released a statement saying that over 200 individuals had been killed during the course of the âriotsâ saying that the figure consisted of the following: âmartyrs of security, people martyred in terrorist attacks, innocent people [who were] victims of the killing projects of grouplets, innocent people who have lost their lives in a situation of unrest and lack of security, rioters, and armed elements belonging to separatist grouplets.â The statement did not provide any details as to how individuals were killed and attributed the responsibility of the killings to âunknown elementsâ, âterroristsâ, and ârioters.â
480. In the absence of official data, international human rights organizations and civil society organizations documenting killings and injuries in the context of the protests have provided figures. As of September 2023, human rights organizations and the media reported figures ranging between 373 to 551. Figures of women killed ranged between 34 to 49 and children killed ranged between 57 to 68. Women and men were reported to have been injured in similar numbers which is consistent with the cases of injuries investigated by the Mission. Deaths were recorded in at least 26 of the 31 provinces, with the highest number of victims in regions with minority populations, in particular in Sistan and Baluchestan province, the Kurdish regions of the country including Kurdistan, Kermanshah and parts of West Azerbaijan. The highest number of deaths reported in one day was 104 on 30 September 2022, during the protests following Friday prayers in Zahedan city, Sistan and Baluchestan province.
481. The Mission is satisfied that the variations between the figures provided by different NGOs are due to the difference in methodology and criteria for including a case based on the information available to the respective organization. The Mission assessed the methodology applied and, in some cases, obtained access to some of the underlying sources of information upon which the figures are based. Finding the methodology applied sound, the underlying information valid and underlying sources credible, the Mission is satisfied that the reported figures, as noted above, are credible.
482. The reported killings coincided with periods of protests organized to mark the third and 40th days after the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini, namely 19 to 22 September 2022 and 26 to at least 27 October 2022, as well as protests that were held following general calls for nationwide protests, from 8 to 15 October 2022, and protests to mark the anniversary of the November 2019 protests, from 14 to at least16 November 2022. In Sistan and Baluchestan province, protests and the Stateâs use of force generally took place following Friday prayers.
483. Beyond the reported total numbers of those killed in the protests as a result of the use of force, the Mission analysed information on the names of killed victims contained in detailed public or confidential lists. With regards to 99 protesters or bystanders included in these lists that cover the period until 8 December 2022, the Mission has been able to obtain underlying material on the killing as a result of the use of force. This included statements, death and burial certificates, photographs, audio recordings and audio-visual material, which the Mission found credible. The work on collection and analysis of relevant material and on the corroboration of the names on the lists available should continue.
484. Based on witness interviews, medical documents, death or burial certificates, images of the victims, statements collected and shared with the Mission by NGOs and [other material], the Mission is further satisfied that in relation to the specific incidents it investigated, persons were killed and injured as a result of the unlawful use of force by security forces, and that targeted killings of protesters constituting extrajudicial executions took place. The Mission stresses that it has not completed its work of collecting, verifying and corroborating information and evidence on the persons killed and injured. It further highlights that many incidents investigated where the use of force resulted in injuries, involved the use of ammunition, such as birdshot, which disperses upon discharge. This indicates that the number of victims is likely to be higher.
485. No figures exist on the number of injuries caused as a result of the use of force. In November 2022, a media report, citing ophthalmologists from three hospitals in the city of Tehran, stated that more than 500 people had sustained severe eye injuries since the start of the protests. Doctors in Kurdistan were reported to have estimated 80 cases of eye injuries. In September 2023, an NGO reported that it had received information on and verified 138 cases of eye injuries. The Mission highlights that these reported figures pertained to eye injuries only and did not include other injuries caused by ammunition such as metal pellets, as well as those caused as a result of other weapons including tear gas, batons, electric shock weapons and live ammunition. It further stresses severe underreporting of cases of injuries in particular because, as discussed below, many injured protesters did not seek medical care due to fear of arrest.
5. Patterns
486. Based on an extensive body of evidence on the use of force by security forces in relation to the protests it investigated, including primary sources such as witnesses, medical files, death and burial certificates, and forensic reports, as well as secondary sources, the Mission established a number of patterns related to the use of force which are described in this section.
(a) Use of firearms and other weapons to disperse protests
487. The Mission has established a pattern of using firearms, including assault rifles and shotguns loaded with ammunition containing pellets, for the purpose of dispersing protests. This includes situations of security forces using lethal weapons and ammunition during protests that took place around and outside the Governorâs Office buildings, police stations and IRGC and Basij bases. The Mission also concluded that in an effort to disperse the protests, weapons and ammunition categorized as less-lethal, including kinetic impact projectiles such as paintball and rubber bullets, were targeted at heads and faces. The Mission maintains that in the same way firearms must never be used simply to disperse an assembly, any weapon and ammunition used outside of less lethal parameters also should not be used to disperse assemblies.
488. The Mission is also satisfied that security forces verbally threatened peaceful protesters warning them they would kill them unless they dispersed and stopped engaging in protests. For instance, a witness stated that during the protests in Tehran in September 2022, an armed member of the security forces in all-black uniforms told her and her friends to âgo home or I will kill youâ. The young woman recalled that plainclothes security forces, operating alongside uniformed State forces, âwere comfortable to point their guns at us and make threats in the light of the day.â Another protester recounted that during protests on 19 September 2022 in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan province, he heard the following message from a loudspeaker installed on an armed vehicle: âI am the commander of the Special Guard Forces of West Azerbaijan and I have received orders to shoot with live ammunition. Unless you go back to your homes, I have no responsibility for your lives.â
489. In addition to causing severe physical pain and mental suffering and devastation, the Mission notes the deterrent and chilling effect that injuries, in particular blindings, have on protesters. The Mission is satisfied that such effect was intended. A woman protester, who lost her sight in one eye, described the use of force by the security forces as a deliberate act of intimidation of protesters. She noted that injuries sustained by protesters not only impacted them but also affected their families and the people around them. âAn injured protester means one less person on the streetsâ, she said. Another woman protester described how the use of force was aimed at intimidating, saying âit is to create fear in society. You get shot and you scream, and people get the message.â
490. Victims with injuries caused by pellets and other ammunition stated that security forces shot at them and other protesters to intimidate them, to instil fear, and to stop them from going back to the streets. An expert report on the impact of the use of force Commissioned by the Mission referred to the âchilling effectâ phenomenon pertaining to how people may avoid expressing themselves or exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly in a context where the use of force does not comply with standards. The impacts are described to be far reaching affecting many more beyond those who are injured or killed.
491. The Mission further established that State authorities aimed to punish protesters and targeted them on discriminatory grounds. In some cases, members of security forces explicitly and verbally uttered phrases that were illustrative of their intent to punish, humiliate and discriminate before resorting to force against protesters or as they beat them or shot at them. Witnesses described security forces using gendered insults against them and against Jina Mahsa Amini. In one case a witness said that when he was arrested on the street, security forces subjected him to beatings with batons while shouting insults including âyou have come to the street for the sake of whores?â. Another witness said that during a protest in West Azerbaijan, a plainclothes agent told her âwhore, I am going to kill you.â Security forces shouted at a group of protesters in a city in a northern province that âthere is not such a thing as Woman, Life, Freedom⊠you will see nowâ before they shot at protesters.
(b) Unlawful use of weapons and ammunition
492. The Mission found a practice of unlawful use by security forces of weapons or ammunition categorized as less lethal outside their less lethal parameters. As detailed above, official documents reviewed by the Mission have confirmed that various State forces were armed with and used such ammunition.
493. The Mission also identified a pattern of security forces, including agents belonging to FARAJAâs Special Forces, the IRGC and Basij, and agents in plainclothes, firing shotguns and other weapons loaded with ammunition containing multiple projectiles, both made of metal and rubber, used in protests across the country leading to killings and injuries. Official documents reviewed by the Mission confirmed that State security forces were armed and used ammunition containing multiple projectiles. An official document confirmed that FARAJA, the IRGC and Basij forces had fired nearly 300 cartridges loaded with multiple rubber pellets in the course of protests on 21 September 2022 in one city.
494. Ammunition containing multiple projectiles, in particular metal pellets such as birdshot, which in themselves are inherently indiscriminate, were fired randomly, wantonly and indiscriminately at persons participating in or appearing to support the protests. In the case of birdshot, hundreds of small pellets can disperse upon discharge covering a wide area. Children were also shot with ammunition containing pellets during the protests. In some cases, as detailed below, persons present in the vicinity of the protests including some reportedly inside their homes were injured as a result of the use of pellets. A witness also described that security forces armed with shotguns patrolled on motorbikes in pairs with the agent sitting in the back firing at people as they passed by them.
495. The Mission analysed death and burial certificates and other official documents including forensic reports pertaining to the deaths of 64 persons reported to have been killed during the protests across the country. The documents revealed that the majority of those killed were hit with firearm ammunition followed by ammunition containing multiple projectiles, in particular birdshot.
496. The Mission recalls that even a shotgun with ammunition containing multiple pellets discharged against a person, who poses an imminent threat of death, surrounded by others who pose no threat, such as in a protest, amounts to an indiscriminate use.
497. Many instances of the use of force resulting in deaths and injuries investigated by the Mission took place after dark and in the late hours of the evening, increasing the risk of indiscriminate use of lethal force. The Mission has also received information that in at least three cases, street electricity was cut limiting the protestersâ ability to react as well as their ability to document the events.
498. Moreover, security forces, including agents belonging to FARAJAâs Special Forces, the IRGC and Basij, and agents in plainclothes, used weapons and ammunition categorised as less lethal outside the permitted parameters. For instance, they fired rubber bullets or paintballs directly at the head and the eyes of protesters. In one case, a tear gas canister was directly shot at the face of a victim, resulting in the loss of one eye and severe damage to the face. Water cannons were also used against peaceful protests including on the day of Jina Mahsaâs funeral in Saqqez (see Annex III). The Mission recalls that less lethal weapons and ammunition should never be used outside less lethal parameters.
(c) Targeting of vital parts of the body
499. The Mission further found a pattern of targeting of protesters and bystandersâ vital body parts, including the face, the head, neck, torso, and the genital area with firearms such as assault rifles, weapons loaded with metal pellets and paintball guns discharged by security forces, causing deaths and extensive and life-changing injuries. Witnesses recalled seeing security forces deliberately aiming for certain body parts, including heads and faces, and genitalia, or their limbs at extremely close range. In one case a witness described the IRGC agent directing a paintball gun loaded with rubber bullets to his head from one meter distance with âa smile of satisfactionâ.
500. The Mission also analysed medical and forensic records and death and burial certificates of victims which showed that many were hit in vital parts of the body, including in the head, chest and abdomen. The analysed documents recorded severe damage and destruction of the skull, brain tissue, internal organs including the heart, lungs, spleen, kidneys, liver, large intestines and vital arteries.
(d) Targeting of individual protesters
501. The Mission concluded that there was a pattern of security forces targeting individual protesters which resulted in killings and injuries. This included those who were chanting slogans, writing slogans on the walls, honking in support of the protests, and taking part in roadblocks. For example, in the case of a young man killed in October 2022 during a protest in a city in Kermanshah province, a witness to his fatal shooting stated that the victim and other youth were setting up a roadblock when a member of the security forces in plainclothes got out of his car and shot in their direction. The witness said that âthe agent who fired did not care who was there, he shot a barrage of bulletsâ. The witness stated that the security forces were armed with a range of weapons including weapons loaded with pellets as well as G3 and AK-47s. He further stated that he had seen at least two members of the security forces on the roof of the cityâs municipality building and the Governorâs Office armed with assault rifles. In some cases, child protesters were targeted specifically for engaging in acts such as chanting.
502. Security forces also targeted individual protesters who were perceived to be leading the protests and encouraging other protesters and/or objecting to security forces, or trying to help protesters who were injured or risking arrest.
(e) Bystanders and the use of force in the vicinity or in the aftermath of protests
503. Lastly, the Mission identified a pattern of persons not participating directly in the protests, who were killed or injured by security forces policing nearby protests. In some instances, bystanders were shot, including fatally, by the security forces while in their cars during the protests.
504. A medical professional who treated persons injured during the protests over the course of several months stated that in at least three cases person injured had not been participating in the protests when they were shot at. In one case, he reported that a young man was standing outside his house, next to the door, when forces in FARAJA Special Forces uniforms on motorbikes shot him with metal pellets injuring him in the back of his head, his back and the side of his abdomen. Protests were reportedly taking place in the nearby streets. In another case, he reported a man returning home was he was shot at with pellets by agents in plainclothes. Protests were taking place in the general area, but not in the street where he was shot. In another example, in November 2022, a witness in a city in north Iran, saw a Basij agent, with a weapon loaded with ammunition containing pellets, shooting a woman standing on her balcony.
505. Equally, according to credible information, on 21 September 2022, a young woman, Hannaneh Kia, who was standing on a sidewalk in the proximity of a protest on a central square of Nowshahr, Mazandaran province, was fatally shot with live ammunition. Official documents, received through an NGO and analysed showed, that she sustained severe damage to her organs resulting in significant blood loss and hypovolemic shock. In another case, Shirin Alizadeh, another young woman was shot in the car in Salman Shahr, Mazandaran province on 22 September 2022. She and her family were travelling from another city and were on vacation. According to credible information, forces belonging to Basij were wantonly shooting from inside a Basij base at people who were protesting outside. A video captured by the victim herself depicts the moments before the shooting as well as the moment she was fatally shot. The video taken from inside the car shows unarmed protesters fleeing in distress as sounds of gunshot are heard. The passengers are heard saying, âthey are shootingâ in shock, adding âthey are shooting into the air not directlyâ. Almost immediately after this an anxious passenger is heard saying, âoh, they shot a girl [âŠ] they killed them.â Seconds later Shirin Alizadeh turns around towards the back seat as she continues filming when the footage abruptly moves as the phone drops and what appears to be blood is seen.
506. In some cases, security forces shot at persons who were in the vicinity of areas where protests had taken place earlier in the day or at persons in areas where protests commonly took place even though there were no protests at the time. In some cases, security forces fired at individuals who, upon seeing heavily armed forces, appeared frightened and/or started running. An illustrative case is that of a man shot in his car by members of the IRGC on 27 October 2022 in Baneh, Kurdistan province.
507. In another case, in late October 2022 in a city in Kurdistan province, a young man was shot by a weapon loaded with metal pellets. The victim was standing with several other persons near a shop on a street where protests commonly took place when a car pulled over close to them and several agents, including in FARAJA uniforms, got out of the vehicle. When one of the forces aimed his shotgun at the victim, he turned around and started running. At this point the security forces fired the weapon loaded with metal pellets several times. No protests were reported to be taking place at the time of shooting.
5. Women and girl protesters and gender dimension of the use of force
508. Though there is no official sex- and gender-disaggregated data, young men and boys (between 15 and 18 years) were the majority of protesters killed by security forces at protests.
509. As of September 2023, up to 49 of those killed were women. Figures provided by different organizations suggest that around 10% of protesters killed were women and girls. However, the killings of women might have been under-reported as the authorities particularly pressed families to attribute the death of women and girls to health issues, accidents, or suicides. At the same time, information received by the Mission indicates that women were affected more on par with men with regard to injuries.
510. While women and girls participated in the protests in large numbers (see Section IV), their participation was not of similar levels across provinces. Womenâs participation in large cities was very visible whereas women were under-represented in other cities. For example, this was the case in Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province. A witness who participated in protests in the Sistan and Baluchestan province described to the Mission that while the majority of protesters were men, women and children were also present. He noted that Baluchi women who attended protests were from a more educated segment of society but that âordinary womenâ, like his mother or sister, and women from poor communities also protested.
511. The Mission identified elements that contributed to this difference. First, information reviewed shows that most killings of men took place in the later hours of the evening when it appeared that more men were protesting as compared to women and even less so girls. Second, some witnesses highlighted that when security forces were violent, men would go to the front to shield women protesters. A witness told the Mission that men protesters were protective of the girls and did not want the young women to stay behind as they feared for their safety. Another witness described how in her experience before the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini, âboys were looking down on girlsâ. She noted that in the protests, she did not experience any âbad looksâ from men, and that “young men changed the way they looked at womenâ. As a result, she felt very secure. She noted that young men were taking care of and supporting the women. When they set fire to dumpsters in the street or went on top of dumpsters, the men were very protective. If there was shooting or when live ammunition was used, the men protesting made sure she was shielded. Third, on âBloody Fridayâ, which accounted for possibly up to 1/5 of the reported killings, mainly men and boys were protesting after the Friday prayers.
512. The Mission also notes that authorities and State media consistently denied that women and girls had been killed during the protests or attributed responsibility to protesters. While the overall response by the State to the killings of protesters has been denial, State authorities and media went to great lengths to deny any role in the killings of women and girls. For example, in an article published by Mizan news agency linked to Iranâs Judiciary, the death of protesters is reported as due to various causes: an âenemyâ either substituting a person for another person and declaring them dead or introducing a person who died in other circumstances (usually suicide) as a person killed in âriotsâ; an âenemyâ assigns people to infiltrate the âriotersâ and kill a person to blame their death on the government and fake news. In comparison, the deaths of women and girl protesters, were instead commonly attributed to alcohol consumption, suicide, ordinary crimes, illness (seizure, influenza, cardiac arrest), traffic accidents, fake news, family dispute, and falls from a window or a building. The authorities put families under pressure to deny that the death of their female relative was linked to the protests. Such narratives attempted to erase the overall role of women and girls in the protests, and to stifle their demands for equality and non-discrimination, which were at the core of the September 2022 protests.
513. Indeed, authorities minimized their deaths and injuries in an attempt to avoid at any cost that woman killed gain a symbolic status akin to that of Neda Agha Soltan, whose killing in the anti-government protests of 2009 was captured on video, and to that of Jina Mahsa Amini. There is credible information that in one case, the family of a woman protestor shot in the head was threatened to remain quiet and stop posting online as her case was receiving significant attention. Authorities said they had another âMahsa situationâ on hand.
514. In another example, examined by the Mission, the authorities attributed the killing of Minoo Majidi to an opposition group which they called the âHypocritesâ in relation to the PMOI. In another case the authorities forced the family to say that the victim had died of a heart attack even though pictures of her bloodied and disfigured face and bullets wounds were circulating online and the family being in possession a death certificate stating that the cause of death was being hit by a bullet and the use of âwar equipmentâ.
515. In another case reviewed by the Mission, a woman protester, Aylar Haghi, was found dead after attending a protest in the evening on 16 November 2022 in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan. Credible information received by the Mission indicated that the woman, a medical student, had joined the protest at around 6:30 p.m. Reportedly, between 9 and 9:30 p.m., the victim called and sent several messages to friends and family in which she asked for help, stating anxiously that she was being followed and adding that âthey are killing everyoneâ. Around 1 a.m., having been unable to reach her over the phone, her family went to a police station to look for her. There, the police showed them the victimâs shoes and mobile phone and asked if the items belonged to her. When they confirmed this, the family was told by the police to go to the city morgue. Reportedly, the body bore marks of beatings and a wound with stitches was visible on the back of her head. Her death certificate reportedly said that she had been âkilled by [a] hard objectâ. State officials announced that Aylar Haghi died after falling into a hole at a construction site. According to media reports and media interviews by relatives, authorities placed her family under pressure to announce that her death was caused as a result of a fall. Security forces were reported to have been present at her funeral and used force to disperse mourners who were chanting slogans.
516. Similarly, according to reports by human rights organizations, State authorities subjected the family of Sarina Esmailzadeh, a 16-year-old girl reportedly killed on 23 September during the protests in Karaj, Alborz province to harassment and intimidation to coerce them into repeating the official narrative. According to public reports, member of the security forces fatally struck Sarina Esmailzadeh in the head with a baton. Following a public outcry in relation to her death, the head of the justice department (dadgostari) in Alborz province, claimed that Sarina Esmailzadeh had committed suicide by jumping from a rooftop. Subsequently, State affiliate media aired a short âinterviewâ with a relative of her repeating the Stateâs narrative on her death, namely that she had not been involved in the protests and had died as a result of suicide. Media outlets, citing a relative, stated that security and intelligence bodies subjected the girlâs family to intimidation and harassment including by making threats of harming other family members to coerce them into absolving the State of responsibility. They further highlighted various contradictions on the Stateâs narrative.
517. Women protesters were also subjected to gendered and sexualized threats, including threats of violence. They were threatened that they would be shot at if they did not put their hijab back on. One victim stated that before the shooting, security forces called women protesters âwhoresâ, and said âThere is no such a thing like âWoman, Life, Freedomâ; this is nothing!â and âYou will see now!â
518. The Mission investigated several cases that are emblematic of injuries and deaths of women protesters.
(a) Women protesters in a northern province on 20 September 2022
519. In September 2022, a protest took place in a city in a northern province. A witness recalled that by the time she arrived at the protest at 6:30 p.m., around 200 people had gathered on the main square. The majority of the protesters were women of different ages. The rest were young men and boys. About 10 minutes later, around 20 police officers dressed in light and dark green uniforms and armed with shotguns and pistols, accompanied by another 30 plainclothes agents, arrived at the protest site. Another 15 minutes later, security forces started shooting at the protesters who were chanting âWoman, Life, Freedomâ and âDeath to the dictatorâ. The witness tried to help two boys, aged around 14, who had been shot by a plainclothes agent with a shotgun when she was shot. She described that immediately after seeing her kneeling down near the boys, the plainclothes agent shot her from a distance of around five meters and hit her in the eye. Forensic analysis of medical reports, video footage and picture material confirmed that the victim suffered a traumatic eye injury with a globe rupture due to blunt force trauma, which led to her losing her sight. The Mission concluded that the victim was intentionally shot at close range by a security agent.
(b) Woman protester, Tehran, mid-October 2022
520. In a protest in Tehran on 12 October 2022, a woman recalled walking towards a protest in Tehran province when she saw that armoured vehicles, armed enforcement agents and special forces agents in black uniforms had been deployed to a sidewalk leading to the protest site. She explained that they had blocked the adjacent streets leading to the intersection, forcing protesters to pass by an informal checkpoint should they want to join the protest at the site. As she passed by the agents, a member of the Special Forces Basiji pushed and punched her, saying âWhere is your shawl, put on your shawl, this is not Europeâ and âI am going to waste a bullet on youâ. An altercation ensued over her defiance to wear the hijab, while two other agents in plainclothes approached the scene and told the witness âWe will kill you the same way as we killed Mahsa Aminiâ. As she continued arguing, one of the agents also made sexualized threats against her saying âInstead of shooting you, we will put a gun inside youâ. As the argument escalated, the witness saw that a third agent in plainclothes approached and, from a meter away, shot at her with a paintball which she described as âsimilar to a rock with metal insideâ causing her severe pain. She recalled the âhatredâ he exhibited when he shot at least seven paintballs into her body. He also hit her in the stomach, legs and chest. The victim then recalled how she tried to run away, but she fell. At that moment, two women passing by came to her rescue. Minutes later, she saw how the two women were being dragged by two Special Forces agents. As she assumed that the women were being arrested, she asked the agents to let them go. In response, the same plainclothes agent who threatened shooting her earlier, âsmiledâ and shot her in her eye. The witness described how she could âhear her eye explodingâ and how her hands were covered in blood after she touched her eye. The victim noted that that night she witnessed security forces shooting with paintballs at people passing by and beating others with batons.
6. Children
521. As some of the incidents and emblematic cases described above show, security forces used force against children in the context of the protests investigated by the Mission. The Mission has also investigated specific cases of children killed and injured in protests in Tehran city and West Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, a northern province and Kurdistan provinces. The Mission highlights the severe impact that the use of force could have, both physically and psychologically, on children. A report on the impact of weapons and ammunition used on the victims, commissioned by the Mission, pointed to the special vulnerability of children in protest contexts due to their age, developmental stage, and higher risk of short and long term injuries. Children have more delicate skin, bones, and organs, making them particularly vulnerable to physical trauma from projectiles and batons which could result in exacerbated fractures, penetration, and trauma. In some cases, especially when metal pellets were embedded in the tissues of children and young people, lead poisoning has also been reported. Moreover, children could suffer long term consequence as fractures of developmental plates can impede growth, and damage to organs in youth can result in dysfunction or uneven growth over time. Brain trauma can further lead to a range of symptoms including developmental delay and seizures. Psychological trauma can have lasting consequences on the development and ability to learn of children.
Kian Pirfalak
522. On 16 November, in Izeh, Khuzestan province, 9-year-old Kian Pirfalak was in the car with his parents and younger brother on the way home when he was fatally shot, and his father was severely injured. Seven people, including two other children, Artin Rahmani, and Sepehr Maghsoudi were killed during the incident on 16 November. A witness described that a large number of people had gathered in the city in Hafez Jonoubi and surrounding streets and were chanting “Woman, Life, Freedomâ. Security forces in uniforms, including those belonging to FARAJA and its special forces as well as plainclothes agents were reportedly present. Forces were also reported to have been stationed on rooftops from where they opened fire at protesters.
523. State authorities immediately denied that security forces had any role in the killings claiming that security forces were not armed with firearms. A few hours after the incident, IRGC in Khuzestan issued a statement announcing that Kian Pirfalak and the other persons killed on that day had been the victims of a terrorist attack. State officials, including the Deputy Governor for Law Enforcement and Security Affairs of Khuzestan province, Valiollah Hayati, also claimed that âterrorist agentsâ were responsible for the incident. On 19 November, the Governor of Khuzestan province, Sadegh Khalilian, stated that 11 âterrorist agentsâ were arrested in connection with the events in Izeh. On 27 November, the head of the Justice Department (dadgostari) in Khouzestan announced that 61 people had been arrested in relation to the incident.
524. As detailed in Section V. E, in April 2023, the Judiciary announced that the Revolutionary Court in Ahvaz had sentenced a man, Mojahed (Abbas) Kourkouri to death on the charge of âcorruption on earth over accusations that he was involved in the Izeh incident and the killing of seven persons, including Kian Pirfalak. Mr. Kourkouri was charged with âwaging war on Godâ, âcorruption on earthâ and âbaghiâ (armed rebellion).â State media aired âconfessionâ made by Mr. Kourkouri shortly after his arrest which were reported to have been obtained under torture. He was filmed in what appeared to be a hospital bed with his arm bandaged with traces of blood visible. (For the details of State accusations against Mr. Kourkouri and the documented violations and irregularities in his case see Section V. E)
525. Kian Pirfalakâs family have repeatedly and persistently refuted the State narrative. A video analysed showed that during his funeral on 18 November, Kian Pirfalakâs mother said: âHear it from me about how the shooting happened so they [the authorities] cannot say it was by terrorists; because they’re lying.â She described that the family was driving home when plainclothes officials stationed near the office of the Red Crescent ordered them to stop and turn around before opening fire at the car. As a result, Kian Pirfalak sustained fatal gunshot wounds and his father was severely injured. On 19 November, in a news interview, Kian Pirfalakâs uncle confirmed the motherâs account. On 27 December, Kian Pirfalakâs family once again refuted the official narrative around his killing and said in a statement: âthe identity of the shooters is absolutely clear, definite and unchangeable for awakened consciences. Under no circumstances we accept fake and untrue narratives about the murder of Kian.â In April 2023, Kian Pirfalakâs father stated in a video: âI do not recognise Mojahed Kourkouri or any other regular citizen as the murderer of my son because I saw with my eyes that security forces opened fire at our vehicle.â
526. Credible information showed that since June 2023, Kian Pirfalakâs family has been subjected to various forms of harassment including arrest, detention, vilification by state media, and expulsion from work. On 11 June, when the Pirfalak family gathered at his grave in Izeh, amid a heavy state security presence, to remember the child on what would have been his 10th birthday. The cousin of Kian Pirfalakâs mother, Pouya, was shot dead by Iranian officials who claimed Pouya tried to drive his car into police forces who had surrounded the outdoor memorial service at Kianâs grave.
527. Credible information indicates that Kian Pirfalak was killed by security forces.
Artin Rahmani
528. Another child, Artin Rahmani, a 17-year-old boy also attended the protests that took place on 16 November in Izeh, Khuzestan province and was chanting with the crowd. According to a witness, security forces armed with AK-47s and Winchester guns were firing at protesters in Hafez Jonouvbi street as well as in Helal Ahmar and Rasulullah streets. The witness noted that there were âbullets hitting everywhereâ and that he stopped a motorcyclist telling him: âplease take me to another place so I can surviveâ. According to the witness, Artin Rahmani was shot to the head and chest that night during the protest.
529. Credible information indicates that Artin Rahmani was killed by security forces.
Two boys in a northern province
530. A witness also described that during a protest that was held in September 2022, a member of the security forces shot directly at two boys aged 13 and 14, after they tore up photos of the Supreme Leader. The witness stated that she learned later that one of the boys had severe injuries on the spinal cord. The other boy suffered injuries on his liver and stomach, and part of his intestines had to be removed. The witness noted that while she had seen the same agent shooting at protesters, she ânever thoughtâ he would also shoot at the children.
Child protester in a city in West Azerbaijan province
531. A protester, who participated in the protests that took place in a city in West Azerbaijan province when he was 17 years old, described that during a protest that took place in October around 1,000 people had gathered. As soon as he arrived, at around 8 and 9 p.m., he saw that armed FARAJA special forces had surrounded the protesters. Plainclothes agents in unmarked vehicles and armed with shotguns, paintball guns and AK-47s had joined them from the side streets adjacent to the square. Security forces started firing at protesters with shotguns shortly thereafter. As he was in the front of the protesters chanting âZhen, Zhian, Azadiâ and slogans against the Supreme Leder, along with other protesters, a plainclothes agent, who was standing at a distance of 20 meters away, shot him with a shotgun loaded with ammunition containing pellets and hit his face, eyes, and shoulders. The agent first attempted to drag him out of the site to a vehicle nearby, but as the boy began vomiting blood, he left him on the ground. As of August 2023, the victim reported that at least nine pellets remain in his body, including in his both his eyes. The Mission concluded that the victim was shot by a member of the security forces with a weapon loaded with ammunition containing pellets.
Child in a city in Kurdistan province
532. The Mission investigated the case of another child injured during the protests that took place on in November 2022, in a city in Kurdistan province. According to a witness, around 200 protesters had gathered in several locations. Upon arriving at a protest site, the witness saw protesters setting tires on fire to block the street so as to prevent the security forces from accessing the protesters. The witness saw IRGC forces, uniformed police from FARAJAâs Emdad unit, and plainclothes agents wearing hats and masks, whom he believed belonged to the intelligence service at the site. The security forces were armed with AK-47 and shotguns. Sometime after 9 pm, the witness noticed a 13-year-old child who was chanting along with other protesters who threw stones. He saw a police officer he identified as belonging to the Edmad Unit dragging the child to an adjacent alley. Protesters, who saw this, threw stones at the police officer, and minutes later, the witness heard gunshots. He located the child at around 9:40 p.m. and realized that he had been shot and hit on the foot. Forensic analysis of injury images and an ex-ray showed a penetrating injury to the foot at the heel of the victim. The fresh wound on the heel had multiple lacerations at the edge, consistent with a near-contact gunshot entry wound. A radiological image showed a minimum of 180 radio-dense at the plantar surface consistent with shotgun pellets, particularly birdshot. Images also showed healing phases of the tissue with signs of multiple surgical interventions. The Mission concluded that the boy was shot by a security officer with a weapon loaded with metal pellets, likely birdshot, during the protest.
7. Lack of medical assistance
533. The Mission received information indicating that security forces hindered medical personnel from providing assistance, exacerbating the situation further for the injured protesters.
534. Iranâs High Council for Human Rights asserted in a November 2022 report that the law enforcement officers deployed to police the protests were âcoordinating with medical centers to provide quick aid to the woundedâ.
(a) Emergency medical care
535. Witnesses describe a lack of available emergency response operations, including ambulance services, and of a lack of access without delay by individuals to essential healthcare at protests starting in September 2022. As an example, one victim who was shot in the eye in a protest in September 2022 in a northern province, noted that no ambulance was present at the protest. At the same time, according to the witness, there were around 20 uniformed police officers, around 30 plainclothes agents and Basij forces, as well as some police vehicles at the site. After she got shot, her three family members approached peopleâs vehicles to take them to the hospital. They also approached taxi drivers asking them to take her to a hospital, but they refused and some even locked their doors to prevent them from getting into the car. A plainclothes security officer said that an ambulance would come, but she believed it was a trick to arrest her. Either way, no ambulance came.
536. Another victim, who was shot in the arm at a protest in Bukan in October 2022, also could not find any ambulance or other medical help on the site of the protest. A victim who was beaten almost to unconsciousness by four or five police officers, shot with rubber pellets and hit by a flashbang at a protest in Tehran in October 2022, was taken home by taxi as there were no ambulances at the protest site. The taxi driver was told that the victim had an accident.
537. At the same time, witnesses stated that ambulances were being used by security forces during the protests including to arrest protesters, in particular in Tehran. A witness said that he had seen security forces shooting from inside of an ambulance during protests on 20 September in Valiasr Square in Tehran. They were firing metal pellets and compressed rubber balls. One protester interviewed stated that he had seen ambulances in Tehran without plate numbers which was unusual. He believed that they most probably were used to transport security personnel. A witness in a western province said that he had seen ambulances and Red Cross vehicles, as well as vehicles belonging to the municipality, being used by the Qods security forces of IRGC in order to transfer forces and detainees.
(b) Security forces inside and outside of healthcare facilities
538. The Mission established that from at least October 2022 onwards, across Iran, including in Alborz, Tehran, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan provinces, security forces were present inside and outside hospitals, blocking or controlling access, as well as requesting and collecting information on injured patients, interfering with their medical care, arresting and questioning them in hospital. For instance, a medical professional witnessed, on two occasions in October and November 2022, security forces blocking the entrance to a hospital in a city in a western province, between 9.30 to 11.30 pm. A van belonging to the FARAJA, the regular police force, was placed in front of the entrance door. On one occasion, security forces outside were also firing towards the inside of the hospital. He saw state agents in plainclothes in all sections of the hospital. A witness who had sustained serious facial injuries in a protest in Tehran in October 2022 also noted the presence of security forces across the hospital he was treated in. A police officer was sitting at a table in front of the hospital entrance and checking and controlling every person, and another police officer was deployed next to the entrance of the emergency unit. In addition, a Basiji in plainclothes was by the desk of the cashier of the hospital, who was checking all patients being discharged from the hospital.
539. In addition, security forces operating in the hospitals took measures to identify protesters among the patients. In their interview with the Mission, a medical professional stated that when the protests started, an instruction came through the kortabl system, an internal portal for hospitals, where communications of the Ministry of Health are received and kept. In this communication, medical personnel at medical establishments were instructed to report anyone who came seeking medical help for injuries sustained from bullets, metal pellets, and beatings with batons. The instruction, addressed to the chief of the clinic, was in the form of an official letter, seen by the witness, bore the letterhead of the ministry and a logo, and contained the name of a person who worked at the ministry and a contact number to report patients. According to the witness, the instruction went to all hospitals and clinics, private or public. They also noted that the personnel in large hospitals had no choice but to report cases, in light of the police presence and the government affiliation of some staff. The situation was different in private clinics as the State could not afford to station police or security forces in all of them. They sent occasional security forces instead, and the clinics were required to inform the police station in their neighbourhood on injured protesters. The police would then come to make a report and could arrest the patient.
540. A medical professional who worked in a hospital in West Azerbaijan province also referred to an instruction sent to their hospital requesting it to include information on gunshot wounds relating to people injured during the protests in the database called Hospital Information System (HIS) which is used in every hospital. The database contains the patientsâ identity and address, which makes it easy for security to trace them. The security (herasat) unit at the hospitals, including in this city in West Azerbaijan, and another city in a western province, were identifying protesters and reporting them to the authorities, particularly the IRGC. The herasat would also check the CCTV footage and cameras every morning to ensure that no injured protester had left during the previous night.
541. Moreover, in one hospital, the supervisor was required to establish lists of protesters and provide them to the hospital matron every day. The practice of identifying protesters was also confirmed by a victim, who had been treated in hospital after sustaining injuries to his face in a protest in Tehran in October 2022. He said that one of the nurses gave his name to the security bodies, along with the names of two other protesters with eye injuries with whom he shared the room. The witness hid in an examination room and was able to leave the hospital in time. He feared, however, that one of the other patients was arrested and is still detained since he would have otherwise heard from him.
542. Security forces also questioned some patients suspected of being protesters in the hospital and were seen guarding and tying a patient to their bed and arresting others. In particular, a victim, who was beaten almost unconscious by four or five police officers, shot with rubber pellets and hit by a flashbang at a protest in Tehran in October 2022, was questioned for five hours by the herasat unit in the hospital he sought treatment. According to him these units are closely linked to Ministry of Intelligence. A medical professional noted the arrest in a hospital in a city in a western province, of a 24 or 25-year-old man with pellet injuries. He also explained that those who were in critical condition, for example had been shot in the eye and needed surgery, were not arrested in the hospital, but those who were shot with pellets and did not need to be hospitalized could get arrested. While she was not arrested at the hospital, one witness feared at the time that she may be arrested later as the hospital would have a record of her injuries and her personal information, including social security number. Another expressed that for five months she was hiding because she was scared that she would be arrested because of her visible injuries.
543. Fear of arrest in hospitals, including based on information shared by friends or healthcare professionals, prevented some injured protesters from seeking medical treatment in general in hospitals or in specific hospitals. Other patients sought treatment, but concealed the reasons behind their injuries. In particular, a witness who had pellet injuries to his eye after attending a protest in Saqqez, Kurdistan province in October 2022, already refused treatment at two hospitals, said at the third hospital that he had injured his eye falling down lying for fear that the hospital may not treat him. In some cases, doctors helped conceal the injuries or the cause of the injuries. A witness who sustained injuries to his eyes during a protest in Tehran in November 2022, said treating physicians indicated in one of his medical records that the injury had been caused by a âsharp and cutting objectâ, because indicating that they were caused by pellets or paintballs could have got him into trouble with the security forces. In another case, a doctor indicated in hospital records that the injury that one woman protester had suffered during a protest in West Azerbaijan province had been caused in a âcar accidentâ instead by pellets.
544. The Mission also obtained credible information that security forces interfered with the treatment of injured protesters and created a threatening atmosphere for medical staff. For instance, a medical professional who worked in a hospital in West Azerbaijan observed a security agent asking a nurse what medication she was administering an injured protester. The witness saw that security agents were telling her colleague which medication the boy should receive as medicine. He later died and the security agents took his body. A witness who had sustained injuries to his face in a protest in Tehran in October 2022 said that the medical staff of the hospital were very frightened by the atmosphere created at the hospital by the security forces. According to him, providing medical services to injured protesters could be very dangerous for them and put them into serious trouble. Despite the risk they faced, they treated him very well.
545. Information also suggests that persons injured during the protests were left vulnerable to abuse. A witness who sustained injuries to his eyes during a protest in Tehran in November 2022, stated that he paid a hospital a significant amount for an implant, which the witness later found out had never been implanted.
(c) Access to healthcare facilities and insurance coverage
546. The Mission established that persons injured in protests covered by this document were regularly initially denied admission at hospitals, at times being told that security would be notified if they did not leave. In particular, a victim who sustained injuries to his eye during a protest in Tehran in November 2022, said that at the first hospital he went to, he was told at the reception that there had been a communication to hospitals that they should not admit injured protesters or if they did, they should communicate the details to the authorities. He was explicitly told that they would not admit those who had been shot. The second hospital also denied him admission at the reception. At a third hospital, he was told that they did not have the right expertise and equipment to treat him. Only in the fourth hospital was he finally admitted.
547. Equally, a witness injured by a pellet shot at a protest in Saqqez, Kurdistan province, in October 2022, was refused admission at the first hospital and was not admitted at the second hospital because as the medical staff put it, the hospital was crowded. At the third hospital he was admitted. Another witness who tried to get medical treatment for an unconscious minor with pellet wounds at a hospital in Marivan, Kurdistan, was told by nurses and doctors in the hospital that the patient was not allowed to get treatment, and that permission from the medical director was needed. At one point, a nurse came to say that someone had alerted the intelligence.
548. According to information collected by the Mission, while in some cases patients were admitted by the hospital, doctors refused to treat them. For instance, when seeking treatment, a witness overheard a doctor at the hospital in a northern province telling nurses: âI am not dealing with the people who are shot at, and have injuries, itâs not my responsibility to do thatâ. When her blood pressure dropped, she felt and heard the nurses checking her heart and blood pressure and doing CPR. While none of the doctors treated her, the hospital also refused to transfer her to another hospital. In the end she was transferred by a private ambulance to a hospital in a larger city. The witness thinks the hospital refused to transfer her because she was a ârioterâ, a âcriminalâ in their eyes, so they didnât care if she died.
549. There is also credible information that injured protesters had to pay for their treatment and could not claim their insurance directly. A medical professional who worked in a hospital in West Azerbaijan stated that those who were not able to make a cash payment among the injured protesters would not get medical care. Their insurance coverage was not accepted. The person responsible for reviewing insurance coverage told the witness that the patients could get reimbursed. Another colleague also told the witness that there had been an instruction from the Ministry of Health to not accept the insurance coverage.
550. One witness stated that protesters who were seriously injured and apprehended by the intelligence or security forces were taken to the military hospital in a city in West Azerbaijan noting that this is how the security forces would keep information contained and that nobody would know what treatment those injured protesters would receive in the military hospital. Another stated that during a period in the first weeks in September 2022, private hospitals in Urmia were forced to close.
551. The Mission also notes the treatment and support some medical staff have given to injured protesters despite the circumstances.
(c) Specialized equipment and expertise and overcrowding
552. Several witnesses stated that hospitals did not have the specialized expertise or equipment needed to treat their serious injuries. For instance, a victim with a 1.75 x 2 cm pellet in her eye socket and a fractured bone under the eyelid said that when she sought medical treatment one of the hospitals she went to neither had an eye department, nor an MRI facility. A witness who sustained injuries to his face by paintball guns filled with lead bullets used by security forces in a protest in Tehran in October 2022, also could not obtain the specialized eye treatment in two hospitals on the night his injury occurred and was only treated more than 12 hours after the injury. He also noted that one of the hospitals was overcrowded; having seen 3000 patients being treated. The number of patients who were injured in the eyes, shot by shotguns and metal pellets in the protests was also high.
(d) Medical assistance by volunteers
553. The Mission established that from September 2022 onwards, healthcare professionals, including physicians, nurses, midwives and medical students volunteered to assist injured protesters, including in private clinics, improvised medical posts, and private homes. First, as they became aware of injuries sustained by protesters, doctors began individually offering medical help on social media platforms and immediately received messages asking for help or advice. Doctors and nurses also created networks dedicated to providing medical assistance to injured protesters. Doctors also travelled to different cities across provinces to provide medical care, while others, such as activists, helped with transporting medical staff and medicine in their vehicles. One witness, an activist who transported medicine across different cities in one province, said that she would collect and dispose of injured protestersâ used bandages in areas outside of large cities to prevent victims from being arrested.
554. One doctor stated that he treated about twelve women in private homes, including for pellet wounds and severe beatings. He noted in his interview that some patients had been beaten so badly he is not sure that they survived. A medical professional interviewed by the Mission helped treat 16 or 17 persons injured during the protests in a private clinic in Tehran, including a 16-year-old girl. The injuries included fractured bones, a dislocated shoulder from being dragged to a police van, and injuries from beatings. Another witness stated that he provided medical care at home for over 100 individuals injured during the protests over a period of four months. Witnesses who were injured in protests also stated that they first consulted a doctor outside a hospital for fear of going to the hospital.
555. In addition to treatment by healthcare professionals, one witness referred to bringing persons injured in Zahedan on 30 September to, a person without a formal medical licenses practicing a form of traditional medicine.
556. The Mission is satisfied that healthcare professionals who volunteered to help persons injured in the protests were subjected to harassment, arrest and detention by the security forces. For instance, a doctor, who helped injured people in his private clinic and in private homes noted that at one point he received a text message apparently to be from the local Security Office of the Prosecutor. The message included the doctorâs name, medical license number and home address and asked him to come to said office to answer questions regarding âhis actionsâ. He thought it was a message sent to all doctors to see who would show up, as a friend who did not provide help to protesters also had received it. However, after a visit to his clinic in his absence by two men he suspected to be from the security forces, the doctor did not go back to his practice for fear of arrest. Later, plainclothes agents came to the house of a family member of the doctor and confiscated the doctorâs personal items.
557. One of the medical professionals who had offered medical help on social media was subsequently called by a person who identified themselves as being from the IRGC and accused the witness of helping âriotersâ and told him to remove the story to avoid any âproblemsâ. In addition to his post, he had been assisting protesters. He was arrested by the IRGC after receiving a call from the Ministry of Intelligence requesting him to report to their local office. He was interrogated, including about his social media posts on how to treat injuries caused by pellets and tortured during his interrogation. He was released on bail. One of his close family members was also interrogated and threatened by the Ministry of Intelligence about his activities. A medical student who had provided treatment to injured protesters in West Azerbaijan was detained for 21 days at an unofficial site, interrogated about his activities and tortured. He was asked to sign a paper that contained the charges against him. The paper bore the logo of the Ministry of Intelligence, and referred to the âoffice of the intelligence securityâ of the province at the bottom. The witness also stated that three friends who had also assisted protesters had been arrested. Likewise, two doctors who had travelled from Tehran province to a city in West Azerbaijan province in December 2022 were arrested by intelligence officers who raided their accommodation and confiscated medical supplies. During interrogations, one of the doctors was told by an intelligence officer that he: âshould have left the protesters die; they donât deserve the medication provided to them.â
558. Many of those who were detained, as well as others whose activities had come to the attention of authorities have left Iran out of fear of arrest and detention. One of them stated that he was sentenced in absentia, while another noted that he has been charged in his absence.
8. Impact
(a) Permanent, life-changing injuries
559. The Mission established that protesters and bystanders, including children who were shot at, including with pellets and rubber bullets, sustained debilitating, severe and painful injuries during protests, which led to disabilities such as blindness. An expert opinion on the physical impact of ammunition such as birdshot and less-lethal weapons commissioned by the Mission highlighted irreversible injures and disabilities that could result from their use. In relation to kinetic impact projectiles specifically, the report highlighted bruising and lacerations of the skin, contusions and fractures of bone and muscle, internal bleeding, liver, heart, and kidney penetration, which could lead to organ failure or death, and neurovascular injuries. Injuries to the head could lead to haemorrhagic strokes and permanent disability while ocular injuries can result to permanent vision loss, given the large size of the projectile against the fragile bony structure and supple eye tissues. The report further stated that metal pellets, which are typically hunting rounds, are âindisputably lethal at close rangeâ and have the ballistic capacity to penetrate some organs, including the eyes causing blindness.
560. Protesters who endured injuries from metal pellets and rubber bullets suffered excruciating pain at the moment they were shot at and in the aftermath. A protester who was shot in the eye with a rubber bullet sustaining severe eye trauma stated that after he was shot, he was able to walk a few meters before he collapsed due to pain and weakness and was helped by others who carried him away. He said the pain he suffered was indescribable. A young woman who was shot in the eye with a rubber bullet said that she could âhear her eye exploding and then the whole world went dark and blurryâ. Another young protester who was shot at with metal pellets from close range remember falling on the ground after she was shot at and feeling a burning pain. When she looked at her injured arm, it looked as if it had been cut into half; with the second half hanging from a piece of skin only. She recounted bleeding profusely like a âwater tapâ.
561. Witnesses also said that even months or a year after they sustained injuries, they continued to feel debilitating pain. An injured protester who was shot at with nearly 40 metal pellets in his back, buttock, legs and around the spinal cord said, that to cope with severe pain, even a year after the incident, he was prescribed with strong painkillers which he feared was affecting his ability to go about his daily activities. One victim explained how life has changed after she was shot in the eye. She recalled how, at least two to three times a day, she runs into a wall while at home, or into people when on the street, because of her impaired vision. She also noted how painful it is for her if water gets into her injured eye, making it excruciating to even wash her face or shower.
(b) Blindings
âThe agent was standing some 20 meters away from me. From that distance, he could have shot at my lower body, but he didnât: he shot at my face and eyes directly.â
Boy, shot at with pellets by a plainclothes agent during a protest in October 2022, West Azerbaijan province
âHe screamed at me, âgo away or I will shoot you in the eye, at your nasty face and dirty smileâ. I looked him in the eye, and knew that he meant itâŠ[then] I saw members of the Special Forces dragging two women⊠I yelled at them to let them go… at this moment the plainclothes agent smiled at me and shot me in the eye⊠I could hear my eye exploding and the whole world went dark and blurryâŠâ
Woman protester, Tehran
562. On 25 November 2022, the alarming number of eye injuries suffered by individuals in the context of the protests, including injuries leading to permanent blindness, led to a public letter by Iranian ophthalmologists warning about the long-term health consequences of pellet and paintball injuries on victims.
563. Evidence collected by the Mission showed a clear and discernible pattern of systematic eye injuries caused by security forces to women, men and children during protests countrywide. Injuries led to victims losing their eyesight, either partially or fully, in one or both eyes. Victims routinely described to the Mission that they had been shot at close range, with weapons loaded with ammunition containing pellets, or paintball guns loaded with rubber bullets, including bullets that were described by witnesses as excessively heavy, as well as with tear gas cannisters. For example, one witness, who was shot with a paintball gun, stated that the impact caused his eye to âexplode from its middleâ. Another witness, who was shot with a tear gas canister, explained that the sclera of his eye and small pieces of bone fell out. He realized this as he was holding his eyeball in the palm of his hand after he was shot at. Victims, moreover, often reported seeing security officers âsmilingâ or âlooking at them with hatredâ seconds before they fired in their eyes.
564. Consistent with witness statements, forensic pathology analysis of victimsâ medical records obtained by the Mission, confirmed extensive severe traumatic eye injuries including rupture of the eye globe; severe lacerations; eyeball atrophy; corneal scar and displacement; loss or displacement of the natural lens of the eye; perforation of the globe of the eye; vitreous prolapse; and haemorrhage at the retina and damage to it including detachment.
565. In some cases, metallic foreign objects, namely pellets, were visible in victims X-rays months after the injury, indicating that pellets had remained lodged in the eye sockets of protesters, leaving them to subsist with multiple pellets in their body post-injury. As many feared seeking medical care, retaining the pellet in the body rendered victims extremely vulnerable to infections and long-lasting health complications. Victims who were able to access medical post-injury underwent multiple eye surgeries including enucleation (removal of the entire eyeball); surgical intervention aimed at preventing the eyeball from collapsing or extruding its contents through the rupture (anti-evisceration); open-sky vitrectomy; uvea reposition; blepharoplasty repairs; and vitrectomy and silicone oil injection. In some cases, many months after the injury, the vision continued to deteriorate, including in the eye that had not sustained an injury.
566. Credible information received by the Mission confirmed the systematic scale of eye injuries to protesters caused by pellets. Both human rights organizations as well as victimsâ submissions reported on such injuries during protests occurring in the provinces of Alborz, East Azerbaijan; Hamedan, Kurdistan; Kermanshah; West Azerbaijan, and Tehran. The Mission further analysed open-source material recording injuries, in particular traumatic eye injuries, sustained by protesters and bystanders in the context of the protests.
(c) Injuries to genitalia and other injuries
567. Protesters were also shot in the genitalia with pellets, impacting victimsâ reproductive capacities. An expert opinion commissioned by the Mission highlighted significant short-term and long-term consequences caused by the targeting the genitalia. In the short term, targeting of genitalia carries a high potential for bleeding, severe pain, and dysfunction. Immediate medical attention is crucial to address potential issues such as haemorrhage and intraperitoneal injuries. In the long term, individuals who sustain injuries to genitalia may experience sexual dysfunction, lack of sensation, and chronic pain, significantly impacting their quality of life. In men, trauma to the testes, the penis, or its nerves or vessels could lead to infertility. Women could suffer chronic pain, inability to orgasm, or scarring of the vaginal entry, making sexual function painful or difficult as a result of trauma to the vulva or external genitalia. Moreover, internal trauma from penetrating bullets or blunt trauma can result in infertility, irregular disrupted menstrual cycles, or complications during pregnancy.
568. One witness, a medical professional, described that he treated a young protester in November 2022, who had injuries on his genitalia, caused, as the witness understood, by a plainclothes officer who had shot at him at close range after forcing him to lie on the ground. Another protester, who was hospitalised due to severe injuries to his eye and face, stated that while in a hospital in Sanandaj, he saw a young man who had sustained injuries on his genitalia. He stated that the victim had not sustained injuries elsewhere on his body, suggesting that his genitalia was specifically targeted. Another witness said that during protests in Rasht, Gilan province in November 2022, he saw a member of FARAJA forces in uniform beating a young man who appeared fully unconscious and unresponsive on the ground with a baton on his genitalia and testicles. A witness stated that she knew of the case of several men who had been shot in the genitalia with pellets.
569. According to credible information, a protester sustained an external penile injury and injury to his inner thigh at a protest in November 2022, in Kurdistan province, when IRGC officers beat him severely and shot him at close range and hit the genital area. The injury led to the removal of the left testis and urethral issues and testicular failure in his right testicle, which has become atrophic. In another case, according to credible information, on 20 September 2022, during the protests in Tehran, an IRGC agent kicked a woman protester on her genitalia after she and small group of protesters chanted âdown with Khameneiâ and âWoman, Life, Freedomâ. The agent reportedly pulled woman by the hairâ.
570. In addition, one witness noted that protesters who had suffered pellet injuries to the genitalia were often âashamedâ of seeking help from a doctor. Reparative surgeries were also reported to be unaffordable, especially for victims of financially disadvantaged backgrounds.
571. Witnesses also sustained other permanent injuries, such as limb neuropathy. A young protester, who was shot with metal pellets in his back, including in his buttocks, described how even after a year, he had difficulty sitting as his buttocks would go numb. âThey have even taken away the ability of sitting from meâ, the witness said. Another protester, a child who was shot in the head and blinded, said that he experienced weakness in one of his hands and difficulty picking up objects. In the case of a child protester who was shot at close range in the foot information reviewed showed that even though the child had undergone over ten surgeries and needed almost daily physiotherapy sessions per month he was still unable to feel his leg, from the knee down. Another victim said that he was experiencing stomach bleeding from the approximately 100 pellets that had remained in his body, more than a year after he sustained the injury. Forensic analysis of medical documents of a child injured with live ammunition, commission by the Mission, recorded severe nerve damage, making it hard for the child to move and feel sensation in the lower affected limb adding that the injuries are likely to have significant morbidity effects on the victim. The Mission received further credible information with regards to damage to severe vascular and musculoskeletal damage caused by firearms to protesters.
(d) Psychological Impact
572. In describing what it meant for them to be shot at and injured while chanting for freedom and equality, witnesses often referred to the absolute shock, bewilderment and disbelief they felt upon realizing what had happened to them. One woman, who was injured during a protest in Western Azerbaijan, recalled staring at the man who shot at her point blank with disbelief. As she bled profusely, she asked him: âwhy did you shoot me?â but the man did not respond, leaving her pondering about his motivations almost a year after the injury.
573. Others recalled the overwhelming sense of fear and terror spreading over their bodies as they realized that they would be shot at. One injured protester, who was shot in the eye, after attempting to help a woman protester from being arrested in Tehran province, described how all he could think of was death when a member of the security forces lifted his weapon and aimed it directly at his face. The victim also recalled seeing the agent smiling before shooting him at point blank range. Another protester, who was shot with metal pellets from the back described that after he was shot, he stared at the ground, and saw the blood streaming down his leg; he recalled seeing how his shoe was filling up with blood. A young woman, who was shot directly in the eye and lost the sight in that eye, stated that she could not believe what had just happened. Yet another witness, a young man who was shot with tens of metal pellets as he was writing slogans on a wall recalled the moment he was shot at as indescribable:
Only those who have been shot at can truly understand what it is like to be shot. When I was shot, the sound of it reverberated in my entire body [âŠ]. It sounded like a ripe watermelon being stabbed with a knife. I will never forget that sound.
574. Injured protesters were also forced to drive from hospital to hospital, after they were denied medical care. In some cases, they had to make hours-long journeys to other cities in private cars in seek of medical care as they continued to lose significant amounts of blood which left them agonising over the possibility of losing their lives. Both those who saw no other choice but to go to hospitals, and those who hid at home for weeks or months while dealing with painful and life-changing injuries, faced the constant anxiety of identification and arrest by the authorities.
575. Many injured protesters were thus forced to leave the country in seek of adequate medical care and protection in the face of constant risk of arrest, detention and criminal prosecutions. Another victim recalled how, after a picture of herself and other victims with eye injuries were published on social media, three unidentified men raided her home in January 2023. Fearing for her safety, she fled the country but continued to receive threats such as âwe will hunt you down and come for your other eyeâ even abroad. Due to visa restrictions however, most injured protesters remained in neighbouring countries for months or even a year, where they also lacked specialised medical care due to their immigration status, and fears of being forcibly returned to Iran.
576. Meanwhile, victims also retained the numerous pellets in their bodies, exposing them to a risk of further infections for as long as medical care remained inaccessible. As a result, victimsâ physical health continued to deteriorate while they waited for settlement in a safe country, exacerbating the anxiety and mental anguish caused by their injuries. In one case, a blinded protester explained that he had begun losing sight in his healthy eye, as he was not able to get the surgery and care he needed for his injury. Another protester with a severe eye injury fought an infection which was spreading towards his other eye and brain, without being able to receive medical treatment due to his immigration status in one country. The victim also reported how his eyes were often bleeding due to the infection. A young woman, who was shot point blank, was told that she might need a limb amputation after her health deteriorated significantly because she was unable to undergo the surgery she required.
577. Injured protesters and relatives of those killed, described how the violence they were subjected to had upended their lives. Injured witnesses described feeling unwell and reported symptoms of psychological trauma including feelings of anxiety, fear, anger, and increased startle response. A woman protester who was shot at and sustained a severe eye injury reported experiencing panic attacks in the aftermath of her injury. A young protester, who in addition to having been injured had also witnessed the injuries of others, stated that he had difficulty sleeping. A child protester reported that even in a safe country, he got startled and feared he was about to be struck when he walked on the street and heard a motorcycle passing. In the case of a young man whose family member was killed by the security forces and who himself was seriously injured, a psychological assessment analysed by the Mission listed trauma-stress related symptoms such as, severe insomnia, frequent nightmares, flashbacks, hypervigilance, sadness, high levels of fear, fear of losing loved ones, exaggerated startle response and worry thought patterns. The young man reported not being able to sleep for periods of 50 to 60 hours as if he had to be up and alert all night to be safe.
578. An expert opinion on the psychological impact of the weapons used in the context of the protests commissioned by the Mission, also confirmed that exposure to the weapons used in the context of the protests in Iran may result in significant psychological symptoms and long-term disability. Victims who sustain permanent disabilities, such as blinding, may experience, among others, stress, anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Those sustaining permanent disabilities were reported to undergo a grieving period, feeling in addition to sorrow intense emotions such as fear, rage, anxiety, mental and physical discomfort as well as feelings of alienation, isolation and loneliness. The report further referred to âchilling effectâ phenomenon pertaining to how people may avoid expressing themselves or exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly rights in a context where the use of force does not comply with the strict standards. The impacts are described to be far reaching affecting many more beyond those who are injured or killed. A woman protester described how the use of force was aimed at intimidating, saying, âit is to create fear in society. You get shot and you scream, and people get the message.â
579. Despite the traumatic impact of the injuries and loss of loved ones on witnesses, the difficulties of recounting traumatic events and the risks associated with speaking up, many survivors expressed their deep resolve to the Mission to continue to shed light on their experiences and that of others and to seek justice.
(e) Socio-economic impact
580. Women, children and men impacted by the Stateâs use of force, including by losing their loved ones and/or sustaining injuries, were also socio-economically affected. As detailed in Section X, family members of victims of killings, who despite State harassment continued to seek truth and justice, faced reprisals including in the form of expulsion from workplace. In some cases, those killed were the breadwinners of their family or provided financial support to their parents and relatives, who were in an economically deprivileged situation. Those injured incurred costs of treatments and suffered financial loss as they had to take time off work and undergo treatment.
581. Blinded protesters reported that their eye injuries made them visible and recognisable as protesters in a context where protesting was criminalised. A young woman blinded in one eye reported that she was expelled from her workplace after her colleagues connected the eye injury to a protest injury, despite her attempts to conceal the truth by saying that it was merely a cosmetic procedure. She also lost the prospect of continuing her higher education. Another young women protester had to drop out of university after she received threats from intelligence bodies following her eye injury which had also resulted in her blinding. Blinded protesters were effectively âbrandedâ by the authorities. A woman protester who was blinded described this as following, âthey take away part of your beauty and you need to wear a bandage and everyone asks you about it. It is also to brand you that you participated in the protests.â
582. For many injured victims, leaving Iran was the only viable option. The victimsâ effective relocation and their need to leave the country in an urgent and abrupt manner also placed an additional economic and emotional burden on them. In some cases, protesters were from economically disadvantaged backgrounds and/or those who had to flee were the breadwinners of the family. In others, injured protesters reported that they had financially stable lives in Iran but had lost everything after they were injured and had no other choice but to leave the country.
583. Child victims, in particular those who sustained eye or other severe injuries, lost educational opportunities as their studies were interrupted. In some cases, they spent long periods of time in hospital recovering from several difficult surgeries. In one case, a blinded child protester reported that he was denied an educational certificate after the school learned about him being injured. He also reported that he had lost the opportunity to continue with martial arts, which he engaged in prior to his injury, due to the high risk of complications if his head was struck in sports.
9. Findings
584. The Mission assessed the lawfulness of the use of force incidents described in this document. Its analysis covers the use of lethal force by the security forces; of weapons and ammunition categorized as less-lethal, and weapons and ammunition the use of which does not comply with the principles guiding the use of force by law enforcement personnel.
585. The Mission recalls that lethal force must not be used against an individual who does not pose (i) an imminent threat of death or serious injury, or if the force used was not pursuant to a (ii) legitimate law enforcement objective, or was not (iii) necessary or not (iv) proportionate. Furthermore, weapons or ammunition categorized as less-lethal must be used within the required parameters, including complying with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Thus, using weapons or ammunition categorized as less-lethal outside of those parameters is unlawful. Equally, certain types of weapons and ammunition used, including metal pellets and multiple kinetic impact projectiles, should not be used as their use does not comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality.
586. Based on the analysis of each criterion as detailed hereinafter, the Mission concluded that, in the context of the protests that began on 16 September 2022, the security forces resorted to unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force, killing and injuring protestors who posed no imminent threat of death or serious injury, thereby committing unlawful and, in some cases, extrajudicial killings. Moreover, among the cases investigated, the Mission established a pattern of use of lethal force, as well as the use of force categorized as less-lethal outside of less lethal parameters, by the security forces against protesters in mostly peaceful situations. In this context, its legal analysis is as follows.
(a) Imminent threat
587. During the course of its investigation, the Mission obtained information on violence used by protesters.
588. At the outset, the Mission notes, however, that for most part, protesters were peaceful and unarmed. Activities such as protesting in front of a government building or a base of the security forces, driving a car near a protest, including when honking, chanting slogans or helping others in themselves constitute the exercise of protected rights. They do not warrant any use of force. With respect to the incidents investigated, the use of lethal force was therefore unlawful and the targeted killings of protesters constituted extrajudicial executions.
589. The Mission found that protesters engaged in various acts such as burning of tyres, including to prevent law enforcement access, and engaged in various acts of vandalism. The Mission finds that such acts generally did not pose an imminent threat of death or serious injury to the security forces or others. The use of lethal force in those situations thus was unlawful. Burning of tyres over a prolonged period or severe acts of vandalism may, in specific circumstances, justify the use of force categorized as less-lethal, within the required parameters and to the minimum extent necessary.
590. The Mission found that protesters, including at protests where children were present, frequently resorted to throwing stones at security forces. This often followed initial use of force by law enforcement. Based on the review of video footage, witness interviews and other material, there appears to be no persuasive evidence that throwing stones would pose an imminent threat of death or serious injury justifying lethal force. This is particularly so when security forces were wearing protective gear, as seen in much of the video footage reviewed. Thrown from a short distance, stones may cause some injury, possibly justifying the use of force categorized as less-lethal, within the required parameters and to the minimum extent necessary. Yet, evidence showed that security forces used firearms, as well as ammunition such as metal pellets against protesters throwing stones, thus unlawfully killing or injuring them.
591. The Mission is aware of claims that protesters used firearms. In response to allegations by the Iranian authorities, the Mission asked, in its 27 June 2022 letter, the Government of Iran to provide information on any firearms and armes blanches seized, on where and from whom they were seized, on the circumstances and their provenance. The Mission also asked whether there were any persons arrested, detained, prosecuted, convicted or sentenced for the use of such weapons, what the detailed charges and sentences pronounced were, and what the legal and factual basis for such measures was. No response has been received. Moreover, in its year-long investigation it has only come across one video footage, which appears to include protesters carrying firearms during the âBloody Fridayâ events on 30 September 2022. Based on the available information and evidence, the Mission has not been able to verify these facts, in accordance with its standard of proof.
592. The Mission also reviewed information in the public domain, that includes cases of beatings of security forces by protesters, which it deems credible. In one such case reviewed by the Mission, an angry crowd of protesters descended on a security officer and beat him in the middle of the street. The incident occurred after the same security officer apprehended one of the protesters and used what appeared to be a stun gun or baton against him.
593. The Mission also reviewed information about the use of Molotov cocktails by protesters. Molotov cocktails are a specific type of âimprovised incendiary deviceâ (IID). The Mission found that Molotov cocktails were used by protesters, but that such incidents did not occur routinely. When Molotov cocktails are thrown at security forces at short range, this could pose an imminent threat of serious injury. This being said, in two cases investigated. the protesters made and threw Molotov cocktails after the security forces had used lethal force. When the security forces again used lethal force resulting in killings and injuries at a later moment the threat was no longer imminent. That use of force was thus unlawful.
594. Moreover, the Mission is satisfied that with respect to the victims for whom it has reasonable grounds to believe were injured and killed by security forces, they posed no imminent threat of death or injury to security forces or others.
595. Having established that in the cases investigated by the Mission the use of lethal force was unlawful, the Mission now turns to weapons and ammunitions used outside of less lethal parameters.
(b) Legitimate law enforcement objective
596. The Mission recalls that blocking, dispersing or disrupting peaceful assemblies, including assemblies without prior authorizations is not a legitimate law enforcement objective. Therefore, the use of any force including deploying water cannons or tear gas to disperse peaceful protests is unlawful.
597. The Mission notes that while dispersal, if the assembly as such is no longer peaceful may be resorted to and thus constitutes a legitimate law enforcement objective, force should be avoided.
598. As mentioned, the Mission analysed information on protesters throwing Molotov cocktails and stones in the direction of security forces, as well as the burning of tyres to create smoke and forms of vandalism. It finds responding to, protecting from or preventing such acts is a legitimate objective.
(c) Necessity
599. Only the minimum force necessary may be used where it is required for a legitimate law enforcement purpose during a protest. Having already established the absence of an imminent threat of death or injury in the cases investigated, the Mission notes that deploying less-lethal force within the applicable parameters and to the minimum extent necessary to respond to, protect from or prevent the acts listed above is permissible in international human rights law. That said, force categorized as less lethal also is subject to the necessity test. Water cannons, for instance should only be used in situations of serious public disorder where there is a significant likelihood of loss of life, serious injury or the widespread destruction of property. In the cases investigated, however, water cannons and tear gas, often alongside lethal force, were used against peaceful protesters, including to simply disperse the protest, and thus making the use unnecessary and unlawful. Moreover, in at least two instances peaceful protesters were shot with a tear gas canister at close range, including into the face, causing serious injury. The Mission also notes that in the cases investigated that involved throwing of stones and the burning of tyres, the security forces actually used lethal and thus unlawful force.
(d) Proportionality
600. Even when force is the minimum necessary, its use may not cause harm that would be disproportionate to the aim sought to be achieved. Assuming that the use of force categorized as less-lethal, such as tear gas or water cannons, had become necessary because of an individual at one point, the Mission considers use disproportionate because of their indiscriminate impact on protesters, especially those protesting peacefully and children. The force used would not stand in reasonable relation to any threat being averted. Equally, with regard to violent conduct by individual protesters, possibly justifying the use of force categorized as less-lethal, such weapons and ammunition can only be individually aimed at the individuals engaged in the conduct and within the required parameters. In the incidents investigated by the Mission, however, less-lethal force was used alongside lethal force, resulting in killings and injuries, in contexts where there was no imminent threat of death or serious injury. An assessment of the proportionality of the use of less lethal force is therefore rendered moot.
(e) Impunity and obstacles to access to truth and justice
601. The extensive body of evidence collected, received and analysed by the Mission shows that not only has the State failed to take measures to ensure accountability, but its various entities and forces have taken concerted action to conceal and suppress the truth about the deaths and injuries they have caused in the context of the protests, to evade responsibility and to silence justice-seeking families and victims.
602. State authoritiesâ immediate and public response to the killings and injuries caused by their use of force has been denial. Officials and the State media have repeatedly stated that âhostile groupsâ, âriotersâ, and âanti-revolutionary groupletsâ carried out the killings with the aim of attributing them to State security forces in a plan they described as âthe killing projectâ, or attributed the killings to natural causes, accidents, and suicide. In several cases, including in Kurdistan in September and October 2022 examined by the Mission, State officials immediately and publicly denied responsibility for fatal shootings, blaming it on âriotersâ, âterroristsâ, and opposition groups, only for evidence, such as CCTV footage and official documents to emerge later establishing that State agents were responsible for the shooting. In the case of Fereydoun Mahmoudi, several days after his fatal shooting, senior police officials in Kurdistan province confirmed that the victim had been fatally shot but stated that âanti-Revolutionary groupsâ had shot at the victim. After a complaint was lodged by the victimâs family, the Military Office of the Prosecutor in the province, issued an order, publicly available and examined by the Mission, confirming the deployment of FARAJA, including its Special Forces (yegan-e vijeh), to the protest site where the victim was killed. Despite these denials, this very order cites an official communique by the police forces stating that the Special Forces had fired over 40 cartridges filled with metal pellets of size 9-12. The order states that it had been established that an agent of the Special Forces of the police was responsible for firing at the victim, however, the investigations were terminated as it was not possible to identify the individual agent responsible.
603. The Mission established the existence of a practice of State officials subjecting relatives of those killed to intimidation and harassment with the aim of coercing them into silence and concealing the truth. This included pressuring and coercing families of those killed, including in protests in Kurdistan in September 2022, to give video-taped âinterviewsâ or sign statements that their loved ones had been killed by âriotersâ or âopposition groupsâ thus absolving the State of responsibility; including by threatening grieving family members with withholding the body of their loved one or harming other family members. In some cases, State officials attempted to entice families by telling them that they would announce their loved ones a State âmartyrsâ and would reward them with sums of money and financial benefits in exchange for them changing their version of events and repeating the official narrative.
604. Similarly, State officials, including senior police officials, and the State media have denied reports of injuries, in particular blinding caused by weapons and ammunition used by the security forces. State media, including the news agency of the Government, Iran Newspaper, have accused protesters injured and blinded of deception and lying about their injuries. According to domestic media, Iran in May 2023 Iran Newspaper published a report entitled âanother rioter is healed!â In the case of a woman protester, using her images published by her in the immediate aftermath of the injuries and medical operations depicting her with bandages and an eye shield and her videos after ocular prosthesis was implanted, State media claimed that she had never lost her vision but had âliedâ in an effort to become a âcelebrity.â
605. The Mission is satisfied that other practices by the State authorities hindered and obstructed the processes and efforts to establish the circumstances surrounding the deaths and to obtain justice in cases of individuals killed and injured. The systematic use of plainclothes forces also severely hindered the identification of individual perpetrators for victims. In the context of State denials, it also allows the authorities to claim that the killings and injuring of protesters and bystanders were committed by âunknown armed individualsâ and ârioters.â A witness to a fatal shooting by security forces in October 2022 in Kermanshah province stated: âthe authorities have a policy of deploying security forces in plainclothes so if they are filmed, they can claim that it was not their forces [âŠ] they use private car so people would not have evidence. Otherwise, who among the ordinary people is armed?â The Mission established that State authorities removed CCTV footage from business premises and streets in the vicinity of which fatal shootings and killings took place. Relatives of protesters killed by security forces whose testimonies the Mission received and reviewed, have stated that they were told by officials that no CCTV footage of the incident existed as cameras were broken or the footage had already been erased.
606. State authorities have failed to conduct investigations in line with international human rights law and standards, including requirements of promptness, independence, impartiality, transparency, and thoroughness, into the killings and injuries caused as a result of their use of force. As detailed below, in the several cases where an investigation was initiated following a complaint, cases were referred to the military offices of prosecutors and military courts. Military courts should not have jurisdiction over human rights violations and crimes under international law. Moreover, families were pressured to bury their killed loved ones swiftly hindering the possibility of adequate autopsies being carried out. Ultimately in the cases where the Mission saw evidence of an investigations being initiated, as detailed below, offices of prosecutors generally terminated the investigations on the grounds that the individual member of the security forces could not be identified or that victims were effectively guilty as they had taken part in the âriotsâ.
607. The Mission is aware of one case in which a police official has reportedly been prosecuted and sentenced in connection with the killing of a young man, Mehran Sammak, in Anzali, Gilan provinces. The 27-year-old man was fatally shot with metal pellets on 29 November 2022 in Anzali after he honked in his car during the protests in which protesters celebrated the defeat of the countryâs football team during the World Cup. On 6 June 2023, Shargh Newspaper published an interview with the lawyer of Mehran Sammakâs family who reported that the former commander of the police forces in the city of Anzali had been convicted by a Military Court in Gilan of the charge of âfailure to adhere to the Law on the Use of Arms resulting in murderâ. He reported that the case was with the Supreme Court upon an appeal by the accused personâs lawyer. The Mission has not been able to obtain any further details with regards to the prosecution and the proceedings. In January 2024, state media reported that the Supreme Court had overturned the sentence against the police commander and had sent the case back to a lower court for retrial.
608. The Mission has analysed information including court document issued in the cases of several persons killed in the protests whose relatives lodged criminal complaints with the authorities. In one case, the Military Office of the Prosecutor issued an order terminating the investigations on the basis that the identification of the individual who had shot at the victim was not possible despite confirming that the victim had been shot by metal pellets and killed by a member of the Special Forces of the police.
609. In the another case, Abdollah Mohammadpour and Danesh Rahnama killed with AK-47 assault rifles during the protests in September 2022 in a village in West Azerbaijan province, According to official documents obtained through open sources and NGOs, the Military Office of the Prosecutor terminated the investigations stating that the victims had been among the individuals involved in âriotingâ and they were shot at the location where âriotersâ intended to attack the Basij base. The order was subsequently overturned by a criminal court which instructed the Office of the Prosecutor with investigative steps including to determine whether the Basij agents were armed with AK47 and whether there were any armed individuals among the protesters. According to credible information received by the Mission, as of December 2023, the family of the victims had not been informed of any updates on the mandated investigations.
610. Finally, review of publicly available court documents pertaining to the case of, a 16-year-old child killed in Mashhad, Razavi province with metal pellets, also showed that no investigations in line with international law were carried out. Subsequent to a criminal complaint by the childâs family, a prosecutorial order issued by Branch One of the Military Office of the Prosecutor in Razavi Khorasan terminated the investigations officials terminated the investigation on the basis that there was no robust evidence that armed forces used âpellet gunsâ. The order cited the commander of FARAJA in Razavi Khorsan who had stated that some of its forces were armed with pellet guns on the day of the incident but did not use it and the Intelligence Organization of the IRGC stating that the IRGVC forces present at the scene did not have pellet guns.
611. With regards to injuries, the Mission has documented one case in which a protester lodged a criminal complaint with State authorities. The protester, a man in his 40s who was blinded after FARAJA special forces fired metal pellets at him during protests in October 2022 a city in Alborz province, reported to the Mission that he had lodged a complaint to the authorities but despite persistent follow-ups, his complaint was dismissed. A corresponding prosecution order issued in the case, examined by the Mission, revealed that the Military Office of the Prosecutor in the province closed the case stating that the victim had been injured during the âriotsâ by his own admission, which constituted âan apparent offenceâ.
612. Victims and their families have consistently referred to prevailing impunity, the absence of avenues for accountability, the serious risks associated with drawing the attention of the authorities to their participation in the protests and the âfutilityâ of complaining as reasons they have not lodged complaints. Protesters stated that lodging complains was âout of questionâ as the authorities âwere responsible for attacks themselvesâ. One protester whose account the Mission received through an NGO stated âhow could I report the actions of my rapist and killer to my rapist and killer?â They questioned if there has ever been any outcome to such complaints and stated that it would be the protesters themselves who would ultimately be âcondemnedâ. One protester said that the question of whether a complaint had been lodged with State authorities resembled a joke as âthe entire state officials in Iran were members of a coordinated oppression system and reporting [violations] to them would logically be futileâ. A child protester who was severely injured with metal pellets and blinded in one eye as a result stated that the State was not âaccountable to anyoneâ and that despite many protesters being killed no one was ever held into account. He said that the killings were easily attributed to âriotersâ and âterroristsâ and that no one was arrested in connection with the killing of a child protester whose death he had witnessed. He noted âwhen a person is killed, and the perpetrator is not prosecuted, thatâs not justice.â
613. Injured protesters, in particular those who have lost their vision due to their serious eye injuries, explained that they feared their injuries visibly marked them as dissidents and could be used as proof of their participation in the protests. A protester who was blinded in one eye stated that his lodging an official compliant would be tantamount to signing an order for his own conviction. In many cases, injured protesters who spoke up about their injuries or demanded justice, including through social media posting, were harassed by the authorities, including by being summoned, and arrested.. In some cases, victims who spoke up about their injuries were prosecuted on charges such as âpropaganda against the systemâ and convicted. A protester who was blinded and published their story on social media were arrested and requested to re-repost stating that, in reality, they were injured by members of terrorist organizations.
614. A young protester severely injured by metal pellets, stated that her family members had been threatened and intimidated after she gave a media interview. She reported that IRGC agents told her family that they would âhunt her downâ and âbring her dead body backâ.
B. Arrests and detention in the context of the protests
615. Mass arrests and detention of protesters and those associated with the protests took place across the country between at least 16 September 2022 and March 2023. While the Government has not made public any detailed or disaggregated information on the overall number of individuals arrested and detained in connection with the protests. According to official statements, in March 2023, 22,628 individuals had been pardoned in connection with the protests. Non-governmental organizations have continued to report arrests and detentions for months after the protests, and up to 12 March 2024. This was confirmed by witnesses as described below.
1. International legal framework
616. Iran has ratified a series of treaties providing for the fundamental rights to liberty and security. These include the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CRC, all of which prohibit arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance. According to article 9 of the ICCPR, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. Article 9 provides for the right to be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for arrest; to be promptly informed of any charges; in case of a criminal charge, to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power; and to be tried within a reasonable time or released. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
617. According to the Human Rights Committee, arrest or detention may be authorized by domestic law but nonetheless be arbitrary. The notion of âarbitrarinessâ is not to be equated with âagainst the lawâ but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.
618. Arrest or detention is arbitrary if imposed as a punishment for the legitimate exercise of the rights as guaranteed by the Covenant, including freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion and the right to privacy. Restrictions on the right not to be subjected to arbitrary detention are admissible if provided by law and necessary to respect inter alia the rights of others, national security, public order, public health or morals. Arrest or detention on discriminatory grounds in violation of article 2, paragraph 1, article 3 or article 26 is also in principle arbitrary.
619. During arrest and when in the custody of State authorities, irrespective of the legitimate or arbitrary nature of the arrest, the right to security of person protects individuals against intentional infliction of bodily or mental injury. Officials of States parties violate the right to personal security when they unjustifiably inflict injury.
620. Children enjoy the rights provided for under article 9 of the ICCPR in the same way as adults. In addition, under article 37 of the CRC, the arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be treated as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period of time. States should further ensure that children are not held with adults, except where that is in their best interests. When children are arrested, notice of the arrest and the reasons for it should also be provided directly to their parents, guardians, or legal representatives. The privacy of information must be ensured, and notice must be provided without delay, to avoid the risk of harm including sexual violence.
621. Pursuant to international human rights law, detainees should be held only in facilities officially acknowledged as places of detention. A centralized official register should be kept of the names and places of detention, and times of arrival and departure, as well as of the names of persons responsible for their detention, and made readily available and accessible to those concerned, including relatives. Prompt and regular access should be given to independent medical personnel and lawyers and, under appropriate supervision when the legitimate purpose of the detention so requires, to family members.
622. The prohibition of enforced disappearances is a norm of peremptory law (jus cogens). Enforced disappearance, i.e. the deprivation of liberty, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate of the disappeared person, in effect placing that person outside of the protection of the law and places their life at serious and constant risk, for which the State is accountable. An act of enforced disappearance constitutes a violation of the rules of international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to recognition as a person before the law, the right to liberty and security of the person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It also violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life and physical integrity. It is also a grave risk of sexual violence for women. Enforced disappearances violate numerous substantive and procedural provisions of the ICCPR and constitute a particularly aggravated form of arbitrary detention. According to the Human Rights Committee, the situation of relatives who remain without knowledge about the fate or whereabouts of a disappeared person for extended periods of time constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
2. Lack of legal protection under domestic law
623. Iranâs domestic laws do not guarantee the right of detainees to be brought promptly before an independent and impartial judicial authority. The 2015 Code of Criminal Procedure provides that detainees should be brought before an investigator within 24 hours of being detained. The office of the investigator is located within the Office of the Prosecutor, the authority which issues and approves the detention order responds to a detaineeâs request to have it revoked, and determines whether it should be extended.
624. By-laws continue, however, to allow intelligence and security bodies to maintain special detention facilities for people accused of national security offences. Unofficial secret detention sites, referred to as âblack sitesâ and âsafe housesâ (khanehay-e amn), are often houses or apartment buildings used by the Ministry of Intelligence or the Intelligence Unit of the Revolutionary Guards to hold individuals in their custody. As discussed in Section II, these facilities are not under the supervision of the Prison Organization.
3. Arrests
âWe, the people, need to protest and object to the violations to our rights, and raise our voice when our demands are not met. When, âviolationsâ become âlawâ âweâ need to protest, this is why I joined the protests.
Testimony of a student interviewed by the Mission.
625. The Mission found a pattern of arbitrary arrest and detention of women, children and men in 16 of the countryâs provinces, namely Alborz, Eastern Azerbaijan, Gilan, Hormozgan, Isfahan, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Lorestan, Mazandaran, Qom, Razavi Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Tehran, and West Azerbaijan. The persons arrested included not only those peacefully participating or allegedly participating in protests and/or attending events organized to commemorate protesters who had been killed, but also bystanders and those who provided medical care to protesters who had been injured. Individuals who publicly expressed support and solidarity with protesters, posted evidence of State violence, or simply discussed the protests on social media, were also arrested. These included family members of those killed, injured, or arrested during the protests, lawyers, doctors and other medical personnel, public and private employees, teachers, and journalists, who were arrested at their homes or workplaces and, in some cases, children and students.
(a) Scale and scope of the arrests
626. In the absence of official detailed and disaggregated data on arrests, State bodies and State affiliated media reported thousands of arrests in various provinces from the very first days of the protests. On 6 October, the Commander of Hameden Corps indicated that 700 people had been arrested in the province, with 80% of them aged under 25 years old. On 11 October 2022, the Spokesperson of the Judiciary pointed out that about 400 people had been released immediately after the investigations while 1,700 people were released during the investigation phase. He concluded that âthe number of detainees was minimalâ referring to those that remained in detention. Later, in March 2023, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, the Head of the Judiciary, announced that 22,628 individuals, out of the 82,000 individuals who had received state pardons, had been connected with the protests, adding that the figure included âthose who had been convictedâ as well as âthose who were pardoned prior to convictionsâ.
627. State officials acknowledged that individuals under the age of 18 were among those arrested during the protests. In an interview published on 5 October 2022 by Iranian media, the Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Ali Fadavi, recognised that: âthe average age for many of those arrested in the recent riots is fifteen years old.â In another example, from a provincial level, the Chief Justice of Isfahan province speaking about the amnesty of protesters indicated that âduring the riotâ 4,247 people were arrested, and that 60 per cent of the accused and convicted were released âwith the generous amnesty of the Leader of the Revolutionâ. He also stated that protesters below the age of eighteen years-old were among those accused, and that more than 1,000 of them were warned by judicial officers and were handed over to their families after executing a bond.
628. In a report published only two months after the start of the protests, the Campaign to Free Political Prisoners in Iran alleged that Iranian security forces had kidnapped and detained at least 60,000 people. In March 2023, another non-governmental organization indicated that it had registered the arrest of 29,688 people from March 2022 to March 2023, with a major part of these arrests having occurred during the 2022 nationwide âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests. As noted above, arrests in connection with the protests were still ongoing at the time of writing this document.
629. Witnesses also provided evidence on the scale of the arrests. A witness stated that following his participation in a demonstration, he was arrested and brought to a stadium based in a military compound located at Takhti three-way junction, 30 minutes away by car from Tehran, where thousands of arrested protesters, including children, were being held. Another witness reported that he saw parents, relatives or acquaintances of those arrested, around 600 individuals, waiting for their loved ones in front of this stadium.
630. Incidents of mass arrest continued in 2023. A young woman arrested on 16 September 2023, the anniversary of Jina Mahsaâs death in custody, shared her account with the Mission. She said that many women with chador and in military uniform, with black masks on their faces, as well as men in plain clothes wearing black shirts and pants started beating and arresting anyone on the street. She stated that âthat night, about 600 to 700 of us were transferred to this military compoundâ, that âthe location was full of men in plain clothes, as well as those in military uniforms, but without any name tags or signsâ and that âdetained women were of all ages; children, adolescents, adults and the elderly.â She further stated that: âIn fact, they arrested everyone in such a way that no one was left on the street, and in this way, they created the impression that no one had come to the street at all to protest on the occasion of the anniversary.â
631. Several witnesses saw large numbers of protesters rounded up during protests and taken to detention facilities. A lawyer explained to the Mission that most of his clients had been arrested while protesting when a large group was rounded up and arrested. The statement of a woman protester obtained by the Mission described the conditions of her transfer in a bus with no windows to Qarchak Prison, together with around 70 protesters. The bus was so crowded with detainees that she could hardly breathe. A man arrested on the 40th Day commemoration (chehelom) of Jina Mahsa Amini in Tehran also described that security forces ordered 55 people to get inside a minibus and took them to the detention centre in Fashafouyeh (Greater Tehran Central Penitentiary). The detainees were very young, prompting one of the officers on duty to say that the place had been turned into a âkindergartenâ.
632. In response to the strong support of school children, for the âWoman, Life Freedomâ movement, security forces proceeded with massive arbitrary arrests and detention of youth and children, some as young as 10 years-old. A witness indicated that in October 2022 in the Greater Tehran prison, he saw around 300 inmates, among them nearly 200 young protesters between 16 and 18 years of age, brought from the streets. Children were arrested while participating in protests, in their schools, at their homes, on their way to or from school or on the street. Teachers from several schools also reported on these arrests. For example, in a statement obtained by the Mission, a child explained that on 29 November 2022, he was with his friends and others celebrating Iran’s loss to the USA in the Qatar World football Cup when several security cars surrounded them, picked them up, blindfolded them and took them to the Ministry of Intelligence office. Massive arrests also took place at universities. In an emblematic example, Basij forces raided university dormitories and arrested students, including in the emblematic protest organized in Sharif University of Technology on 2 October 2022.
(b) Nature and arbitrariness of arrests
633. The Mission investigated instances of arrest and assessed the facts against the elements of appropriateness, predictability, due process of law, reasonableness, necessity and proportionality to determine whether arrests were arbitrary and to identify patterns.
634. In one of its first reports, Iranâs High Council for Human Rights (HCHR) explained that âthe peaceful gatherings that took place in different parts of the country following the death of Ms. Amini have morphed into a round of riots and vandalism which was separated from peaceful assembliesâ. The High Council added that âthose who did not commit acts of sabotage and security-disturbing measures are basically separate from those who entered the riots under the command of certain infiltrating elementsâ, and that âthe police in Iran never resorts to force in the first and exercise tolerance and restraintâ. It also affirmed that âon 5 October 2022, nearly half of the detainees of the recent unrest and riots have been released.â Other reports from the HCHR also stated that protesters caused widespread damage to private property, public and religious places; law enforcement officers were killed, and other persons were âmartyredâ by protesters/terrorists.
635. The Mission invited the Government to share information regarding the protests allegedly characterized by widespread and serious violence, and reasons and evidence for each such protests. It also requested supporting material in relation to the acts of arson, assault and fatal assault as alleged by the HCHR. The Mission regrets that the Government did not respond to any of these questions.
636. The Mission reviewed information, including audio-visual material, showing instances in which some protesters committed isolated acts of violence. It also reviewed audio-visual material showing instances where persons in the protests beat police officers, shook and flipped over vans, threw Molotov cocktails and in a few cases, used weapons such as shotguns and handguns. Some such acts were corroborated by witnesses interviewed by the Mission. If carried out in accordance with international human rights law standards, arrests of persons committing such acts would not, prima facie, be considered arbitrary. The Mission took any such acts and the conformity of the arrest with international standards into account when assessing the arbitrariness of individual arrests and establishing patterns. The Mission further notes that isolated acts of violence by some participants should not be attributed to others, the organizers or to the assembly as such and that participants who do not carry out violence continue to be protected against arbitrary arrest even where other protesters in the same assembly are exercising violence.
637. All individuals arrested in the context of the protests with whom the Mission spoke, consistently asserted that the demonstrations in which they participated were predominantly peaceful. They maintained that they did not engage in any acts of violence that could have justified their arrest and witnessed the arrest of protesters who were participating peacefully in demonstrations. The Mission corroborated this information with open-source material, when available, showing the circumstances at the time and location of the arrests. Evidence gathered by the Mission shows that protesters were arrested for a range of protected conduct, such as chanting slogans, writing slogans on the walls, honking car horns in support of the protests, and taking part in roadblocks. Arrestees were interrogated about their posts on social media platforms, including in support of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement. The authorities also arrested family members of the protestors seeking redress, their supporters (lawyers, medical personnel), those expressing solidarity (teachers, artists, athletes, and social media influencers) and those seeking to uncover the truth about violations (journalists and human rights defenders). The Mission concluded that these arrests were arbitrary.
(c) Patterns of arrests
638. In addition to their large scale and arbitrariness, the arrests followed similar patterns. People arrested in connection with the protests at protest sites as well as witnesses of these arrests provided similar accounts of the circumstances of the arrests.
639. Arrest operations targeting thousands of individuals were conducted with significant coordination and use of substantial law enforcement resources. Security forces responded to nationwide protests through coordinated operations, relying upon a high level of logistical support and multiple forces, including intelligence agents, Basij, IRGC, and the police (FARAJA), at times acting jointly.
640. Evidence shows that the arrests were carried out in a manner that disguised the identity of the arresting officers, and the places to which those arrested were brought. The majority of the arrests were conducted by or with the assistance of plainclothes agents, often wearing masks concealing their identity. For instance, police officers, who took young arrestees to Evin prison, were dressed in civilian clothing, some wearing T-shits and sneakers, and a similar hair style as those arrested. Forces deployed to control lawyer protesters would wear suits. Despite wearing plainclothes, security forces were often recognisable for other reasons: because of the manner in which they dressed, the tattoos displayed, the fact that they were carrying sprays or other devices on their belts or, in small cities, because they were known by the protestors. In some instances, they used particular measures to conceal their identity from the protesters while remaining identifiable to each other and other security forces, for example by covering the plates of their motorbikes with medical masks. A witness stated that âsome of those in plainclothes were well dressed and were even chanting slogans, but would then suddenly point to someone to be arrested saying that the person was a leader, or would trap one person and hold them until the security forces arrested that personâ.
641. As detailed in sub-section A, security and intelligence forces, including paramilitary Basij forces, exerted significant presence in and around hospitals and medical centres throughout the country in order, inter alia, to arrest or interrogate injured protesters, to obtain lists of patients admitted with injuries sustained during protests, to review security cameras footage.
642. Witnesses who were arrested stated that they were handcuffed and blindfolded before being violently shoved into vehicles, taxis, unmarked cars, vans, or motorcycles. Others were forced on the vehicle into a position from which the route and location could not be seen. Witnesses also stated that ambulances were used to transport security forces and hold arrested protesters, a practice that undermined public trust in emergency services and involved misuse of their resources. For instance, a young protester was dragged into an ambulance that was being used to hold arrested people. His mother, who was participating in the same protest, tried to prevent the arrest of her son. Protesters surrounded the ambulance for around 20 minutes and pushed it over. The driver opened the door and ran away. The arrested protester, helped by his mother, managed to escape from custody.
643. Authorities used intelligence and surveillance technology to conduct arrests. Plainclothes security forces were deployed to protests to identify or take pictures of protesters. Witnesses described that drones and surveillance cameras, including those deployed for vehicular traffic control, were used for this purpose . Others referred to the existence of a specific section of the police dedicated to internet surveillance, deployed to identify or threaten supporters and their families.
644. Intelligence and security forces conducted raids at homes, including during night-time, for the purpose of arrests. According to witnesses, security forces broke into private houses violently, for instance by using sledgehammers and axes. During house raids, security forces deployed âblack boxesâ, used for tapping, cloning or blocking devices. Individuals were also apprehended at their workplaces, on the streets, at burial ceremonies, and in certain instances, children were taken into custody directly from their schools. Arrest operations outside protests involved multiple agents, in some instances up to ten or 20 persons.
645. Arrests, both at and outside protest sites, were characterized by violence and threats of violence. Security officials routinely resorted to severe beatings of protesters, to various parts of their bodies, alongside threats, verbal abuse and humiliation. Moreover, credible information shows that visibly seriously injured arrestees, including after being shot and blinded, continued to be beaten with batons, kicked and punched, including in the head during transportation. A witness stated that during his transfer to a IRGC intelligence detention center, an arresting officer used a stun gun on his testicles. Security forces, in certain instances, openly displayed firearms during these arrests, including pointing at personsâ heads. Interviews with victims, their families, direct witnesses, lawyers, confirmed a pattern of violent arrests resulting in injuries of all types in addition to psychological harm. Family members of arrested protesters found them at detention centers with visible injuries, such as bruises and swollen heads or foreheads.
646. A student arrested during a protest in Tehran stated that he was grabbed by Basij forces, beaten, kicked in the head, pepper sprayed, insulted and called names. Agents pulled his t-shirt over his head and brought him to a police station. There, he saw two men who had just been arrested, and beaten and were bleeding. At some point when he was able to speak to them, one of them indicated to him that he had been attacked by an agent on a motorcycle who ran him over, causing his ribs to break. In another statement obtained by the Mission, a man indicated that IRGC agents chased and fired at him and that one of the bullets hit a utility pole and the shattered pieces struck and broke his head. While his head was bleeding, they hit him on the head with a stone from behind, beat him severely and put him in a car. They shoved his head down onto the car floor and one of the officers sat on his back and pressed his four right fingers until they were dislocated.
647. Intelligence and security forces seized private property from protesters, including electronic devices such as laptops, and requested those arrested to provide passwords, which allowed investigation into their online activity and contacts. One witness for example told the Mission that when he was arrested and beaten during transportation, he could not breathe as he had asthma, and asked for his inhaler in his bag. The Basij agent replied that if he wanted the inhaler, he should disclose his telephone password, which he did. They were also asked questions about messages they sent via applications.
648. The vast majority of witnesses were not informed of the reasons for their arrest or the location of the detention facility to which they were brought. Individuals arrested outside protests were not shown an arrest warrant. According to a witness, in some instances the authorities issued âgenericâ arrest warrants, setting out in the abstract that those who had engaged in activities related to protests could be arrested. This applied to categories of persons, including lawyers, whereby the generic arrest warrant was accompanied by a list of professionals wanted for arrest. One witness stated that when he asked for a warrant of arrest, he was shown a document from such a distance that he could not read it.
649. These patterns provide a strong indication that arbitrary arrests and detentions were not randomly conducted, but rather part of an organized and coordinated response by law enforcement authorities to the protests.
Arrest of women protesters
650. Witnesses stated that authorities targeted for arrest and interrogation women who had the potential to lead protests, had been active online and accumulated a large number of followers on social media and arrest them from their home or workplace. Women who attended several protests were also targeted, suggesting widespread surveillance by state agents. According to one witness, while men protesters were often rounded up in the streets, the women arrested on protest sites were generally arrested for openly showing defiance towards the security forces and talking back to them. Some women victims mentioned that they believed they were singled out in the protests because of their physical appearance.
651. While the authorities appeared to consistently ensure that at least one woman agent participated in the arrests of women, a woman agent was not always present during interrogation, and usually in lower-ranking roles. This appeared to be a tick in the box exercise or for cultural and religious propriety, rather than as a form of judicial guarantee for the treatment of women during arrest and interrogation.
652. Women interviewed by the Mission who had been arrested were subjected to invasive body searches and cavity searches. Such searches, while always conducted by women guards, took place in rooms equipped with CCTV cameras making women extremely nervous that men guards working for the prison may have been watching them.
4. Detention
(a) Detention facilities
653. As mentioned above, the vast majority of arrestees were not informed of the locations in which they were to be detained, and often only discovered upon release where they had been held. Most of these locations were not registered at all or only after completion of the investigation phase, upon transfer to prisons. A range of detention facilities were used to detain persons arrested in connection with the protests, including police stations, prisons, Basij or Revolutionary Guard units. Arrestees interviewed by the Mission explained how detention facilities were often filled beyond capacity and how they witnessed overcrowding following mass arrests of protesters.
654. Authorities also routinely used unofficial detention facilities, belonging to the Ministry of Interior intelligence or IRGC intelligence to hold protesters, sometimes for weeks, before handing them over to prisons or releasing them. Protesters interviewed by the Mission described these places as including military barracks, sports venues, houses and apartments, ruined buildings and underground rooms.
655. A witness said he was brought to a facility managed by police, military and Basij forces which was âdifferent from a prisonâ, saying that âinside it was like an army barrack or a schoolâ. Another witness explained to the Mission that he was held in a place belonging to the IRGC, which they referred to as the âhotelâ. In Tehran, a young woman stated that after being abducted on the street by IRGC agents, she was brought to a âsafe houseâ. She described the place as the parking lot of a building in a residential area from where she could hear children on the upper floors and the sounds of cars outside. She said the place was freezing and that she thought she was going to die. Another young woman arrested in Karaj explained that she was brought by intelligence agents to a ruined building under construction, which was âtheir torture placeâ.
656. As regards the detention of children, on 11 October 2022 Iranâs Education Minister Yousef Nouri stated that: âstudents had indeed been protesting, and the government had been responding by detaining and sending them to mental health (psychiatric) facilities meant to âreformâ the protesting students and rid them of their âanti-socialâ behaviours.â Scores of children were held in the Stateâs prisons together with adults. On 20 October 2022, the Head of the Islamic Propaganda Department of Mashhad, Mohammed Fallah reported on his visit to the quarantine ward of Mashhad prison where children were being held.
(b) Respect for procedural rights in detention
657. As already noted above, people apprehended while peacefully participating in protests or arrested at their homes and workplaces were arrested by agents who did not reveal their identity and almost never showed them an arrest warrant. Victims described other similarities with respect to their detention, notably blatant disrespect of their procedural rights.
âAccess to defence lawyers was totally cutâ
Interview of a lawyer from a minority populated region
658. None of the persons arrested and detained who the Mission interviewed or whose statement it obtained was given access to a lawyer at any point of their detention, not even to lawyers in the judiciaryâs approved list. The right to defence was also greatly undermined by the numerous arrests and detentions of lawyers who were trying to ensure legal aid for protesters. The treatment of children was not different from adult detainees. They were not sufficiently informed of their rights, and they were interrogated in the absence of a parent or guardian and without the presence of a legal counsel.
659. A lawyer explained to the Mission that defendants could only have access to a lawyer after their release on bail, and rarely when the case was in court, and that they could access only those lawyers appointed by the court if they were accused of crimes against national security. A woman detainee in Ward 209 in Evin explained: âWhat is strange is that during the detention, they make you confess, and then they have the written confession from you and once you confess and sign, they say you can now go and hire a lawyer.â
660. Nearly all witnesses reported that they were never brought before a prosecutorial authority. Others explained they were brought to the prosecutorâs office only days after their arrest and without knowing exactly who they were meeting or why or only saw a prosecutor when paying the bail amount prior to their release. A witness for instance stated that he was taken before the Investigator at Branch 2 of Evin Office of the Prosecutor on the fifth day after his arrest. He said that he was not asked any questions, was not sure whether the person he met was the investigator, or a secretary. After being asked his name and ID number, he was returned to prison. One day later, the witness said, his lawyer was able to ensure payment of one billion tooman (16 835 US$) bail for his release. Another witness explained that he was taken to the General and Revolutionary Office of the Prosecutor for the IRGC to be granted an order to hold him. He stated that the Prosecutor was effectively an agent of the Revolutionary Guards and âdoes what they (the IRGC) wantâ. He further stated: âImagine how lawless it is, they are so sure that they would get the order from the judge that they first arrest and then seek the orderâ. The IRGC obtained a ten-day detention order but told the witness âthey would keep him for a long timeâ.
(c) Enforced disappearances
661. The Mission established that most detainees were held incommunicado for hours, days and sometimes weeks, in official and unofficial secret detention places run by intelligence and security bodies. In some cases, the authoritiesâ refused to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty to or concealed the fate or the whereabouts of the detainees from their families, in what amounts to enforced disappearances
662. Family members of former detained protesters interviewed described to the Mission how they had to search, sometimes for months for their loved ones and how the authorities refused to disclose information to them. A man arrested and brought to an unofficial detention place explained to the Mission that after one week and a half, he called his family and told them that he was being detained. He also stated that his family later told him that they had been looking for him everywhere and had approached the IRGC and the police, but that no one told them where he was. His family was told to look for him in another city. A young man detained in a police station and who was transferred to several places of detention indicated: âI wasn’t asked if I wanted to contact my family. I asked six or seven times to speak to my parents, but they refused to let me talk to themâ. In a subsequent interview, his father confirmed that he was informed of his sonâs whereabouts only two days after his son was arrested. A young woman explained how she was âstressedâ that her family had no news about her. Another woman said she had to beg to be authorized to call her parents, Another witness explained that for the 54 days of his detention, he was not allowed to inform his family about his whereabouts and that âagentsâ did not inform his family.
663. Children were also held incommunicado without being able to inform their families of their location, with their parents kept in the dark as to their fates. In some instances, parents of child detainees were not informed of the whereabouts of their children, given conflicting information or even verbally insulted, by security or law enforcement agents. According to some reports, families were under intense pressure not to publicize the names and situations of their children and were threatened that if they did, they would never see them again.
(d) Release from detention
664. In most of the cases investigated by the Mission, detainees were eventually released after the family paid exorbitant bails ranging from 100 million (1683US$) to 2 billion Tooman (33670 US$). A teacher stated he was released on bail after he paid 2 billion Toomans, which is double his salary over the last 30 years as a teacher. A lawyer interviewed by the Mission indicated that in many cases, in particular in some cities in West Azerbaijan, relatives of those detained were asked for money to have their family members released. He further explained that the chaotic situation had provided a unique opportunity for the abuse of authority.â
665. Witness interviews and statements of government officials confirmed the release of most of the children who were arrested and detained in the context of the protests, as a result of the official pardon and based on their having âexpressed regret for their activities and give(n) a written commitment for not repeating those activitiesâ. Others were released after furnishing a bond or bail, or signing a confession and repentance, or on conditions of acting as a police informant on the streets.
5. Findings
666. The Mission established that since September 2022, the authorities have engaged in large scale arbitrary arrests and detention of women, children and men in connection with the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests.
667. The Mission established that women, children and men were arbitrarily arrested and detained for protected speech and acts, including protesting peacefully, dancing, chanting, writing slogans on walls and honking car horns in an exercise of rights guaranteed by the ICCPR including freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion and the right to privacy. Arbitrary arrests also extended to those seeking to uncover the truth about protest related violations, as well as supporters of protesters and those expressing solidarity.
668. Iranian authorities also violated their obligations under the ICCPR and the CRC by arresting children and detaining them together with adults.
669. The Mission established that the arrests and detentions were not random, but the result of organized and coordinated action from State authorities, as evidenced by the number and multiplicity of forces acting jointly, the use of intelligence and surveillance technology, seizure and inspection devices, by the tracking of individuals outside protests, including at hospitals and private homes, and targeting inter alia lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders, medical personnel, students, artists, trade unionists, and family members.
670. The Mission established that the Iranian authorities used unnecessary force during arrests in connection with the protests, as well as during transfers. The Mission has documented multiple instances where brutal violence was used during arrests, amounting to torture and ill-treatment.
671. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the Iranian authorities routinely held persons arrested in connection with the protests incommunicado. In some cases, in what amounts to enforced disappearances, authorities refused to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty to or concealed the fate or the whereabouts of the detainees from their families, in effect placing them outside of the protection of the law and placing their lives and their physical and mental integrity at serious and constant risk.
672. The Mission was unable to find any information on domestic investigations, in line with international human rights standards, launched into allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention, nor any case where judicial authorities intervened to put an end to instances of arbitrary detention in connection with the protests or victims of arbitrary arrests were compensated. The Mission therefore concludes that instead of protecting detained persons from arbitrary arrests and detention or from enforced disappearances, the Iranian justice system played a significant role in these violations.
C. Treatment and conditions in detention
673. The Mission interviewed victims and witnesses of torture and ill-treatment in various places of detention in 16 provinces, namely Alborz, Eastern Azerbaijan, Gilan, Hormozgan, Isfahan, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Lorestan, Mazandaran, Qom, Razavi Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Tehran, and West Azerbaijan since the start of the protests. The majority of them were women and men aged between 26 and 40 years at the time of arrest and detention. Among them were local activists, students, lawyers, medical workers, journalists and schoolteachers, as well as parents who shared with the Mission details of the treatment their children were subjected to while in detention. The Mission also collected and analysed audio-visual material, judgments and other court documents, detailed statements, obtained from non-governmental organizations. The vast majority of the witnesses interviewed by the Mission, and persons from whom it obtained statements, described the torture and ill-treatment to which they were subjected since the moment of arrest and reported appalling detention conditions.
674. The Mission wrote seven letters to the Government of Iran asking specific questions regarding allegations of torture and ill-treatment. No response or information was received from the Government of Iran before completion of this document on 15 March 2024.
1. International legal framework
675. Iran as a State party to the ICCPR has the obligation to respect and ensure the rights of detained persons, including their right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment. The prohibition against torture is absolute and non-derogable. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State Party to justify acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. No justification or extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 of the ICCPR for any reasons, including those based on an order from a superior officer or public authority. Prolonged solitary confinement of a detained or imprisoned person may amount to acts prohibited by article 7 of the ICCPR.
676. The obligation to ensure includes to adopt laws and take measures that give effect to those rights. Iran is also required to take effective measures to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish all acts of torture and ill-treatment. This include measures to ensure that, in accordance with international law, law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty as far as possible apply non-violent means, ensuring that all places of detention are officially recognized, respecting the right to access an independent doctor at the start of detention, and keeping an official and central registration of detainees, amongst other measures. Under international standards, all persons deprived of their liberty must be given or offered a medical examination as promptly as possible after admission to a place of detention. Statements elicited as a result of torture or ill-treatment, or other forms of coercion, must be excluded as evidence in criminal proceedings except if a statement or confession obtained in violation of article 7 is used as evidence that torture or other treatment prohibited by this provision occurred. The requirement to exclude such evidence is inherent to the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment, as well as the rights of every accused person not to be compelled to testify against themselves or confess guilt and to remain silent.
677. Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Iran must ensure that no child is subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Disciplinary measures in violation of article 37 of CRC are strictly forbidden, including corporal punishment, placement in a dark cell, closed or solitary confinement, or any other punishment that may compromise the physical or mental health or well-being of the child concerned. Every child deprived of liberty must be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. In particular, every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the child’s best interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances. The Havana Rules (1990) state that deprivation of liberty should be effected in conditions and circumstances which ensure respect for the human rights of juveniles. Juveniles detained in facilities should be guaranteed the benefit of meaningful activities and programmes which would serve to promote and sustain their health and self-respect, to foster their sense of responsibility and encourage those attitudes and skills that will assist them in developing their potential as members of society” (Rule 12). Iran also has the obligation to take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse, torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
678. Under the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, a range of acts including physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.â Rape constitutes a violation of a range of human rights, including the right to bodily integrity, the rights to autonomy and to sexual autonomy, the right to privacy, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, womenâs right to equality before the law and the rights to be free from violence, discrimination, torture and other cruel or inhuman treatment. In 2017, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women indicated that rape is characterized as a crime against the right to personal security and physical, sexual and psychological integrity, and that the definition of rape, was based on the lack of consent and took into account coercive circumstances. It also established that any time limitations, where they existed, should give consideration to circumstances hindering the capacity of the victims to report the crime, and that rape could amount to torture. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls has noted that the international human rights framework and jurisprudence recognizes rape as a human rights violation and a manifestation of gender-based violence against women and girls that could amount to torture. The Special Rapporteur on Torture indicated that it is well established that rape and other forms of sexual violence can amount to torture and ill-treatment and that rape constitutes torture when it is carried out by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials. He highlighted that women and girls are at particular risk of sexual violence in detention, including rape, insults, humiliation and unnecessary invasive body searches. He stated that the risk of sexual and other forms of violence can arise during transfers to police stations, courts or prisons, and particularly where male and female prisoners are not separated or when male staff transport female prisoners. Ensuring that female detainees are supervised by female guards and prison officials are key safeguards against abuse.[1] He also identified pretrial detention as creating an increased risk of torture and ill-treatment because sexual abuse and violence may be used as a means of coercion and to extract confessions. Under international criminal law, rape can constitute a crime against humanity.
679. The United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) adopted by the General Assembly, provide guidance on meeting specific needs of women in case of imprisonment, including rules relevant to the prevention of and protection from torture and ill-treatment and the protection for women prisoners from any gender-based physical or verbal violence, abuse and sexual harassment.
680. Under international human rights law, the Government of Iran has an obligation to conduct investigations into any allegation of these violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially and, where appropriate, take action against those found responsible in accordance with domestic and international law. It also has the obligation to provide victims with equal and effective access to justice, as well as to effective remedies, including reparation.
2. Torture and ill-treatment
(a) Lack of legal protection under domestic law
681. Iran’s Constitution prohibits infringement of the dignity and reputation of individuals who are arrested, detained, jailed, or banished. However, it does not contain an absolute prohibition on torture or ill-treatment as reflected in the ICCPR, as it narrows the definition of torture to acts done âfor the purpose of extracting confession or acquiring informationâ. Moreover, while domestic legislation bans certain types of abusive conduct during interrogations, it does not expressly include or define a crime of torture, thus preventing adequate investigation and prosecution of the crime and the provision of remedy, including reparation, to victims. Furthermore, Iranian legislation is silent on the infliction of mental pain and suffering and does not cover cases where torture is inflicted on an individual in order to coerce, punish, or intimidate a third person. Iranâs domestic legislation neither prohibits the prolonged use of solitary confinement as a form of torture or other ill-treatment nor regulates it. In addition, Iranian law continues to provide for various punishments that are prohibited by international law, including flogging, amputation, blinding, crucifixion and stoning, all of which constitute forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
682. Under the 2004 Law on Respect for Legitimate Freedoms and Safeguarding Citizens’ Rights, officers are forbidden from harming an accused person, and shall not interrogate accused persons by handcuffing, blindfolding, humiliating or disrespecting them Interrogators and investigation agents should refrain from covering their faces or sitting behind the accused or taking them to unknown places and doing illegal actions in general. The Law also requires that interrogations are carried out in accordance with âscientific and legal principles, previous training and under required supervision.
683. Investigations and interrogations of women and children should be done by trained female law enforcement officers (zÄbetÄn-e dÄdgostarÄ«) as far as possible. Investigating judges are prohibited to coerce or impose duress on a defendant, to use insults or suggestive and misleading questions, or to ask any questions that are unrelated to the accusations. Answers obtained in such a way and are not admissible as evidence. According to article 171 of the Islamic Penal Code, if an accused person confesses to the commission of an offence, their confession shall be admissible and there is no need for further evidence. Moreover, article 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if the accused explicitly confesses to the commission of a crime in such manner as to remove all doubt and uncertainty in respect of the confession, the court shall pronounce its judgment by virtue of the confession. The Mission notes that taken together article 171 of the Islamic Penal Code and article 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure carry the risk of an institutional reliance on obtaining and using confessions to secure convictions.
684. Iranian law provides that âupon the request of the person in custody or the request of one of their close relatives, a doctor appointed by the Prosecutor shall examine the detainee.â It therefore does not fully ensure the right of people deprived of their liberty to be examined by a doctor as promptly as possible and does not recognize the right of people deprived of their liberty the right to an independent doctor of their own choosing. Iran Regulation of the State Prisons and Security and Corrective Measures Organization provides that prisons and detention centres should provide for medical care needs as far as possible inside the institution in case of necessity. However, they have to release the convict from prison for treatment outside.
685. The Mission also notes that in February 2020, Iran did not support any of the ten recommendations made in the context of the third cycle of its Universal Periodic Review with respect to torture and ill-treatment. Iran did not support the recommendations to ratify the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to remove all national legal provisions that allow for punishments that amount to torture or cruel and degrading treatment, and to define torture as a crime in national legislation in line with international standards.
(b) Patterns
âFor those who protested and say âwhy were we arrested, why were we beaten with batons?â, I told them: Don’t take the story personally. This is a trend and the police, and the system are dealing with the trend and not with you.â
Head of the Islamic Propaganda Office of Mashhad
responding to questions of Fars News Agency 20 October 2022
âThey did not consider us humans.â
Witness detained in Tehran by IRGC
686. Women, children and men provided similar and consistent accounts of the torture and ill-treatment. As noted above, torture and ill-treatment often started immediately upon arrest, continued during transfer to detention centres as well as in police stations, Ministry of Intelligence or IRGC detention centres and in prisons. Most violations occurred during the initial period of detention, and in particular during interrogation sessions. Detainees who were subjected to the most egregious violence, including rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, were persons detained in unofficial detention centres belonging to the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence.
687. Methods of torture reported included a wide range of physical and psychological torture, as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The Mission also established that detained men, women and children arrested and detained in the context of the 2022 protests were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. Techniques also included mock executions. The use of torture and ill-treatment was mainly aimed at extracting confessions.
688. Victims reported long and repeated interrogations during which they were subjected to both physical and psychological torture. A victim detained in Evin prison in Tehran in February 2023, indicated that he was interrogated for four or five days, each time for around five to six hours and was subjected to beatings every time he was interrogated. âWe called it being hosted by the intelligenceâ, he said. A woman detained in Evin ward 209 in September 2022 explained that her interrogations started in the morning and continued until it became dark. Another witness detained in Evin ward 209 a month later provided a similar account.
âThey had no names, no family names, their identities were secret, and they called each other with titles like, âHaji, or Seyyed.â
Interview of a young woman
detained in November 2022
689. Interrogators almost never identified themselves to the person in their custody. Nearly all detainees were blindfolded or hooded while tortured during interrogations, and were also required to sit on a chair facing the wall and therefore could not see their interrogators. A young woman explained to the Mission that: âvery few prisoners were not required to be blindfoldedâ. Some victims of torture whose statements were obtained by the Mission were able to identify the security service to which the perpetrator(s) belonged, including the Basij, Etelaâat (intelligence agents), the Revolutionary Guards or the police (FARAJA) and in a few cases identified the perpetrators themselves.
âThey sat me on a chair and placed chairs around me. I could tell from sounds that a number of people – five or at most seven individuals – came into the room and sat around me in the back, front, left and right.â Then they started beating me.
Interview of a man detained in Tehran in November 2022
“Several men were beating me, I don’t know for how long. They continuously hit me for about an hour and a half. Someone was hitting me with cables and batons for as long as he had the strength. When he got tired, another one would take over.â
Statement obtained by the Mission of a man detained in October 2022
690. Several agents, sometimes up to ten, participated in the torture during the interrogations. One victim also spoke about the different roles played by interrogators often with one of them acting as the âkindâ one asking the detainee to cooperate, while others were aggressive and used violence.
691. Witnesses explained that prison authorities would not accept anyone presenting clear signs of torture and that detention authorities would only release torture victims once their wounds were no longer visible. A young man, for instance explained: âThis is ânormalâ, they keep you in detention until you heal, and your wounds are no longer visible, and then they release you. That way, we cannot prove that we were beaten in prison. I know that because no one who was injured was released with fresh wounds.â Another victim who was subjected to severe torture stated: âI remember once when I was being transferred to prison, the officials refused to take me due to my serious condition. They said, âWeâre not going to accept this corpse.â
(i) Patterns of physical torture and ill-treatment
âI was beaten and insulted so much that I almost lost consciousness due to the pain,
and my whole body was numb, and I didn’t feel any pain anymore.â
Interview of a man detained in Tehran in November 2022
692. The vast majority of detainees interviewed by the Mission or whose statements were obtained by it were subjected to physical assaults during their detention in the form of punching, kicking, beatings on a range of body parts including the head, face, ribs, hands and legs with fists, belts, sticks, batons, and electric batons, metal handcuffs, cables, rifle butts, and handgun barrels. Many detainees were subjected to prolonged blindfolding or hooding, flogging, burnings, electric shocks, suspension and stress positions, waterboarding, forced administration of psychotropics and of unknown substances, deprivation of sufficient food and potable water, of medical care, or of access to the toilet for long periods of time. Most witnesses described the severe physical and mental pain resulting from the prolonged and repeated nature of the physical torture they endured.
693. A man stated that he was subjected to numerous incidents of physical abuse including of a sexual nature while detained for twenty-one days in an unofficial detention facility managed by the IRGC. Beaten with a belt, baton, and electric baton, on his legs and his back until he threw up blood, his interrogators tied a plastic rope around his arms and hung him from a bar that was fixed to the walls, under the ceiling, and left him in this position for at least one day. Another man, who was detained in Sanandaj intelligence detention centre in September 2022, also described being hung from the ceiling with his hands tied to his back and beaten, with interrogators throwing water on him to revitalize him when he fell unconscious. He explained that he was hung up for 13 days, causing his shoulder to become dislocated.
694. A woman detained in a prison in Karaj, also described multiple incidents of physical torture inflicted on her, including the application of electric shocks, assault and battery, slaps and kicking, being forced to stand for long hours, and not being allowed to go to the toilet.
695. A man arrested and detained in November 2022 in Kurdistan province by agents of the IRGC Intelligence Organization explained to the Mission the various forms of torture to which he was subjected, including the âgrilled chickenâ method.
âThey started torturing me with the âgrilled chickenâ method: As my hands and feet were bound in the interrogation room, they put a metal bar between my arms and legs and put me on the interrogation table like roasting a chicken. The torture started: They poured water on my head and tortured me with shocks and electric cables. With disrespectful insults and torture, they demanded the names of my friends who participated in the protests and I kept saying I donât know anyone.â
Interview of a man detained in an IRGC detention facility
696. Prolonged blindfolding and hooding of protesters was widely used. In some instances, blindfolded and hooded detainees were also handcuffed and or had their feet tied up. A victim said that he was blindfolded for the first three days following his arrest. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a man explained that for 10 or 12 hours from 6pm till the next morning he was blindfolded and handcuffed with his feet tied together. A witness indicated that during the entire time of his detention in the custody of the IRGC Intelligence Organization in a city in Kurdistan, he had a bag over his head and his hands and feet were bound, even when he went to the bathroom. A similar statement was received from a man who was detained in a detention centre of the Ministry of Intelligence in Marivan, Kurdistan province and reported having been blindfolded during the six days of his interrogation.
âIn the mornings, I used to wake up with the sounds of the screams of other people being tortured at 4am or 5am. This used to cause me a lot of anguish and was worse for me than even my own torture.â
Statement received by the Mission of man detained by IRGC in Razavi Khorasan.
697. Some detainees explained to the Mission how they witnessed or heard women, children and men being subjected to torture and ill-treatment or saw protesters bearing clear signs of torture and ill-treatment or sustaining injuries because of physical abuse. A young man detained in a stadium with hundreds of protesters rounded up on the streets indicated to the Mission: âI saw three brothers severely injured. One of them had his head broken, one had an arm broken, they were all bloody. I didn’t see them receiving any medical assistance. One man was even shot with a gun. I could see his injury, on his forearm. The bleeding had stopped, but the wound was open.â In October 2022 in the Greater Tehran prison, another witness reported that he saw around 300 inmates, among them nearly 200 young protesters between 16 and 18 years of age, brought from the streets. Many of them were severely beaten and marks of bruises, pellets and stabbing were visible on their bodies, which also had bandages. A man detained in a police station in a city in south of Iran together with around 40 protesters in November 2022 explained that all had damaged faces and ruined and broken limbsâ.
âI do not know what was in that water because the water tasted very different. After drinking the water, I fainted and collapsed and I do not know how many minutes it took! After that my body started to get rashes and wounds, my skin started to get inflammation, weird wounds on my skin and severely itchy, something I never had before! The wounds started spreading around the area of my liver, to my back, belly and everywhere on my body. I started to feel bad and got worse in prison, I was getting injections in prison several times and we had to do it and we did not know what they were doing. We were not even allowed to know the name of these medications. Most of the inmates were given medications for example with the excuse of Tetanus vaccine, they never showed us the brand or name of those. These injections made me feel worse.
Interview of a woman detained
in Ministry of intelligence unofficial detention facility November 2022 in Karaj
698. Eleven detainees reported to the Mission that they were subjected to the forced administration and injection of unidentified substances. A man whose statement was obtained by the Mission reported that while he was in the custody of the IRGC Intelligence Organization in Saqquez, agents gave him an injection through his pants in the buttocks. He said he did not know what was injected but that after that injection, until the next morning, he was âdelirious and talking nonsenseâ. A witness who had been detained by IRGC intelligence in Lorestan province stated: âthey gave us things that made all of us disorientated and made us all lose our memory. They forced me to take some pills that made me dizzy, sleepy and disorientated. I was sleeping all the time.â He also said that after being given water, detainees felt as if they had been given morphine. Another man also explained in his statement obtained by the Mission that detainees were given three to four different pills which made him feel like he was âin another realmâ, and caused delusions to the point that you thought the walls were talkingâ. He further stated that detainees were also given a âtruthâ pill, which induced nightmares.â and that detainees were forced to open their mouths for inspection to ensure that they ingested the pills.â
(ii) Patterns of psychological torture and ill treatment
âThey put so much pressure on you it drives you mad. You expect to be beaten up any secondââ
Interview of a man detained in October 2022 by IRGC in Tehran
âMost of my clients reported being subjected to psychological torture, they complained about that a lotâ
Interview of a lawyer from Tehran
699. Many victims reported fear and mental distress on witnessing and or hearing the sounds of beatings and detainees crying and screaming from pain. Several victims said that the fact of awaiting being subjected to repeated torture sessions was itself a kind of suffering.
700. The Mission also found that persons arrested in connection with the protests were routinely placed in solitary confinement for periods ranging from one night to several weeks. The psychological suffering resulting from being placed in isolation was often exacerbated by the inhuman and degrading detention conditions in the solitary confinement cells. A man who was held for eight days in a solitary confinement cell of 2m x 1m in a city in West Azerbaijan, described it like a box in which he couldnât stand up or sit in a comfortable position. During those eight days, he had no sense of the time as the cell had no window and no light. He said he felt as he was going to lose his mind and often contemplated suicide.
âIt was all kinds of swear words, directed at my sister, mother, wife, child. (âŠ) They have no boundaries in using profanities. Contrary to their claims that they are believers, they would even swear at the mother and sister of GodâŠthey have no belief in anything.â
Interview of a man detained by the IRGC
701. In the vast majority of the cases, persons arrested in connection with the protests were subjected to verbal abuse, obscenities and profanities Persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities reported insults based on ethnicity and religion.
702. A witness said that when he asked about the reasons for his arrest, his interrogator responded: âshut up, and âyou know the shit you have eaten.â He also reported that he was told that his mother was a âwhoreâ who had given birth to a âbastardâ. Others indicted that interrogators used words such as Padar Sag (son of a dog), Haramzadeh (bastard) Madar Jende (mother whore), and Bi Sharaf (someone with no honour). Insults also came from prison officials and judges.
âHaji, pull over, if we kill him here, who would know? If we drop him in the forest between the trees, who would know?â
Interview of a man detained in Tehran
703. Detainees were routinely subjected to threats, including death threats against them and their family, threats of torture, execution, rape, to âdisappearâ the person or to place them in solitary confinement, to build a case against them, to destroy their reputation, to kill, harm, rape, beat, detain family members including children as well as friends, and threats to make the person or her or his family members lose their job or education.
He threatened me âwe tear down your stomach and eventually we throw your flesh in front of dogs and finally nobody would find out about the place we throw your body in (âŠ) I overheard the sound of him opening up his belt, he threatened that they would hit my mother and brother with a car and nobody would find out who their killer had been.â
Interview of a woman detained in November 2022
âWe will kill your brother and father, rape your mother, we will kill you, too. This is the punishment for anyone who fights against the Islamic Republicâ.
Interview of a man detained in an unofficial IRGC
detention facility
âWe will arrest your wifeâ, âyou will never see your child againâ, âyou did not even get a chance to say goodbye before you dieâ, cooperate with us so we let you call your child and hear his voiceâ.
Interview of a man detained by IRGC agents in Mazandaran Province
âIf you are released from prison and repeat your crime (protest),
we will execute you in the middle of the universityâ
Interview of a man detained in October 2022
in intelligence detention facility in Razavi Khorasan
704. According to his statement obtained by the Mission, a judge, mocked threatened the victim in the office of the prosecutor: âYou think, just a few people together you can topple the system? We will massacre you allâ Another man explained in his statement obtained by the Mission that IRGC agents in Marivan, Kurdistan province, threatened to execute him with an unmarked car because âa dog isnât worth a rope or bullets and should be run over by a car instead.â
705. A man stated that after his having been tortured, interrogators opened his eyes for a short time and placed a banner next to him that read: âKhamenei, the murderer, run awayâ, which they had found in his car and then took pictures with him âlike hunters next to their preyâ with a mocking and smiling face before resuming the beatings. In another statement obtained by the Mission, a man explained that while beating him, agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization in Saqqez insulted him and asked him to make goat sounds.
Mock execution
âYou didnât know that you are about to be executed? No one told you?
Officers to a woman detained
in unofficial detention facility in Western Azerbaijan in September 2022
706. A young woman held in an unofficial detention facility in the city of Urmia, described in detail the mock execution to which she was subjected. One morning, at dawn while she was asleep, two armed plainclothes agents stormed into her cell and yelled at her to get out. They blindfolded her and asked: âYou didnât know that you are about to be executed? No one told you?â. Brought into a car with another young woman she asked to be allowed to call her mother, so she could hear her voice for the last time and tell her mother where she would be buried, but the agents refused. Ten minutes later the two women were transferred to a van where seven other women detainees were sitting. Asked by one of them where they were being taken, one of the two armed men in the van responded that since they had refused to cooperate, they would be treated âin a different wayâ. The women were eventually driven to the central prison of the city, registered outside and driven back blindfolded to the place where they had been initially detained.
(iii)Psychological torture of women protesters
707. Women protesters were particularly targeted for psychological torture, including through the use of insults, and threats with gendered overtones. Witnesses stated that during their arrests, their families were used against them. Another witness described how her interrogators taunted her about her husband and whether she could trust him, suggesting that he was unfaithful. Her interrogators would torment her with comments such as: âRight now, you are here, do you know what he is doing right now? Do you trust him?â She explained that it instilled doubt in her mind and then eventually led to the breakdown of the marriage. Two witnesses explained that the authorities relied on patriarchal mindsets and values around virginity, chastity and honour to turn the families of women protesters against them or to exert pressure on them so as to prevent them from attending protests.
708. Another witness commented that the authorities tried to incite the parents of young women and girls against them to turn against them, especially in conservative families. A witness who had collected and published stories of women protesters who had been arrested, explained that security forces and interrogators violate womenâs privacy by reading their diaries, going through their phones and photos and using them against them, trying to turn their families against them by disclosing to family members private information, including about their sexual lives. During interrogation, interrogators asked women about their sexual lives and to detail their sexual encounters. They tried to blame women for not being good wives or mothers. A feminist activist was told that her husband had divorced her and that it âsignalled the kind of woman she wasâ. Another woman was asked what kind of mother she was to leave her children for ânudityâ. The witness who had herself been arrested in the past (prior to the death of Jina Mahsa Amini and the 2022 protests) said that this experience changed her. After her release, she became very conservative. When she has intimate moments, she feels Iranian security people are watching. They can easily turn families against women by disclosing personal details, she concluded.
(iv) Deaths as a result of torture in custody
709. Civil society organizations reported that at least 37 protesters died as a result of torture, and 23 protesters died shortly after their release.
710. According to credible information, Javad Rouhi, a 35-year-old man who was detained in the context of the protests, was subjected to severe torture in the detention of the IRGCâs intelligence organization in Mazandaran province following his arrest on 21 September 2022. Information analysed showed that he was beaten, flogged, and sexually assaulted by having ice put on his testicles. Notes written by Javad Rouhi from prison were made public in September 2023. In these notes, Javad Rouhi reflected that âWith such severe torture, even the bravest and healthiest people in the society would surrender to making forced confessions [âŠ].â He died in custody on 31 August 2023.
711. Ramin Fatehi, a 47-year-old Kurdish man from Sanandaj, was arrested on the road by the security forces on 12 October 2022 while he was transporting merchandise to Saqqez in his van. On the following day, around 30 armed security forces masked and dressed in black clothing, broke into Raminâs house and arrested Raminâs brother, threatening his elderly parents and sister. The agents were accompanied by men wearing traditional clothing who were filming the arrests. Two days later, on 14 October 2022, they arrested his sister. During the weeks preceding the arrests, the Ministry of Intelligence had summoned family members and threatened them not to participate in protests. Raminâs family members had gone several times to the grave of Jina Mahsa Amini. All were detained in Sanandaj Intelligence Department’s detention facility. For nine days, the family did not have any news about them. The family went to the intelligence office but were not given any information until 21 October 2022 when they received a call to inform them that Ramin had committed suicide. The family was requested to come and identify the body. When they arrived at the Intelligence Office, they were only allowed to see Raminâs face and not to examine his body. Raminâs body was subsequently brought to the Behesht Mohamadi cemetery in Sanandaj for burial without any family members present. Raminâs sister and brother were released after his death.
712. Amir Javad Asadzadeh, a 36-year-old protester was arrested in the evening of 19 November 2022 by plainclothes agents on motorcycles in Pirouzi Street, Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan when he was writing slogans on a wall. According to credible information, Mr. Asadzadeh was subjected to beatings including with a baton at the time of arrest by over a dozen plainclothes Basiji agents. He was subsequently transferred on the back of a motorcycle to a mosque in the same neighbourhood where he was taken to the basement and subjected to further beatings resulting in him sustaining severe injuries. After this, he was put in a car and taken to a police station. There, he was coerced to put his fingerprints on papers even though he was unconscious and extremely and visibly unwell. In the early hours of the morning, Amir Javad Asadzadeh was taken to a hospital. Credible information received by the Mission shows that when he was taken to hospital, he did not have any vital signs. At hospitals, plainclothes Basij agents intimidated the medical staff and attempted to coerce them to record that the victim was brought to the hospital alive and with vital signs and that he had died in hospital after cardiopulmonary resuscitation was conducted. They subsequently removed all CCTV footage from the hospital.
3. Sexual and gender-based violence in detention
âThis is a lesson for all the whores and prostitutes who take to the streets!â
IRGC officer to a woman held in an unofficial detention facility.
âYou wanted freedom to get naked: here, this is your freedom!â
Plainclothes agent to a woman during her arrest.
713. The Mission established the existence of a pattern of sexual and gender-based violence targeting protesters on the basis of their gender, sexual orientation and gender identity. The Mission obtained 21 statements on rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, gang rape, rape with an object, threats of rape, electrocution to the genitalia, intrusive body searches and gendered insults and harassment carried out primarily in unofficial detention facilities in Alborz, Gilan, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Lorestan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Tehran and West Azerbaijan provinces against individuals who had been arrested for their participation in or support to the September 2022 protests. The Mission further obtained and analysed statements originally collected by civil society organizations, which it assessed to be credible. These statements related to sexual and gender-based violence occurring in Alborz, Fars, Gilan, Isfahan, Khuzestan Kurdistan, Lorestan, Mazandaran, Razavi Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Tehran provinces. Furthermore, supportive documentary material of physical injuries and medical reports, including victimsâ psychological assessments, were examined, and reviewed by a forensic pathologist. The Mission also obtained additional reports of sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, including with objects, threats of rape, virginity testing, groping, touching, harassment, and gendered insults, in several provinces in Iran, among others, Alborz, East Azerbaijan, Isfahan, Khuzestan, Lorestan, Tehran and West Azerbaijan. The Mission further reviewed open-source material in which allegations of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence against protesters in detention were made.
714. On the basis of primary accounts and credible information obtained, the Mission documented rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence in 14 provinces in Iran. Prevalence of sexual violence is difficult to estimate, as several factors may contribute to under reporting, both domestically and to human rights organizations, in the context of Iran. First, as regards rape, the various shortcomings contained within the Iranian legal framework on rape, including the absence of rape as a distinct crime, lack of definition of consent or lack thereof, and rules of evidence applicable to zina crimes, means that victims who suffered other forms of sexual violence, as described in this section below, have, at the time of writing, virtually no legal avenue to seek justice for the sexual harm they have endured. Second, shame, fear, and a deeply entrenched stigma associated with violations of a sexual nature, may also create an additional disincentive barrier for victims to come forward. One man survivor expressed concerns to report sexual violence, due to stigma and gender stereotypes relating to masculinity. Third, delayed reporting to human rights organizations is also not unusual as it takes time to locate survivors, or for them to speak about their experiences, if indeed, they feel safe enough to ever do so. Lastly, in the context of the protests, individuals also feared reporting violations they endured, as they feared that this would serve as a proof for their participation in protests.
715. In none of the cases investigated, did survivors inform the Mission of considering or having lodged a complaint already to the judiciary, citing fears of reprisals and the overall mistrust in the Iranian judicial system. In this regard, one survivor told the Mission that she has not filed a complaint because it was the âsecurity forces who had raped her and there is no difference amongst the various agencies, they do that to womenâ. In a leaked official document, published by international media (The Guardian) in February 2023, the Deputy Prosecutor of Tehran advised to classify the case of rape of two young women by two IRGC officials as âcompletely secretâ and asked that it be gradually âclosed over time by removing the suspects [from their positions] without mentioning the names of the law enforcement agencies involved.â Credible human rights organizations also reported on threats and intimidation against survivors, which let to them withdrawing complaints already lodged before the judiciary.
716. In this context, in March 2023, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Narges Mohammad, issued an open-letter from Evin prison where she remains incarcerated, in which she described âhaving seen the physical effects of sexual violenceâ inflicted on women protesters who were also imprisoned there. Her letter was in response to an interview by the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs broadcasted on CNN on 1 March 2023 during which he denied that women arrested in connection with the September 2022 protests had been beaten or subjected to sexual violence in detention.
(a) Rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence during transfer
717. Women protesters were subjected to sexual and gender-based violence upon arrest, including in ambulances, vehicles, and vans during detaineesâ transfers by security forces to detention facilities. A witness described her arrest by nine intelligence officers and a female agent in chador who stormed her home in late 2022 in one province. Before taking her away, one of the agents forced her to change her clothing and insisted on watching her undress after shoving her into a room in the house. The agent then told her she had a âgood bodyâ and when she asked him to leave, he responded by saying that this is what âfreedomâ meant, equating her participation in the protests against her willingness to âget nakedâ. He then dragged her out of the room by the hair and put her in a vehicle without telling her either the reason or grounds for her arrest, or where she was being taken to. While still in the vehicle, he blindfolded her and touched her upper thighs, telling her to be a âgood girlâ and to stop crying.
718. Evidence shows that detainees were subjected to sexual violence or threats of sexual violence during their transfers, including women being touched on their breasts, groped and their blouses ripped off in front of male detainees. In one statement obtained by the Mission, a security officer put his finger inside the trousers of a woman and raped her with his finger. Another man, who was arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence was threatened with being hung by his testicles while he was taken to an unofficial detention facility in one province.
(b) Rape and other forms of sexual violence upon arrival to and while inside detention facilities
719. Upon registration in official prisons women were asked to undress and change into prison clothes. One witness, arrested in October 2022, was made to squat naked several times in front of female guards, before being sent to her cell. Two human rights defenders, both arrested prior to the protests, confirmed that naked squats and visual cavity searches have been a common practice in Evin prison since at least 2018. Both women recalled being filmed by CCTV cameras during cavity searches and referred to these practices as âdegrading and humiliatingâ. They also feared that men guards would have access to the footage or the CCTV cameras during the searches.
720. In another case, a woman, arrested by the police described her humiliation when a woman officer from the morality security police violently searched her private parts upon arrival to a police station. The witness stated that the officer kept her hand in her underwear for âat least three minutesâ and that âshe cried out when they did thisâ. Once the intrusive search completed, the woman officer proceeded to do the same with the other women detainees.
(c) Rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence during interrogations in unofficial detention facilities
âRape is the âidealâ punishment: it is an instrument to suppress women. They want to destroy you to your core and crush your spirit. Because then, you will talk to others. And as a result, everyone would be scared. It will also push families to exert more control over the women in the family, and thus, stop them from attending protests altogether.â
Woman, rape survivor, held in a âsafe houseâ.
721. Women arrested for their participation in the protests were usually rushed into investigation rooms soon after arrival at unofficial detention facility. The Mission established that rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence was used during interrogations between November and December 2022 against women and men in unofficial detention facilities. Victims described the perpetrators as members of the security forces in plainclothes, who subjected them to harsh interrogations and held them in a manner amounting to enforced disappearance whereby they were unable to have contact with relatives, loved ones, or legal representatives.
722. One witness recalled his arrest by plainclothes agents in one province. The witness described how he was held in an unofficial facility run by the Intelligence Services who beat him and electrocuted his genitals to extract a confession whereby he would admit to disturbing the public order, acting against national security, and engaging in destructive acts. Unless he confessed, the interrogators threatened to kill him or his family members, including by subjecting him to sexualized threats. Just over two weeks after he was detained, having failed to extract a confession, one of his interrogators raped him with an object. In West Azerbaijan province, two cases of rape of women, reportedly in the custody of the Ministry of Interior and the IRGC, and one attempted rape in an unofficial facility run by the Ministry of Intelligence, also took place. Similarly, another man was raped with an object while held in the custody of the Ministry of Intelligence in one province in Iran.
723. Evidence shows that the rape of women also carried discriminatory ethnic undertones. One woman recalled her arrest in one province in by several IRGC agents who snatched her off the street and held her in an unofficial detention facility for several days. In order to extract a confession, the IRGC agents forced her to undress and ridiculed did (REDACTED) as a âlesson to all whores and prostitutes who take [to] the streetsâ. She was raped several times, before being thrown out on a street in the middle of the night. She described feeling paralyzed from fear and unable to move to find her way back home.
724. Likewise, a Kurdish woman protester described that she had been taken to an unofficial detention facility and interrogated by security officers for hours on her alleged role in the protests. During interrogations, she was hit for wearing a traditional Kurdish piece of jewellery and asked about her alleged relationship to Kurdish political parties. She was then taken out to another room for a âbody searchâ, and as she was undressing, she was gang raped. The victim described how, after she was raped, she was given a tissue to âcleanâ herself by a female agent. She was released the following day, after security forces left her out on the street.
725. Credible information also confirmed patterns of rape and sexual violence of women belonging to minority groups during interrogations. In one such case, a woman belonging to a minority group was arrested by intelligence officers of the Revolutionary Guard along with several others during a protest in one province in Iran. After she refused to confess to her participation in the protests, she was violently raped. One man arrested in late 2022 in one province, witnessed how a security officer ordered a plainclothes security officer to insert a spray can into the anus of a detained man. The spray can had been reportedly used by the victim to write slogans, and then found by the security forces during the arrest. In another case, a Kurdish woman was forced to masturbate and then shower in front of three agents in an unofficial facility in one province.
Threats of rape and other forms of sexual violence during interrogation sessions
726. Detainees regularly faced threats of rape during both interrogations and while held in official and unofficial detention facilities. With interrogations conducted solely by men agents and in the absence of a lawyer, women felt these threats to be sufficiently credible, fostering a deep sense of fear and anxiety.
727. In one case, a woman arrested in one province by the IRGC, who had been held in an unofficial detention facility, described feeling terrified when the agent opened his belt in front of her during an interrogation. He then threatened to ârape her, rip her stomach open and feed (her) to the dogsâ. She described how this left her agonising over the likelihood of being raped, and how she felt she had no other choice but to sign confessions admitting to âpropaganda against the stateâ for having participated in the protests.
728. Men were also threatened with rape and with the rape of their female family members during interrogations in unofficial detention facilities. Credible information indicates that threats of rape by security forces, including with batons or bottles, were accompanied by stripping men detainees naked as a manner of practice. In one case, a man who had been arrested by plainclothes agents in one province was brought to an unofficial detention facility, stripped naked and threatened to be raped with a baton unless he confessed.
729. Although less explicitly, women were also on occasions threatened with rape in official prisons. One woman recalled how she was arrested by intelligence officers and taken for interrogations in one official prison. She described how an intelligence officer asked her whether she was familiar with the punishment for the crime of zena, given that she was married, to which she responded âdeathâ. In another official prison, one woman were interrogated in a room referred to by guards as the âshariaâ room furnished with only a bed covered with a red blanket. One witness told the Mission that the âshariaâ rooms were commonly known to be used for conjugal visits.
Electrocution to the genitalia and forced nudity
âDid you search in their underwear and bras too?
You searched them good, eh? They didnât hide anything in the folds [of their bodies]?â
Interview of a woman, arrested during the protests
730. Security forces used forced nudity to intimidate women detainees in unofficial detention facilities, including in cells and during interrogations. For instance, a woman described how she was arrested in October 2022 by plainclothes agents who took her to an unknown location. During interrogations, she was forced to undress and then squat, while security officers mocked her body. Women were reported to have been held in cells naked in an unofficial detention facility in one province, reportedly under the custody of the Ministry of Intelligence.
731. Credibly information shows that humiliating cavity searches of women detainees, including in official detention facilities. In one statement obtained by the Mission, one intelligence officer forced a woman to undress, shake her breasts as well as bend over and cough in order to determine whether she was hiding anything in her body. The woman had been arrested in 2023 and held in a facility run by the intelligence services.
732. Evidence also indicated that security forces stripped men naked during interrogations as a manner of practice, beat and electrocuted their genitalia, and in one case, inserted needles into the genitalia of a detained man. Such incidents of violence were reported in unofficial facilities in three minority provinces. When men detainees belonging to ethnic groups were forced to undress, interrogators also mocked their skin colour.
LGBTQI+
âThey were acting like a psychologist, trying to break you, anything to force you to confess. In the middle of this, there was the humiliation and insults based on (my) sexual orientation.â
Released detainee in a statement with a NGO
733. Throughout its investigations, the Mission found a discernible pattern of cruelty directed at protesters on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. In one case, a trans woman protester was arrested and beaten by plainclothes agents in September 2022. Upon realizing that she was a trans woman, security forces beat her more harshly, groped her and burnt her hair with a lighter. During subsequent interrogations, she was beaten, and threatened to be âburr[ied] alive and turned into a hashtagâ by security officers, unless she confessed to her role in the protests.
734. In another case, a gay man who was arrested after writing slogans on a wall was blindfolded, transferred to an unknown detention facility where he was questioned as to whether he was a âgirl or a boyâ. Upon replying, security officers insulted him and shocked him with tasers. He was then forcibly undressed by one security officer âto see whether he was indeed a boyâ, threatened with rape, and continuously asked questions surrounding his sexual orientation. He was forced to sign a document to confirm that he âwas a transgender and suffered a mental illnessâ and released on the following day.
735. Another man described how he was arrested and taken to an IRGC unofficial detention facility where he was beaten and threatened with rape because he was perceived by the security officers holding him to be âtrans because of his demeanourâ.
Insults of sexual and discriminatory nature
736. Sexual and gender-based violence was, moreover, often accompanied by sexist and misogynist gender-based insults directed against women protesters owing to their participation in the protests. Such expressions reflect patriarchal views reinforcing a domesticated role of women in society, such as of a homemaker or a child bearer, and the broader, deeply rooted discrimination against women and girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Throughout their detention, women were asked if they wanted âfreedomâ, were labelled âwhoresâ, âslutsâ and âprostitutesâ with âno honourâ, who were âwilling to get nakedâ and spread âimmortalityâ. One woman detainee was told by a security officer that âgarbage that has filled (her) headâ had to be âremoved.â She was also labelled a âsouvenirâ, and a âdog that needed a collarâ who had to be âtaught a lessonâ as she was handed over to security officers in an unofficial detention facility in one province.
737. Security officers also made concerted threats against mothers, including with the removal of their children, and labelled others âbad mothersâ for not preventing their daughters from participating in protests. According to a witness, during interrogations, security officers also referred to detained womenâs mothers, undermining mothersâ parental abilities for failing to raise âa good womanâ who aspired to âmarriage and childrenâ instead of participating in protests. Another interviewee recalled how an intelligence officer told her during interrogations that her participation in the protests was ânot surprisingâ given that her mother was divorced, and she was raised without a father.
Torture for purposes of extracting a confession or as a form of punishment:
âThey said my brother was in the next cell, and that my mother had had a heart attack and is dead. Sometimes it got to a point that I would have signed my execution order if they asked me to do so. They used any trick to force us to sign even an order for our own death!â
Interview of a woman detained in November 2022
âConfessions were primarily the basis of convictions. The atmosphere was such that they wanted to get confessions in any possible manner. Generally speaking, the justice system wants to get an accused person to a point where they would confessâ.
Interview of a lawyer
738. The Mission found that in nearly all cases it investigated, detainees were tortured with the view to extracting self-incriminating statements from them, to obtaining written or pre-written confessions as well as confession in front of cameras. Interrogators mainly sought admissions of involvement and or leadership in the organization of the protests or alleged contacts with opposition groups, human rights defenders, journalists and media outlets outside Iran, as well as with foreign governments. Torture and ill-treatment were also inflicted with a view to preventing any further participation in or action in solidarity with to the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ and to punishing, intimidating, and humiliating.
739. A man detained in Evin Ward 209 in October 2022 explained that he was sleeping when officers took him blindfolded to a very cold room in the basement of Evin prison, where he was chained and beaten, with his interrogators demanding that he admit in a television video that he was one of the organizers of the protests. He was taken to this room several times and each time when they failed to make him confess, they increased the severity of the torture. Another man detained in Evin Ward 209 in October 2022 explained that he was given a blank paper and was told to sign it, the interrogators indicating that they would fill it later. Another victim similarly reported that his interrogators threatened him that if he didn’t confess, they would break his other shoulder. Another witness stated that one of the interrogators took a lighter and used it to burn his body hair. While he was doing this, another interrogator was holding the paper in front of his face telling him he needs to sign it, and told him âListen, boy, [X] has âno headâ, he is crazy, he will kill you, sign the paperâ. A victim detained in Tehran described how his interrogator threatened him with âhanging or a lengthy imprisonmentâ if he didnât confess. A young woman detained in an intelligence unofficial detention centre in Urmiah explained how her interrogator took her hand, put it in sink and thumbprint it on a document indicating she accepted the charges of moharabeh (waging war against God), crime against national security, disturbing public order, taking her hijab off, and insulting the Supreme Leader.
âWhen I said that I am only a dissident and a protester and I am not a member of any party and I am not belong to one, and I had protested because of the society situation and issues, and I demand documents and evidence of these charges that you accuse me with, the interrogator slapped me on my mouth and said, âyou only need to answer, here, to accept and to sign, and you do not have the right to ask us to show you evidence or any document, you are an offender from our point of view. You still donât know where you are and in whose hands you are.â
Interview of a woman detained in an unofficial detention facility
740. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a man reported that his torturers were asking him if he had communicated with media organizations outside of Iran and whether he sent clips to media such as Iran International or to Masih Alinejad, and asked about the MEK and accused him of being a monarchist. They told him to write that he regretted trying to overthrow the Government. In another instance, he was pressured to sign a document saying that he had not been harmed while in detention. A mother whose statement was obtained by the Mission explained that interrogators told her daughter that if she wanted to be released or pardoned, she had to write that she worked for the MEK and that she had received money to write slogans, and that she repented. When she did not comply with them, they slapped and beat her and when she fell to the floor, they would drag her up from her hair. In another statement obtained, a man indicated that â they constantly made threats that if I didn’t accept the charge of being a member of a leftist anti-state organization, they would tie me to other cases such as armed actions, and then, according to them, I would have no way out. But they didn’t have any reason or evidence to prove their false accusations, and therefore they tried to force me to confess against myself with a lot of psychological pressure, in order to use my forced confessions as proof of the crime.â
741. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a man reported that cameras had been placed in the interrogation room where he was held. He explained that he was asked about the kind of activities he had engaged in and when he was answered, was told to answer the questions with what they told him. For example, interrogators asked him to tell that he was paid to participate in protests, that he did certain things in order to seek asylum, that he wanted to bomb some places. As he resisted, interrogators initially tried to be funny and said, âDonât take it so seriously; just say these words… We just want to take a video and publish it in order to scare the othersâ. Eventually, they shouted obscenities and threatened to charge him with waging war and to execute him.
âWe have seen tougher people than you and we hanged them by their feet for 48 hours and they confessed everythingâ
Interrogator speaking to a woman detained in an official detention facility
742. In the Greater Tehran Prison, a witness described that he saw mostly young protesters, who had been arrested in the streets in the most brutal way possible and who had been severely tortured, he stated that âunfortunately, the atmosphere of repression was such that they confessed whatever interrogators wanted. â The fear instilled in young people was also clearly explained by a student interviewed by the Mission. He explained that his interrogator accused him of being a protest leader and that he had to sign a criminal form indicating that he was a leader âto feel safeâ. He indicated: âI felt that the environment was threatening. I didn’t know what was coming for me, what was next. On the news we saw people being executed, arrested, this is why I was afraidâ. When he asked what would happen to him, he was responded: âwhat will happen to you is what happens to a criminal”.
743. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a woman held in a military location in Tehran with hundreds of other women indicated: âI could hear all the threats. Many of the detainees who had no experience of being in prison or detention at all, were deceived and influenced by the officers with false promises, that by signing the form they would be released sooner. I saw that many of them cried after filling the form. In fact, many who were deceived and filled the form, were kept in detention and some of them got sentenced and some were released on bail awaiting prosecution. I can say that all the [detainees] were forced to confess, I mean by filling out the form. Some people who didn’t want to fill out the form were forced to fill it after a lot of threats.â
744. A witness detained in Ward 209 in Evin reported that interrogators accused her of writing slogans on a wall and that she was pressured to confess that she had been participating in the âriotsâ. She explained that for each question asked, she had to sign her answers but because she did not answer the way they wanted, they tore up the paper and they repeated the questions some 20 times. She also indicated that she was pressed to ask her husband to come to Iran in exchange of a reduced sentence. Her interrogator also threatened to harm her brother and sister. Indeed, during her detention, her mother, her sister and her brother were interrogated, and her family members received threatening phone calls. She also reported that one inmate was sentenced to 5 years in prison based on handwriting documents she had not written herself and which her lawyer contested before the Supreme Court. Another woman detained in Evin explained that despite her effort to resist the pressure for long from her interrogator that she was able to identify, she finally signed a written confession that she had played a role in calling the protestors, organizing the protests and chanting the slogans.
745. Victims also described instances when persons were indicted based on documents they had not signed or did not know what they had signed under pressure. A witness for instance explained that âone inmate was sentenced to 5 years in prison based on handwritten documents she had not written herself and which her lawyer contested before the Supreme Court. Another detainee whose statement was obtained by the Mission explained that he was asked to sign papers without him being able to read them. He said that the officer covered the page with his hand and only told him to sign and put his fingerprints on it. The officer himself took his hand and put his finger on a stamp and put his fingerprint on the page. When asked what this was, the interrogator responded âit is none of your business, we ourselves know what this isâ.
746. In some instances, interrogators sought to obtain statements incriminating others who had participated in the protests. A witness for instance said that in Ward 209 of Evin, he was pressured and promised a reduced sentence if he would say that his eye injuries had not been caused by the Islamic Republic of Iran but by âthe hypocritesâ a word they used to refer to Mojahedin Organizationâ.
747. Physical and psychological torture and ill-treatment were also exerted to punish persons arrested in connection with the protests, to intimidate them and prevent them for any further participation. A man arrested after posting WhatsApp story explained that while in solitary confinement cell in a Ministry of Intelligence detention center, two agents came to his cell to beat him as he wanted to âoverthrowâ the Government. Another witness indicated that in Greater Tehran Prison, security forces, badly beat him and that the purpose of what was done to him was to intimidate the rest of the prisoners.
748. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a journalist explained that he was warned that if he writes any news or reports about the torture, or publishes photos, he would not only be arrested and imprisoned again, but that they would not hesitate to harass his family. He was also asked to refrain from political activities until further notice. As a result, he deleted the photos of the injury marks, fearing that if they were published or leaked by mistake, his family and he would have faced serious danger. In another statement obtained, a man reported having been told by one of his interrogators: âIf we see you anywhere again, weâll kill you with our own hands in front of everyone.â
4. Conditions of detention:
749. The Mission examined the detention conditions of persons detained in the context of the protests in light of relevant United Nations standards and Iranâs commitment to ensure compliance of its prison conditions with the Nelson Mandela Rules and that detainees and prisoners receive satisfactory medical treatment.
750. The Mission carefully reviewed information contained in reports published by the Government of Iran since the start of the protests. In its 4th report, Iran informed that Mr. Kazem Gharibabadi, the Secretary-General of High Council for Human Rights (HCHR) together with other authorities of the HCHR and the Head of the State Prisons Organization, visited a detention centers where people in connection with the ârecent riotsâ in Tehran. The report notes that during the visit, Mr. Kazem Gharibabadi emphasized the need to respect the human rights of the detainees and called upon the prison authorities to further facilitate their contact with their family members. The report also notes that HCHR sent a letter to the chiefs of justice in all provinces asking them to fully protect the rights of detainees. The report further mentions that detainees in the Greater Tehran Penitentiary had phone cards to call their families and were granted the opportunity to meet with them.
751. In its 22nd report, the High Council for Human Rights in Iran affirmed that: â in a notification sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran dated 25 September 2022, the Minister of the Interior emphasized that âin dealing with women present in illegal gatherings, it is necessary that, in addition to strictly respecting the limits and regulations, any actions should be taken based on Islamic leniency and avoiding unnecessary coercive measures and with the maximum involvement and presence of female officers.â The report also indicates that âemphasis has been placed on treating female detainees with respect and resorting to detention and referral to judicial authority as a last resort.â
752. The Mission established the existence of appalling detention conditions of people arrested and detained in connection with the protests in both official and non-official detention centres.
753. Detainees were held in unbearable conditions in overcrowded cells or kept in cramped conditions in small and unsanitary cells with no bedding. According to most detainees, only filthy military blankets were given to them. A witness indicated that in Garchak, she was held with two and sometimes three other detainees in a cell of around 2x 3m. Another witness held in Ward 209 in Evin explained that her cell was 2X4 and that because 9 women were held there, they could not move, sleep or breath. She further explained that there was no bedding and no pillows for sleeping and she only had a military blanket. A detainee described that he was often detained with four other detainees in Tirin kola Block 3 in a small cell 2x3m , in which there was a toilet and a bathroom but no window. In the prison of Tabriz, another detainee stated that during the first night in detention he was held in a room of around 20 square meters with around 24 other detainees. Transferred to the Ghaem Shahr Prison, he described the cell of 25 square metres hosting 48 detainees and indicated that since there were only ten beds, they had to ask for permission for two people to sleep in one bed and that some were sleeping on the floor of where the bathrooms were located. Similar overcrowded detention conditions were described by a witness in the quarantine women section of Kachuiee prison, where 1700 women prisoners were held. A witness detained in Dezful prison stated that he heard that that the prison had three times more detainees than its capacity. In several detention places, people said there was no respect for privacy due to cameras that were installed in the cells.
754. Some witnesses stated that the light was on 24/7 or on the contrary that there was no light at all in their cell. Others noted that the temperature in the cell was very cold and that they had only a filthy blanket. A witness detained in Tabriz explained that he complained to the prison authorities who had removed a glass from the window to make his cell even colder. Many described appalling hygiene in the prison with dirty cells smelling bad. A witness noted that he had no access to an open space for 13 days which caused him to have a nervous attack and had to receive oxygen.
755. Poor sanitary conditions were described by many former detainees the Mission interviewed. A woman held in Ward 209 in Evin explained that once a week (sometimes twice) women detained could take a 10-minute shower. A woman detained in Kachuiee prison in Karaj indicated to the Mission that 70 or 80 of prisoners were put in a small cell with a small bathroom and could only have 5 minutes to shower with cold water. She said that there was only one toilet, a situation which triggered âa psychological war among inmates.â A woman held in Quarchak explained in a statement obtained by the Mission that the quarantine unit had only two bathrooms with only two functioning showers without hot water for more than 70 women.
âif you placed the food in front of an animal, they would not eat itâ
Interview of a man detained in Evin Ward 209 in February 2023
756. Detainees were provided with insufficient and bad quality food and water. A woman detained in Garchak said that because the quality of food was unbearable, she was able to eat only three times a week. The rest of the time she explained she bought yogurt and snacks from the prison store just to survive. A witness detained in Ward 209 of Evin explained that since they had no clean water, they had to store and wait for it to clear after a while. Another witness detained in Ward 209 of Evin prison explained that prison guards would open the door of the cell and throw the food in âas if the prisoners were dogsâ. A man detained in a stadium in a military compound indicated that not everyone was given food. A woman explained that in Kachuiee prison in Karaj: âthere was no fruit or vegetables. The water was from the well, and mixed with chlorine, 100 per cent and acid citric and then later we found out why the water was like that and why it caused us to have rashes. She further stated: âTwice a week we were instructed to wash the carpet there with whitex/chlorine (bleaching product) which affected our lungs and in fact gradually they were killing us, through lack of food, medication, air and acid citric, as a result many got sick.”
âThey said: We donât bring physicians for riotersâ.
Woman detained in October 2022
757. The majority of the persons detained in connection with the protests reported to the Mission said that they were not seen by a doctor upon arrest nor at any time during their detention. Some witnesses noted that they had a rapid medical check, in some cases blindfolded and only had to respond to basic questions about their medical conditions. A witness detained in Garchak prison stated that the female doctor in charge of the medical screening started to ask her strange and humiliating questions, for instance, âhow is your sexual affair with your husbandâ which the woman said she was not comfortable responding to. Another witness detained in Tehran indicated he was only asked to fill a form about his medical conditions.
âItâs not important to us if you die, your grave is openâ
Excerpt from a statement obtained by the Mission – an IRGC official
responding to a man detained in Khorammabad
and requesting access to medical treatment
758. Evidence shows that detainees were not provided or denied medical care despite the fact that they were in bad medical conditions due to torture and ill-treatment or dire detention conditions. One witness explained that despite his injuries, he was not provided medical care in the police station where he was held. He also indicated that two badly injured protesters including one with broken ribs similarly received no medical care. Later detained in a stadium outside of Tehran, he reported that injured detainees asked for medical care but received no response. A man reported that in an statement obtained by the Mission that in Great Tehran Penitentiary, he hardly saw anyone who was not injured but that nobody was given any medical care. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a man explained that when the Prosecutor whom he named saw his situation, including his injuries, he called the IRGCâs intelligence to take him to the hospital but they refused.
759. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a man explained that because of the torture inflicted on him, his condition was so bad that he had to be transferred to a police force hospital where he was treated while his hands and feet were tied to the bed with handcuffs and straps the whole time. The victim indicated that he was well treated by the medical staff and that one doctor, knowing he was a protester told him just before he had a surgery to reconnect bones in his hands told him: âDon’t worry, youâre not alone. Weâre all with you.â The man also indicated that there was no opportunity for him to receive medical treatment for his broken nose, ribs and leg. In another statement obtained by the Mission, a man shot during protests in Sanandaj arrested and severely beaten was brought to a hospital. He explained that the doctor asked the agents who arrested him why they had beaten him âlike an animalâ, the agents responded with a threat to arrest the doctor.
760. Detainees were deprived of medical treatment. A witness detained in Sanandaj for instance explained that detainees were not given proper medication when sick and that sick prisoners were not separated from the rest of the detainees. A young woman who was severally tortured explained that in detention she did not have her medication for inflammation of her intestines and that she was suffering from internal bleeding in her stomach because of torture. Brought blindfolded in front of a person who said he was a doctor, she was told âtake whatever medication you have with you since you cannot find any in prisonâ despite the fact that the doctor knew she did not have any with her and only gave her vitamin C and energizers. She also explained that none of the other inmates had access to their medication. As her health condition deteriorated, she was brought to a medical unit, and told her about her symptoms notably the fact that she was suffering from severe diarrhea and had sometimes severe bleeding. However, in the medical form she filled, the female doctor indicated she had none of these symptoms. She said: âI felt short in breathing and collapsed and felt and said the Islamic Republic want to kill all of us.â
761. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a man explained that while detained in a centre belonging to the Intelligence Unit of the IRGC in Khorramabad, he asked for his medicines and was told that âItâs not important to us if you die, your grave is openâ. Another man indicated: âOne time the cell ceiling fell on my head. I was lucky to survive. My whole head and face became bloody and my face was swollen. Yet they did not bring a doctor to see me, nor did they transfer me to a medical center, or even a clinic, for treatment. They left me to heal by myself!â
5. Treatment of children in detention
762. The Mission established that children were subjected to the same treatment inflicted on women and men as described above and suffered violations, including torture, sexual violence and appalling detention conditions. In some instances reported by non governmental organizations, torture reportedly led to the death of children.
763. Child victims and witnesses shared encounters of their arrest or forceful kidnapping, how they were thrown blindfolded into unmarked cars, severely beaten, and brought to detention facilities administered, among others, by the Revolutionary Guards, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Public Security Police, the Basij forces or the police. Children and their family members described that they were kept for days or even weeks in both official and unofficial detention facilities, without knowing the reasons for their arrest and detention and not given any opportunities to call their family members or to request legal representation. Evidence shows that children were subjected to severe physical, psychological, and sexual torture, including rape. Children described severe interrogation techniques, while kept in handcuffs, blindfolded, aimed at obtaining forced confessions, or scaring them from exercising some of their fundamental freedoms such as expression and peaceful assembly.
(a) Torture and ill-treatment of children
âThe children were in shock. Some had injuries, bruises, they looked beaten before coming to this place. They were interrogated too, and no special care was provided to them. They were treated the same way as we wereâ.
Interview of man detained in a stadium Tehran in October 2022
âThe younger the people were, the more severely they were beatenâ
Statement obtained by the Mission of a man detained
in an unofficial detention centre of the IRGC in Tehran in October 2022
764. Children were often subjected to both physical and psychological torture in detention. Children were beaten with batons, hosepipes, planks of wood, hung from the ceiling with chains, , choked, strangled, subjected to flogging and forced to do hundreds of sit-ups Some children were kept with very tight handcuffs for days.
765. A 12-year-old child who was arrested on his way back from school, a in Tehran province shared a chilling account of his treatment in a Basij base. He said he was arrested together with his schoolmates, due to writing âWoman, Life, Freedomâ slogans on walls. They were kept in a Basij base in a deserted location, held in an industrial shed for seven hours, beaten with planks of wood, batons, hoses (with cables inside), he was later dropped in a bad shape in an isolated location. During detention he was threatened with harm to his family if he disclosed anything. He was sexually assaulted as Basij forces touched his genitalia, and threatened to rape him.
766. In another statement obtained by the Mission, a 16-year-old child explained his gruesome experience in detention: âThey would hang us to the point that I felt like my arms were going to be ripped off. They would beat us on the soles of our feet. I didnât know what they used on my feet. Every time they struck my feet, it felt like I was being struck by lightning.â He further said they wrapped a scarf around his neck and choked him. Then, with the same scarf, they hung him until he is choked so much that he felt completely suffocated and was unable to breath. âIt was at that point, when they lowered me down, I told them I would say whatever they wanted me to say I had done. They were taking my hand and forcibly making me fingerprint the papers.â
767. A mother reported in her statement obtained by the Mission the arrest of her daughter for writing slogans on a wall in Tehran. She indicated that in the unofficial place of detention where she was brought, detainees around 30, most of whom were children were forced into a freezing swimming pool and forced them to go under water until they were drowning. Then they would take them out, beat them with wooden sticks, and force them back into the pool.â
768. Credible information shows that children detained also were deprived of essential medical care, while others were forced to take unknown medicines. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a child explained that he was made to swallow an unidentified pill, the agents did not explain the purpose but simply told him: âTake the pill it will lessen the pain of your torture.â He said, âI took it one day and I felt confused and dazedâ.
769. The Mission obtained credible information on children who died due to torture inflicted by government intelligence and security agents. Some of these children were taken from the streets while protesting, while others were picked during school raids. Nika Shakarami and Asra Panahi were among those for whom the Mission found corroborating evidence that they died as a result of severe beatings and torture.
Emblematic case; Nika Shakarami
770. Based on public accounts of her family and friends, on the 20 September 2022, Nika Shakarami attended a protest held at Keshovarz boulevard in Tehran city. Since she did not return home that evening and the next day, her family searched for her in prisons, detention centres, police offices and hospitals the next nine days. Her mother said in a recorded video that in her last call, Nika Shakarami said she was running away from police. Other protesters reportedly told the family that Nika Shakarami had been arrested and interrogated by IRGC officers and detained in Evin prison.
771. According to the public account of her mother, on 29 September 2022, she, together with her brother, went again to a police station to enquire about the fate of Nika Shakarami. They were shown pictures of a dead body, told that those pictures were taken on 20 September and that the body is at Kahrizak detention centre morgue. At the morgue, according to her aunt, the familyâs request to see the whole body was denied and the family could only see Nika Shakaramiâs face for a few seconds. The family noticed that her nose was smashed, and her skull and forehead were broken and smashed like she had been hit by hard objects several times.
772. According to the report of Iranâs High Council for Human Rights, investigations by Tehran`s Prosecutor found that Nika Shakaramiâs body was found on 21 September. Specialized crime-scene investigators found that she fell from the adjacent building to the yard of the house. The report asserted that a video released by the police and judiciary authorities showed Nika Shakarami going into that building seven hours before her body was found. The High Council reported that the forensic pathologist performed an autopsy and took toxicology and pathology samples on the order of the judicial authority. The autopsy tests and examinations of the body reportedly showed âtraces of multiple fractures in the pelvis, head, upper and lower limbs, arms and legs as well as in the pelvic cavity, indicating that the foregoing person fell from a heightâ. The High Council furthermore stated that according to the judicial authority the death of Nika Shakarami was âNOT related to the recent `riots`, as there are no bullet marks found on the deceasedâs body, and the existing evidence proves that the death was caused by a fall.â Lastly, building workers are said to have been investigated, interrogated and even some arrested, and investigation by the criminal investigator and police of intelligence is underway.
773. No mention is made in the report of any investigations into allegations that Nika Shakarami sustained injuries on her face and that she had been arrested, detained and interrogated before her death. In its letter to the Government 27 June 2023, the Mission requested further clarification on the evidence. As of 29 February 2024, no response or information was received by the Mission from the Government of Iran.
774. Announcing the death of her daughter in a video, Nika Shakaramiâs mother, referred to it as a âcrimeââ and stated that she was under pressure to make forced statements and a confession on TV, including by characterizing her daughterâs death as a suicide. Her maternal uncle also contested claims of a suicide and a fall in an interview with Tasnim News Agency. Her family repeatedly asserted that Nika Shakarami was participating in the protest that took place in Tehran on the 20 September as she went missing.
775. A witness detailed a death in custody of an injured child protester who was intentionally deprived of essential medical care. Although the injured child was brought to Khomeni hospital in Urmia, both his hands and legs were tied to a hospital bed, security agents (Nuruhai Amniyati) intervening and restricting doctors and nurses from administering treatment and medicines. Within a few days the child was reported to have died of his injuries following denial of proper medical care.
âYou donât know what they did to me. They kept telling me to say I killed someone. I was forced to say what they wanted because they raped me with a hosepipe.â
Statement obtained by the Mission of a 17-year-boy
776. The Mission found credible information that children as young as twelve-years-old were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. According to one statement obtained, agents sexually assaulted children, touching private parts, and threatened them with rape to break their morale and to bring them to sign a confession. Another statement refers to a rape of a child with a hosepipe, received electric shocks on their genitals. Children reportedly being told: “Take off your pants!” […] “Bring the Vaseline!” âYou must undress and walk naked in front of us until morning.â
777. Psychological torture was also inflicted on children. According to credible information this included solitary confinement. One witness indicated that children were forced to witness executions which put them in an overwhelming condition of distress, unable to recover.
âDuring my detention, I spent 10 days in a solitary cell of 1×2 metres, in complete darkness. The solitary confinements and prevailing conditions had very negative psychological effects on me; effects that are still with me even after being released.
Statement obtained by the Mission of a 16-year-boy
detained in September 2022
778. A witness explained to the Mission that her brother was made to witness live executions. She stated that âafter forcing him to witness an execution, they put a gun to his head and said to him ânow is your turnâ. Security agents also threatened him that they would sleep with his sisters and mother. One of the agents touched his private parts and ridiculed him and made him feel ashamed. The witness suspects that they might have raped him.â An adolescent detained in November 2022 stated that his interrogators sat him in front of a person. He said the interrogator had something in his hand which he placed on the person’s head and asked: “Are you sorry or not?” As the person replied, “No, I’m not sorry, and I’ll do it again”. He then heard a shot. He explained that he was crying so much and only heard two more shots. He then felt someone come to him and put something on his head. It was something like the barrel of a gun and he said, “It’s your turn.”
779. A child explained to the Mission how he was told to inform the authorities of anyone intending to demonstrate, as a condition for his release. The authorities threatened saying âIf you don’t give us information by tomorrow night, we will come to your house and snatch you out of your parents’ armsâ.
(b.) Childrenâs conditions of detention
780. Many children explained that they were kept together with adult detainees, in some cases for a few days and then moved to a segregated facility, in others for longer periods. Many explained the physical space in which they were detained as being overcrowded. In one case, 40 to 50 detainees including children were held in a small cell.
781. One witness, a former prisoner in Ghaem Shahr Prison, Mazandaran Province explained that the cell was 25-square-meters, and there were 48 people cramped together, including boys aged 16-years.
782. In another instance, children were held in inhuman conditions of detention, being deprived of sufficient food and/or potable water. A child placed in solitary confinement for 20 days told the Mission that during his time in detention he was given only a small piece of bread once, and at nighttime, pushed in from under the door, and nothing else to eat.
6. Impact of torture, ill-treatment and conditions of detention
783. Persons detained in connection with the protests who were subjected to physical and psychological torture and ill-treatment, including inhuman, cruel and degrading conditions of detention, endured mental suffering as a result of physical and psychological torture as well as both short- and long-term impact on their physical and mental health.
784. A witness detained in October 2022 explained to the Mission his ribs, his jaw and teeth were broken and how they started again on the following day while his body was completely bruised to the point that he was no longer able to walk. Statements obtained by the Mission describe heavy bleeding, loss of consciousness, loss of teeth and fractures. One man indicated that one of his ribs was broken as a result of torture but that luckily, he did not do an internal damage. A man hit in the testicles and burst, indicated he had blood in his urine. Another young man explained that due to the beatings he endured during arrest, his two vertebrae in his spinal cord were broken.
785. In a statement obtained by the Mission, a man explained that after having two officers throw him on the ground and jump on his body with both their feet, he couldnât walk on his right leg, so the police officers had to drag him on the ground âlike someone who had passed outâ. His shirt that was completely red, stained with blood, that his patella buckled, his cruciate ligament was torn and that his ribs and the humerus of his shoulder were broken. In another statement obtained, a man indicated that he was tortured “in a way that he could not eat anything for a month,” and that his nose and legs were broken as a result of being kicked with military boots.
786. Nine images of a man who reported in detail the various forms of torture he was subjected to as well as 11 images of medical documents were analysed by a Forensic pathologist who assessed that the witnessâs back presented tram track contusions covering at least 80 per cent of the back and patterned tram track abrasion of the lower limbs. According to the forensic expertise , these marks are seen in cases of physical abuse when the victim has been subjected to repeated blows or impacts which led him to conclude that these injuries were consistent with the witness’s statement of experiencing beatings while in detention.
âI have the same kind of fear and anxiety throughout the day. It is mainly because of my experience during detention. Now Iâm afraid of my own shadow.â
787. Many victims spoke about the devastating psychological impact of the torture and ill-treatment inflicted on them. Speaking about the psychological torture he suffered, a witness stated: âbeing beaten up is better that these forms of torture, with physical torture, you pain will get better, you will go to physiotherapy, but the impact of these types of torture remains.â In an statement obtained, a woman spoke about the impact of female officersâ behaviour in Qarchak Prison who beat and âengaged in vile obscenityâ. She indicated: âIt was unbelievable and unbecoming of any human being to be so repulsive. Under such conditions, it was impossible to think that these obscenities wouldnât affect the young detainees How could they forget? They were very shocked. There were many detainees under the age of 18, despite the claim by authorities to have freed the children.â
788. A witness detained in Evin explained to the Mission how the two months of detention changed her life in a way that affected her mental health and her physical health. She said her hair became grey in prison, she lost her job, had to leave her country and now has a life which is âupside downâ Another witness explained that she is âdamagedâ and needs to take medication every day. A victim explained how he was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms, felt depressed, isolated and did not want to socialize or engage with people. In a statement obtained, a man who reported two suicide attempts following his release.
789. A witness also explained the anxiety prisoners feel about their family members and how their detention impacted them. âAll the concern of prisoners is their families; how they are doing do they have enough to eat? What is oneâs child doing?â He said that among the detainees held in Qaem Shahr prison, there were two brothers who were the breadwinners and mother was left alone without any support. âWe all preferred to be beaten up as compared to thisâ. According to a statement obtained, a man severely tortured by IRGC intelligence indicated in his statement obtained by the Mission that after he was released, he was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for a month. Another man similarly tortured said in another statement obtained by the Mission that when he was first released, he was mentally crushed and that even now despite being at peace? he still has nightmares and is afraid to be arrested again.
790. The Mission also obtained a statement from a clinical psychologist who reported on the mental health status of two young men and a child who were arrested and suffered torture in detention. He reported notably that the 15-year-old boy was diagnosed with suicidal thoughts, and depression, that another young man he saw was suffering of depression and that his third patient was âin avoidanceâ, with no social relations anymore for fear of being re-arrested.
(a) Impact of SGBV on survivors
âI reached the brink of suicide. Even now, as I talk to you, my entire body feels like it’s on fire. There hasnât been a night where I havenât had nightmares. I was so depressed that I wanted to end my pain. But then I thought, why should I destroy myself? I should make them answer for their crimes.â
Statement obtained by the Mission of a rape survivor
791. Sexual and gender-based violence poses deep and enduring consequences on the physical and mental health of survivors. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, survivors sustained physical injuries which often went untreated, either because care was denied to them, or because they feared arrests by the security forces for disclosing the violence they endured. Others were deeply ashamed and feared rejection by their own families. Rape survivors also reported fearing reprisal, including arrest by security forces, which coupled with the feelings of shame, left them with no other choice but to leave Iran. Survivors were commonly able to receive medical care and psychological support only after they were able to relocate abroad.
792. When survivors described the sexual violence they experienced in detention, fear, pain, and harm, emerged as the most common narratives amongst them. Victims reported experiencing vaginal bleeding and irregular menstruation months after the assault they endured, along with chronic pain, flashbacks, anxiety, and insomnia. Other detainees who had spoken to survivors described them as being âbrokenâ, appearing quiet like âa mouseâ and ânever the sameâ after the rapes. Violence directed at LGBTQI+ people in detention confined survivors to their homes, leaving them feeling âno longer the sameâ and overcome by negative views with themselves.
(a) Credible information obtained by the Mission consisting of the psychological evaluations of survivors of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence endured in detention indicated similar experiences, including shame, anxiety, severe PTSD as well as feelings of deep anger and revenge.
(b) Impact of torture and ill-treatment on children
793. Evidence shows the devastating physical and psychological impact that torture and ill-treatment had on children including symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), flashbacks, nightmares, suicidal thoughts or attempts, anxiety, self-isolation, lack of concentration, low mood, and panic. Other symptoms reported include frequent crying, withdrawing from school and activities, and not communicating with their friends and family members.
794. A mother said âI went to the juvenile detention facility (kanoun) to find out if my son was being held there. When they called him, I saw all the torture marks on my child â he had blisters on the soles of his feet, scars on his hands and feet from being chained, and his forehead was swollen and scarred. He said they pulled his hair and hit his head against a wall to force him to [make forced âconfessionsâ]â.
795. A witness šspoke in detail on the impact of torture on her younger brother who suffered from PTSD. She said that: âdespite the short duration of detention of her brother, he was in very bad shape when he was released from prison. The brother who was made to witness executions has often a difficulty to sleep in the night. As his head was hit and swollen then they took him to a doctor and got some treatments. She mentioned that mentally he was in such a bad condition, with nightmares, he was crying, even if he was sleep only for 2 hours in 24 hours then he will wake up.
796. According to a statement obtained by the Mission, a mother whose child survived torture and sexual violence I didnât want to ask him anymore because I thought he would be reminded of it. He tried to commit suicide twice in detention â once by having tablets, another time by ingesting washing up liquid.â
7. Impunity
(b) âIf I had filed a lawsuit against the perpetrators, and their bosses, for committing these totally illegal acts of torture, I wouldnât have any hope that the relevant authorities would investigate. In addition, there was the possibility that [the security authorities] would intensify their pressures. For this reason, I never tried to file a lawsuit or complaint in the judicial system.â
797. Statement of a man received by the Mission of a man detained by agents of the IRGC Intelligence
798. Iran, as a state party to the ICCPR is required to conduct prompt, impartial, independent and thorough investigations into all allegations of torture and ill-treatment, bring those responsible to justice, and ensure that victims have access to an effective remedy and receive reparation, notwithstanding the official status of the offender. The Head of the Judiciary is required to establish a committee to ensure that procedural regulations governing the administration of detention centres and prohibiting the use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment against prisoners are followed, and that all those responsible for violations are held accountable.
799. However, Iranian law contains serious shortcomings that undermine accountability for acts of torture and ill-treatment. Iranian laws fail to define and criminalize torture in line with international standards. Article 578 of the Islamic Penal Code does not use the word torture, fails to adequately guarantee the right to a remedy and reparation. It also limits the punishable violation to physical assault of the accused, hence excluding the infliction of mental pain and suffering and excludes torture and ill-treatment inflicted on an individual for other purposes than âto force him or her to confessâ, namely torture and ill-treatment aimed at punishing and intimidating.
800. A victim stated that he was taken four times to a court, where he showed marks of beatings on his body, but the investigator told him that âit was good that they beat himâ. Every time he said he was beaten, he was beaten more upon return to his cell. . A woman explained that it was impossible for any of the detainees in the prison to get out of the quarantine section and talk to any authority. She stated that each time a prison authority was coming to her section, she tried to talk about her condition and mentioned that her brother also tried to take her medical record to a judge, but she said they denied everything and did not take any action.
801. The Mission obtained several statements indicating that despite seeing injuries resulting from torture, judicial authorities took no action. A man tortured in detention in Saqqez stated for instance that at the court hearing, he had a plaster cast on his leg and told the judge he had been tortured. He said the judge responded, âYou were tortured? So what? Go complain to the military court.â Another man explained in a statement obtained by the Mission that when brought before Judge Makhmali Branch 2 of Islamic Revolutionary Court with bruises on his body and face, he could not report mistreatment because he was not even allowed to speak. A witness who had been tortured said that the official who was in charge of accepting new prisoners at Evin was âvery professionalâ and realized that his injuries were serious and said he could not accept him in Evin because he had broken bones in a thousand places in his body.â In that condition, he explained that he was returned to the FARAJA security station. He also explained that days after his release, he was brought before Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court, presided by Judge Abolqasem Salvati. The whole trial lasted 10 minutes. He kept making obscene comments during the trial. He said, âIf they broke your arm and leg, they did a good job.â
802. In none of the cases reported to the Mission where victims denounced the tortured and ill-treatment to prison and /or judicial authorities, could the Mission find evidence that adequate measures were taken to prevent further torture and to hold perpetrators accountable. On the contrary, evidence gathered by the Mission showed that in many instances, judicial authorities not only failed to act but in some instances condoned acts of torture, ill-treatment.
8. Findings
Torture
803. The Mission is satisfied that acts, including beatings, punching, kicking, flogging, burning, rape, attempted rape and other forms of sexual violence, suspension from the ceiling, deprivation of sleep, food or water, and administration of substances against the will of a person deprived of liberty described above caused severe pain or suffering, physical or mental, were inflicted intentionally. These acts were committed for purposes such as extracting a confession, obtaining information, punishment, intimidation, humiliation, coercion and reasons based on discrimination, and involve public official of Iran. As such, these acts amount to torture. Other acts described, such as death threats, insults and verbal abuse, constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
804. In particular, the Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that the police, intelligence and security agents and some prison officials used widespread torture and ill-treatment against children, women and men detained for their participation or alleged participation in the âWomen, Life, Freedomâ movement.
805. The Mission established that Iranian public officials had intentionally inflicted acts of torture for purposes such as extracting a confession, obtaining information, punishment, intimidation, humiliation, coercion or for reasons based on discrimination, and preventing participation in protests.
Rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence
806. The Mission established that rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence were committed in a widespread manner against real or perceived supporters to the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement. The Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that State agents belonging to the Basij, police, IRGC, the Ministry of Interieur and the Ministry of Intelligence committed sexual and gender-based violence at a large scale against detained women, men and LGBTQI+ persons, including rape, threats of rape, sexual touching, electrocution to the genitals and forced nudity, which amount to torture. By perpetrating rape and other forms of sexual violence, the State also violated individualsâ right to right to bodily integrity, the rights to autonomy and to sexual autonomy, the right to privacy, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, womenâs right to equality before the law and the rights to be free from violence, discrimination, torture and other cruel or inhuman treatment. By failing to criminalize rape as a distinct crime and providing a clear definition of informed consent, or the lack thereof, the Islamic Republic of Iran, furthermore, violated its obligation to protect individuals from sexual violence, including women and girls, under the ICCPR. By restricting the definition of rape to a limited scope of non-consensual penetrative rape committed by men only outside of wedlock, the State also failed to protect women and girls from other forms of rape and sexual violence, including rape with an object, as well as groping, harassment and touching. Information obtained through sexual and gender-based violence was also used as grounds for their arrests, in violation of international human rights law.
807. In a glaring illustration of systematic discrimination and violence against women and girls, the Mission also found that security forces capitalised on cultural and sexual taboos and impunity for sexual and gender-based violence violations, to spread fear, humiliate, punish, and terrorise women, men and LGBTQI+ persons or their families for their participation in the protests. In resorting to sexual violence against women protesters however, security forces deliberately used gendered insults and equated womenâs participation and aspiration for equal human rights against âwillingness to get nakedâ or an attempt to âspread immoralityâ. Such expressions manifest deeply rooted fundamental discrimination in law and in practice against women and girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
808. The Mission concludes that Iranian authorities subjected children, women and men detained in connection with the protests to inhumane and degrading conditions of detention.
809. The Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that judicial officials failed to comply with their legal obligation to prevent acts of torture committed in detention facilities, failed to investigate allegations of torture and ill-treatment during arrests and detention, and relied on confessions obtained under torture and in the absence of lawyers to convict defendants. The Mission found that judicial authorities were aware of credible allegations of such crimes and took no action to prevent further violations, to protect, consciously disregarded such information.
D. Trials of individuals in connection with the protests
810. Soon after the start of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests, a torrent of statements by State authorities started to emerge announcing arrests and warning protesters with imminent criminal prosecutions. By late October 2022, trials of protesters had already started and by late November, slightly over two months from the start of the protests, thousands of them had already received a judgment. State authorities did not make public any detailed or disaggregated information with regards to the overall number of individuals with respect to whom they conducted criminal investigations, or indicted, prosecuted, tried, convicted and sentenced in connection with the protests. However, official statements reveal that over 22 thousand individuals faced criminal investigations and prosecutions within the first six months of the protests that started on 16 September 2022.
811. The Mission investigated cases of individuals being prosecuted in connection with the protests, gathering and analysing a wide range of evidence, including direct accounts of witnesses; summons issued by prosecutorsâ offices and courts; judgments; defence submissions; photographic and audio-visual evidence; official statements and information published by the Judiciary, Prosecutorâs offices and other State institutions; domestic laws, regulations and decrees, documentation provided by civil society organizations outside Iran and their public reports; and open source information, including interviews given by lawyers and family members of detainees to domestic and international media, journalistic coverage of cases of criminal prosecutions, and information available through social media platforms. It is important to note that data regarding arrests and detentions, indictments or other documents regarding judicial proceedings, including judgment are not generally made publicly available by Iranâs judiciary.
812. The Mission repeatedly sought information from the Government with regards to the judicial proceedings against protesters, including on the status of proceedings against those pardoned as well as their gender, age and ethnicity. No response was received from the State to date.
1. International legal framework
813. International human rights law provides for the right to a fair trial and for due process guarantees (ICCPR, article 14; CRC, article 40; see also UDHR, article 10). ICCPR article 14 (1) entitles individuals to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, if they face any criminal charges or if their rights and obligations are determined in a suit at law. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the article contain procedural guarantees available to persons charged with a criminal offence. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) noted that Article 14 contains guarantees that States parties must respect, regardless of their legal traditions and their domestic law (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 4).
814. The HRC noted that âtribunalâ in ICCPR article 14 (1) designates a body, regardless of its denomination, that is established by law, is independent of the executive and legislative branches of government or enjoys in specific cases judicial independence in deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in nature. Article 14 (1) guarantees access to such tribunals to all who have criminal charges brought against them (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 18).
815. The HRC also highlighted that the requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception. The requirement of impartiality has two aspects according to the HRC. First, judges must not allow their judgment to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other. Second, the tribunal must also appear to a reasonable observer to be impartial (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 21).
816. The provisions of article 14 apply to all courts and tribunals within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialized, civilian or military (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 22). The HRC also notes that the trial of civilians in military or special courts may raise serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is concerned. Therefore, it is important to take all necessary measures to ensure that such trials take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14 (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 22).
817. Moreover, the HRC stated that it must be ensured that courts based on customary law or religious courts cannot hand down binding judgments recognized by the State, unless the following requirements are met: proceedings before such courts are limited to minor civil and criminal matters, meet the basic requirements of fair trial and other relevant guarantees of the Covenant, and their judgments are validated by State courts in light of the guarantees set out in the Covenant and can be challenged by the parties concerned in a procedure meeting the requirements of article 14 of the Covenant (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 24).
818. The notion of fair trial includes the guarantee of a fair and public hearing. the Human Rights Committee highlighted that fairness of proceedings entails the absence of any direct or indirect influence, pressure or intimidation or intrusion from whatever side and for whatever motive (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 25). Apart from such exceptional circumstances, a hearing must be open to the general public, including members of the media, and must not, for instance, be limited to a particular category of persons (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 29).
819. According to ICCPR article 14 (2), a person charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. The HRC noted that it is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused. Defendants should normally not be presented to the court in a manner indicating that they may be dangerous criminals. The media should avoid news coverage undermining the presumption of innocence (CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 30).
820. ICCPR article 14 (3) protects the rights of persons charged with a criminal offence, including the right to be to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which they understand of the nature and cause of criminal charges brought against them, to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and to communicate with counsel of their own choosing. It also includes the guarantee to be present during the trial; the right to defend oneself in person or through legal counsel of oneâs choosing and to be informed of this right; and the right to have legal assistance assigned to accused persons whenever the interests of justice so require, and without payment by them in any such case if they do not have sufficient means to pay for it. The provision also guarantees the right of accused persons to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against them and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against them; and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt.
2. Criminal prosecutions in connection with the protests
821. Despite the lack of official statistics, statements by State authorities show that criminal prosecutions and sanctions were used against protesters on a mass scale and within a short span of time. In its March 2024 report in reaction to the report of the Mission, entitled âExamining the inauthentic, non-legal and political report of the so-called Fact-finding Missionâ, the High Council for Human Rights in Iran referred to the report of the âSpecial Committee to Investigate the 2022 Unrestâ which it said confirmed that âduring the Riot of 1401 [2022], cases were filed for about 34 thousand peopleâ. It stated that âfiling a caseâ against a person is not the same as detentions and that many of such persons had received orders of non-suit and their cases were dismissed.
822. During this period, the heads of Justice Departments (dadgostari) of several provinces also provided some indication of the number of indictments. On 28 December 2022, the head of the Justice Department in Qazvin province announced that 93 individuals whom he referred to as âthe agents and elements of the recent riots in the provinceâ had been convicted. Others included the following: Zanjan, (119), West Azerbaijan (95), Markazi (276), Khouzestan (213), Alborz (201), Hormozgan (164), Kurdistan (110), Qzvin (237), and Sistan and Baluchistan (45), Semnan (89), Isfahan (316), and Kerman (25).
823. The Mission highlights that not all individuals charged with criminal offences were pardoned, as they did not meet the announced conditions. This suggests that the real number of those facing criminal investigations and prosecutions was even higher than 22,628. Furthermore, trials of persons in connection with the protests, including those of women defying mandatory hijab, lawyers, journalists, and family members of victims, continued well beyond March 2023 and were ongoing at the time of writing this document.
3. Criminalisation of peaceful assembly and expression
824. State authorities charged and tried protesters and others who manifested their solidarity with the protests in cases that effectively constituted criminalisation of peaceful assembly and expressions of dissent. Based on the information reviewed by the Mission, offices of prosecutors and courts, including both criminal and revolutionary, considered activities such as participation in protests; chanting slogans or writing slogans on the walls; dancing and clapping; removing the mandatory hijab; advocating for human rights; taking videos and photos in connection with the protests; publishing social media content deemed critical by the authorities and/or sending such content to journalists, media outlets and human rights defenders outside the country; publicly speaking up or reporting about human rights violations and/or criticising the authorities; calling for or encouraging protests or strikes; publishing material in solidarity with the protesters; publicly speaking up including through giving media interviews by victims including those injured and blinded and the families of those killed; and participation in commemorative ceremonies for the victims and visiting their gravesites; as activities amounting to criminal offences. A lawyer who represented tens of protest related detainees said that the majority of their clients were arrested as they engaged in acts such as writing slogans on the walls, participation in the protests and honking their car horns in solidarity with the protesters, and were charged accordingly. Another lawyer reported that their clients systematically faced charges of âgathering and colluding against national securityâ simply for using whispered hashtags during the protests. When legally challenged, a Revolutionary Court judge in Tehran with a large case load connected to the protesters told the lawyer that protesters had âcolludedâ with âenemy mediaâ through the use of hashtags.
825. An illustrative case is that of several protesters in Arak, Markazi province. In August 2023, Branch 105 of Criminal Court 2 in Arak, tried and convicted eight men and a woman on charges of âdisrupting public orderâ and âinsulting the sanctities of Islamâ in connection with an assembly in which they were alleged to have participated in and sentenced them to punishments that included public flogging. According to information reviewed by the Mission, including State and domestic media reports and the judgment in the case, the defendants were among a group of people who, on 27 July 2023, had allegedly gathered at the gravesite of Mehrshad Shahidinejad, a young protester who had reportedly been killed after security force struck him in the head with a baton a year earlier. They were reportedly arrested several days later. According to the judgment, obtained through an NGO, the nine defendants were accused of âassembling on the gravesite while some individuals in white clothes with unveiled women clapped to a particular music and chanted slogansâ. The publication of the videos of the alleged activities online were considered by the court to have âinjured the heart of the countryâs Muslim and devout peopleâ.
826. Merely a month after these arrests and following a single hearing, the court acquitted the woman defendant in the case and sentenced the male defendants to prison terms, flogging, mandatory residency in different cities (known as internal exile) and a two-year prohibition on online activities. The judge ruled that âdue to the social impact of the committed crime and fears that the accused persons and others would repeat theseâ, the flogging was to be carried out in public in Arakâs Mosalla and after prior announcements. The court called in evidence the defendantsâ previous record of participation in protests. According to interviews given by the defendantsâ lawyer to domestic media, they were detained for over a month without access to a lawyer and denied access to their independently appointed lawyers even at trial. The eight defendants were also convicted of âspreading propaganda against the systemâ for the same alleged activities by Branch One of the Revolutionary Court in Arak.
827. According to evidence reviewed and analysed by the Mission, most of the activities described in the court documents and other primary sources of information in the cases investigated, fall under the scope of protected human rights, namely the exercise of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, to freedom of opinion and expression, of peaceful assembly, and/or to freedom of association.
828. Prosecution of persons in connection with the exercise of their protected rights is made possible through Iranâs domestic legal framework. The countryâs Constitution contains several provisions with regards to the right to freedom of expression, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of association. However, the provisions subject these rights to vague and undefined exception clauses. For example, freedom of association is protected under article 26 of the Constitution as long as it does not violate the âcriteria of Islamâ. Article 27 protects freedom of assembly so long as it is not âdetrimental to the fundamental principles of Islamâ. Similarly, Article 24 guarantees freedom of expression for the publications and the press âexcept when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the publicâ.
829. Restrictions on protestersâ rights under international law are further exacerbated by other legislation, most notably the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, which contains provisions that not only impose undue restrictions but criminalise them, in some instances making them punishable by death. These include provisions criminalising insulting the Islamic religion and religious figures, insulting the authorities, including Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei and the President as well as those imposing sanctions for âspreading propaganda against the systemâ
830. Other vague and overtly broad offences also allow for the criminalisation of conduct that may encompass lawful and legitimate exercise of protected human rights. This includes, âgathering and colluding to commit crimes against the securityâ, âforming of and/or membership in a group or association with the intent to undermine the countryâs securityâ, âspreading lies with intent to disturb the public opinionâ, âdisrupting the public orderâ, the capital offences of âwaging war against Godâ (moharebeh) and âspreading corruption on earthâ and âcollaborating with enemy groups and hostile governmentsâ. The Mission recorded the details of over a 100 persons reportedly charged with capital offences in the context of the protests, with many charged with the overly broad and vaguely worded criminal offences of âwaging war against Godâ (moharebeh) and âcorruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel arz). The Mission highlights that the number of persons charged with such capital offences is believed to be higher, but many cases are not reported publicly or to human rights organizations due to fear of reprisals.
831. According to official statements, as well as information reviewed by the Mission, including direct witness statements, court documents including summons and orders issued by the offices of the prosecutor and courts, indictments, and judgments issued by courts of first instance, appeal courts and the Supreme Court, and open sources such as interviews given by lawyers, vaguely worded and broadly defined charged of âspreading propaganda against the systemâ, âgathering and colluding to commit crimes against the securityâ, âdisrupting the public orderâ, âforming of and membership in a group or association with the intent to undermine the countryâs securityâ, âspreading lies with intent to disturb the public opinionâ, âinsulting the leaderâ, âinsulting the sanctities of Islamâ, âwaging war against Godâ (moharebeh), âspreading corruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel arz), were commonly used in the cases of individuals prosecuted in connection with the protests. Two lawyers who had represented tens of protest detainees reported that nearly all their clients faced the charges of âspreading propaganda against the systemâ and âgathering and colluding to commit crimes against national securityâ. Official statements and state media reports made on individual cases, including that of artists, journalists, human rights defenders and lawyers, as well audio-visual material including videotaped and publicly aired âconfessionsâ of persons arrested by security and intelligence bodies in connection with the protests corresponds with the information collected by the Mission regarding charges commonly brought against individuals in the context of protests.
832. These broadly defined offences contravene the principles of legality under international human rights law, grant broad discretion and interpretive powers to prosecutorial and judicial authorities and are commonly used to repress real or perceived dissent and opposition including in the context of protests. A lawyer representing what are considered âsecurityâ cases stated that the law effectively rendered it impossible for lawyers to mount an effective substantive defence in such cases:
âThe law is worded so broadly that when you challenge that an act does not constitute propaganda [against the state], the judge would argue in return that it does indeed constitute propaganda. It is all subject to wide interpretation.â
833. Based on the available evidence, prosecutions and convictions solely for exercising protected rights in connection with the protests were not a random occurrence. The repeated use of such prosecutions and convictions on a regular basis over the course of the period between September 2022 and the time this document was written constituted a clear pattern.
834. The evidence reviewed further shows that most persons tried in connection with the protests were brought before Revolutionary Courts. The Mission highlights that UN experts and bodies have repeatedly raised concerns about the role of Revolutionary Courts, which as detailed in Section II, were established without a Constitutional basis. Based on reports, Revolutionary Courts are responsible for the majority of death sentences issued and routinely try and convict journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers and others for the exercise of their protected human rights. The Mission highlights that fair trial violations are further exacerbated in Revolutionary Courts, in particular given that they have jurisdiction over national security offences where, as detailed below, additional restrictions are imposed under the law including in relation to access to lawyers, casefile material, and written judgments.
4. The right to a fair trial
Right to presumption of innocence
835. Judicial proceedings against persons tried in connection with the protests took place against the backdrop of Stateâs labelling of the protests as âriotsâ and vilification of protesters as âriotersâ. State authorities, including the head of the Judiciary, , the Prosecutor General, the Heads of Justice Departments (dadgostari) in various provinces, and Friday prayer Imams as representatives of the Supreme Leader, repeatedly referred to the protests as âriotsâ and described them as a ploy by âenemyâ and âhostileâ Statesâ and their intelligence services, the âanti-revolutionariesâ and âthe enemy mediaâ in order to overthrow the Islamic Republicâs system. Officials and state media repeatedly accused real or perceived opponents of having committed serious crimes, using denigrating terms and language such as âriot elementsâ and âthe agents of the enemyâ.
836. On 28 October 2022, in a joint statement entitled âthe Enlightening Joint Statement by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Intelligence Organization of the IRGC surrounding the Interventions of the American Regime in the Recent Riots in the Countryâ, Iranâs core intelligence bodies alleged that âforeign intelligence servicesâ had been behind the âground preparationsâ and the âimplementation of the executive operationâ of the ârecent unrestâ and that their ploy had been executed through âgroups and networks in the country that were connected to them.â
837. In late October and November 2022 and simultaneous with official announcements that the trials of the âkey elements of the riotsâ had started, Mizan, the news agency of the Judiciary, and other State affiliated media repeatedly published news articles on the trials of individuals arrested and charged in connection with the protests, publishing images of defendants in prison uniforms and referring to them as âriotersâ while the trials were still ongoing. On 29 October 2022, an announcement was made by Mizan News Agency that the trial of several individuals accused in connection with the ârecent riotsâ had started earlier in the day before a Revolutionary Court in Tehran, presided by judge Abolghasem Salavati. Subsequently, Iranâs state media published video footage and photographs of the court session showing an official banner behind the judge, which in violation of the accused personsâ right to presumption of innocence, referred to the court conducting the group trial as the âcourt for dealing with the charges against recent riotersâ.
838. The Mission established a clear pattern of airing of video-taped âconfessionâ by persons accused in connection with the protests by State media immediately after detainees were arrested and/or prior or during their trials. The Stateâs broadcasting service, the Islamic Republic of Iranâs Broadcasting (IRIB) and its news agency, as well as the Judiciaryâs news agency, Mizan News Agency and other state media, including, Fars News, Mehr News, and the Islamic Republicâs News Agency, the Intelligence Organization of the IRGC and the website of IRGCâs Centre to Investigate Organized Crime, Gerbab, systematically released videotaped statements of persons arrested in connection with the protests, in violation of their rights to presumption of innocence and not to self-incriminate.
839. The Mission reviewed 30 such videos depicting men and women arrested in connection with the protests. In some of these videos, persons have been recorded while âconfessingâ to the commission of acts falling under protected rights such as removing their hijab, participating in or calling for protests, and chanting slogans. In others, individuals make statements incriminating themselves and/or others in acts such as alleged arson, the use of Molotov cocktails, stabbing, fatal assault and shooting at the security forces. While the timing of the recording of some of these videos remains unclear, the Mission established that in some cases, the âconfessionsâ were taped at the time of the arrest, shortly after the arrest and before the start of the trial. In several cases, investigation by the Mission established that the âconfessionsâ taped and aired were extracted under torture or other ill-treatment and/or in the absence of lawyers. The IRIB and other state media aired video-taped âconfessionsâ prior to convictions, of at least six of the nine men executed in connection with the protests.
840. The Mission also found the terms of the State pardons, announced by the Judiciary in February 2023, which included a requirement for admission of guilt and expression of remorse even for those who had not been convicted, to have been in violation of individualsâ rights, including their right to presumption of innocence. In a prosecutorial order examined by Mission, the authorities terminated criminal investigations against six individuals accused of vaguely worded and broadly defined offences such as âspreading propaganda against the systemâ, in light of a decree by the head of the judiciary pertaining to the State pardons and the âwritten undertakingsâ by the accused persons stating that they would not ârepeat similar intentional offences.â Similarly, another prosecutorial order involving tens of accused persons ordered the termination of investigation against over thirty people given that they had âexpressed remorseâ and provided written undertakings that they would not ârepeat similar intentional offences.â In its 12 March reaction to the report of the Mission, the High Council for Human Rights of Iran equated arrest with the establishment of oneâs guilt saying, âOf course, the mission’s claim that innocent people have also received amnesty with the precondition of expressing remorse is completely baseless because no innocent person has been arrested to be pardonedâ.
Access to independent and impartial tribunals
841. Evidence reviewed by the Mission show that the Office of the Prosecutor lacked independence and impartiality and operated closely with security and intelligence bodies. Victims stated that they witnessed prosecutorial officials consulting with security and intelligence agents about their cases, in person or on the phone, in a manner from which it appeared they were receiving instructions including on issuing detention or bail orders. A victim who was arrested by the IRGCâs Intelligence Organization and was detained for over three months said:
Basij and the Revolutionary Guards do what they want to do and request and receive the orders legalising their actions later. They conduct arrests knowing that warrants will be issued subsequently. They even speak with the prosecutors in a commanding manner.
842. In several cases investigated by the Mission, prosecutorial officials did not accept the bail amount furnished by the relatives of detainees thus prolonging their stay in the custody of security and intelligence agencies. In some cases, victims and lawyers reported that such delays were aimed at allowing for physical marks of torture on detainees to disappear before they were released. Prosecutorial officials failed to take any steps to conduct investigations into allegations of torture, ill-treatment and irregularities. In the case of several detainees investigated by the Mission, the intelligence body conducting the questioning was located in the same building as the Office of the Prosecutor.
843. The Mission similarly established that judges, who were expected to be guarantors of a fair process, lacked independence and impartiality, manifestly exhibited apparent bias against protestors and real and perceived dissidents and systematically ignored complaints of torture and ill-treatment, coerced confessions, and disregarded flagrant irregularities. Witnesses reported that courts lacked independence and judges presiding over their trials were hostile towards them, subjected them to shouting and insults, and repeated the same line of questioning as their interrogators. A witness described that her hearing before a Revolutionary Court âfelt just like another interrogation session,â while another emphasised that it was the security and intelligence bodies that effectively governed the justice system. A lawyer who himself was arrested and tried in connection with the protests described the Revolutionary Court judge presiding over his case as a âsignature machineâ for the intelligence and security bodies, whose judgments were issued at their orders. He stated:
âUp to the point of the court hearing, I had put all my efforts to present a defence and get an acquittal, so I could continue my work as a lawyer. During the hearing, however, I realised that whether I mount a defence or not, the court had decided to convict me. A clear sign of this was that when I was reading my defence, the judge paid no attention to me and was on his computer with his earphones on, watching a video footage he had received from intelligence bodies pertaining to another case⊠I did not appeal the judgment; I knew it would be upheld as it was.â
844. A lawyer who represented tens of protest related detainees in court said that judges at Revolutionary Courts routinely held meetings with intelligence officials just prior to hearings or spoke with them on the phone. The lawyer reported that their clients received the exact prison term that interrogators from intelligence bodies had told them would be imposed.
845. In cases of women defendants, prosecutorial and judicial officials, similar to interrogators from security and intelligence bodies, subjected accused persons and defendants to sexual slurs and gendered insults. A lawyer said that the judge presiding over the case of a woman whose photos depicting her in a shirt that showed her midriff were found on her phone, subjected her to profanities and told her, âyou are all whoresâ during her few-minute long hearing. In another case, a witness said that a prosecutorial official hit the table with his fist and subjected her to insults and profanities by telling her to shut up, that she was âthe daughter of a whoreâ and a ârioterâ. The Mission has also reviewed open source material similarly showing that in one case a Revolutionary Court judge subjected a woman to gendered insults including by telling her that she was involved in âprostitutionâ.
846. Judgments analysed by the Mission, as detailed below, also reveal that courts regularly handed down convictions by rebutting the defenceâs evidence and objections without providing any explanations. Instead, they heavily relied on reports by security and intelligence bodies as well as self-incriminating statements made by accused persons in the absence of lawyers and under torture and other ill-treatment, to convict accused persons.
Right to lawyer of the oneâs choice and effective assistance of legal counsel
847. The vast majority of individuals detained in connection with the protests did not have access to a lawyer, including to those approved by the Judiciary (See paragraph xx below), following arrest and during the course of investigations. No former detainee interviewed by the Mission had access to a lawyer while undergoing interrogations. Detainees did not have access to independently appointed lawyers during the entire investigations. Two lawyers who had represented tens of protest related detainees reported that lawyers were âabsolutely neverâ granted access to their clients during interrogations and the investigation phase of the proceedings when their clients were detained. Defence lawyers in Iran also repeatedly and publicly stated that lawyers were generally barred at the investigation phase. A lawyer reported:
âIn about 50 protest related cases that I represented, I never had access to either my clients or the casefile during the investigations. It was only when the case was sent to the court that we, as lawyers, could enter the case. Before that, lawyers are only able to proceed on the basis of general principles and their speculations and give advice to the families.â
848. Security and intelligence bodies in charge of detention and officials at Offices of the Prosecutor simply rejected detaineesâ requests to access a lawyer. A former detainee, himself a lawyer, said:
âAgents from the Judiciaryâs Intelligence took me before the assistant prosecutor. He started to take my statements. I told him that I wanted a lawyer. He said, âyou are yourself a lawyer, better than 100 lawyers.â I told him that this was not relevant and that I had been brought before him as an accused individual and not in my position as a lawyer. I said that mentally and psychologically, I was not in a state to defend myself. He said, âso you will not answer?â I said that I had answered, and that my answer was that I wanted a lawyer. He left and I could see that he was speaking with someone on the phone, either the prosecutor or the intelligence agents. He came back saying âno, you do not need a lawyer.ââ
849. Another former detainee said that a day after his arrest, he asked his interrogators, who, according to him, belonged to the Ministry of intelligence, whether he could have access to a lawyer. The interrogators denied his request, in turn subjected him to insults and profanities and told him that âthey were the decision makers there.â Another detainee was told that âhere, in this place, you cannot even call Godâ after she requested prosecutorial officials to have access to a lawyer. When she insisted that, given the gravity of the charges against her, she was legally entitled to have a lawyer, prosecutorial officials told her, âOh, so you are one of those who think they are cleverâ.
850. Under Iranian law, there is no express right to a lawyer of the accusedâs choice following arrest or during interrogation and at other stages of trial. According to article 48 of the 2015 Code of Criminal Procedure and subsequent amendments (the 2015 CCP), detained individuals can request a lawyer from the start of the detention. Lawyers can meet with the detained individual while âobserving the secret nature of the investigationâ., . The law places limits on the amount of time detained individuals can meet with their lawyers. Furthermore, severe restrictions on the right to access a lawyer of one ownâs choosing are imposed under the note to the article. Under the note, individuals accused of âcrimes against internal or external securityâ and âorganized crimesâ which are punishable by death, life imprisonment, amputation, payment of one-half or more of a full personâs diya (blood money), and ten yearsâ imprisonment or more are only permitted to select their legal counsel from a list of lawyers approved by the Head of the Judiciary for the entire duration of the investigation phase.
851. In their reply to the UN Special Procedures, the Iranian authorities have stated that the âphilosophyâ of the note to article 48 âis the existence of classified information and documents in security files to which only authorized and competent authorities shall have access.â In a media interview on 1 September 2020, a former Revolutionary Courtâs Judge and member of the Parliamentâs Legal and Judicial Commission stated that the note to article 48 was needed because âunfortunately, some lawyers had not kept the stateâs secretsâ. In October 2022, in an event for the establishment of the bar association in Khouzestan and amid the nationwide protests, the Judicial Deputy of the Judiciary stated that â[âŠ] the accused has the right to choose a lawyer. However, sometimes the interest of the country is so important for which article 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been ratified.â
852. In their statement, including in their reply to the UN Special Procedures, the authorities of the Islamic Republic have said that the restrictions imposed under the note to article 48 of the CCP are only applied to the investigation phase. Contrary to Iranâs own laws and these statements, the Mission confirmed that in some cases, the authorities, and in particular the Revolutionary Courts, applied these restrictions to the trial stage, thereby denying defendants access to their independently appointed lawyers even after the end of the preliminary investigations. In some cases, defendants were told by judicial and prosecutorial authorities that they could only be represented by Judiciary-approved lawyers.
853. Several witnesses stated that they were not permitted by courts to have access to lawyers of their own choosing during the trial phase and that they were only represented by lawyers of their own choice after the issuance of the judgment and at the appeal stage. This was further confirmed by lawyers interviewed by the Mission. In at least one instance, Mizan News Agency, the news agency of Iranâs Judiciary, confirmed that in the case of Mohammad Ghobdalou, a young protester who was executed in January 2024, in accordance with the note to article 48 of the CCP, his independently appointed lawyers did not have the clearance to represent him before the Revolutionary Court. The young man was undergoing two separate trials on capital charges at the time. In some cases, defendants did not have a lawyer even during the trial. In one case, a lawyer undergoing trial in connection with the protests was told by a Revolutionary judge at trial that he was a lawyer and could defend himself, therefore his lawyers were not permitted to attend the hearing. Some lawyers reported that certain judges at Revolutionary Courts did not accept specific lawyers with a track record of taking what are considered âsecurityâ cases.
854. In the months following the start of the protests, in interviews with domestic media and letters addressed to the head of the Judiciary, lawyers in Iran repeatedly stated that courts, in particular Revolutionary Courts, were not permitting lawyers of defendantsâ own choosing to represent their clients even during the trial stage. On at least two occasions, on 19 November 2022 and 16 January 2023, in letters addressed respectively to the head of the Judiciary and the head of the Supreme Court, the President of the National Union of the Bar Associations, citing reports by ânumerous lawyersâ, stated that Revolutionary Courts were applying the note to article 48 of the CCP to the trial stage, denying the defendantsâ independently appointed lawyers at trial.
855. Witnesses, including lawyers interviewed by the Mission, raised concerns about the independence of âarticle 48 lawyersâ and their ties with the authorities meaning independent lawyers were generally excluded from the list. In one case, a lawyer said that a colleague of his who âwas not an insider to the systemâ yet had accidently been included in the list of approved lawyers by the Judiciary had attempted to take on his case. Officials at the Office of the Prosecutor however removed them from the list of approved lawyers as soon as they reminded them that under the law, they could take on the case and told them that they were no longer on the list.
856. According to information analysed by the Mission, many judiciary-approved lawyers did not provide protest-detainees and defendants with effective assistance. Witnesses who themselves or their loved ones were appointed with âarticle 48 lawyersâ reported that such lawyers effectively undermined them in court and treated them in a manner similar to that of their interrogators including by telling them to âcooperateâ with the authorities. A person detained in connection with the protests along with tens of other protest detainees said:
The detainees were told that they could only have state-appointed lawyers. Many of my fellow detainees had been forced to accept these lawyers who would call their families and tell them that if they wanted the situation of their loved ones resolved, they should pay exorbitant fees. They had turn this into a business, given that their numbers were limited. They would tell their clients to cooperate. Why would detainees need a lawyer if they are told the same things by them that they are told by their interrogators? These lawyers acted as interrogators.
857. In a media interview, an Iranian lawyer stated that judiciary appointed lawyers âwant to preserve their place in the Judiciaryâs list and as such, not only do they not take any steps for the accused individuals, but act as the catalyst for convictions in courtsâ.
858. The small number of judiciary-approved lawyers as compared to the number of individuals arrested and charged in connection with the protests further affected the right of detainees to access a lawyer. A lawyer stated that following the start of the protests, several families of detainees were going to his office on a daily basis asking him to represent their loved ones. He further stated that only 40 lawyers were on the judiciaryâs list in a large province and only three of those were in fact active in the provinceâs capital. Similar figures have been provided by other lawyers speaking with domestic media indicating overwhelming demand for legal representation in the months that followed the start of the protests. In November 2022, the head of the Bar association in Kerman highlighted the problems caused by the note to article 48 stating that only four or five lawyers from the Bar in Kerman had been approved by the judiciary, three of whom had passed away or had already retired.
859. Witnesses, including former detainees and lawyers, also stated that in some cases, the judiciary-approved lawyers, commonly referred to as âarticle 48 lawyersâ demanded exorbitant fees from the families of detainees. Increased fee rates by the judiciary-approved lawyers in a context of extreme demands stemming from the large number of protest detainees was also raised by Iranian lawyers and officials in media interviews. The Mission notes with concern that this would further restrict the already diminished right to legal counsel for individuals in economically disadvantaged conditions.
860. Credible information indicates that in light of the risks associated with taking on cases that are deemed âsecurity-relatedâ by the authorities, and due to fear of reprisals, discussed in the Section X of this document, lawyers, in particular in smaller cities, may have been reluctant to represent individuals who have been charged with criminal offences in connection with the protests. In a context where lawyers continue to take on the cases of real or perceived opposition and dissidents in extremely complex conditions and in the face of constant risk, the arrest of lawyers could also have serious consequences for their clients.
Right to equality of arms
861. Judicial and prosecutorial officials refused to disclose casefile material to the accused and their legal counsel, violating the right of the accused persons to equality of arms and severely limiting their ability to prepare a defence.
862. Witnesses, including individuals prosecuted in connection with the protests and lawyers who represented protest detainees, consistently reported that they were denied access to casefile material during investigations by the Office of the Prosecutor. A lawyer who himself was tried in connection with the protests said that neither his two appointed lawyers nor him were allowed to read the casefile and it was only after he was convicted and at the appeal stage that he was able to access the casefile. Where access was granted, it was after the case was referred to the court and even then, lawyers were generally given limited time to read the casefile material without the ability to make copies. In one case, lawyers in a group trial were given 30 minutes to read hundreds of pages of documents in the casefile.
863. Iranâs laws fail to place an obligation on the prosecutorial officials to disclose inculpatory and exculpatory material to the accused and their legal counsel in line with international law. Moreover, under the note to article 351 of the CCP, âproviding copies of classified documents and documents containing content pertaining to investigation of crimes against decency and crimes against internal and external security is prohibited.â Article 191 of the CCP, provides the prosecutorial official, namely the investigator, with wide discretion to issue non-disclosure orders when they determine that disclosure of material would âcontradict with uncovering of the truth, or in cases of crimes against national or external security of the countryâ. While non-disclosure orders can be appealed at court, a lawyer stated that they had never seen such orders being overturned, describing the possibility of appealing âa formality.â
864. The lack of access to casefile material including inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, investigative measures and orders, and written copies of judgments, as detailed below, severely hindered the ability of lawyers to draft properly supported and reasoned defence submissions and appeals. Moreover, court judgments did not include any references to the presence of exculpatory witnesses at court or other evidence put forward by the defence. In a case investigated by the Mission where defendants were charged with capital offences, the defenceâs repeated requests for subpoenaing an exculpatory witness were dismissed by judicial officials.
Closed and summary proceedings
865. In the weeks following the start of the protests and amid large scale arrests and detentions, judicial and prosecutorial officials made several announcements that the court hearings of the âkey elements of the riotsâ would be held publicly. Subsequently, a stream of reports, including selected video footage of court proceedings in the cases of persons accused of capital offences, described as public hearings, were published by the state media.
866. On 17 October 2022, prior to the commencement of these proceedings, the Head of the Judiciary, Mohseni Ejeâi, stated, âthe key elements of the recent riots must be tried as soon as possible and upon the decision of judges and with observance of legal requirement, their trials will be held publicly so that the atrocities [committed] by these riot elements are brought to the attention of the peopleâ. He further added that the media centre of the Judiciary would collaborate and coordinate with the justice departments and the IRIB with regards to publicising the trials. In a similar statement, in an interview with Al-Alam on 1 November 2022, Masuod Setayeshi, the Judiciaryâs Spokesperson referred to article 165 of the Constitution as a âshiningâ provision stating that it allowed people:
âTo attend court hearings and to hear the content. Of course, the aim of these trials is to determine what atrocities these [defendants] have done and how they would defend themselves in the face of [the charges pertaining to] these atrocities and whether trial processes are done correctly ⊠[t]hese [trials] should be done in the public eye so that the people see and judge how [the defendants] have wronged our dear people and what punishments they will be subjected to.ââ
867. The Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure provide for public hearings respectively in articles 165 and 352. However, these provisions grant judges wide discretion to restrict the right to an open hearing and to hold trials behind closed doors on the basis of vague and broadly defined clauses such as in the cases of âcrimes contrary to chastity or good moralsâ and where public hearings would âdisturb public security or religious or ethnic sentimentsâ.
868. Witness statements and statements made publicly by family members and lawyers of protest detainees reveal that court hearings of individuals charged with criminal offences in connection with the protests were held behind closed doors and that even family members and independently appointed lawyers were routinely denied access to the hearings.
869. The Mission has also reviewed the video footage of several such trials which were widely circulated by the State media. The video footage of the court sessions selected by the Judiciary and State media for publication generally consisted of several minutes and consistently only included statements by prosecutorial authorities, statements made by prosecution witnesses, the questioning of the accused by presiding judges, which closely aligned with the statements by the prosecutors, and statements by the defendants in which they admitted guilt and/or expressed remorse for their actions.
870. Persons charged in connection with the protests were tried in hasty proceedings held in a summary fashion. In the vast majority of cases investigated by the Mission, only a single court session was held, with the session, in some cases lasting only minutes. A lawyer who represented tens of protest-related cases said that in all their clientâs cases, only a single brief court hearing was held, generally resulting in prison terms. The witness stated that âin cases involving the charges of moharebeh [waging war on god] and efsad-e fel arz [corruption on earth], as a lawyer must be present in court, the proceedings might be held in several sessions. In all other cases, there is only one hearing.â Another lawyer who similarly had represented tens of protest detainees reported âall Revolutionary Court hearings are one session⊠before branch 26, sessions were longer and lasted around 15 minutes. In other Revolutionary Court branches they lasted five minutes.â
871. Witnesses stated that they and their lawyers, if present, barely had a chance to speak in their defence. A person who was sentenced to long imprisonment in connection with exercising his rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly by a Revolutionary Court said:
âI was taken to court in handcuffs and shackles. I had one court hearing only and it lasted around two hours. I spoke very little as the judge kept interrupting me and my lawyers. He would pose a question, asking me why I had insulted the sanctities and the Prophet and then would start telling stories. I told my lawyers that he was intentionally doing that so we would not get a chance to speak. I had a lot to say in my defence, I wanted to talk about the torture and the ill-treatment and the disrespect at the Office of the Prosecutor.â
872. In a media interview with a domestic newspaper, a lawyer representing individuals accused in connection with the protests raised concerns about speedy proceedings with which courts were processing cases and the resulting lack of precision saying, âcourts are busy and have limited time for proceedings in each caseâ. He added that courts were processing 10 to 12 cases per day.
873. The Mission also found that courts held trials of several defendants at the same time even when there was no link between the defendants and the alleged offences of which they were accused of. A lawyer reported the following during a court hearing before a Revolutionary Court:
âThe hearings before this branch generally lasted about five minutes. Once, our court hearing was scheduled at 9am; the judge arrived at 10. He ordered four defendants and their lawyers to be brought in [for simultaneous trials]. I objected and he said, âyou talk too much, write it up and get it doneâ. I was writing when he started questioning another defendant.â
Another lawyer who had represented protest-detainees similarly reported:
âCourts were extremely busy and defendants without lawyers were treated terribly. Once I was in court for the hearing of a client. I took several minutes to write something down as part of my defence. The judge used this time and told the security to go and bring a âdefendant without a lawyer.â A young man was brought in and was made to stand in the corner of the room. He was there for five or six minutes and the hearing in his case was done within those short minutes. I saw several examples of accused persons without lawyers tried in just five or six minutes with the judge insulting and threatening them. Judges tried the cases of several other defendants within the court hearing of another defendant.â
874. The Mission further established that, as detailed in the section on the use of the death penalty, in the cases of several persons who were tried before a court presided by Judge Salavati, entitled by the authorities the âcourt for dealing with the charges against recent riotersâ during the 29 October court session, there was no connection between many of the defendants and that they were are accused of involvement in separate incidents.
875. Hasty proceedings against persons accused in connection with the protests came against a backdrop of statements by judicial and prosecutorial authorities consistently calling for speedy proceedings in the cases of persons arrested in connection with the protests, often drawing a link between the speed with which the proceedings were conducted and their ability to deter. For example, in an interview with Al-Alam, the Judiciaryâs Spokesperson, Masoud Setayeshi stated: âWe believe that time lapse between the commission of a crime and the implementation of the sentence should be the shortest for it to be a deterrent and a lesson, so that the accused know that this is not a joke…â
876. Judicial officials repeatedly praised the speed with which proceedings, in particular those leading to the issuance and implementation of death sentences, were held. In some cases, persons accused of capital offences were tried, convicted and executed within merely weeks of the alleged crime.
877. The Mission also concluded that in some cases judgments were issued in absentia including where the authorities did not notify a defendant of their trial date; did not transfer them from prison to court for the proceedings; or defendants had fled the country by the time their trials were held.
Reliance on forced confessions and other evidence obtained in violation of international law
878. Courts, both criminal and Revolutionary, relied on self-incriminating statements extracted by security and intelligence bodies, including the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGCâs Intelligence Organization under torture and other ill-treatment and in the absence of lawyers. As detailed earlier, court judgments and witness statements revealed that self-incriminating statements made by the accused persons during their interrogations and before prosecutorial officials were systematically cited as evidence of guilt and were relied upon to convicted individuals and to sentence them including to the irreversible punishment of death. A lawyer representing tens of protest detainees reported that âthe atmosphere was as such that confessions were extracted in any possible wayâ and that such âconfessionsâ were predominantly the basis of judgments.
879. As discussed in a previous section of this document, detainees were coerced into making statements incriminating themselves and others and/or to signing documents that they could not see as they were either blindfolded or denied the right to read the content. In one case, a woman was threatened that she would be brought the corpse of her child if she refused to incriminate another co-defendant. The statements were subsequently used as evidence in court. In another case, a young man was coerced into making âconfessionsâ, which constituted the main piece of evidence against him at court, after he was subjected to torture including threats of rape.
880. Under the code of criminal procedure, officials at the Offices of the Prosecutor, are trusted with the authority to assess the legality of detention and issue and renew detention orders and/or to release detainees on bail. Officials at the Offices of the Prosecutor either ignored injuries or made statements condoning the treatment of the detainees when they were brought before prosecutorial officials by security and intelligence agents while exhibiting visible marks of torture, including lacerations on their faces and heads, bruises and swellings.
881. Iranâs laws lack provisions on the admissibility of unlawfully obtained confessions, including confessions obtained under torture and other ill-treatment and other tainted evidence. While the Constitution and the Islamic Penal Code contain general principles on the exclusion of confessions extracted under torture, there are no detailed procedural legislation offering objective criteria on what constitutes an involuntary confession or statement. The law is also silent on the procedures that must be followed when the lawful nature of confessions is in question, when an accused individual retracts their statements and raise allegations of torture and other ill-treatment, and who bears the burden of proving that a statement has been voluntary. Under the law, the judge presiding over the trial is given the authority to make determinations about the admissibility of confessions in broad and undefined terms. Under the CCP (art. 385.e), in cases where âthere are doubtsâ about the accuracy of the confessionâ court shall start investigating the accused.
Prohibition of double jeopardy
882. The Mission found that in some cases persons charged with offences in connection with the protests were tried in two parallel trials, one before a criminal court and one before a Revolutionary court in relation to the same underlying act. The practice contravened the principle of protections against double jeopardy, as individuals risked being convicted for acts of which they have already been convicted or acquitted.
883. For example, in a case investigated by the Mission, a defendant faced two cases stemming from two social media posts. Each case resulted in the charged of âspreading propagandaâ and âspreading liesâ which were tried, respectively, by both a Revolutionary Court and a criminal court. The defendant ultimately received four convictions and sentences in connection with the content of the two social media post. In an almost identical case, both a Revolutionary Court and a criminal court convicted and sentenced a defendant on the charges of âspreading propagandaâ and âspreading liesâ in relation to a single social media post. In the case of nine defendants sentenced to punishments including public flogging in Arazk, Markazi province (para. xx.), both a criminal as well as a Revolutionary Court reportedly convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to punishments for the same underlaying acts.
884. In a case involving capital offences, Mohammad Ghobadlou, a young protestor executed in January 2024, received two death sentences, handed down by both a criminal court and Revolutionary Court, following two separate proceedings on the charges of murder and âcorruption on earthâ. The charges stemmed from the same underlying alleged act, namely the alleged killing of a member of the security forces.
Right to a public reasoned judgment
885. Judgments issued in the cases of individuals convicted in connection with the protests were extremely brief and, in the vast majority of instances examined, consisted of only several paragraphs with the ruling itself not exceeding several lines. Convictions were based on vague and generic evidence. Most commonly, courts listed self-incriminating statements by the accused during the course of preliminary investigations and reports by various security and intelligence bodies including the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGCâs Intelligence Organization, the Security and Intelligence Police as evidence of guilt. In most cases, no details or explanations as what such material entailed were provided in the judgments.
886. Moreover, courts rejected the defence put forward by the accused and their legal counsel by simply stating that they that the defence was ânot acceptableâ or unable to rebut the prosecutionâs case without providing any further details. Under such brief judgments which failed to provide any substantive or detailed reasons, courts sentenced individuals to a range of punishments including the death penalty; imprisonment including for prolonged periods of time; flogging including in public; forced residency in certain cities (also known as internal exile); monetary fines; prohibition from leaving the country, prohibition from engagements in certain arenas including on social media platforms, and confiscation of digital devices.
887. Revolutionary Courts did not provide those convicted and sentenced in connection with the protests with a written copy of the judgment. Persons convicted by Revolutionary Courts stated that they had either been informed of their convictions and sentences by the court verbally or through the Judiciaryâs online platform, SANA. In some cases, those convicted and/or their lawyers were permitted to review the judgments at the courthouse and make handwritten copies.
888. Denial of providing defendants and their lawyers with written judgments is made possible under Note 2 to Article 380 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states that in cases involving offences against âdecencyâ where the judgment âcontains content which would be haram [religiously forbidden] for the complainant to know aboutâ and in cases of crimes against national and external security, the judgment must be communicated to the parties in in-person session and the parties can be informed of the content of the judgment and take notes. The Mission highlights that Iranâs laws lack legal provisions with regard to making court judgments publicly available, contrary to human rights standards on the transparency of the justice system.
Suspended prosecutions, sentences and conditional pardons
889. The Mission found a pattern whereby the Offices of Prosecutors and courts issued, respectively, suspended prosecution orders and suspended sentences in cases of individuals charged or convicted in connection with the protests. Under suspended prosecution orders, the prosecutorial authorities do not pursue the charges laid against the accused individuals for a certain period of time without dropping the charges. Such orders allow for the prosecution to be reinstated if the accused person is charged with a criminal offence and indictments within the specified or is in breach of other conditions imposed. Similarly, implementation of sentences may be suspended for certain periods of time with similar conditions.
890. Suspended termination orders and suspended sentences imposed conditions on persons, many of whom had in the first place been charged and/or convicted in connection with the peaceful exercise of their human rights, that required them to forego their human rights, including to peaceful assembly. The terms imposed generally forbade individuals of committing similar âoffencesâ as well as from other activities such as the use of smart phones and social media; In some cases, the conditions imposed included highly politicised and ideological tasks. For instance, in one case, the Office of the Prosecutor suspended the prosecution for a period of six months on the condition that the accused person procured, read and summarised several books written by the Supreme Leader and as well as on the lives of war âmartyrsâ. The order stated that the accusedâs refusal to abide by the conditions imposed would result in the revocation of the suspension order and re-initiation of the prosecution. In another case, prosecution was suspended for a period of two years on the condition that a protester would refrain from passing through âpotential locations for illegal assembliesâ which are used by âenemy groupsâ and attend counselling sessions and educational classes before a religious body.
891. By suspending prosecutions and implementation of sentences, State authorities maintained a constant threat of prosecution and imprisonment against individuals in an apparent effort to deter them from participating in the protests and/or other forms of expression of dissent. In a statement received by the Mission, a man whose sentence, issued solely in connection with his peaceful expression was suspended, told a human rights organization that such suspension decisions effectively put individuals âin shacklesâ.
Punishment violating international law
892. Courts imposed punishments that violated international law. In addition to violating the rights to liberty, punishments imposed were in breach of the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Most notably, courts imposed the punishment of flogging, which constitutes torture, for offences that included âdisturbing the public order.â Women defying mandatory hijab were also sentenced to flogging.
893. Courts also imposed punishments that humiliated and degraded persons and/or coerced them into activities which were in apparent conflict with their beliefs and the very reasons they had taken part in the protests. Courts sentenced women defying the mandatory hijab to punishments that included cleaning governmental offices; washing corpses; and psychiatric treatments.
894. Protesters were also made to praise and promote the State, its authorities or the very discriminatory policies that they had questioned or challenged. In one judgment, a Revolutionary Court sentenced a protester to writing an essay in support of the positive impacts of the âIslamic Revolutionâ as a supplementary punishment. In another judgment, the court ordered a woman to research and then publish on her own social media account at least 20 examples of the âimpact of hijab in individual and social lifeâ and cite âcredible Islamic booksâ, further requiring her to disseminate the content through her social networks to hundreds of individuals within three months. Two lawyers reported that a branch of Revolutionary Court in Tehran routinely issued supplementary punishments that included reading ârevolutionary and religious booksâ and making handwritten copies of them and/or attending seminary lessons. One lawyer described the mental toll such punishments, which aimed at âtormentingâ protesters further took on those convicted who wondered how they could engage in activities that went against their beliefs.
Judicial proceedings against children
895. Under International law, children accused of criminal offences, are not only entitled to all fair trial guarantees that apply to adults but must be afforded additional and special protections. Article 40 of the UNCRC, in conjunction with article 14 of ICCPR, provide that children should be accorded with procedures that take account of their age. Children alleged to have committed a criminal offence shall be treated in a manner consistent with the childâs sense of dignity and worth.
896. Under article 40 of the UNCRC, States must ensure childrenâs rights to presumption of innocence and to not be compelled to give testimony or admit guilt; to be promptly informed of the charges against them; and to have the matter determined without delay by to competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, in the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance. Moreover, childrenâs privacy should be respected in all stages of the proceedings. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has called on states parties to establish juvenile courts either as separate units or as part of existing regional or district courts. Where that is not immediately feasible for practical reasons, the Committee calls on states parties to ensure the appointment of specialized judges or magistrates for dealing with juveniles.
897. Information reviewed by the Mission shows that children who came face to face with the countryâ justice system in the context of the protests were not treated any differently than adults. The Mission documented similar or identical patterns of fair trial violations, as detailed above, in the cases of children. Children were arrested for their participation in and support of the protests and for activities such as writing slogans on walls. State authorities charged children with broadly worded and vaguely defined national security offences, including the capital offences of âwaging war on Godâ and âcorruption on earthâ, and tried them before Revolutionary Courts for adults. In a case concerning the fatal assault of a Basij agent and widely covered by Iranâs State media, Mizan News Agency announced that three 17-year-old boys were tried before Branch One of the Revolutionary Court in Karaj alongside adults. The children were charged with the capital offence of âcorruption on earthâ as well as âgathering and colluding to commit crimes against national securityâ.â All three were initially sentenced to a prison term of up to 25 years , reduced upon appeal.
898. The Mission highlights that trial of children by Revolutionary Courts not only violates Iranâs obligations under international human rights law but contravenes the countryâs own domestic laws. Under Iranâs Code of Criminal Procedure Code, children charged with criminal offences should be brought before special units the office of the prosecutor and tried special juvenile branches in Provincial Criminal Courts.
899. Consistent with the broader patterns of denial of the right to presumption of innocence, the Mission analysed information showing that State media aired âconfessionsâ made by a child under torture and in the absence of access to lawyers and the legal guardian. According to credible information, in one case, a boy was tortured in detention, including by being beaten, and was coerced to make âconfessionsâ. The following day he learnt that State media had publicly aired his forced âconfessionsâ.
900. Information shows that prosecutorial and judicial officials also exhibited bias towards child protesters, and instead of conducting investigations into allegations of torture and irregularities, ill-treated and questioned them in a manner that resembled that of the security and intelligence bodies. According to credible information reviewed by the Mission, in one case, a prosecutorial official subjected a 17-year-old boy, who had been tortured and ill-treated in police detention, to questioning resembling an interrogation, asking him âwhy did you write slogans?â, âwho do you work for?â, âhow much were you paid?â. The officials questioned the child without the presence of a lawyer or the childâs legal guardian and issued a detention order. The child protester was questioned on a second question by another prosecutorial official who similarly questioned him without allowing him or his family to respond and reportedly threatened him with the death penalty. According to the information reviewed, the prosecutorial official told the child, “you wrote death to the dictator. You insulted the leadership; how can I not order for your execution?” The boy recounted that he thought his fate was sealed and that he was going to receive a death sentence. The case was subsequently referred to a Revolutionary Court.
901. In another case, according to credible information reviewed by the Mission, prosecutorial officials accepted the âconfessionsâ a child from a minority populated region of the country had made under torture and ill-treatment and without access to a lawyer. The childâs fingerprints were reported to have simply been placed on self-incriminating statements in which he âconfessedâ to possession of a firearm. The Mission also reviewed information showing that in some cases, children were brought before prosecutorial and/or judicial officials with strains where no imminent threat of injury to the child or others was present. Such treatment may violate the absolute prohibition of degrading, cruel and inhuman punishment.
902. Consistent with the broader patterns of denial of the right to access a lawyer, child detainees were not permitted to have access to a lawyer including as they underwent criminal investigations and judicial proceedings. In some cases, they were also denied the right to contact their families or to have legal guardians present during the various stages of judicial proceedings. Denial of access to lawyers and access to their family further exacerbated childrenâs vulnerability including in relation to making self-incriminating statements.
903. As detailed in Section V. C children were subjected to torture and ill-treatment in detention and were coerced into making âconfessionsâ. According to credible information, in some cases, they were presented with and forced to sign blank papers or statements without being permitted to read and understand the content. In one case, according to credible information, a boy from Tehran was brought blindfolded before an Office of the Prosecutor, where he was placed in an office and given papers to sign. When he requested to read it first, he was told that âit was not possibleâ and that âthey did not have time. In another case, the Mission reviewed credible information on the case of 16-year-old boy who was accused of being a leader in the protest in a western province. He was reportedly subjected to torture by the intelligence agents and was coerced to make âconfessionsâ. The authorities further videotaped his âconfessions” and submitted it to a Revolutionary Court. The child was subsequently convicted.
Findings
904. The Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that State authorities used the countryâs criminal law and its justice system, to repress protestors and real and perceived opposition. By resorting to criminal charges based on laws that violated international human rights standards, and through summary proceedings that were marred by serious irregularities and violations of due process guarantees, the Mission established that the right to due process and fair trial of persons prosecuted in connection with the protests was violated. State authorities systematically charged, tried, convicted and sentenced individuals for conduct that fell under the scope of protected human rights, including the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of association. Criminalised conduct included legitimate expression of opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iranâs policies, including with respect to gender equality.
905. In this regard, the Mission finds that officials at Offices of the Prosecutors and judges lacked independence and impartiality and systematically and on a large scale violated the rights of accused persons to fair trial standards and due process guarantees. Judicial proceedings generally gave the pretext of legality to what constituted unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Instead of upholding the rights of the accused individuals, including through conducting investigations into allegations of torture and other ill-treatment, the Mission finds that prosecutorial officials and judges dismissed reports of torture while courts used confessions obtained under torture to convict persons in connection with the protests. Fair trial violations were severely exacerbated by the absence of legal representation for protesters, in particular during the interrogation phase following apprehension and arrest.
906. Based on evidence reviewed, courts were predisposed to finding protesters guilty of wrong-doings, rather than reviewing evidence in an impartial manner. The lack of impartiality manifested itself in a number of areas, including apparent exhibitions of hostility and bias by judge towards protesters; hasty and summary closed-door proceedings; denial of access to lawyers; and the accusedâs lack of access to casefile material as well as the lack of reasoned judgment. The Mission highlights that the large number of legal proceedings against over 22,628 protesters or persons involved in the protests, in the short span of six months, is illustrative of the hasty nature of the proceedings and the lack of respect for due process guarantees and fair trial standards.
907. The Mission further finds that the countryâs very legal framework made violations of fundamental fair trial rights and due process guarantees possible. This included laws which do not guarantee the right of the accused individuals to an independent lawyer of their own choosing in line with international law; allow for the imposition of severe restrictions on or full denial of access to casefile material; and open the hands of judicial authorities to hold trials behind closed doors on broad and vague grounds. Moreover, laws criminalising protected rights provided the legal ground for arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
908. The Mission also finds that the state media coverage of the legal proceedings described by the authorities as âopen and publicâ aimed to strengthen the Stateâs narrative of the events. Furthermore, on the basis of evidence analysed by the Mission, such coverage may have constituted an effort to intimidate protestors through the justice system.
909. Concerning punishments, the Mission finds that sentences of flogging imposed by courts constituted a form of torture and a violation of the right to security of a person. Further, other punishments such as those requiring persons to create and disseminate content contrary to their beliefs, violated their rights including to freedom of thought and conscience and religion and belief. Such punishments may also amount to torture or to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
910. Finally, the Mission is concerned that the terms imposed as part of the State pardons, and the use of suspended prosecutions and suspended sentences, creates a deterrent environment to protest or expression of dissent in the future, further exacerbating the already arbitrary and unlawful restrictions to the fundamental freedom of women, men and children in Iran.
E. The use of the death penalty in the context of the protests
911. On 8 December 2022, less than three months since the start of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests, the news agency of Iranâs Judiciary, Mizan, announced the execution of a young man, Mohsen Shekari, earlier in the day for the charge of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) over allegations that he had assaulted a member of the security forces during the protests.
912. The news was met with a domestic and international outcry. That day, eight United Nations Special Procedures issued a joint statement condemning the execution and raising alarms about other individuals in Iran facing the death penalty in the context of the protests.
913. Nonetheless, four days later, on 12 December, the authorities announced that another young man, Majidreza Rahnavard, had been executed in public in Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan province, again on the charge of âwaging war on Godâ for allegedly fatally stabbing two members of the security forces and injuring four others. Between then and the time this document was published, seven other young men, Mohammad Mehdi Karami, Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, Majid Kazemi, Saeed Yaghoubi, Saleh Mirhashemi, Milad Zohrevand, and Mohammad Ghobadlou were executed.
914. Executions of the nine young men in connection with the protests came against the backdrop of official statements and reports regarding the trials of âthe key elements of the riotsâ which started to emerge in late October 2022. Between 29 October and 12 November 2022, Mizan news agency, and other State and State affiliated media published a series of reports announcing that the trial of at least 20 individuals for the capital offences of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) and âcorruption on earthâ (efsad- fel arz) had started before several branches of Revolutionary Courts in Tehran and Alborz provinces. On 6 November 2022, in a statement, 227 members of Parliament asked the countryâs Judiciary to take a robust stance against the âriotersâ and execute those who had committed moharebeh. On 13 November 2022, the Judiciaryâs news agency announced that a Revolutionary Court in Tehran has sentenced an unnamed individual to death on the charge of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) and âcorruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel arz) in connection with acts of arson committed in the context of the protests in Tehran. This was followed by two other statements by the Judiciary on 15 and 16 November 2022, stating that four other unnamed individuals had been sentenced to death in connection with the protests.
915. According to credible reports, as of March 2024, courts in Iran had pronounced at least 30 death sentences in relation to the protests. Of the individuals sentenced to death, nine young men were executed in December 2022, January, May and November 2023, and January 2024 respectively, while at least six remained under death sentences with some at imminent risk of execution at the time of writing. The remaining men had their death sentences overturned and, as of March 2024, were either undergoing or awaiting retrials or were sentenced to other punishments including long prison terms. The Mission recorded the details of over 100 individuals reported to have been charged with offences carrying the death penalty in the context of the protests. Among them were at least five women, while officials confirmed that at least three children were tried on capital offences in connection with the protests. The Mission highlights that due to the lack of transparency by Iranâs Government, closed proceedings and the fear of reprisals associated with publicly reporting and speaking up, the exact number of individuals sentenced to death or facing charges that carry the death penalty in the context of the protests remains unknown.
916. The Mission further highlights with concerns credible reports that show a staggering increase in the overall use of the death penalty in Iran since the start of the protests. According to reports by a human rights organization, at least 834 individuals were executed in 2023. This, reportedly, constitutes a 43 per cent increase as compared to 2022 and the second time in two decades where the number of executions has exceeded 800 per year. A significant increase in the number of public executions were also reported. The execution of Majidreza Rahnavard was the second public execution after a reported two-year hiatus in public executions. In 2023, seven people were executed in public, a three-time increase as compared to 2022. Moreover, at least 22 women were reported to have been executed in 2023, the highest number over the past decade. UN experts and human rights organizations have repeatedly warned about the use of the death penalty as tool of political repression and to instil fear in the population.
917. As per its mandate, the Mission carefully investigated cases of the use of the death penalty in the context of the protests. The Mission looked specifically at the context and the scale of the use of the death penalty, compliance of judicial proceedings with international human rights law and standards on the use of the death penalty and due process and fair trial rights, harassment and intimidation of family members of those executed and their denial of their rights to truth, justice, and to mourn the loss of their loved ones according to their religious and cultural practices. In doing so, the Mission assessed the reports issued by Iran High Council for Human Rights in December 2022, January 2023, and January 2024 pertaining to the cases of Mohsen Shekari, Majidreza Rahnavard, Mohammad Mehdi Karami, Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, and Mohammad Ghobadlou as well as a variety of information, including Government responses to UN Special Procedures mandate holders, witness statements, statements obtained through civil society organizations and shared with the Mission, domestic laws and legislation, court documents, official statements and reports, audio-visual material, in particular video footage of segments of court proceedings and video-taped âconfessionsâ of accused individuals. As detailed below, the Mission established the same pattern of gross violations of the most fundamental due process and fair trial rights, which were detailed in Section V. D in the cases of individuals charged with capital offences In such cases, under international human rights law, even stricter compliance with fair trial standards is required.
918. The Mission sent seven letters to the Government of Iran in May, June, August and November 2023 and in January 2024, the Mission called on State authorities to halt plans for the execution of all individuals on death row in connection with the protests; to establish a moratorium with a view to abolishing the death penalty; and to ensure all judicial proceedings adhered to fair trial and due process guarantees under international law. It further shared lists of questions to the Government of Iran requesting detailed information pertaining to the cases of persons executed and sentenced to death as well as the cases of 89 individuals who at the time were reported to be facing charges carrying the death penalty. The Mission regrets that no response has been received to any of the seven letters at the time of writing.
919. In March 2024, following the publication of the Missionâs mandated report on 8 March, the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran published a report entitled âExamining the inauthentic, non-legal and political report of the so-called Fact-finding Missionâ. This report did not include a reference to the letters sent by the Mission to Iranâs authorities in relation to persons at risk of the death penalty, including the list of persons reported to be under death sentences and charged with capital offences. However, it stated that following a probe into the âalleged listsâ, it was determined that 30 persons had received prison term while 29 had received âorders of non-suitâ. Six persons were reported to have been pardoned, three acquitted, and another three released on bail. One death sentence was reported to have been overturned by the Supreme Court and referred to a court of first instance for retrial. No records were said to have been found in the cases of eight people. For 21 persons, indictments were reported to have been issued and the execution of nine persons were confirmed.
920. The report did not include any further details, including on the identity, gender and age of the persons mentioned in the report. As such, the Mission was not able to corroborate the information provided therein.
1. International legal framework
921. Under international law and standards, states that have not yet abolished the death penalty may apply it only for âthe most serious crimesâ and then only in the most exceptional cases and under the strictest limits. The Human Rights Committee has stated that âthe expression âmost serious crimesâ must be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure,â and only to crimes involving âintentional killing.
922. Under no circumstances can the death penalty ever be applied as a punishment for conduct the very criminalisation of which violates the ICCPR. Application of the death penalty for exercising protected rights under international law, including the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of life. The use of the death penalty against individuals under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged crime is absolutely prohibited under international law.
923. The principle of legality bars the imposition of the death penalty for vaguely defined criminal provisions whose application depends on subjective or discretionary considerations. Alternatively, a lack of discretion is also a bar to the death penalty. Mandatory death sentences that leave domestic courts with no discretion as to whether to designate the offence as a crime warranting the death penalty, and whether to issue the death sentence in the particular circumstances of the offender, are arbitrary in nature. Carrying out executions in public is contrary to article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in absolute terms, and amount to a violation of the right to life.
924. Violation of fair trial guarantees provided for in article 14 of the ICCPR in proceedings resulting in the imposition of the death penalty would render the sentence arbitrary in nature, and in violation of article 6 of the Covenant. The imposition of the death penalty in breach of any of the above-mentioned standards and fair trial and due process safeguards violates the right to life and the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Under international human rights law, arbitrary deprivation of life and violations of inhuman, degrading and cruel treatment or punishment are absolutely prohibited, at all times and in all circumstances.
2. Lack of legal protection under domestic law
925. In contravention of international law, Iranâs domestic laws allow for the use of the death penalty for offences not amounting to âthe most serious crimesâ. These include, but are not limited to, drug-related offences, including possession of certain quantities of drugs, certain types of theft upon fourth conviction, and rape. Moreover, vaguely worded and broadly defined offences of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) and âcorruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel arz), which breach the principle of legality, also allow for the imposition of the death penalty for acts that do not involve intentional killing. Furthermore, Iranâs laws make punishable by death a range of conduct the very criminalisation of which violates international law. They include âinsulting the Prophet of Islam (sabbo al-nabi), âapostasyâ, and consensual same-sex sexual relations (certain types upon first conviction and others upon the fourth conviction). Iranâs laws also provide for the imposition and the implementation of the death penalty against individuals for crimes committed under the age of 18. Under the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, the use of the death penalty for offenders under the age of 18 is allowed for murder, which falls under the qesas (retribution-in-kind) and hodoud (offences for which there are fixed penalties categories of punishments under Shariâa law), including âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) and âcorruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel arz).
926. Iranâs laws provide for the mandatory death penalty. Hanging is the common method of carrying out executions and laws further allow for executions by crucifixion and stoning. While executions in public are also provided for under Iranâs law, including the countryâs Anti-Narcotics Law, which provides for executions in public when the offence of drug trafficking has been committed by armed offenders. Judges are granted the discretion to decide the location of the implementation of the sentence meaning they can rule for executions to be carried out in public.
3. Factual Findings
(a) The use of the death penalty for offences not amounting to âthe most serious crimesâ
927. Iranâs courts tried and sentenced individuals to death for broadly worded and vaguely defined capital offences, most notably the offence of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) and âcorruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel arz) which breach the principles of legality and legal certainty. The vast majority of individuals executed in connection with the protests and those sentenced to death or on trial for capital offences were charged with the above-mentioned offences.
âWaging War on Godâ (Moharebeh)
928. Article 279 of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code defines moharebeh as âas drawing a weapon on the life, property or chastity of people or to cause terror as it creates the atmosphere of insecurity. When a person draws a weapon on one or several specific persons because of personal enmities and his act is not against the public, and also a person who draws a weapon on people, but, due to inability does not cause insecurity, shall not be considered as a mohareb [i.e. a person who commits moharebeh].â Per article 282 of the Code, the judge presiding over the trial may choose between the death penalty, crucifixion, amputation of the right arm and the left leg, or banishment as punishment for those found guilty of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh).
929. Iranâs High Council for Human Rights explicitly confirms that the death penalty may be imposed for the charge of âwaging war on Godâ where there are no allegations of intentional killing. A report by the Council pertaining to the execution of Mohsen Shekari, states that â[a]ccording to the law, brandishing a weapon is well enough to be considered moharebeh. It is not that a person has to be killed so that moharebeh is perpetrated. Anyone who strikes fear into the hearts of people and creates terror in society is considered a moharebeh. As far as moharebeh is concerned, there is no need to harm someone with a weapon; as soon as the weapon is brandished, the material element of the aforesaid criminal act has been fulfilled.â The report mirrors statements made by the Judiciaryâs Spokesperson, Massoud Setayeshi on 10 December 2022.
âCorruption on Earthâ (Efsad-e fel arz)
930. Under article 286 of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code â[a]ny person, who extensively commits felony against the bodily entity of people, offenses against internal or international security of the state, spreads lies, disruption of the economic system of the state, arson and destruction of properties, distribution of poisonous and bacterial and dangerous materials, and establishment of, or aiding and abetting in, places of corruption and prostitution, [on a scale] that causes severe disruption in the public order of the state and insecurity, or causes harsh damage to the bodily entity of people or public or private properties, or causes distribution of corruption and prostitution on a large scale, shall be considered as mofsed-e-fel-arz [a person committing corruption on earth] and shall be sentenced to death.â
931. Similar to the offence of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh), âcorruption on Earthâ (efsad-e fel arz) allows for the imposition of the death penalty for conduct that does not amount to âthe most serious crimesâ under international human rights law.
932. The Mission established that in many cases individuals were tried and/or convicted and sentenced to death for the charges of âwaging war on Godâ and âcorruption on earthâ for alleged offences that did not meet the threshold of âthe most serious crimesâ. Rather, the charges concerned allegations of arson, vandalism, and non-fatal stabbings, not intentional killing. At least one protester, Mohsen Shekari, was executed over accusations that did not include any allegations of intentional killing.
933. State authorities executed a 23-year-old protester, Mohsen Shekari, for an alleged offence that did not involve allegations of intentional killing. Mohsen Shekari was executed on 8 December 2022, only three weeks after he was sentenced to death. According to official statements, he was arrested on 25 September 2022 for blocking a street in Tehran, âwhile wielding a machete and threatening people to join and accompany him.â No allegations of intentional killing were made against Mohsen Shekari. According to the Judiciaryâs News Agency, Mizan, his court hearing was held on 1 November 2022. Iranâs High Council for Human Right stated that Mohsen Shekari was convicted of âmoharebeh for brandishing a weapon with intent to kill, create terror and deprive people of freedom and security, as well as intentionally wounding an on-duty security officer with an arme blanche [cold weapon], blocking Tehranâs Sattar Khan Street, and disturbing the order and security of the societyâ by a Revolutionary Court on 20 November 2022â. Mohsen Shekari reportedly was not allowed to have access to his independently appointed lawyer and his family members were not allowed to attend his court hearing.
934. The case of a 26-year-old protester, Sahand Nourmohammad Zadeh, is again illustrative of the use of the death penalty for acts not amounting to âthe most serious crimesâ. Sahand Nourmohammad Zadeh was sentenced to death on the charge of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) over accusations that during the protests in Tehran on 23 September 2022, he had torn down the highway railings and set fire to rubbish cans and tyres. According to Mizan, the charges against Nourmohammad Zadeh included âvandalism and arson of public property with the aim of causing disruption to the countryâs peace and order and confronting the Islamic government.â On 3 December 2022, Mr. Nourmohammad Zadehâs lawyer reported that the death sentence of his client had been communicated to him. Mr. Nourmohammad Zadehâs conviction was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court. Following a retrial, in March 2023, Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran, presided by Judge Iman Afshari, convicted him again of the charge of moharebeh but instead of the death penalty, sentenced him to 10 years in exile in Kahnouj, Kerman Province as well as six years in prison for the charge of âgathering and colluding to commit crimes against national securityâ. The sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court.
935. Another case in which a protester was sentenced to death for alleged acts that did not amount to the âmost serious crimesâ was that of Mahan Sadrat Marani, a 22-year-old protester. Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran sentenced him to death after convicting him of the charge of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) through âwielding a cold weapon (a knife) in a manner that caused insecurity and fear in the surrounding areaâ. He was also charged with âgathering and colluding with intent to commit crimes against national securityâ, setting fire to the motorcycle and destroying a mobile phone, and causing intentional bodily harm by a knife on 12 October 2022 in Tehran. Mr. Sadrat Marani denied the charges. In January 2024, after a retrial was ordered by the Supreme Court, a Revolutionary Court convicted him of the charge of âwaging war on Godâ once more and instead of the death penalty, sentenced him to 10 years in prison to be served in internal exile. He received a further six years in prison for the other charges against him.
(b) Death Penalty Conviction for Otherwise Protected Speech and Acts
936. Protesters were charged with, and convicted on, similar charges for non-criminal protected activities, falling within the scope of the rights to freedom of religion and belief, to freedom of expression, and of peaceful assembly.
937. In one case, a Revolutionary Court in Sari, Mazandaran Province convicted and sentenced Javad Rouhi, a 31-year-old protester to three death sentences including for alleged acts that stemmed from his exercise of protected rights. In addition to convicting him of the charges of âwaging war on Godâ and âcorruption on earthâ over allegations of âcommitting crimes against domestic security, arson and vandalism in a manner that caused severe disruption in the countryâs general security, [caused] lack of security and significant damage to public propertyâŠ. with the intent to confront the Islamic Governmentâ, the court also convicted him of the charge of âapostasy (through violating the holy Quran by setting the holy Quran on fireâ, and âinsulting the sanctities.â The court judgment reviewed by the Mission cites reports by the IRGCâs intelligence organization stating that Javad Rouhi was âpart of the initial circle of the assemblies leading to riots.â According to the court documents reviewed by the Mission and interviews given by Javad Rouhiâs lawyer to Iranâs domestic media, Mr. Rouhi consistently maintained that his participation in the protests was peaceful, that he had not engaged in any act of vandalism and arson and had only danced, burnt scarves and removed some items from a police booth which others had set on fire. Court documents reveal that the case file lacked evidence of Mr. Rouhiâs involvement in acts such as arson and vandalism. In convicting Javad Rouhi of the charge of âapostasyâ and sentencing him to death, the court cited fatwas (religious rulings) by Muslim jurists and the opinion of Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani stating that the blood of those insulting the holy Quran may be legitimately spilled. Javad Rouhi died in custody on 31 August 2023 following credible reports of torture and ill-treatment in the aftermath of his arrest.
(c) Imposition of the death penalty following grossly unfair trials
Right of Presumption of Innocence
938. Judicial proceedings against persons tried for capital offences in connection with the protests took place against the backdrop of Stateâs vilification of protesters as âriotersâ. Evidence reviewed by the Mission show that those accused of capital offences were especially vilified by State affiliated media. Media articles depicted persons accused of capital offences who were perceived to have differences or different lifestyles, in particular by having tattoos, as âthugsâ and persons without moral and ethical principles.
939. Authorities, including prosecutors, police and government officials as well as the Judiciaryâs news agency and other State media made statements indicating an opinion about the guilt of defendants before the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against them or even before they had started. The Judiciaryâs news agency and other state media systematically released videotaped âconfessionâ of persons tried on and convicted of charges carrying the death penalty in connection with the protests, in violation of their rights to presumption of innocence and not to be compelled to self-incriminate. In at least six cases, video âconfessionsâ of those executed in connection with the protests were broadcast before their trials had even started.
940. For instance, on 20 November 2022, Fars news and other state media published a report entitled âthe first statements by the murderer of the Basij Martyrs in Mashhadâ, which included an IRIB report depicting Majidreza Rahnavard, a young man who was executed on 8 December 2022, immediately after his arrest. In the video, Mr. Rahvanard could be seen sitting blindfolded in the back seat of a car while making self-incriminating statements including by stating that he had stabbed several Basij members. In the video the Head of the Justice department (dadgostari) identifies Majidreza Rahavard by name while a police official describes him as the âstabberâ of the security forces. In one segment of the video, Mr. Rahnavard is seen shackled and in handcuffs while his arm is heavily bandaged and in a cast, raising concerns that he may have been subjected to torture.
941. Several reports and videos in the case of the three men, 30-year-old Majid Kazemi, 35-year-old Saleh Mir Hashemi, and 37-year-old Saeed Yaghoubi, who were executed on 19 May 2023 in Isfahan and the three other defendants in the case showed them making statements incriminating themselves and each other prior to the start of their trial. State media published reports aimed at vilifying the men including by claiming that the detainees had criminal records including records of rape. Court records however reveal that these claims were false and an apparent effort to portray the men as violent criminals. Bar one of the defendants, for whom a record is mentioned, the judgments explicitly stated the defendants did not have any criminal records.
942. Prosecutorial and judicial officials also violated the right of those convicted of capital offences to presumption of innocence as evidence reviewed gives rise to serious concerns as to whether guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt, in particular in cases where they made allegations of involvement in killings. The Mission documented a pattern of vague and general accusations made against several defendants in one case; and a lack of precision on the exact allegations made against each defendant, in particular in group trials. Judicial documents, including court judgments showed that courts heavily or solely relied on self-incriminating statements by the accused persons as well as reports by security and intelligences bodies to convict persons of capital offences. In the case of the three men executed in Isfahan on 19 May 2023, Majid Kazemi, Saleh Mir Hashemi, and Saeed Yaghoubi, for example, the court relied on âthe report paper of the examination of the corpses of the security martyrsâ which found that the cause of death was âbeing hit with a fast-flying objectâ as well as the outcome of the report by the ballisticsâ expert which âindicated that the martyrs were martyred by AK-47.â The forensic and ballistic reports cited do not appear to draw any links between the weapons allegedly seized from two of the defendants and the ammunition which caused the death of the security forces. According to the judgment, the court heard at least five prosecution witnesses, all of whom appear to have been from the security forces while no witnesses for the defendants appear to have been recorded. The ruling lacked reasoning, failed to address facts and issues essential to the determination of aspects of the case, and did not make any references to the defence put forward by the accused personsâ legal counsel.
943. The case of Mojahed (Abbas) Kourkouri is another illustrative example. The authorities accused Mojahed Kourkouri of involvement in the killing of seven persons, including Kian Pirfalak, a 9-year-old boy during the protests in Izeh, Khouzestan province on 16 November 2022 and charged him with âwaging war om Godâ, âcorruption on earthâ and âbaghiâ (armed rebellion). On 7 April 2023, the Judiciary announced that the Revolutionary Court in Ahvaz had sentenced Mr. Kourkouri to death on the charge of âcorruption on earthâ. State media aired âconfessionâ made by Mr. Kourkouri shortly after his arrest. He was filmed in what appeared to be a hospital bed with his arm bandaged with traces of blood visible. Relatives of Kian Pirfalak repeatedly stated that they saw state forces firing at their car and that they have no complaints against Mr. Kourkouri and a witness stated that on that day Mr. Kourkouri was on the side of the protesters and was not at the location where the fatal shooting at the car with Kian Pirfalak and his family took place. In December 2023, reports emerged that his death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court placing him at imminent risk of execution at the time this document was written. The Governmentâs response to a UN Special Proceduresâ communication includes large segments of self-incriminating statements made by Mr. Kourkouri, which based on credible information, was obtained under torture. It further draws on a ballistic report which it alleges connects him to the incident and the analysis of a CCTV footage which only states âthere exists a resemblanceâ between a person the State alleges to have been involved in the incident and Mr. Kourkouri.
944. Human rights organization and the media have repeatedly highlighted discrepancies in the official narratives and the evidence put forward by officials in the cases of several others sentenced to death or executed in connection with the protests. For example, in the case of Milad Zohrevand, a young man executed in November 2023 over accusations of involvement in the killing of a member of the IRGCâs Intelligence in Hamedan during the protests, media outlets highlighted contradictory reports by state media and officials in relation to the events that took place during the incident in which Mr. Zohrevand was accused of being involved in.
Violation of the right to access to lawyer of oneâs choosing and effective legal assistance
945. Consistent with the broader pattern of denial of the right to a lawyer of protest detainees, prosecutorial and judicial authorities systematically denied detainees facing capital charges the right to access a lawyer during the detention and investigations. Evidence analysed by the Mission also shows that the authorities denied detainees and defendants the right to an independently appointed lawyer including at the trial stage. Court judgments reviewed in some cases listed State appointed lawyers even where defendants requested to have access to independently appointed lawyers.
946. In one case the Judiciaryâs news agency explicitly admitted that a 22-year-old protester Mohammad Ghobadlou, who at the time was simultaneously undergoing two parallel trials on charges of âcorruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel arz) and murder, respectively, before a Revolutionary Court and a criminal court, was denied access to his independent lawyers during one of the trials. In November 2022, Mr. Ghobadlouâs lawyer stated that his clientâs court hearing before the Revolutionary Court had been held in his absence and the absence of his family. Subsequently, Mizan online, published a report citing the note to article 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, confirmed that in Mohammad Ghobadlouâs case, his independently appointed lawyers did not have the clearance to represent him before the Revolutionary Court and were only able to represent him at his trial before a criminal court. A report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic pertaining to the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou also implies that he had a state appointed lawyer in one of the proceedings despite him having retained two independently appointed lawyers. According to Mohammad Ghobadlouâs lawyers, he did not have access to a lawyer following arrest and during the course of investigations.
947. In December 2022, a lawyer whose client had been sentenced to death in connection with the protests by a Revolutionary Court told a domestic media outlet that he was not permitted to represent his client at trial. He further stated that he was told by prosecutorial/judicial officials that it was the decision of the head of the Revolutionary Court to not allow independently appointed lawyers even during the trial stage in âsecurity-related casesâ.
948. Denial of access to a lawyer left defendants facing capital charges, many of whom were very young, defenceless and most vulnerable. In a publicly available audio message from prison, a young protester, who was sentenced to death on the charge of âwaging war on Godâ, stated that he had been made to sign papers which he was not allowed to read in the Office of the Prosecutor. He stated: âI did not know what the word moharebeh meant. I asked the investigating judge in Branch 3 of the Office of the Prosecutor [âŠ] âwhat does moharebeh meanâ. He said, âit means what you have doneâ. He did not even explain to me what the word moharebeh meant.â
949. Evidence reviewed by the Mission shows that in some cases State appointed lawyers failed to provide persons facing capital charges with effective assistance and in some cases reportedly told their clients to âcooperateâ with the interrogators. In December 2022, the father of a young protester sentenced to death told a domestic media outlet: âThey told us that you can appeal the judgment. I have been calling the lawyer appointed by the Judiciary, but he does not even respond to me. The lawyer would not even bring himself to give me the address of his office. I asked him to go to him to have him record what my son has told me in the casefile [âŠ] but I have not been able to have this added to the casefile.â
Hasty proceedings and show trials
950. Persons tried on and convicted of charges carrying the death penalty were tried in hasty proceedings that failed to resemble meaningful judicial processes, amid repeated calls by State authorities, including the Head of the Judiciary as well as Members of Parliament and other officials for the expedition of trials of protesters, harsh punishments and the implementation of death sentences. Officials and state media praised the speedy nature of the proceedings leading to the death penalty.
951. In some cases, the authorities executed persons convicted of capital offences merely weeks after their arrest and/or conviction dates. Majidreza Rahnavard was executed on 12 December 2022, a little over three weeks after his arrest on 19 November 2022. Mohsen Shekari, another young protester, was executed on 8 December 2022, less than three months after his arrest on 25 September and less than three weeks after the pronouncement of a death sentence against him by the lower court on 20 November. Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, tried as part of a group trial of 16 persons, were executed three months after their arrest. The trial, which according to evidence examined by the Mission, consisted of only four sessions with each defendant having one hearing only.
952. The authorities broadcast trials, including of groups of defendants, as part of the Stateâs narrative on the protests. Most notably, on 29 October 2022, Mizan news agency reported that several individuals accused in connection with the ârecent riotsâ had appeared earlier in the day before a Revolutionary Court in Tehran. The court was presided over by Abolghasem Salavati, who is the head of Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran. An official banner behind Judge Salavati introduced the court as âcourt for dealing with the charges against recent riotersâ. The Mission was not able to establish the exact number of defendants tried before the above court. The Judiciaryâs news agency disclosed the identities of six men who were charged with capital offences. Video footage and photographs of the court session, which were widely published by state media, show at least a dozen defendants present in court. Evidence reviewed by the Mission shows that the named defendants were accused of involvement in separate incidents that allegedly took place on different dates and locations. According to credible information received by the Mission, in at least one case, the judgment was not issued by the special court or Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court, but another branch of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran. Following the court session, which was the only session publicised by State authorities and the media, interrupted, edited snippets of video footage session was widely circulated by the state media. Segments of the session aired generally depicted defendants making incriminating statements against themselves and/or their co-defendants.
Reliance on confessions extracted under torture and ill-treatment
953. Persons charged with capital offences were subjected to torture and ill-treatment. This included various methods of physical and psychological torture including prolonged solitary confinement. Courts relied on âconfessionsâ extracted under torture and ill-treatment and in the absence of lawyers to convict individuals charged with capital offences and to sentence them to death. No investigations were conducted by the authorities in cases in which defendants recanted their self-incriminating statements in court and where allegations of torture and coerced confessions were raised, including publicly, by the defendants, their lawyers and their family members. As detailed below, in cases investigated by the Mission in which allegations of torture and forced confessions were raised, the authorities carried out the executions without conducting any investigations.
954. In the case of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, a witness described how both had been subjected to severe torture including by being hung and beaten with stun guns after they were dosed with water and being tied in what is known as the âchicken positionâ. The witness said that they made âconfessionsâ just to stop the torture. Mohammad Mehdi Karami was reported to have been beaten up so severely on one occasion that when he was returned to the ward, he was unconscious while Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini sustained bruises all over his body. Credible information received by the Mission also show that Mohammad Mehdi Karami was subjected to severe beatings including to the head upon arrest and in detention. Intelligence officials also were reported to have used electroshock weapons on his body including on his chest and torso, arms, and hands.
955. Hamid Ghare Hassanlou, a doctor who was tried along with Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini and whose death sentence was commuted to 15 years in prison in internal exile, was also subjected to torture at the time of arrest and in detention. Arresting agents subjected Hamid Ghare Hassanlou to severe beatings at the time of arrest and in detention resulting in him sustaining broken ribs and suffering internal bleeding in his lungs which required several surgeries. In an audio message published by the media, he stated that one of the arresting agents forced him into a lied down position in front of his 13- year-old daughter and wife âlike a sheepâ, placed a knife on his throat and said, âI will behead you nowâ. Farzaneh Ghare Hassanlou, Hamid Ghare Hassanlouâs wife who was arrested along with him, tried on capital offences, and at the time of writing was serving a five-year prison term in internal exile, was also tortured in detention. Interrogators subjected her to beatings including to the head and threatened her children in order to coerce her into making statement incriminating her husband.
956. In the case of the three protesters executed in Isfahan on 19 May 2023, in a publicly available audio messaged from prison, Majid Kazemi, stated that he was subjected to immense physical and psychological torture, including by being subjected to beatings with a stun gun, death threats against his family, and threats of rape and execution and that he had made self-incriminating statements under torture. He further added that during trial, he recanted all statements he had made prior to his appearance in court. Credible information also reveals that Majid Kazemi was tortured while in the detention of the IRGCâs Intelligence Organization in Isfahan including by being subjected to prolonged solitary confinement, beatings including on the sole of the feet and with a stun gun, and being threatened with rape, execution and execution of his family members. Agents from the IRGCâs Intelligence Organization also detained Majidâ Kazemiâs brother, who according to credible information was not present at the protests of 16 November 2022 and was not subsequently charged with any offences for weeks. According to the credible information, interrogators from the IRGCâs Intelligence Organization showed Majid Kazemi video footage of his brother being tortured to coerce him into making self-incriminating statements.
957. According to reports and credible information reviewed by the Mission Mojahed Kourkouri was also subjected to torture including beatings, forced administration of medication, and psychological forms of torture. He was reportedly injured at the time of arrest but did not receive adequate medical care in detention. The Government response to the UN Special Proceduresâ communication on the case of Mr. Kourkouri states that âtorture during the investigations are categorically unfounded.â It does not include any reference to investigations being carried out into the allegations and merely refers to domestic legal provisions that prohibit torture in general terms.
958. Mohammad Ghobadlou was also reported to have been tortured and ill-treated including by being beaten in detention, being denied medication for his bipolar disorder, and being held in solitary confinement. A publicly available forensic report, dated 20 October 2022, reviewed by the Mission recorded bruising and injuries on Mohammad Ghobadlouâs right arm, right elbow and left shoulder blade. The report assessed that the injuries were sustained at a time when he would have been in State custody. Both a report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic as well as Supreme Court judgment by Branch 39 annulling a retrial order draw on the opinion of a Legal Medicine Organization doctor during the trial attesting that Mohammad Ghobadlouâs mental health had no impact on his culpability. This is despite the fact that according to his lawyers the same doctor, subsequently, including in a letter to the Supreme Court, withdrew his previous opinion expressed at court and requested an adequate assessment in light of the victimâs long mental health records. The High Human Rights Council report further claims that the âtorture allegations are absolutely falseâ. It does not include any reference to investigations being carried out into the allegations and merely refers to domestic legal provisions that prohibit torture in general terms and repeats the âconfessionsâ attributed to Mr. Ghobaldou claiming they were given âfree from any pressureâ.
959. Courts and prosecution officials systematically dismissed allegations of torture and failed to conduct investigations including where defendants recanted their statements. For example, in the case known as the âHouse of Isfahan caseâ, the judgment explicitly stated that Saleh Mirhashemi recanted nearly all the statements he had made before the IRGCâs Intelligence Organization and the Office of the Prosecutor, stating that he âdenied nearly all his previous statements and made new statementsâ during the hearing. All three men in the case also publicly raised allegations of torture and coerced confessions. The court records, including the Supreme Courtâs judgment which was issued following the allegation of torture, reveal that no steps were taken to investigate the torture allegations. Instead, the statements were treated as evidence of guilt.
960. Equally in the case of Gholamreza (Reza) Rasaei, a young man from Kurdish and Yaresan ethnic and religious minority communities, the court heavily relied on âconfessionsâ which the defendants recanted at court and reported to have been extracted under torture. On 7 October 2023, Branch Two of Criminal Court One in Kermanshah province convicted Reza Rasaei of âmurderâ and sentenced him to death as well as a prison term and flogging. According to the judgment reviewed by the Mission, Reza Rasai was convicted of involvement in the killing of a member of the security forces on 18 November 2022 during a protest in Sahneh, Kermanshah province. The judgment shows that the defendants in the case recanted their âconfessionsâ at court reporting that they had been obtained under torture. Despite these allegations, the court heavily relied on statements made by the defendants incriminating themselves and each other to convict them. Instead of ordering investigations into torture reports, the judgment states that the defendantsâ allegations of torture were âwithout credibility and void of any truthâ. The presiding judge explained that he deemed the torture allegations âwithout credibilityâ as firstly, denial of statements after they were given would not negate the punishment; and secondly, âconfessionsâ were made repeatedly before prosecutorial officials, were detailed and corresponded to other evidence in the case thus âleaving no doubtsâ that they were taken âwithout any tortureâ. The judgment further admits that despite the courtâs instructions to address âdeficienciesâ in investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor had not done so adequately. On 16 December 2023, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence against Mr. Rasaei and on 16 January 2024, his lawyerâs request for a judicial review was rejected. The court reportedly dismissed exculpatory evidence including key witness testimonies and his lawyerâs submissions on the flawed investigations.
961. In the case of Javad Rouhi, his lawyer stated in a media interview with a domestic newspaper that his client had raised allegations of âcoercion and pressuresâ during interrogations, but these allegations were dismissed. Evidence reviewed by the Mission shows that Hamid Ghare Hassanlou removed his clothes during the court hearing showing the judge his injuries sustain under torture. No steps were taken to investigate the reports of torture. In the case of Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, after his lawyer publicly raised allegations of torture and coerced confessions, Fazeli Harikandi, the Head of the Justice Department (dadgostari) in Alborz Province stated a case had been opened before a branch of the Office of the Prosecutor in Karaj and invited him and his lawyer to submit their âevidence and documentations.â He further added that Mohammad Hosseini had not made any claims and that he âwas subjected to necessary medical examinations at the time of his transfer to prison and no traces of beatings were observed. Moreover, there has been no harm done to him in prison and he has not been subjected to beatings.â On 3 January 2023, less than three weeks after the allegations were made, the Supreme Court upheld the death sentences against Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini and Mohammad Mehdi Karami. The Mission has not seen evidence of any investigations being carried out into the reports of torture.
Secret proceedings and denial of the right to meaningful appeal and to seek pardons
962. Those convicted of capital offences in connection with the protests were also denied the right to meaningful appeal. Proceedings before the Supreme Court were held in a summary fashion with, in some cases, the Supreme Court judgments being issued only days after an appeal was lodged. Executions were carried out swiftly after Supreme Court rulings. For example, Milad Zohrevand was executed 10 days after his death sentence was upheld. Moreover, Supreme Court judgments in the cases of persons convicted of death sentences and executed examined by the Mission were not sufficiently reasoned and failed to provide reasons for rejecting appeal requests. In the case of Majid Kazemi, Saeed Yaghoubi and Saleh Mirhashemi, the Supreme Court judgment consists of 45 pages. However, the review of the judgment by the Mission revealed that it included the entire text of the indictment and the judgment of the lower court and that the judgment itself consisted of only several paragraphs. The ruling rejected the defendantsâ appeal by merely stating that their âlawyers did not mount a reasoned and credible appeal that would be able to challenge and overturn the appealed judgmentâ and that âwith regards to respect to due process, no particular problems were noticed.â
963. Furthermore, the Missionâs investigation of the case of young protester, Mohammad Ghobadlou, who was executed in January 2024 show an array of human rights violations and serious irregularities including proceedings shrouded in secrecy and interventions by high judicial officials. Mohammad Ghobadlou who suffered from long-term mental disability, was arrested in September 2022. He was subsequently charged and underwent two separate trials for âcorruption on earthâ, and âmurderâ, respectively before Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court and Branch one of Criminal Court One in Tehran in relation to allegations that on 22 September 2022, during a protest in the city of Parand, Tehran province, he ran over security forces resulting in the death of one of their members. In contravention of the principle of protection against double jeopardy, he received two death sentences, one by a Revolutionary Court, on 16 November 2022, and one by a criminal court, on 24 December 2022 for offences stemming from the same alleged acts. On 25 July 2023 Branch One of the Supreme Court accepted Mohammad Ghobadlouâs request for a judicial review of his death sentence issued on the charge of murder (qesas sentence) and referred the case to a lower criminal court for retrial involving an adequate mental health assessment. The decision was in light of new evidence, namely a letter by 50 medical professionals, mostly psychiatrists, which concerned his bipolar disorder and requested an adequate assessment to be carried out into Mr. Ghobadlouâs mental health by the medical committee. The signatories reportedly included a doctor from the State Legal Medicine Organization who, according to reports by the lawyers, had previously during the trial confirmed Mohammad Ghobadlouâs mental health without having read his medical records.
964. On 23 January at around 8.30 pm local time, a lawyer of Mohammad Ghobadlou announced that they had received a notification just a few hours earlier informing them that their client was scheduled for execution under qesas the next morning. Court documents and interviews by the lawyers given to the media show that after the Supreme Court ordered a retrial and while the victim and his lawyer were awaiting a retrial before Branch 5 of the criminal court, the Head of the Judiciary, Gholamhossein Ejeâie directly intervened in the case. According to court documents released by the Judiciaryâs news agency, the Head the Judiciaryâs intervention came following a request from the Head of the Justice Department (dadgostari) of Tehran province. As per instructions by the Head of the Judiciary, instead of a retrial, the case was sent to another branch of the Supreme Court. Contrary to Iranâs own laws, Branch 39 of the Supreme Court, presided by the same judges who had previously upheld his conviction was entrusted to rule on the case. Branch 39 of the Supreme Court, in a brief judgment that did not provide any reasoning annulled the July 2023 judgment ordering a retrial. Mohammad Ghobadlouâs lawyers publicly explained that the authorities kept the proceedings before Branch 39 a secret. Despite repeated inquires made by lawyers to Branch 39, they were reportedly denied any information and were told that the case was considered âhigh securityâ. According to the lawyers, no judgment was ever communicated to them, and they were only notified less than 24 hours before the scheduled execution.
Secret executions and executions in public
965. The Mission received credible information that the authorities carried out the execution of several protestors in secret without informing their family members and lawyers of the date of the execution. In the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou, according to an interview by his lawyer, his family was not given the opportunity to see him before the execution. Prison officials reportedly concealed the truth from his family and lawyers who were anxiously waiting for clarifications outside the prison in the early hours of 23 January 2024 and denied that he was scheduled for execution. At around 5.30 am., a conscripted soldier finally confirmed to the lawyers that officials including the prosecutor as well as the family of the deceased had arrived. Fifteen minutes later, officials announced to the family and lawyers that Mohammad Ghobadlou had been executed and told them to go to the cemetery.
966. In one case, that of Majidreza Rahnavard, the authorities carried out the execution in public. His December 2022 execution marked the second public execution after a reported two-year hiatus in public executions.
Trial of Children on Capital Offences
967. Prosecutorial and judicial officials charged and tried individuals under the age of 18 with capital offences. According to a statement by the Head of the Justice Department (dadgostari) in Alborz province, in the case consisting of 16 defendants accused of the charge of âcorruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel arz) in connection with the fatal assault of a member of a member of the Basij forces, three defendants were 17 years old. They were tried in the same proceedings as the adult defendants and in a Revolutionary Court. In its report on the first court hearing in the case on 30 November 2022, the Judiciaryâs news agency stated, âin accordance with article 315 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the cases of mature children under the age of 18 whose charges fall under the jurisdiction of Revolutionary Courts⊠shall be tried by branch 1 of criminal court 1, specialised to try offences [committed] by the adolescents.â It further stated that it was determined that the judge presiding over the case of 16 defendants in Karaj âhad special authorization to sit on both Revolutionary Courts and specialised criminal court [panels] for the adolescent.â The report added that all due process guarantees for the accused persons under the age of 18 had been respected in the case and the children were afforced the âprivileges considered for them under the law including having access to a lawyer and the presence of a social workerâ. The Mission was not able to confirm the precise punishments pronounced against the three children tried before Branch of the Revolutionary Court in Alborz province. According to official statements, bar five protesters who were sentenced to death by the court, the other 11 defendants in the case were sentenced to long prison terms of up to 25 years.
968. The Mission is aware of other cases in which children were reportedly charged and/or tried on capital offences. It highlights that due to the lack of transparency by the Government of Iran regarding the use of the death penalty and given that many family members and lawyers of persons charged with capital offences do not publicly report on the cases due to well-founded fear of State reprisals, determining the true scale of the use of the death penalty against children, including in the context of the protests, is not possible.
4. Legal findings
969. The Mission finds that by executing individuals for crimes not amounting to âthe most serious crimesâ and/or following summary proceedings that severely violated international human rights law, authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran unlawfully and arbitrarily deprived at least Mohsen Shekari, Majirdreza Rahnavard, Mohammad Mehdi Karami, Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, Majid Kazemi, Saeed Yaghoubi, Saleh Mir Hashemi, Milad Zohrevand and Mohammad Ghobadlou of their right to life and violated the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
970. The Mission established that proceedings leading to the pronouncement and implementation of death sentences were held in an extremely summary and hasty fashion and that judicial and prosecutorial authorities systematically violated the most elementary due process and fair trial guarantees including the right to presumption of innocence and to not be compelled to self-incriminate, the right to access a lawyer of their own choosing, the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, and the right to seek pardon, commutation of sentence or clemency. The Mission established that fair trial rights were so grossly violated and the proceedings leading to the issuance and implementation of death sentences were held in such summary and expedited fashion that they did not amount to meaningful judicial processes.
971. The Mission further established that Iranâs domestic laws, in violation of the non-derogable right to life under international human rights law, allow for arbitrary use of the death penalty including by imposing the death penalty for offences not amounting to âthe most serious crimesâ and for acts protected under international human rights law. They further contravene international law by allowing the use of the death penalty against children and providing for executions in public.
972. The Mission also has reasonable grounds to believe that the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran committed the crimes of torture in cases leading to the issuance and/or implementation of death sentences in a systematic manner.
973. Based on evidence, including statements by officials, the Mission finds that State authorities used the death penalty and a public execution and proceedings leading to the pronouncement of death sentences as a tool to punish protesters, to intimidate them and to instil fear in the population for purposes of deterring others from taking to the streets.
VI. Impact of the protests on ethnic and religious minorities
974. The death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini reverberated deeply among the ethnic and religious minority communities in the country. Her Kurdish identity and the Kurdish slogan âJin, Jiyan, Azadiâ or âWoman, Life, Freedomâ, became a rallying cry for ethnic minorities across the country, bringing to the fore their long-standing grievances, stemming from structural discrimination and marginalization in law and in practice.
975. Protests were sparked immediately after the news of Jina Mahsa Aminiâs death emerged, with many describing her death as the âspark that set fire to the ashesâ. Protesters took to the street in her hometown of Saqqez following her funeral. In the days that followed protests spread across the country, in particular in minority-populated regions, including East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Lorestan, Ilam and Sistan and Baluchestan. Zahedan city in Sistan and Baluchestan, Sanandaj, Saqquez and Mariwan cities in Kurdistan, and Mahabad city in West Azerbaijan became epicentres of the protest movement. Slogans such as âKurdistan, Kurdistan âŠ. Zahedan, Zahedan, the eye and light of Iranâ and âFrom Kurdistan to Tehran, my life for Iranâ, chanted by protesters across the country, expressed solidarity with minorities and recognition of their suffering. Reports indicated that minority populated areas recorded one of the highest number of protests compared to their population size. Over a year since the protests began, people continued to gather and protest with regularity in Zahedan, especially following Friday prayers.
976. The protests that started in Kurdish areas were immediately met with the Stateâs lethal force, and protesters in cities such as Saqqez and Divandarreh in Kurdistan were among the first victims of killings and injuries. As the numbers of those killed and injured increased across the country over the months, reports by non-governmental organizations indicated that minority-populated provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan and Sistan and Baluchestan, witnessed the largest number of killings. Video footage analysed by the Mission showed bloody scenes of the use of heavy military grade weapons and uninterrupted shooting by State security forces against protesters in cities such as Javanroud and Zahedan, resulting in a large number of killings, including of children, as well as severe injuries.
977. In his latest report to the UN General Assembly, the Secretary-General has noted that ethnic and religious minority communities in Iran were significantly affected in the context of the protests and that the number of reported deaths amongst minorities appeared to be higher relative to the total population.
978. In this section, the Mission reviews allegations of the disproportionate impact on minority communities of the Stateâs violent response to the protests, with a particular focus on Kurdish and Balochi communities, in line with the Missionâs intersectional approach to its investigations of allegations of violations under IHRL and international law in the context of its mandate. The focus on specific areas and communities is a reflection of the time constraints under which the investigation was conducted and the availability of information.
979. The Mission notes the overlapping and intersectional nature of the discrimination experienced by ethnic and religious minorities in Iran. Ethnic minorities in Iran are also predominantly religious minorities. The Mission accordingly considered the discrimination faced by these minorities on ethnic and religious “ethno-religiousâ grounds.
A. Legal framework
980. The ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD and the CRC, to which Iran is a State party, all enshrine the principle of non-discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
981. The ICERD notes that the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
982. States parties are required not to engage in any act or practice of racial discrimination against minorities; to undertake certain measures, including legislative measures, to end racial discrimination; to guarantee equal treatment before the law, the right to security of person, political rights, civil rights, the right to freedom of movement, of religion, of opinion and expression, of peaceful assembly.; and assure effective protection and remedies.
983. The Human Rights Committeeâs General Comment number 36(23), further states that the duty to protect the right to life requires States parties to take special measures of protection towards persons in vulnerable situations whose lives have been placed at particular risk because of specific threats or pre-existing patterns of violence. Such persons include religious and ethnic minorities.
984. The Mission highlights that States have an obligation to protect the existence of the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity. It further notes that the concept of minority is not numerically defined and that key factors are the existence of shared and common characteristics of culture, language, religion or a combination of them; their non-dominant position within a given territory; and how the groups and individuals self-identify.
985. Severe levels of discrimination against a group on the basis of their ethnicity or religion may amount to the crime against humanity of persecution, if directed against an identifiable group or collectively on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law in connection with an underlying act within the jurisdiction of the Court. In the Rome Statute “persecution” is defined as the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectively.
B. Structural factors underpinning marginalisation and discrimination in minority regions
986. In examining the impact of the protests and the Stateâs response to them on Iranâs minority communities, the Mission sought to review some of the structural, socio-economic, legal and other underlying contributing factors. In particular, the Mission noted consistent concerns expressed by the UN Secretary-General regarding the situation of ethnic and religious minorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, in 2015, the Secretary-General had noted that members of ethnic and religious minority groups continue to face persecution, including arrest and imprisonment, the denial of economic opportunities, expulsion from educational institutions, deprivation of the right to work, closure of businesses and the destruction of religious sites, such as cemeteries and prayer centres. Individuals seeking greater recognition of their cultural and linguistic rights risk facing harsh penalties, including capital punishment. Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, during its last review of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2010, expressed concern at the limited enjoyment of political, economic, social, and cultural rights by, inter alia, Arab, Azeri, Balochi and Kurdish communities. In its review, the Committee highlighted, in particular, discrimination faced by minorities with respect to housing, education, health, employment, and the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and religion, despite economic growth in Iran, noting that the provinces where many minorities live are the poorest in the country. These concerns were also echoed more recently by the Human Rights Committee, which in addition, expressed concerns about restrictions on political and social participation, and the reduced number of members of minority groups in senior and decision-making positions in governmental bodies and public administration.
987. While certain human rights issues are specific to particular ethnic or religious minorities, minority communities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as elsewhere, have overlapping ethnic, linguistic and religious identities that can result in significant intersectional discrimination. Iranian authorities do not collect or publish disaggregated data that would enable an analysis of the full extent of such intersectional discrimination.
1. Discrimination embedded in national laws and policies
988. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran guarantees the rights of all the people of Iran regardless of their ethnic group or tribe and states that âcolour, race, language and other such considerations shall not be grounds for special privilegesâ. However, there are significant areas where discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities remains embedded in domestic laws, as discussed below.
989. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that it does not consider Kurds, Baloch, Turks, Arabs, Lurs or Persians to be minorities, but rather âethnic groupsâ, by virtue of âthe diversity and multiplicity of the ethnicitiesâ of the Iranian population. It has further referred to the âAhwazi Arab ethnic minorityâ as a âfabricated phraseâ.
(a) Discrimination based on religion
990. Iranâs Constitution does not provide adequate legal protection against discrimination on the basis of religion or belief. Under the Constitution, religious freedoms are only extended to the practitioners of Islam and three other ârecognised religionsâ, namely, Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism. Practitioners of other religions and faiths, including the Bahaâi, Sabean-Mandeans and Yarsanis, as well as atheists, are afforded neither recognition nor protection under the Constitution. Moreover, article 14 of the Constitution qualifies the equal treatment of non-Muslims by stipulating that such equal treatment applies only to âall those who refrain from engaging in conspiracy against Islam and the Islamic Republicâ. Such a vaguely and broadly defined clause allows for wide and arbitrary interpretation, placing protected fundamental rights and freedoms of all non-Muslims including to religion, belief, and expression at risk.
991. Moreover, Iranian law further provides for prosecution and punishment of persons solely on the basis of their exercising their right to religion and belief. Notably, Iranian laws allow for the imposition of the death penalty for âapostasyâ. The Islamic Penal Code, amended in 2013, does not include the offenceâ of âapostasyâ, which remains a capital hadd offence under Shariâa. However, article 220 of the Code states: â[W]ith regards to the hadd crimes that are not specified in this Code, Article [167] of the Constitution will be applicableâ. Article 167 of the Constitution gives judges the discretion to, âpass judgments based on authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwasâ in the absence of codified laws. Therefore, judges are authorized to rely on Shariâa sources in adjudicating cases where a individuals are accused of âapostasyâ and can convict and sentence them to death on the basis of such sources. Article 513 of the Islamic Penal Code further establishes the offence of âinsulting Islamic sanctitiesâ and âinsulting the prophets and religious figures. Article 262 further provides that the punishment for âinsulting the Prophet of Islamâ (sabo- al-nabi) is death. UN Experts have persistently raised concerns with regard to the persecution of religious minorities accused of blasphemy or views deemed to be critical or derogatory to Islam.
992. Other vaguely worded and broadly defined provisions in the criminal law are open to wide interpretation and allow for criminalisation of the exercise of the rights to freedom of religion, belief and expression. Despite the prevalence of a series of offences in existing laws on national security and pertaining to the insult of religions and religious figures, in 2021, Iranâs Parliament added new provisions to the Penal Code, imposing harsh punishments on âanyone who insults Iranian ethnicities or divine religions or Islamic schools of thought recognised under the Constitution with the intent to cause violence or tensions in the society or with the knowledge that such [consequences] will followâ. The prescribed punishment in cases where the outlawed conduct âleads to violence or tensionsâ is a sentence of imprisonment of between two and five years and/or a fine. If no âviolence and tensionâ is caused, a sentence of imprisonment of between six months and two years and/or a fine may be imposed.
993. Additionally, article 500 bis of the Islamic Penal Code states that a person may be prosecuted if they are perceived to engage in âany deviant educational or proselytising activity that contradicts or interferes with the sacred law of Islamâ. The provision effectively criminalises adherence to, practice, and promotion of religions and belief systems that fall outside the legally recognised religions under the Constitution and is disproportionately used against religious minorities such as Bahaâis and Gonabadi Darvishes.
994. Iranâs laws also severely limit the rights of religious minorities to political participation. While under the Constitution members of recognised religions may be elected to five parliamentary seats reserved for them, they are not allowed to run for other seats in parliament. Many other high ranking leadership positions, including that of the President, are reserved for Muslims only and/or require candidates to make a mandatory declaration of their belief and adherence to the principle of the âabsolute rule of the Islamic juristâ thereby effectively excluding persons on the grounds of religion, belief and political opinion.
995. Iranian laws fail to guarantee the right to equality including before courts for religious minorities. Article 176 stipulates that, âif the witness does not meet the requirements provided for an admissible testimony under Shariâa rules, his/her statements shall be heard. [However] such statements shall be regarded as judicial signs (hearsay evidence) and the validity and weight given to them in the knowledge of the judge shall be decided by the courtâ.
996. Moreover, the Islamic Penal Code prescribes different penalties for Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, significantly harsher penalties, including the death penalty, are imposed for acts and crimes committed by members of religious minorities or those belonging to unrecognised religious which, for certain groups also overlap with ethnic minorities. In some cases, the âoffencesâ in question fall under the exercise of protected human rights. For example, the Islamic Penal Code prescribes the punishment of 100 lashes for the offence of fornication between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, but if the man in question is a non-Muslim, the punishment is enhanced to death. Similarly, a non-Muslim man may be sentenced to death for being the âactive partyâ in both penetrative and non-penetrative sexual relations with an unmarried Muslim man, whereas an unmarried Muslim man taking the âactive roleâ would be punishable by flogging. Another example relates to cases involving homicide, for which the Penal Code sanctions the punishment of qesas (retribution in kind), allowing the family of the murder victim to seek the execution of the convicted person or blood money. Under the law, if a Muslim is murdered, the murderer is sentenced to qesas. If a non-Muslim person murders another non-Muslim, the convicted person will similarly be sentenced to qesas. However, if a Muslim person murders a non-Muslim, qesas is not stipulated. In such cases, the convicted person may be prosecuted under article 612 of Book Five of the Islamic Penal Code, which prescribes a sentence of three to 10 years imprisonment, if the âaction (murder) disturbs public order, protection or security of society, or incites him or othersâ.
997. Other domestic laws, including the Civil Code, also contain discriminatory provisions based on religious or ethnic grounds. For example, under the Civil Code, a non-Muslim may not inherit from a Muslim.
998. While Shiâa Islam is the official state religion, the Constitution recognises other Islamic schools, including the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, namely the Hanafi, Shafiâi, Maliki and Hanbali, and states that they âare free to perform their own religious practices, religious education, and personal matters.â They may practice their religious education, and ensure their personal status (regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, and bequest), in accordance with their own jurisprudence. The dispute over these matters is recognized in the courts. According to the Constitution, in any area where followers of these schools of thought are in the majority, local regulations, within the domain of the councilâs jurisdictions, are set according to that school of thought so long as the rights of the followers of other schools of religion are maintained.
999. Despite legal protections contained in the Constitution, Sunnis continue to face discrimination including in relation to political representation. The Constitution itself excludes non-Shias from applying for the position of President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, as stated above, candidates for many political positions as well as judgeship are required to fulfil criteria of belief and adherence to the principle of the âabsolute rule of the Islamic juristâ. This effectively excludes persons, including Sunni Muslims, on the grounds of religion, belief and political opinion. Institutionalized discrimination against Sunnis is also reflected by the absence of Sunnis appointed to senior, influential government positions. While Sunnis can enter parliament as Muslims, they still face restrictions. While not legally excluded, in practice Sunnis are not appointed as government ministers or provincial governors, even in provinces with significant Sunni populations.
1000. Moreover, there continue to be reports that Sunnis enjoy less freedom to worship than their Shiâa counterparts. For instance, while there are reportedly one million Sunni adherents in Tehran city, there continue to be reports that the Government blocks the building of Sunni mosques. Sunni citizens often have to gather in private prayer centers, some of which have been shut down by security forces. In addition, several Sunni mosques and religious schools have reportedly been demolished and confiscated in the past several years.
1001. The Mission highlights that there is a strong overlap between the Sunni minority and the countryâs ethnic minorities. Iranâs largest ethnic groups, the Baluchi, the Kurds and the Turkmen are predominantly Sunni Muslims, as are many Ahwazi Arabs- Existing estimates show that the Sunni population of Iran constitutes about 8 to 10 percent of the total population of the country, which is concentrated or scattered in the provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, North and South Khorasan, Golestan, Gilan, Ardabil, Hormozgan, Bushehr, Fars and South of Kerman, as well as Tehran and Karaj.
1002. State policies further exacerbate domestic laws that allow for discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief. Religious minorities, including Sunnis, face particular barriers in the area of access to employment, which is often limited by gozinesh, the screening process for recruitment to government jobs. Under gozinesh, candidates for positions with the government or State corporations are required to pledge their loyalty to the Islamic Republic, the state religion and the principle of VelĂąyat-e Faqih (Governance of a Muslim jurist). Accordingly, members of religious minorities and/or persons not adhering to State-sanctioned ideologies are particularly disadvantaged and discriminated against in the context of access to employment.
1003. Iranâs national security laws also have implications for the rights of minorities. As detailed in Section V, Iranâs laws, the Islamic Penal Code in particular, contain a large number of provisions, especially those pertaining to national security offences, that in vague and broad terms allow for criminalisation of dissent including speech and acts that fall within protected rights under international human rights law. The Mission highlights that while the provisions apply to all individuals, minority communities are at a disproportionate risk of being charged with and prosecuted for certain national security offences. This is in light of the authoritiesâ discourse on minorities pertaining to âseparatismâ and âterrorismâ as detailed below.
2. Socio-economic situation
1004. Iranâs minority regions suffer the highest poverty rates. According to the latest World Bank report, disparities have increased across the country, with poverty increasingly concentrated in the Southeast and Northwest regions. In 2020, 32 per cent of poor households in the country lived in these two regions, home to only 20 per cent of the total population. Conversely, only 24 per cent of the poor live in the Tehran metro area and the central region, where 40 percent of the population lives. These spatial disparities have only widened between 2011 and 2020. The poverty headcount has increased from 43 per cent to 52 per cent in the Southeast region, and from 16 per cent to 36 per cent in the Northwest region. The difference in poverty headcount between the Southeast region and the Tehran metro area has increased from 29 percentage points to 36 percentage points over the past decade. Sistan and Baluchestan province has remained Iranâs poorest region over the last decade. Poverty rates in West Azerbaijan have also more than tripled from 13.6 per cent in 2011 to 44 per cent in 2020. There also appears to be a strong correlation between an increase in poverty and the share of the labour force working in agriculture, with those provinces relying heavily on agriculture experiencing the greatest increases in poverty.
1005. According to the World Bank, agricultural labourers were disproportionately affected by increasing prices and persistent drought in especially the Northeast and West and Southeast regions. In 2022, the unemployment rate was reportedly at 11.4 per cent in Sistan and Baluchestan and 10.2 per cent in Kurdistan, higher than the national average of 8.9 per cent. Khuzestan, home to the majority of Iranâs ethnic Arabs, reportedly has the third-highest rate of unemployment, even though it has 80 per cent of Iranâs oil and 60 per cent of its gas reserves. In some parts of Sistan and Baluchestan, unemployment is up to 60 per cent. The province is also has the highest illiteracy and infant mortality rates in the country.
1006. Environmental challenges, and resulting grievances, are particularly significant in the ethnic majority areas of the country. For example, 22 incidents of reported gatherings and protests took place in the first ten months of 2018 regarding the right to usable water across the country, at least 12 of which took place in Khuzestan Province, home to Ahwazi Arabs, where a number of protesters were reportedly detained. Similarly, in Sistan and Baluchestan, climate change has reportedly worsened living conditions by drying up seasonal lakes and causing a surge in respiratory illness
World Bank Group, âIran Poverty Diagnosticâ, November 2023, p.30
1007. Very high unemployment rates have meant there are limited livelihood opportunities for people living in minority provinces. In this context, ethnic and religious minorities in these regions have resorted to hazardous and high-risk economic activities, such as cross-border couriering (often called kulbar), which entails importing and transporting merchandise along unofficial routes on the north-western borders of Iran. Kulbars carry packages on their backs or on horses through hard-to-reach mountain passes over borders and into the regionâs towns and villages in return for a small fee. Accounts of a continuous use of force against and extrajudicial killings of border couriers has been long documented in reports of human rights organizations, the UN Special Procedures as well as in reports of the Secretary-General.
1008. Many Baloch people do not have birth certificates (shenasname) leaving them without any identification papers and effectively rendering them stateless. This is due to several factors including those that intersect with discrimination on the grounds of gender. Most notably, under Iranian law, nationality is de facto acquired through paternal descent, and until recently this was also the case de jure as Iranian women only acquired the right to transmit citizenship to their children in limited circumstances. Around 36,000 individuals of Baloch ethnic background lack birth certificates and official identification in Sistan and Baluchestan. Lack of documentation further exacerbates the institutional discrimination that affects Baloch peopleâs enjoyment of their human rights, by excluding them from access to State services such as healthcare and social welfare, as well as to education and employment. Even though some children have been able to attend school with the issuance of special cards, many others remain deprived of education due to the lack of birth certificates.
âWe are several siblings, none of us have a birth certificate [shenasname]⊠none of us could go to school and study because we had no documentation and without documentation, one cannot do anything, there is no possibility to study, or to travel, you are stuck in a prison⊠if you are ill and you see a doctor, the fee would be twice; those who have documentation have insurance⊠but for us the fees are high and so is the price of medication⊠we could not even move freely in a city or travel to other cities for work⊠life is difficult for us beyond description and someone who does not live a life without documentation here and experience the misery of it, can never truly understand this.â
Statement received through an NGO of a Baloch victim describes the suffering caused by being deprived of identity documents and the impact it has on all aspects of oneâs life.
1009. Girlsâ access to education is particularly affected as a result of lack of documentation, as well as by child or early marriage, and economic factors leading to only 40-50 per cent of the girls in minority-populated border regions reportedly completing high school.
1010. Lack of identity documents, as detailed below, also obstructs access to justice of Baloch people. Without documentation to prove identity, courts in Iran often require a DNA test to verify an identity to proceed with their case. Such tests reportedly cost several million toman. In a context of severe poverty, as described above, and lack of access to employment for those without documents, such costs would be unaffordable, thus further impeding peopleâs access to redress through the legal system.
1011. Ethnic and linguistic minorities also face restrictions on exercising their language rights. The Islamic Republic of Iran only recognizes Farsi (Persian) as its official language. There is no access to mother tongue learning in primary and secondary educational institutions. Moreover, advocates for education and cultural activities in languages other than Persian face harassment including prosecution and punishment under national security offences. Depriving children of education in their mother tongue has reportedly resulted in lower levels of learning among students in minority regions.
1012. Reports by human rights organizations and UN experts show that persons, such as Bahaâis, who do not adhere to a ârecognised religionâ under the Constitution, are routinely denied access to higher education as they are either banned, or expelled, from enrolment at university. The admissions regulations for universities established by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution state that students must be from one of the four ârecognized religionsâ as part of the eligibility criteria for prospective students.
3. The Government narrative: Ethnic separatist movements
1013. Early on in the protests, the Government of Iran sought to characterise the nationwide movement as a breakaway uprising by Jina Mahsa Aminiâs fellow Kurds, threatening the nation’s unity rather than its clerical rule. Commentators have said that by blaming separatist groups, the authorities essentially aimed to create a “rally around the flag effect” to encourage Iranians to support the leadership rather than the protesters.
1014. The Government blamed opposition groups, such as the Kurdish group Komala, a left-wing party seeking independence for ethnic Kurds, which the Government considers a âterroristâ group, as protests were most intense in the northwestern Kurdish-majority cities, including Mahabad, Bukan, Piranshahr in West Azerbaijan and Javanrud in Kermanshah. On 14 November 2022, the IRGC reportedly fired rockets which killed 13 people, after hitting the Komala headquarters in Sulaimaniyah, and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistanâs base in Koye near Erbil, both in northern Iraq. The IRGC said it was targeting âterrorist groupsâ with missiles and drones, after repeated warnings about cross-border separatist groups bringing weapons into Iran and fuelling tensions.
1015. Similarly, the Government of Iran blamed âseparatist movementsâ in Sistan and Baluchestan, for the attack on a police station in the city of Zahedan on 30 September during the âBloody Fridayâ events, where it claimed 19 citizens were killed and 32 IRGC members, including volunteer Basij forces were also wounded in clashes (see below). Indeed, on 19 November 2022, State-affiliated media outlet Alalam quoted a Brigadier-General, stating that “Takfiri and terrorist groupsâ had spread out in the provinces of Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan, in western and eastern Iran, but that the security forces had defeated them.
1016. The authorities continuously represented the exercise of minority rights as a threat to national security or acts of insurgency or separatism. Such a narrative allowed the authorities to justify the prosecution of individuals for capital offenses, under the pretext of fighting terrorism and separatist groups (see below).
4. Cyclical State violence and climate of impunity
1017. Persistent violations of a range of civil, political, and social, economic, and cultural rights of ethnic minorities in Iran have been exacerbated by a long-standing entrenched discrimination and historic impunity for violations. There is a long history of the use of force in the context of political resistance dating back to the pre-1979 Revolution. The conflation of actual or perceived dissent with separatism or terrorism has paved the way for the authorities to arrest, prosecute and routinely sentence to death ethnic minorities.
1018. Reports by human rights organizations and UN experts show that persons belonging to ethnic minorities are disproportionately sentenced to death and executed, in particular on national security and drug related offences. In 2021, the Special Rapporteur on Iran reported that between 2010 and 2020, of the 129 people who were reportedly executed for alleged involvement and affiliation with political groups, 53 per cent were Kurdish, 26 per cent Baloch and 13 per cent Arab. In 2022, a human rights organization reported that executions in Sistan and Baluchestan accounted for 30 per cent of the total executions in the country during the year. The majority of these were for drug related offences. For example, in 2019, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that Kurdish political prisoners charged with national security offences represent almost half of the total number of political prisoners in the Islamic Republic of Iran and constitute a disproportionately high number of those who received the death penalty and are executed.
1019. There has been a pattern in these regions of protests being met with lethal force, violence and repression, with ensuing impunity. For example, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed the authorities excessive use of force during the protests in November 2019 against provinces populated by ethnic minorities, resulting in those provinces recording the highest numbers of deaths, with 84 and 52 people being killed in Khuzestan and Kermanshah Provinces respectively. According to documentation by human rights organizations and reports by the media, Khuzestan province, home to Ahwazi Arabs, witnessed a particularly lethal and violent response during the state repression of the November 2019 nationwide protests. Reports show that State authorities deployed heavy military grade weaponry, tanks, and armoured vehicles with DshK heavy machine guns mounted on them to the southern province. More specifically, in an incident that came to be referred to as the âMahshahr Massacreâ, security forces used lethal heavy weapons against protesters who had blocked the roads in the city of Mahshahr, located in proximity to Iranâs major petrochemical facility and its Petrochemical Special Economic Zone. According to reports, in one incident, on 18 November, the IRGC forces opened fire against protesters who had fled and were taking shelter in the marshlands, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner, killing and injuring a large number.
1020. Moreover, dozens of human rights defenders from ethnic minorities, including Kurds and Azerbaijani-Turks, were reportedly summoned, or arrested following the November 2019 protests.
1021. Most recently, in 2021, protests in Khuzestan triggered by a worsening water crisis and access to water were met with violence by security forces, who according to reports, fired live ammunition and metal pellets at protesters killing several people and injuring others. The Mission highlights the atmosphere of fear that is commonly found, due to the risk of reprisals as well as internet disruptions and shutdown imposed during periods of protests which further hindered the ability of victims and human rights defenders to report on the violations including the number of those killed.
1022. Examples of the use of lethal force resulting in unlawful killings in minority-populated areas are not restricted to the context of protests. Reports by human rights organizations and the UN experts show that security forces systematically fired live ammunition at Kulbars and Soukhtbars (border couriers) in Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan, killing and severely injuring them. In 2019, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed particular concerns over the continuing use of excessive force against and extrajudicial killings of border couriers who often reside in the impoverished provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Sistan and Baluchestan and Western Azerbaijan. In the same vein, in a press release on 5 March 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the use of lethal force by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and state security forces against unarmed fuel couriers and protesters belonging to the Baluch minority, which reportedly led to the killing of at least 12 individuals, including at least two minors. The statement further noted that during 2020, a total of 59 Kurdish couriers were reported to have been killed by border officials in provinces in the north-west of Iran and called for an immediate measure to end the impunity that perpetuate the practice.
C. Treatment of ethnic and religious minorities in the context of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests
1. Use of force resulting in deaths and injuries
1023. While protest-related killings transcended ethnic, religious and administrative boundaries, with killings recorded in 29 provinces, the Mission investigated allegations that a disproportionate number of the victims were from the Baluchi minority in Sistan and Baluchestan and Kurdish-populated provinces. In light of the absence of disaggregated official government data, on the reported number of protest related killings, the Mission could not determine the exact number of Kurdish and Baluchi protesters killed in connection with the protests, but instead relied on credible figures advanced by civil society organizations.
1024. This included the credible figure of 121 deaths recorded in Sistan and Baluchestan, followed by 45 deaths in Kurdistan and 60 deaths in West Azerbaijan, between 16 September and 10 December 2022, indicating that almost half of all killings of protesters occurred in minority-populated regions.
Distinct modus operandi in minority-populated regions
1025. The Mission assessed the existence of distinctly egregious conduct of security agents including the deployment of specific units of security forces, and patterns in the use of weaponry and lethal force, which led to the higher proportion of causalities among protesters in minority populated cities and provinces.
1026. The Mission found a direct relationship between protests and the disproportionate number of killings in minority-populated regions. The situation most emblematic of the use of disproportionate lethal force took place on 30 September 2022 in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchestan province, known as the âBloody Fridayâ.
(a) 30 September 2022 âBloody Fridayâ
1027. Events in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchestan province formed the backdrop to the protests in Zahedan. In September 2022, media reports begun circulating about the rape of a 15-year-old girl allegedly by a high-ranking police officer in Chabahar. On 25 September 2022, the provincial Imam issued a statement confirming news of the rape and, according to a witness, called on the people to protest. On 27 September 2022 protests took place in Chabahar. A witness stated that, about 4,000 to 5,000 people gathered in front of the police station and the GovernorÂŽs building, calling for justice for the girl, and for women more broadly. In response, the protesters were shot at from the roof of the police station and the GovernorÂŽs house. There is credible information that several persons were injured as a result. According to media reports, the accused police chief, was released on bail and transferred to Tehran and the family of the girl was put under house arrest.
1028. One week later, on Friday 30 September 2022, Friday prayers took place as usual at the Great Mosalla (prayer hall) in Zahedan, the capital city of the Sistan and Baluchestan province. At approximately 12:30 p.m., and as worshippers remained in the mosque still praying, a group of individuals gathered in front of the police station (Kalantari) number 16, situated across the street from the Great Mosalla. Individuals protested the rape of the Baluchi girl in Chabahar and the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini.
1029. The Mission established that from around 12.30 pm onwards, security forces opened fire, including from the police station rooftop, towards the protesters and bystanders. Evidence reviewed by the Mission shows that protesters, mostly men, chanted slogans and threw stones at the police station. In return, security forces stationed on the rooftop of the police station fired directly at the crowd, including protesters and bystanders. A two-minute video footage reviewed by the Mission depicts the initial moments when the protests started. The video shows a very small group of protesters outside the station with some sporadically throwing stones towards it as gunshots are heard. Others, including young children are seen calmly standing on the sides or passing by. As the sound of shooting becomes more intense and increasingly continuous, the number of protesters grows and a larger number start engaging in throwing stones towards the police station. Two armed plainclothes agents, one in what appears to be traditional Balochi attire, are seen on the rooftop of the police station.
1030. Witnesses told the Mission that AK-47s were shot towards and inside the Great Mosalla as some worshippers were still performing prayers. One witness saw a âworshipper in the mosque being shot in the head as he was prayingâ. A video, taken inside the Great Mosalla, consistent with witnessesâ accounts, shows dozens of worshipers standing and starting to leave the mosque while others are still praying when gunshots are heard. Credible information further confirmed direct firing inside of the Great Mosalla, resulting in killings and injuries of worshippers.
1031. Witness accounts, consistent with other credible information the Mission examined, described heavy fire and non-stop shooting by AK-47s and other assault rifles directed at protesters and bystanders from the police station and security forces stationed in proximity to Mosalla. Witness statements and video footage further confirmed that shooting at protesters continued over a sustained period of time. In one video, which according to position of the sun and shadows was taken at around 13.30, injured and frightened protesters are seen hiding behind vehicles and sitting next to a wall about a hundred meters from the police station while protesters carry more injured and unresponsive persons from the direction of the police station. The sound of weapon discharge can be heard throughout the video which lasts for one minute and 40 seconds. Another video reviewed by the Mission, shows at least five members of the security forces with at least two in FARAJA uniforms on the rooftop of the police station with a cloud of smoke rising from inside the stationâs courtyard. The video depicts a security force in plainclothes, apparently traditional Balochi attire, aim his firearms and discharge a single shot towards where, based on other videos, protesters and bystanders gathered. Ballistic analysis confirmed that the weapon discharged is AK-47 while the sound of other assault rifles could be heard.
1032. According to credible information, plainclothes forces stationed on the rooftop of several buildings and hills in proximity to the mosque also took part in shooting at protesters and bystanders. A witness told the Mission that he saw armed plainclothes forces stationed on the rooftops of several buildings near the Grand Mosalla. Another witness stated that he saw around 20 to 25 security officers in plainclothes shooting AK-47s and sniper rifles from the roof of the police station. Witness statements and credible information reviewed by the Mission further showed that helicopters flew over the area and that protesters and bystanders were shot by forces inside the helicopters.
1033. Witnesses and victims whose accounts the Mission received through civil society organizations saw numerous victims killed and injured and described scenes of extreme violence by the State with some referring to what they witnessed as âcarnageâ and âmassacreâ. A witness described heavy uninterrupted fire against the protesters, saying he tried to take refuge to âsurviveâ. He reported seeing many injured and killed but asked âhow one could count and give an estimate on the numbersâ amid such scenes of violence. Another described that one could see dead bodies everywhere. A witness to the killings whose statement the Mission received through an NGO, said that the extent of the killings were so large that any extended family had one or two or three killed or injured. He himself had carried the bodies of five killed children.
1034. The witnesses also described that injured and possibly dead bodies were brought inside the Great Mosalla covered in blood. One witness said there were approximately 300 to 400 persons injured taken to the Mosalla. Several video footage and photographic evidence reviewed by the Mission also show chaotic scenes of distressed civilians carrying injured and unresponsive persons, including inside the Mosalla. In a video reviewed by the Mission a man walks around inside the Great Mosalla, where at least 20 victims are seen lying on the ground with severe injuries, including to their heads and torso, with their clothes covered in blood. Most appear unresponsive and motionless. The videographer is heard saying âa hundred killed and martyredâ, repeating, as he films each victim, âit is a massacre in Zahedan, it is a massacreâ. Another video shows several injured and unresponsive persons in the trunk of a private car as distressed people, amid a chaotic scene, apparently attempt to transfer those injured to hospitals. Several victims lie on the ground with severe injuries, some look visibly lifeless.
1035. Evidence, including photos and videos of victims, witness accounts, burial certificates and accounts by relatives of victims, shows that most victims were shot in the vital organs including in the head, chest and abdomen. Two burial certificates examined by the Mission lists the cause of death as respectively, âdeep penetrative wounds to the head (fracturing of the bones and severe damage to internal [brain] tissue) caused by âbeing struck in the head with a bulletâ in one case, and âdeep penetrative wounds to the torso (severe damage to internal organs) as a result of âbeing struck with a bullet in the chestâ in the other.
1036. According to credible information received by the Mission, as well as reports from human rights organizations, following the shooting outside of the Great Mosalla, protests first expanded to the neighbouring area, in particular around the Makki Mosque, before spreading further into several areas of the city. Security forces continued to use force injuring and killing more protesters and bystanders well into the evening. Credible information reviewed by the Mission shows that the sound of helicopters and shooting by security forces continued to be heard throughout the afternoon and evening.
1037. Credible information received by the Mission indicates severe overcrowding at hospitals in Zahedan on 30 September 2022 with a large number of injured persons and corpses at hospitals in the immediate aftermath of the shootings.
1038. State officials and media provided contradictory and conflicting narratives of the events. On 30 September 2022, in an interview with the State TV, the chief of police forces in Sistan and Baluchestan claimed that once the Friday prayers on 30 September ended and worshippers were leaving the mosque, several âunknown armed persons carried out a terrorist attack and fired at worshipers and towards police station number 16.â He claimed that the number of those armed âwas very largeâ. Similarly, in a report, Iranâs High Council for Human Rights claimed that âseveral extremist and armed elements attacked a police station adjacent to a place dedicated to Friday prayer and attempted to seize it.â Furthermore, the report stated that â19 citizens lost their lives as a result of the terrorist incident, and 32 security and law enforcement officers sustained injuries.â Another report by State TV, the IRIB, aired several days after the incident, in addition to claiming that there were armed individuals among the protesters, stated that the police forces used teargas to prevent the protesters from entering the police station. According to the report, after a number of protesters broke the door of the station and entered the yard, âthe situation leaned towards the endangering of the armoury and security red linesâ. The report states that it is at this point when the police, to âprotect its borders and prevent being disarmed was forced to shoot⊠what is clear is that the police was forced to shoot only to injure the rioters.â
1039. In November 2022, Iranâs High Council for Human Rights provided a different version of what transpired in Zahedan on 30 September – it appeared to accept that protesters and bystanders were killed by security forces:
â[O]n Friday, the 30th of September 2022, at the end of the Sunni Friday prayer in Zahedan, a group of people attacked Police Station No. 16, which is adjacent to the Great Mosalla prayer complex, and planned to occupy the said headquarters. Unfortunately, some fellow citizens and worshipers lost their lives or sustained injuries during the attack and following clashes between the attackers and the defense forces of the police station. After the incident, several armed individuals abused the highly charged atmosphere and â in addition to attacking citizens and various places set fire to and looted public and private properties and clashed with the security forces, during which some rioters were killed and some innocent people and several members of law enforcement forces martyred.â
1040. In their reporting on the incident, state media claimed that some protesters were armed and have included video footage depicting an individual firing a gun in front of the police station entrance. The Mission commissioned a digital forensic analysis of the video which did not find signs of manipulation with the footage. The Mission notes that based on the evidence, any such alleged cases would have been isolated incidents. According to witnesses interviewed by the Mission as well as other credible information reviewed, protesters were generally not armed, but engaged in throwing stones and/or breaking the door of the police station. According to one witness, it was only several hours later in the day, when protesters had been killed that some family members of those killed returned with arms. Another statement received by the Mission said that protesters were not armed as security forces âmassacredâ them, including children, but later at night, several people took out hunting guns to prevent the security forces from killing people. Moreover, contrary to claims by the state regarding attacks by âarmed terrorist groupsâ, witness statements, credible information and audio-visual material showed that the shooting started as soon as the protests took place and several protesters threw stones towards the police station. Even worshippers inside of the mosque were shot at and killed, according to credible information. Evidence reviewed shows that security forces indiscriminately fired assault rifles at protesters and bystanders for a sustained period of time. A witness described non-stop heavy shooting and 16 or 17 injured and bloodied people, including children, within only minutes after leaving the mosque. Moreover, witness accounts and credible information point to the heightened security presence prior to prayers and deployment of forces including on roof tops, which they referred to as âpre-meditated planâ by the State to crackdown on protesters.
1041. According to credible information and video footage reviewed, after the Friday prayers, some protesters also kicked the police stationâs door and broke it and a protester, under direct fire, drove his vehicle into the police station twice destroying one of the walls. A witness stated also that security personnel were the ones who burned the shops and made the chaos in order to portray an image for Baluch people that they are violent and separatist and to find an excuse for their killings. This was echoed by other credible information reviewed by the Mission.
1042. The November 2022 report by Iranâs High Council for Human Rights claims that âexpert teamsâ were subsequently dispatched to Zahedan to âinvestigate the causes, contexts, manners and dimensions of the incidentâ. According to the report, after measures such as interviewing âpolice commanders and security officialsâ as well as eyewitnesses and injured personsâ:
âThe Security Council of Sistan & Baluchestan province announced the results of the investigations, accepted the negligence of some officers, dismissed both the chief of Police Station No. 16 and the Commander of Police Forces of Zahedan, ordered compensation of innocent victims and their families, and sent to the judicial authority the case of the incidents, including the instigators, rioters and attackers who assaulted the police station, and on the other hand, the relevant police officials, so that violations and crimes can be dealt with accurately and according to legal regulations.â
1043. Despite State claims regarding an investigation, the Mission has not seen evidence that any investigations were carried out, including in cases where families lodged complaints. No reporting of the results of the claimed investigations was made public by the authorities. According to credible information and public reports, some families were simply told or were pressured to accept the blood money (diyeh) without any criminal investigations carried out or were given the body of their loved one on the condition that they refrain from lodging a complaint. Credible information reviewed by the Mission further shows that some family members were not given death or burial certificates, or were given a certificate with the condition that they say their loved one was not killed during the âBloody Fridayâ.
1044. Credible information and evidence gathered, indicates that the death toll was substantial, and included children who were injured and killed by State security forces. According to credible information from human rights organizations and media reported to the Mission, those killed in Zahedan during and in the aftermath of the “Bloody Fridayâ may range from 82 to 103, including at least 13 children, one as young as 2-years-old. Moreover, approximately 350 protesters and bystanders were reportedly injured.
1045. On 1 October 2022, Mowlana Abdolhamid the Sunni Imam of Sistan and Baluchestan in a video posted on social media recited how âthe Bloody Fridayâ incident unfolded and stated that protestors were shot by snipers in the heart and head on 30 September, âthe police force could have used tear gas and plastic bullets to avoid killing so many people, unarmed who just left the Mossala after prayers.â â⊠But it has been over 43 years since security forces singled out this Sunni people, the justice should be served, and these people should be listened to, compensated.â
1046. Based on the analysis of the above-mentioned information, the Mission finds that the use of lethal force by the security forces was disproportionate to the alleged threat posed by some of the protesters to public order, and thus resulted in unlawful and extra-judicial killings. The Mission finds that the tactics and weapons used in responding to what generally amounted to peaceful assembly, were unlawful and possibly the result of discriminatory policies.
(b) Zahedan, one-year on
1047. Reports by human rights human rights organizations, including on the basis of video footage, shows that State security forces continued to use excessive and lethal use of force in the city of Zahedan where protests regularly took place following Friday prayers including in 2023. According to reports, peaceful protesters gathered to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the âBloody Fridayâ killings on 29 September 2023. In response, security forces armed with shotguns and machine guns, used tear gas, beat protesters with batons and shot at them with birdshot and paintball pellets. Large number of protesters, including children were reportedly arrested. Similarly, according to credible information reviewed by the Mission and reports by human rights organizations, on 20 October 2023, protesters peacefully marched after leaving the Great Mosallah in Zahedan following the Friday prayer. They were met with security forces who fired tear gas and shot at them with metal pellets. Water cannons, and yellow-coloured liquid were used reportedly to both disperse the protesters and to mark them for subsequent identification and arrest. Security forces were further reported to have chased protesters and beating and attesting them. According to reports, children as young as 10 were among those injured, arrested, and forcibly disappeared. The Mission notes that this incident requires further investigation.
(c) Javanroud, Kermanshah, 20 and 21 November 2022
1048. On 20 November 2022, a large demonstration in support of the people of Mahabad, a Kurdish city in West Azerbaijan province, was held in Javanroud city, in Kermanshah province. Following protests on 8 October, IRGC forces maintained a heavy presence in Javanroud. Many shops and schools continued to be closed and persons detained. According to public reports, at around 3 p.m. on 20 November, protesters first gathered and marched in Taleghani Street and Omid square, commonly known as the Tooti square. Protesters chanted slogans in solidarity with the people of Mahabad. A car with a loudspeaker reportedly warned people to stay indoors, stating that âanti-revolutionariesâ affiliated with outlawed Kurdish political parties would be crushedâ. According to reports, to disperse the protesters, IRGC forces opened fire against them, shooting AK-47s and tear gas. The Mission analysed a video, captured in the evening of 20 November in Javandroud, depicting protesters, men and women, peacefully chanting âMahabad is not alone, Javanroud has its backâ, and âZhen, Zhian, Azadiâ. Towards the end of the video, what appears to be the sound of gunshot could be heard in a distance.
1049. By around 7 p.m., more protesters were reported to have joined the protests. IRGC forces continued to use force against the protesters including by firing into the air and used tear gas to disperse the crowd. As the protests began to wane, news circulated that Erfan Kakaee, a 52-year-old sports instructor, had been shot in the back as he sought to protect his students by approaching armed security forces. According to credible information and a public report, Erfan Kakaee was not directly partaking in the protests when he was shot but was only engaged in a verbal exchange with the security forces, pleading with them to stop the shooting while also urging the protesters to flee the site.
1050. According to credible information, fearing that the security forces would seize the body of Erfan Kakaee, a group of people went to the hospital to collect his body while protesters gathered outside the hospital. As several cars were in procession, at around 8 pm, IRGC forces fired at one of the cars. A 16-year-old boy, Bahaoddin Veisi, was killed as a result and two other car passengers, including Bahaoddinâs brother, sustained severe injuries. The Mission analysed an image which according to reports, was taken in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. depicting a dozen security armed forces, mostly in IRGC uniforms surrounding a black Peugeot, in which Bahaoddin Veisi was travelling. Ballistic analysis of the image shows that the holes in the window shield were caused by ammunition from a high velocity weapon fired at the car several times. The holes are consistent with the use of assault rifles. The security forces seen in the image are armed with assault rifles including AK-47 and SVD, which are particularly used by snipers.
1051. The killings of Erfan Kakaee and Bahaoddin Veisi sparked further protests in Javanroud on 21 November 2022, the day of their burials. Credible information shows that Bahaoddin Veisi was quietly buried in the early hours of the morning, only in the presence of his immediate family as the security forces had issued threats against his relatives to attend the burial. Following his funeral, a massive crowd of over 15,000 mourners, consisting of women, men and children, with the participation of prominent Sunni clerics, marched from the cemetery towards the houses of the two victimsâ families.
1052. According to credible information, including a witness statement, two statements obtained and shared with the Mission by NGOs, and several videos, upon their return to the city, peaceful protesters encountered heavily armed security forces, primarily consisting of the IRGC forces. armed with assault rifles and machine guns including AK-47s, Uzi, Dshk machine guns mounted on vehicles, and qannaseh, the local term for Dragunov SVD rifles. According to public reports, security forces blocked protesters from going to the victimsâ house. In response, protesters chanted slogans and according to one witness, threw stones. From around 10.30 am, security forces reportedly fired tear gas and warning shots before immediately firing live ammunition at unarmed protesters, including women and children. According to two other public reports, protesters fleeing direct fire separated into several groups with some running to Behdari street (official name Taleghani) where most killings and injuries took place. The Mission has not found any evidence of violence by protesters. After live ammunition was directed against them, some protesters threw stones towards the security forces.
1053. The Mission analysed several video footages depicting State security forces directing heavy fire against protesters in Javanroud. In one footage, taken by a protester hiding behind a wall in a small alley in Behdari street, unarmed protesters, are seen fleeing towards the videographer while a barrel of bullets is directed at them. They pass a motionless man lying on the sidewalk. The distressed protesters are heard screaming saying: âthey killed himâ. Another protester is seen being shot at and falling as he flees to take shelter. Other protesters, under continuous fire, help the injured man to move and take refuge behind the wall. A bullet hits the wall only centimetres away from the camera, barely missing the protesters sheltering. The sound of nonstop gunfire is heard throughout the entire duration of the video, of minute and a half. According to ballistic analysis, the sound of gunfire appears to be that from an assault rifle, mostly likely Ak-47, fired both single rounds and semi-automatic rounds.
1054. A second video footage of the same scene was captured in the aftermath of the shooting. The video depicts the same man on the sidewalk of the street, lying motionless with blood streaming from his head. Around 10 members of the security forces, mostly in IRGC uniforms and armed with heavy firearms, as well as a number of plainclothes forces in seemingly Kurdish attire holding handheld transceivers, continue to walk around. The body on the ground, according to credible information belong to Esmail Golanbar, who was shot dead in Behdari Street. According to ballistic analysis, four uniformed forces are seen carrying AK 47s variants and other weapons including a shotgun, UZI (a short machine gun â SMG), Dshk or SVD are identifiable in the video.
1055. In a third video, a man, Jowhar Fattahi, according to credible information is seen walking down an alley while profusely bleeding from his upper thigh and with his trousers (pantol in Kurdish) covered in blood. Half into the 15-second video, he is seen sitting next to a wall, apparently weak. Protesters are seen fleeing as continuous gunshots are heard. Two protesters stop to help him walk away. According to credible information, Jowhar Fattahi attempted to retrieve the bodies of two victims shot by the security forces when he was shot and died as a result of bleeding shortly after. Another protester, Jamal Azami was similarly shot as he attempted to help Tahsin Miri, another protester who was shot. Masoud Teimouri was also shot and killed as he sought to help other injured protesters.
1056. The Mission further analysed information regarding severe injuries caused as result of the use of live ammunition by the IRGC and other security forces including by being shot in the abdomen and vital organs. In one case, a 16-year-old boy was shot with two bullets, striking him in the arm and leg causing severe injuries.
1057. According to public reports, IRGC forces took control of the city, including all of Javanroudâs entrances and exits by setting up checkpoints until March 2023.
1058. The Mission finds that there is credible information according to which, during the protests on 20 and 21 November 2022 in Javanroud, at least six men, including Erfan Kakaee, Jamal Azami, Masoud Teimouri, Jowhar Fattahi, Tahsin Miri, and Esmail Golanbar, and a child, Bahaoddin Veisi, were killed; at least 80, including children, were injured, many of them severely; and security forces arrested 89 protesters, of which 26 were children.
(d) Killing of minority children
1059. According to credible information, the majority, and up to two-thirds of children killed in the protests were from minority-populated regions. In this context, it investigated incidents where Security forces shot at protesters with lethal weapons randomly, wantonly and indiscriminately, in an apparent disregard for the presence of children among protestors and in the vicinity of the protests and where State forces specifically targeted child protesters. Illustrative of these patterns are the cases of 12-year-old Javad Pousheh and the 16-year-old Kurdish protester, Zakaria Khial.
(e) Javad Pousheh, 30 September 2022, Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchestan
1060. Javad Poushed, a 12-year-old boy was shot and killed on 30 September 2022 during the âBloody Fridayâ events, in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchestan. According to credible information, Javad Pousheh was shot in the back of his head with live ammunition and the bullet exited through his cheek, by security forces outside the police station during the âBloody Fridayâ protests. The Mission reviewed three videos pertaining to his case. Two pieces of video footage captured in the immediate aftermath of the shooting show several men carrying the lifeless body of the child with his face and body bloodied and his clothes fully drenched in blood. The third video is taken later on the same day. It shows the child in his blood-stained clothes, with the blood from his face partially cleaned. A gaping wound is visible on the right cheek of Javad Poushehâs face in all three videos.
1061. Despite the existence of video footage and reporting by human rights organizations and the media, State authorities in a report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran claimed that âthere is no death recordâ for Javad Pousheh before the Legal Forensic Organization of Iran, which they stated âis the official authority for confirming the type or cause of death.â The report added that âinvestigations are underway to clarify and bring to light the issue.â Not only did the report not provide any details on the causes and circumstances of the childâs killing, but it also appeared to question whether the death even took place.
(e) Zakaria Khial, 20 September 2022, Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan
1062. The Mission investigated a protest which took place on 20 September 2022 in Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan province during which a child protester was fatally shot and killed by the security forces. A direct witness said that the protest had started in the city late in the evening at around 10pm in the neighbourhood of Falaka Mohammad Oraz. He and two other protesters whose statements the Mission has received, explained that as the protest started, State security forces including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the police (FARAJA) and its Special Forces, as well as plainclothes agents were deployed to disperse peaceful protesters. They reported that forces were armed with a range of weapons including AK-47s, shotguns loaded with metal pellets, and paintballs.
1063. According to credible information, including statements collected by NGOs and obtained by the Mission, agents from the IRGC fired live ammunition at Zakaria Khial, a boy aged 16 years, at around 10 p.m. as he and other protestors were several meters away from a school called Mohammad Rasoulloh (also known as madreseh shabaneh roozi). They reported that the IRGC agents were stationed at a close distance from the protesters and were shooting at the protesters who had gathered peacefully, were unarmed and did not pose any threats to the security forces. An eyewitness who was injured himself reported that the child victim was struck in the chest and his abdomen. He was reportedly taken to a hospital by other protesters but died due to his injuries before arriving at the hospital.
1064. The Mission examined a Government report pertaining to the reported killing of children in the context of the protests. In its report, the Government stated that the child victim was shot and killed during the âriotsâ in the city of Piranshahr. However, it stated that âno reason or evidenceâ was found that law enforcement officers committed the murder. It stated the âSecurity Council of the city immediately investigated the issue and found that law enforcement agents present at the scene had not used combat weapons. Therefore, it is possible that terrorist groups and infiltrated elements committed the killing in order to fuel the riots and discompose public opinion in line with their killing project.â It further stated that an arrest warrant had been issued for persons who had taken the child to the hospital.
1065. The Mission finds that there is credible information that Zakaria Khial was killed as a result of a deliberate killing by security forces.
(f) War time tactics and methods
1066. As detailed in Section V, the Mission found that security forces used weapons and ammunition designed for military purposes, such as assault rifles, across the country resulting in the killings of and severe injuries to protesters and bystanders. While military grade weapons were used across the country, the Mission found that security forces displayed a particularly militarized response to protests that took place in minority regions, as compared to the means and methods used by security forces to repress the protests elsewhere. Concretely, the Mission found that security forces used military-grade weaponry, such as AK-47s and automatic and semi-automatic and heavy machine-guns, as well as armoured vehicles, and helicopters more regularly in these regions. Moreover, evidence reviewed by the Mission showed that in the Kurdish regions of the country, security forces were armed with and also used Degtyarov-Shpagin Krupnokaliberny (also known as DShKs), a heavy machine gun with 12.7mm x 108mm calibre ammunition primarily used as an anti-aircraft (AA) gun for low-flying aircraft. In the context of the protests in these regions, DShks have most often been used when mounted on armoured vehicles or tripods of security forces deployed to protest sites.
1067. To illustrate, on 18 November 2022, Shahriar Mohammadi, a 28-year-old Kurdish man, was shot and killed while travelling in a car on his way back from a funeral ceremony of Milad Maroufi in Boukan city, West Azerbaijan province. Credible information received by the Mission indicated that security forces shot at the car where Shahriar Mohammadi was, causing him to sustain a fatal injury to the heart. Two other men who travelled in the same vehicle with him were also injured. Credible information received by the Mission also suggested that a group of plainclothes agents as well as uniformed IRGC officials were present at the scene, along with several vehicles, including a pick-up truck, with what appeared to have DShK heavy machine guns mounted on top, and that they surrounded the car of the victims. Statements and credible information received by the Mission indicated that the authorities may have targeted the victim because of his role in organizing the protests in the city.
1068. Moreover, investigations of use of force incidents in minority populated cities, such as the âBloody Fridayâ in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchestan and Javanroud showed that assault rifles were routinely fired on semi-automatic or automatic rounds meanings the weapons fired several bullets or ammunition rapidly at a time. Security forces also deployed such weaponry at a higher rate than they did in other regions or deployed them immediately or almost immediately after the start of the protests. This is also evidenced by the larger number of recorded killings, in particular with ammunition such as those fired from assault rifles, in minority populated regions of the country.
1069. Furthermore, in addition to a pattern whereby security forces indiscriminately fired into the crowds, the Mission found that in some instances security forces deliberately chased and/or targeted persons who were not protesting or when no protests were ongoing at that exact time. The case of Motalleb Saeed Pirou, detailed in Annex III, is an illustrative case of such targeted shooting. Such incidents of targeted killing appear to have aimed at creating a general atmosphere of fear in minority populated cities that became epicentres of protests. Human rights organizations also reported the recurrence of the deployment of heavily armed units supported by military helicopters, in protest hotspots in Kurdish towns such as Sanandaj and Mahabad, with the latest incident reported on 15 June 2023. In Javanroud, Kermanshah province, the IRGC reportedly erected check points at all city entrances, imposing what human rights organizations described as a âsiegeâ, from 21 November 2022 to March 2023.
1070. Witnesses from minority-populated regions described how a history of arbitrary deprivation of life as well as militarised response to protests in minority populated regions of the country and âdehumanisationâ of minority communities formed the backdrop of the lethal crackdown during the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests. One witness, who was shot in the face at point black and blinded as a result, said,
âOver the past 44 years and since Khomeiniâs orders on attacking Kurdistan, the province has always been in a securitised atmosphere and general state of martial law⊠the relationship between the people and the government is that of a prisoner with their prison guards… and there is a racial aspect to this, they have dehumanised Kurdistan.â
1071. Another witness referred to a history of âarbitrary killingsâ and State violence in Sistan and Baluchestan stating that security forces and even Basij agents were ordinarily armed and carried weapons in the province. The witness referred to an incident whereby security forces pointed their weapons at a vehicle with children inside, saying that such incidents were ânormal and commonplaceâ in Sistan and Baluchestan.
1072. The particularly lethal response to the protests in minority populated areas also triggered reactions of community religious leaders as well as member of parliament in some instances. On 23 November 2022, alarmed by the unlawful killing of peaceful protesters in Kurdish towns Sunni cleric, Mowlana Abdolhamid, posted on X (formerly Twitter): â⊠dear Kurds of Iran have suffered from many hardships such as severe ethnic discrimination, intense religious pressures, poverty, and economic difficulties. Is it fair to respond to their protests with bullets?â
1073. On 16 November 2022, Iranian State-affiliated media published a statement of Moein al-Din Saeedi, a member of parliament from Baluchestan, who reacted to the unprecedented violence deployed by the security forces to crack down on Baluch protestors. He questioned the authoritiesâ response asking “Why confrontation tactics to contain the protests in this province are different? Why in other parts of the country pellet and rubber bullets were used against the protestors, but live ammunition in Baluchestan⊔ Reportedly, his microphone was turned off before he could even conclude his speech.
1074. On 28 October 2022, referring to the killing of several protesters in Mahabad, Kurdistan province, in a media interview, Mahabadâs member of parliament, Jalal Mahmudzadeh stated: âI have an objection to the security forces, why do they use [combat bullets] live ammunition in peaceful protests? A person wants to speak up to express their problems, it is regrettable and causes dismay that they are killed ⊠[people] came to the street protesting the unjust killing of a young man, but instead of [security forces] deescalating and speaking with the protesters, four other people are killedâŠâ
(g) Lack of accountability
1075. The lack of accountability for human rights violations in minority-populated areas has been the norm rather than the exception. The Mission found that this was no different in the context of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests. A witness who lost her family member due to police brutality in Kurdistan spoke about the sense of injustice and anguish the family experienced. Her family member was killed by a border police in Kurdistan province because he asked them, why they were shooting at innocent people. According to the witness, it was a Friday and there were so many people outside, and children and women were among them, and the police was firing randomly. Because he challenged them, they shot at his chest and he died immediately.â Another witness similarly highlighted the historical impunity for violations against the Baloch people stating that security forces commit âarbitrary killingsâ in Sistan and Baluchestan and âget away with it … often claiming that unknown armed individuals carried out the killings.â
1076. Indeed, the Mission found that State authorities systematically denied killings committed by their security forces and, in particular in minority-populated regions of the country, attributed the killings to âopposition groupsâ, âterroristsâ and âunknown elementsâ. In several cases, relatives of those killed were pressured and coerced to repeat the official narrative absolving the State of responsibility. In some cases, State authorities threatened to withhold the body of victims or harm the familiesâ other relatives to coerce them into making statement or giving interviews. In some cases, families were pressured to accept the blood money instead of pursing justice. A witness, speaking on the lack of justice and accountability said that after her family member was shot dead, the deputy chief of the border police came to see the family and offered to pay blood money, which the family refused.
1077. The Mission also found that State discriminatory practices further exacerbated the lack of access to of minority communities to truth, justice and reparation. Notably, in a broader context of impunity and lack of accountability for State violence, the lack of ID documents in Sistan and Baluchestan meant that even the death of some victims without documentation, including children, remained unacknowledged.
1078. Therefore, victims and their families in Sistan and Baluchestan who intend to pursue justice and redress and lack valid legal identity documentation such as a birth certificates would face significant challenges in verifying their identity and their victimâs identity, their affiliation. In the case of child victims, this would obstruct establishing the age.
2. Arbitrary arrest, detentions, enforced disappearance, torture and prosecutions
1079. Due to the lack of comprehensive and disaggregated official data on detainees and prisoners, the Mission is unable to determine the exact number and proportion of detained protesters belonging to the two ethnic groups. However, reports and data maintained and reported by human rights organizations were compared and reviewed. For example, Iran Prison Atlas (IPA), a database run by the human rights organization, United for Iran, collects information on political prisoners including those related to the protests, disaggregated by ethnicity and provinces. As of 30 November 2023, IPAâs database showed that at least 936 verified cases of detained protesters in Iran, and among those 43 per cent (404) were Kurdish and 16 per cent (147) were Baluchi. Examined against their estimated 10 and 2 per cent representation respectively of the overall national population this is illustrative of the disproportionate representation of the two ethnic minority groups in the number of protest-related detentions.
1080. Members of ethnic minorities were charged with and convicted of national security offences such as âpropaganda against the system, âinsulting the Supreme Leaderâ and leading an âillegal gatheringâ, and affiliation with opposition groups and parties. In some cases, criminal charges stemmed from activities such as advocating for gender equality, betterment of their standard of living, to eliminate systematic discriminations; or simply participating in religious or cultural activities. Members of ethnic minorities were also charged with the capital offences of âwaging war on Godâ (moharebeh) and âcorruption on earthâ (efsad-e fel-arz), and in some cases were sentenced to death.
1081. The Mission established that Kurdish and Baluchi ethnic minorities underwent arbitrary arrest, detention and prosecution at a high rate. Similar patterns of targeting of the majority populations even without their having had an apparent role in the protests, as detailed above in relation to the use of force, were reported in minority populated areas. For instance, in one example, a witness stated that in the days after two protesters were killed in a Kurdish populated area of West Azerbaijan, security forces patrolled the street arresting and detaining any youth they saw passing. People were scared to leave home fearing arrest. The detainees were reported to have been held for nearly a month and subjected to torture before they were released. In another case, a witness from a city in Kurdistan said that a member of his family was arrested, detained and tortured for 60 days because he went to a hospital to visit an injured relative.
(a) Torture and ill-treatment
1082. As detailed in Section V, State authorities perpetrated torture against women, children and men in connection with the protests and subjected them to degrading and inhumane condition of detention. The Mission investigated cases of torture and other forms of ill-treatment of detained Baluchi and Kurdish protesters of all ages with or without reported roles in the protests. As detailed below, detainees were subjected to severe and violent forms of physical and psychological torture, including rape.
1083. Detainees were held in a range of unofficial detention facilities. Credible information reviewed by the Mission established that persons belonging to minority communities were subjected to enforced disappearances. In Kurdish cities and provinces, several hundred young people were reported to have been forcibly disappeared since the start of the protests. Some were reportedly abducted from their homes, their schools, on the streets, and during the protests. In some cases, children were kept in solitary confinement or incommunicado for several days.
1084. Witness statements and other credible information showed that detainees from minority communities were subjected to various forms of physical torture including beatings, deprivation of food, and being placed in stress positions. A former detainee from a city in Kurdistan province, reported that in the context of his interrogation his interrogators put him outside in cold weather and while it was snowing. They did this every consecutive night, leaving him outside for 2-3 hours, without proper clothing. After 21 days, he became seriously ill. Another witness from Kurdistan said he was moved to a cell and there was a person who had been subjected to torture and broken down mentally, his face and arms were covered with stiches. The person never spoke a word, he often stared at a given point on the wall for four to five hours, without a single movement. In another cell he saw a prisoner whose spinal cord was broken as a result of severe beatings. In another case, according to credible information reviewed, several members of security forces subjected a protester in Kermanshah province to severe beatings resulting in him sustaining a broken limb, ribs and nose.
1085. The Mission further documented cases of rape and sexual violence of Kurdish and Baluchi detainees, with child detainees were among the victims of rape. According to credible information reviewed by the Mission, at least two children were arrested in one city in one minority populated region and kept in detention in late 2022. They were kept in a small dark cell for days, with one at least reportedly raped. A child was also reported to have been subjected to severe beatings, forced to take unknown pills, and was coerced into making âconfessionsâ. On 5 December 2022, the provincial Imam in Zahedan, Mowlawi Abdolhamid posted on the social media that the assault on women prisoners was being committed with the intention of humiliating, suppressing, and obtaining forced confessions from them. A civil society organization documenting and monitoring prisoners and conditions of detention in Iran also reported that in one prison in Kurdistan province, families reported that several of the female detainees have asked their families to bring birth control pills for them because they have been reportedly raped while in custody.
1086. A witness stated, âthey (security agents) were saying lots of abusive words throughout the interrogation process. They said they will bring my wife and rape her in front of me, and that they will kill my son and take me to the burial site.â The witness reported that authorities made him believe that his wife was raped, and that his son killed. He said he felt that he had become delusional as a result of medication administered to him, and that he was certain that the medication had affected his sanity.
1087. Former detainees of prisons in Kurdish and Baluch regions shared direct accounts on the poor detention conditions, describing the physical space as extremely narrow, dark and cold, overcrowded, with over 50 detainees crammed into a small room, with no ventilation or window in the prison cell, and provision of food scarce and of poor quality. A witness described LED lamps with very bright and powerful lights, being switched on 24/7, night and day, which the witness understood to have been done for the purposes of depriving detaineesâ sleep and crush resistance during interrogations. Detainees were also kept in prolonged solitary confinement, or incommunicado detention.
1088. A human rights organization reported between the start of the protests and the end of 2022, eight men, detained in connection with the protests in Kurdish regions of the country died in State custody as a result of torture and ill-treatment. In July 2023, another human rights organization reported that at least three individuals who were arrested in connection with the nationwide protests in the cities of Bukan, Zahedan, and Gachsaran had died as a result of torture by Iranian security forces during the first six months of 2023.
1089. The patterns of torture and ill-treatment detailed above are consistent with those established in Section V against detainees in various parts of the country. However, evidence shows that torture and ill-treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence documented in minority regions was particularly vicious and accompanied by ethnic undertones. One witness stated that the particularly harsh treatment handed to Kurdish detainees was a reprisal for their significant role in the protest movement. He said, âpeople from Kurdish towns like Oshnavieh, Mahabad and Javanroud were treated harshly by security forces as they put up serious resistance during the protest. For that reason, those who were picked up by security agents from those locations were subjected to a very harsh treatment.â
1090. The Mission also established a pattern of humiliation based on ethnic and religious grounds, in particular with respect to Kurdish detainees. Witnesses recounted how prison officials swore at them insulting Kurdish spiritual or cultural values. They said, âyou terrorist Kurds, what do you wantâ, âyou Kurds are all rebels and violent, we will engage you with each other to kill yourselves.â Another witness also said that she believed her ethnic identity was the reason why the authorities had raped and punished her in a more severe manner. Likewise, in another case, a witness described that while in detention she was radicalized on the basis of her ethnicity identity, saying that she was âliving in a REDACTED and everything you have is from us.â
1091. Moreover, while torture and ill-treatment were perpetrated in order to, among others, coerce âconfessionsâ across the country, evidence shows that persons belonging to ethnic minority communities were accused and were pressured to make âconfessionsâ of possession of arms, leading the protests in their towns or cities; and involvement or membership of opposition, including armed groups. Those who had assisted protesters, including those injured were accused of âhelping the terroristsâ. A witness belonging to the Kurdish minority described how her interrogators âbranded her as a terroristâ and accused her of trying to âtear the country apartâ given the history of political activism by one of her relatives. Such treatment corresponds with the authoritiesâ discourse on the ethnic minorities whom they labelled as âseparatistsâ and âterroristsâ. The Mission notes that accusations of involvement with political and opposition groups could lead to charges carrying severe punishments including long prison terms and even the death penalty.
3. Crackdown on civic space
1092. Human rights defenders and trade union leaders played an important role in the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests, especially in minority-populated regions. However, the Mission found that the reactions of the authorities were particularly harsh in these regions. In justifying restrictions on civil society, the authorities consistently labelled those who advocated for the rights of minority groups as âsecessionistâ or âseparatistâ, âterroristâ or as âpuppets of foreign enemiesâ. For example, in a reportedly fabricated video produced and broadcasted on government media, representatives of Kurdistan teachers trade union were accused of conspiracy to topple the Government with the aid of two French nationals. Those individuals who were implicated with the reported âconspiracyâ have dismissed the accusations as total fabrication âaimed at diverting the genuine demand of the population at largeâ.
1093. In another instance, when the Kurdistan Teachers’ Union published statements and called for protests demanding fundamental economic, social and political changes in the country and criticizing the authoritiesâ brutal clampdown on dissent, their statements were met with various forms of repression. Witnesses referred to the Education Department having formed an âEmergency Committeeâ to identify and punish influential trade union leaders that were active in the Kurdish cities of Sanandaj, Marivan and Saqqez.
1094. Similarly, ethnic minority women engaged in advocacy for equal treatment, an end to rights violations and discriminatory practices were subjected to threats, harassment, arrests and imprisonment, with some being labelled âseparatistsâ or accused of endangering public security. A Baluchi womenâs rights defender recalled how her activism on issues of gender equality led to her arbitrary arrest and detention and being subjected to degrading treatment by her interrogators including acts of sexual and gender-based violence. She was charged and convicted for the offense of âspreading propaganda against the systemâ.
1095. In one case of a human rights defender was put under the constant radar of the intelligence agency and was subjected to unwarranted arrests by security forces, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Security Police related to union activities and other activities. He was threatened, subjected to intimidation, arrest and detention, all seemingly aimed at preventing his involvement in trade union activism. Another human rights defender who was arbitrarily detained for his civic activism recalled, âthe agents pressured me to admit in a video footage produced for television broadcast that I was the organizer of the protest, and that I and my compatriots received instructions from foreign countries.â As he resisted them, they took him out of his room, blindfolded him, and put him in a very cold room, beating him brutally.
4. Intimidation and persecution of Sunni leaders
1096. Sunni religious leaders highlighted deep-rooted and systemic discrimination against religious and ethnic minority groups in the context of the nationwide protests when structural and deep rooted discrimination and violations against minorities manifestly surfaced. Many Sunni clerics spoke out strongly against the Stateâs violence against peaceful protesters. Amongst other issues highlighted, Sunni leaders were particularly vocal about the Stateâs disproportionate use of the death penalty against ethnic minorities, and patterns of torture and forced confessions. They condemned sexual and gender-based violence reportedly committed against women detainees, and urged the authorities to release detained protesters. In November 2022, a number of Sunni clerics called for a referendum, with international observers, to be held, reportedly to âchange policies based on the demands of the peopleâ.
1097. Based on witness accounts and reports by human rights organizations and the media, the Mission found that State authorities targeted outspoken Sunni religious leaders through summons, arrest, detention, restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement, prosecution, imprisonment and the death penalty. As detailed below, Sunni clerics have also been vilified by State affiliated media.
1098. One of the most vocal Sunni leaders, Mowlana Abdolhamid, the Friday prayer leader of Zahedan was particularly critical of the âBloody Fridayâ events and voiced consistent support for the nationwide protests. On 2 October 2022, Mowlana Abdolhamid stated that protesters âhave the right to protest and raise their voices.â He said âpeople have the right to speak, criticize and raise their due rights⊠religious and ethnic groups should have freedom and equal rights and opportunities. This boosts our unity, maintains our security, and strengthens national solidarity. Unity is not achieved only by words, but by seeing people and hearing their voices.â In November 2022, he was one of the first religious figures to call for a national referendum addressing protestersâ demands, stressing that officials should listen to the cry of the people. His demand for a referendum was subsequently echoed by Sunni leaders across Iran. Imams in Kurdistan province issued a video statement in late November calling for a referendum and an end to violence against protesters.
1099. On 11 April, 2023, Mowlana Abdolhamid held a reception for the families of dozens of protesters killed in the âBloody Fridayâ events, where he stated: âWeâre proud of the injured, and the families of the martyrs of these incidents. Everyone has been patient after these incidents, and we wanted to seek justice through legal means.â Several days later on 21 April 2023, he stated: âNot only the perpetrators should be punished but also those who issued the orders [referring to the killing in Zahedan on 30 September 2022] ⊠we will not retreat an inch in seeking justice.â He further criticized the wave of executions in Sistan and Baluchestan province, in a sermon on 4 May 2023.
1100. In response to the vocal criticism, State affiliated media have published inflammatory reports against Mowlana Abdolhamid. On 25 February 2023, Fars News published a report accusing Mowlana Abdolhamid of acting against the countryâs unity and national security, and against the “holy system of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. It further urged the authorities to take action against him and stressed that âunless he is dealt with as soon as possible, he will continue creating similar problems and crises in the future by inviting people to âriotsâ, supporting “rioters”, and “insulting” the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.â On July 8, 2023, Kayhan newspaper accused Mowlana Abdolhamid of supporting Baluchi separatists. The next day the, the newspaper published another report about the cleric saying that he was âsupporting the recognition of the Zionist regime (Israel) and negotiating with it, as well as supporting the Zionist Bahaâis.â
1101. State authorities also claimed that Sunni religious leaders incited violence. For example, in an interview held with Iranian media IRNA Deputy Interior Minister Majid Mirahmadi accused Sunni religious leaders as inciters of violence, and stated, âIf there were no provocative remarks in the sermons, we would have seen peace in Zahedan.â
1102. In September 2022, Mowlawi Abdolghaffar Naghshbandi, the senior Sunni cleric from Baluchestan who disclosed the alleged rape of a 15-year-old girl by a local police commander, was summoned by intelligence bodies. He was summoned again on 12 December 2022. Members of his family have also faced summons and arrests. On 20 August, his father, Mowlana Fathi Mohammad Naghshbandi also a senior Sunni cleric was arrested. On the same day, the Justice Department (dadgostari) in Sistan and Baluchestan reportedly issued a statement stating that the cleric âhad unfortunately over the past months taken harsh positions along with those opposing the Islamic Republic and that during Friday prayer sermons and session, through false and far from the truth speeches, invited people to unrest and street riots.â The statement further stated that the cleric had been warned âin a friendly atmosphereâ but he insisted on his âwrong positions and states that he intends to behave in the same manner, along with/favourable to opposing and enemy currents and he does not wish to reform his conduct.â According to the report, his charges included âdisturbing public opinion through false speeches and defaming and slandering the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iranâ and âacting against national securityâ.
1103. A number of associates and family members of Mowlana Abdolhamid were accused of “disturbing public order” and arrested. On 30 January 2023, Haalvsh, a Baluchi news organization, reported the arrest of Mowlawi Abdolmajid Moradzahi, Baluchi Sunni cleric. Reportedly, he was kept in detention in a solitary cell, and subjected to torture in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan province. Based on reports of human rights organizations Abdul Nasir Shahbakhsh the grandson of Mowlawi Abdolhamid was arrested and detained on 27 July 2023. On 23 February 2024, Abdul Nasir was reportedly sentenced by the Revolutionary Court in Zahedan to one year prison term. The arrest and detention of another five Sunni religious leaders were reported in Baluchestan.
1104. The authorities have similarly targeted Kurdish Mamustas (clerics/religious scholars) and religious Sunni activists for their alleged role in the protest movement. Information received from human rights organizations indicates that at least 13 Mamustas and their associates in Kurdistan were sentenced to an average of three years and six months prison terms by in Kermanshah, Hamadan, and Urmia.
1105. According to reports of human rights organizations, on 21 November 2022, Mamusta Seifollah Hosseini, the lead-prayer at Khatam al-Anbiya mosque in Javanroud, and a member of the Quran School Leadership Council in Kurdistan province, was arrested by security forces after he gave a speech at the funerals for two protesters who were shot and killed in Javanroud. It was further reported that on 25 January 2023, he was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment, 74 lashes, being defrocked and two years of exile to Ardabil by the Hamedan Special Clergy Court.
1106. The Mission reviewed information, including court documents obtained through an NGO, on the case of Mamusta Mohammad Khezrnejad, a 45-year-old Sunni cleric from West Azerbaijan province who was sentenced to death in connection with the protests. According to credible information reviewed by the Mission, the cleric and his son were arrested on 19 November 2022 after Mamusta Khezrnejad delivered a speech during the funeral of a protester, during which he reportedly condemned the killing of protesters and criticised Government leadersâ. Documents reviewed show that Branch Three of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Orumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, convicted Mamusta Khezrnejad of âcorruption on earthâ and sentenced him to death. The court further imposed on him a prison term of 16 years for the charges of âacting to harm the integrity or independence of the countryâ and âpropaganda against the systemâ. State authorities accused Mamusta Kezrnejad of giving a speech on 17 November 2022 âagainst the Islamic Republicâ and which they said incited people to violence and claimed resulted in an âunrestâ during which two members of the security forces and several âriotersâ were killed. They further accused him of âtraining individuals in the Salafi ideology and dispatching them to various baghi groups (armed groups opposing the Islamic Republic)â and âleadership in the formation of criminal groups through the establishment of illegal schools, recruiting and training individuals with extremist and jihadist ideologies.â
1107. Court documents reviewed show that the accusations, including of involvement with extremist groups made against Mamusta Khezrnejad were vague and broad with many dating back years or even decades ago. Authorities accused Mamusta Khezrnejad of acts including engaging in âseparatist activitiesâ along with Sunni clerics in Sistan and Baluchestan. The judgment further listed conduct falling under protected rights as evidence against Mamusta Khezrnejad. For example, it states that he âexplicitly confessed to having been behind the idea of a referendum against the Islamic Republicâ. It further claims that he was a member of group consisting of Mamustas with the aim of âdeciding as to how enter the riots and express the demands of Sunnisâ. It attributes a statement to Mamusta Khezrnejad, constituting protected speech, in which discrimination, and the violent State response against the protests and killing of protesters are condemned.
1108. In convicting Mamusta Khezrnejad, the court relied heavily on âconfessionsâ made by Mamusta Khezrinejad as well as reports by intelligence bodies. The judgment refers to copies of his speeches which it says are indicative of his âbeliefs against the Islamic Republicâ. According to credible information, Mamusta Khezrnejad was held in solitary confinement for over 100 days, was subjected to torture and ill-treatment and coerced to make self-incriminating statements. His trial reportedly consisted of a four-minute-long online hearings during which he was barely allowed to speak. According to credible information, Mamusta Khezrnejad recanted his âconfessionâ which were relied on to convict him before the judge and reported that he had been subjected to torture.
1109. In February 2024, after the news of the death sentence against Mamusta Khezrnejad emerged, 242 Sunni Kurdish clerics addressed a letter to the head of the Judiciary regarding his case. The signatories strongly refuted the allegations of Momusta Khezrnejadâs membership in extremist groups stating that he had spent his life towards promoting moderation and preventing extremism.
1110. Public reports show that in addition to arrests, detention and prosecutions, Sunni clerics have also been subjected to travel bans, restricting their freedom of movement. The passports of a number of prominent Sunni scholars were reportedly confiscated and they were restricted from traveling abroad. According to reports, on June 14, 2023, the Ministry of Intelligence cancelled Mowlana Abdolhamidâs planned pilgrimage to Mecca. Justifying the cancelling action, Tasnim news agency claimed that Mowlana Abdolhamid “used a fake notarized document in his planned travel to the Hajj pilgrimage, which the office of the Imam claimed was “baseless and completely false.” According to reports, the planned Hajj pilgrimage of other Sunni scholars were also similarly cancelled. In another example of restriction of movement of Sunni clerics, Mawlana Motahhari and his delegation from Sunni seminary of Khaaf, Khorasan province, who were traveling to Zahedan to express their condolences with the people of Baluchestan, were reportedly forced by the authorities to cancel their travel.
1111. The Mission concludes that Sunni clerics remained under heightened pressure throughout the protests and continue to be subjected to a range of restrictions on their fundamental freedoms, with documented patterns ranging from continued harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, restrictions of freedom of movement, and the exercise of their religious practices including leading prayers.
5. Other minority groups
1112. The Mission also reviewed allegations related to other minorities, in particular the Bahaâi, disproportionately impacted by the Stateâs response to the protests.
(a) Bahaâis
1113. The Bahaâi community is the largest non-Muslim and unrecognised religious minority numbering an estimated 300,000 followers in the country. The Bahaâi have suffered decades-long human rights violations, which have been well-documented by the UN human rights mechanisms and human rights organizations. For example, in a joint communication by the UN Special Procedures, in August 2022, a group of mandate-holders raised concerns over what they termed as a âsystematic targeting of Iranians belonging to the Bahaâi religious minority throughout the countryâ further noting the âcontinuous pattern of targeted discrimination and persecution of this community based on their religious affiliation. In addition to violations of freedom of religion, Bahaâi have been subjected to inter alia to arbitrary arrest and detention, but also a range of violations of economic, social and cultural rights, linked to discrimination, including through the denial of access to schools and universities, expropriation of land as well as a denial of employment opportunities.
1114. In the context of the protests, there have been reports that the Bahaâi community has come under increased pressure, suggesting that the authorities have used the protests to intensify the persecution of the Bahaâi. Early on in the protests, the authorities reportedly blamed the Bahaâi for playing a role in the protests. This has included reports of an increase in arrests and detentions, increased home raids, and hate speech leading to acts of violence by private individuals. These trends are reportedly not novel, with repression of the Bahaâi historically increasing during times of unrests and protests.
1115. It has been reported that the authorities accused the Bahaâi of initiating the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement, and that since the protests there has been a surge in arrests and detentions, especially of Bahaâi women. According to the Bahaâi International Community, Bahaâi women were particularly targeted for arrest and detention in the context of the protests. For example, on 23 October 2023, 10 Bahaâi women were arrested in Isfahan and another 26 Bahaâi, including 15 women received sentences totalling 126 years in prison. Two prominent Bahaâi women, Mahvash Sabet and Fariba Kamalabadi, who had previously served a decade in prison from 2008 to 2018, were re-arrested in July 2022 and in December 2022, were convicted to another 10 years of imprisonment, on âspying charges.â
1116. According to information received, allegations have surfaced that hate speech against the Bahaâi community has also significantly increased since the protests began. According to credible information received a social media campaign launched in July 2023, under the hashtag #Amir_Kabir_Thankyou praised the mistreatment and executions of the early Bahaâi during the Qajar dynasty and directly incited violence and encouraged the present day killing of Bahaâis. The Government has not condemned incitement to violence against the Bahaâi, leading to the conclusions that such incitement to violence may be tolerated or even condoned.
1117. The Mission notes that further investigations are required to gain a fuller assessment of the impact of the Stateâs response to the protests on the Bahaâi community and their targeting on grounds of religion and belief.
6. Conclusions
1118. Consistent and credible information was amassed and reviewed including accounts of witnesses based on which the Mission concluded that the authorities consistently resorted to unnecessary and unlawful use of lethal force against peaceful protesters in Sistan and Baluchestan and the Kurdish provinces, in some cases amounting to extra-judicial executions of peaceful protesters, and leading to a disproportionate number of unlawful killings, with the highest fatalities registered among the protesters belonging to the two minority groups, Baluch and Kurdish. In none of these cases was there any indication that the protesters were directly engaged in a conduct that created an imminent threat of death or serious injury on others including on the security forces.
1119. As detailed in Section XI, structural and historic impunity affect the entire population of the country with no evidence of a single case of internationally compliant investigations being carried out into unlawful deaths or other violations. Yet, ethnic and religious minorities are caught in a perpetual cycle of State violence whereby structural and deep-rooted discrimination facilitates severe forms of violations of their rights in the first place while also further obstructing any forms of redress and justice or them.
VII. Digital space and the protests
A. Introduction
1120. The Mission investigated restrictions on communications affecting landline and mobile telephone usage, including Internet shutdowns and the blocking of social media platforms. In November 2023, the UN Human Rights Committee in its review of Iranâs compliance with the ICCPR, expressed concern about the âInternet disruptions during protests, including the five-day nationwide Internet shutdown during the November 2019 protest, the blockage of social media platforms during the September 2022 protests, and the long-standing blockage of social media platforms such as Facebook and X, formerly known as Twitter.â The present section evaluates whether there has been a pattern of targeted restrictions on communications, amounting to violations of freedom of expression, in locations where protests took place, as established in earlier parts of this document. Additionally, the section deals with the use of surveillance technologies and the criminalization of online expression, including through arrests, detentions, and prosecution based on social media content. Finally, a gender analysis of digital rights is set out. Overall, the section analyses whether, taken together, the restrictions are compatible with the rights provided for in article 19 of the ICCPR and whether these measures contributed to, or facilitated the commission of human rights violations as documented in the previous sections.
1121. For these purposes, the Mission collected and analysed a wide range of information, including reports produced and submitted by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, data on Internet connectivity during the protests, interviews with witnesses inter alia on the availability of the Internet, and access to social media platforms and messaging services at protest sites, the use of communications and social media posts as evidence in interrogations, judicial documents, official statements reports by United Nations entities and NGOs. In relation to the Internet connectivity data, the Mission has received data from an independent Internet measurement organization and supporting data, upon which its analysis is based.
B. International legal framework
1122. Pursuant to article 19 of the ICCPR, everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media or her choice. Article 19 (2) protects all forms of expression and the means of their dissemination, including spoken, written and non-verbal expression such as images. Means of expression include all forms of audio-visual, as well as electronic and Internet-based modes of expression. This right may be subject to restrictions, if provided by law, to the extent necessary to ensure respect of the rights or reputations of others, the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), public health or morals, and proportionate and non-discriminatory. In particular, in relation to one of the legitimate grounds for restrictions, the Human Rights Committee observed that the concept of âmoralsâ derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition. Any such limitations must be understood in the light of the universality of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination.
1123. A norm, to be characterized as a âlawâ, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate their conduct accordingly, and it must be made accessible to the public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution. Regarding the proportionality test, restrictions must be appropriate to achieve their protective function, they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function, and must be proportionate to the interest to be protected. When a State party imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself.
1124. The criminalization of legitimate expression, including online, constitutes an undue restriction of article 19 of the ICCPR. The fact that forms of expression are considered insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression has noted in particular that the arbitrary use of criminal law to sanction legitimate expression constitutes one of the gravest forms of restriction to the right, creating a âchilling effectâ, and leading to other human rights violations, such as arbitrary detention and torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
1125. Access to the Internet is essential for freedom of expression and also central to the realization, inter alia, of the rights to education, to freedom of association and assembly, to participate in social, cultural and political life, to health, to an adequate standard of living, to work and to social and economic development. Internet shutdowns are measures taken by a government, or on behalf of a government, to intentionally disrupt access to, and the use of, information and communications systems online. They include actions that limit the ability of a large number of people to use online communications tools, either by restricting Internet connectivity at large or by obstructing the accessibility and usability of services that are necessary for interactive communications, such as social media and messaging services. As OHCHR noted in its report to the Council, as technology develops, and the modalities for disrupting access to, and the use of, online space evolves, the definition of shutdowns must change as well.
1126. Blanket internet shutdowns have severe consequences and should never be imposed. Other forms of network and communications disruptions are also likely to have indiscriminate adverse effects, rendering them disproportionate. Targeted shutdowns may be deemed proportionate and justifiable only in the most exceptional circumstances, as a last resort when necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, as defined by article 19 (3) of the ICCPR, and when no other means are effective to prevent or mitigate those harms.
1127. Should States implement shutdowns, they should in all cases strictly adhere to the following six essential requirements. Any Internet shutdowns must be: (a) clearly grounded in unambiguous, publicly available law; (b) necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, as defined in human rights law; (c) proportionate to the legitimate aim and the least intrusive means to achieving that end; accordingly, they should be as narrow as possible, in terms of duration, geographical scope and the networks and services affected; (d) subject to prior authorization by a court or another independent adjudicatory body, to avoid any political, commercial or other unwarranted influence; (e) communicated in advance to the public and telecommunications or Internet service providers, with a clear explanation of the legal basis for the shutdown and details regarding its scope and duration; (f) subject to meaningful redress mechanisms accessible to those whose rights have been affected by the shutdowns, including through judicial proceedings in independent and impartial courts; court proceedings should be carried out in a timely fashion and provide the possibility to obtain a declaration of unlawfulness of shutdowns carried out in violation of applicable law, even after the end of the shutdown in question.
C. Lack of legal protection under domestic law
1128. Iran has developed numerous laws, regulations and policies and a complex structure to regulate the use of the Internet, focussing mainly on restricting access to cyberspace, and censorship of online content. This legal and regulatory framework comes against the backdrop of ongoing efforts to build a âNational Information Networkâ (also known as National Internet) announced by the Supreme Leader in 2001. Essentially, the National Information Network, once fully operational, will prevent outsiders from having access to Iranian Cyberspace, imposing on the Iranian public national infrastructure and platforms, effectively moving towards stronger control by the authorities of cyberspace for Iranian Internet-users.
1129. According to credible information, various state bodies interact to regulate Internet connectivity, communication services and access to social media platforms. Under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has the authority to order Internet shutdowns. The main institution in charge of implementing Internet disruptions and digital surveillance is the Communication Regulatory Authority (CRA), operating under the umbrella of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (MICT). The Cyber Police, known as FATA, is responsible for cyberspace monitoring and control. Along with the intelligence forces and the Basij, FATA constitutes the executive force of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and the Prosecutor -Generalâs Office to control cyberspace.
1130. The Government has stated that in case of any threat to national security, the authorities may impose legal restrictions on freedom of expression including the right to access the Internet. The Seventh Plan for Economic, Social, and Cultural Development, presented by the Supreme Leader in September 2022, announced shortly before the nationwide protests, gave responsibility to the Supreme Council of Cyberspace to âcontrol and disconnectâ cyberspace and to âconfront threatsâ, further enhancing its supervisory role over service providers and users and its control over access by anyone inside Iran to digital and social media platforms.
1131. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace was established in March 2012, by order of the Supreme Leader. It consolidates responsibility for regulating access to the Internet, including censorship and connectivity. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace is chaired by the President, and includes the Head of the Judiciary and members of the military and intelligence. The CouncilÂŽs decisions are reported to the Leader. The decisions of the Council are considered final and cannot be appealed. In 2021, of the 18 voting members, 12 were reported to have been appointed by the Supreme Leader, while five were representatives of national security agencies and armed forces. The Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council have already expressed concerns over its lack of sufficient independence from political control and its overbroad and overreaching powers to control expression.
1132. On 21 July 2012, the Supreme Council for Cyberspace established the National Cyberspace Centre, with the mandate âto regulate cyberspaceâ. On 7 June 2022, the Centre issued a strategic document regarding Iranâs cyberspace, goals, and major actions tasking executive organs, government ministries and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace with the structural transformation of the countryâs governance of cyberspace and the establishment of an online media system. Based on this document, some Internet content has been rendered unavailable in Iran, with the stated aim to protect children, national interests, and the system (nezam). The document involves military and security institutions, such as the Ministry of Intelligence, IRGC Intelligence, Passive Defence Organization, and the Basij, in the development of Internet structures.
1133. The Computer Crimes Law (2009) regulates the use of the Internet in Iran. The Law replicates many content-based restrictions found elsewhere in Iranâs laws, but targets specifically the use of technology. The law provides a list of âcriminal contentâ, which includes: âcontent against chastity and public moralityâ such as âencouraging corruption and prostitution or sexual deviationsâ; âcontent against Islamic sanctitiesâ such as âcontent that is atheistic and against Islamic principlesâ, âinsulting the religion of Islamâ and âinsulting the Supreme Leaderâ; âcontent against public security and orderâ such as âpropaganda against the systemâ; and âcontent against officials and governmental and public institutionsâ. Read in conjunction with provisions in the Islamic Penal Code and the Press Law, provisions of the Computer Crimes Law either fall within the scope of protected conduct or lend itself to broad interpretation to potentially include conduct that would fall within the scope of protected freedom of expression under international human rights law.
1134. The Computer Crimes Law also mandates the establishment of a Web Crime Committee, under the supervision of the General Prosecutor of Iran, to make decisions with regard to filtering regulations. Decisions with respect to the cases identified by the Committee are final and cannot be appealed, which further exacerbates the impact of the 2009 Law on human rights. The Committee inter alia, decides on restrictions on access to social networks and it imposes liability on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that, with intent or negligence, fail to filter Internet content that âgenerates crimeâ. Any ISP that is found to have intentionally failed to filter criminal content as required by the Web Crime Committee may be cancelled, and this threat of action for non-compliance leads ISPs to monitor content, encouraging a censorship culture, further impacting on the right to freedom of expression.
1135. In August 2020, a Bill entitled: âRegulatory System for Cyberspace Services Billâ to regulate cyberspace in Iran, particularly the messaging platforms was tabled in Parliament. In January 2023, the Government of Iran stated that this Bill, which is known more widely as the âUser Protection Billâ, was âsent in the form of a draft to research centers for further examinationsâ. However, there have been reports that the provisions of the Bill are already being implemented, while some members of the commission charged with reviewing the Bill have reportedly called for the Parliament to vote on its âexperimentalâ implementation ahead of its adoption by the Guardian Council. The 2021 draft Bill, if enacted, risks leading to increased or even complete communication blackouts in Iran, and carries a multitude of risks to the exercise of freedom of expression, by increasing bandwidth limits, the control over access to online information as well as to digital technologies and online platforms. The Bill reportedly envisages the prohibition of the sale of VPNs, and instead provides for the introduction of âlegal VPNsâ. It also further envisages the blocking of foreign Internet services and websites refusing to comply with Iranâs domestic censorship regulations making such websites inaccessible; unless hosted locally or approved by the government on the National Information Network.
D. Internet shutdowns and restrictions to social media platforms and communication services
1. Digitalization and shutdowns since 2009
1136. There has been a gradual tightening of access to the Internet, in particular to the world wide web and websites hosted outside the country, over the last 15 years in Iran, accompanied by increased restrictions due to the legislative and policy initiatives discussed above.
1137. Nonetheless, according to annual statistics, the number of social media users in Iran grew in recent years and reportedly stood at around 47.70 million in January 2022 and 48.00 million in January 2023. As of 2021, 79 per cent of Iranâs population had access to the Internet, with this figure likely to have increased following the COVID pandemic, following global trends. This facilitated expanded internet access nationwide, a critical development considering the sizable youth demographic, thereby amplifying the importance of reliance on social media.
1138. The role of social media in mobilizing and organizing dissenting voices in Iran first became central during the 2009 protests, known as the âGreen Movementâ and has since been a consistent feature in subsequent protests, including the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement. Since the âGreen Movementâ, the technical capacity of the authorities, to effect online restrictions has also markedly increased.
1139. For example, in 2013, Iranian authorities reportedly reduced Internet speed especially during Presidential elections and disrupted VPNs. Similarly, during nationwide protests between December 2017 to January 2018, major Internet disruptions and slowdowns, and the blocking of circumvention tools as VPNs were recorded. Media platforms and messaging apps, such as Instagram and Telegram, were reportedly blocked. Users were thus often limited to state-backed services, which rely on domestic servers, allowing for Government monitoring and control.
1140. This pattern of disruptions further deteriorated during the November 2019 protests. The Supreme National Security Council ordered a shutdown, with connectivity rates reportedly dropping to five per cent from their usual levels. Reportedly, the Internet was virtually unavailable throughout the country between at least 16 and 20 November 2019. On 30 December 2019, referring to the protests, the authorities reportedly stated that âthe origins of riots must be found in cyberspaceâ. Between January 2020 and July 2021, seven instances of localised Internet shutdowns and blocking of social media and communications platforms were reported. Iran meanwhile climbed in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs’ national cyber power index from 22nd to 10th place due inter alia to increases in âits destructive and surveillance scoresâ [..]. Similarly in May 2021, Internet shutdowns were reportedly implemented to hinder information on serious abuses during the recannpression of protests in various parts of Sistan and Baluchestan province.
2. Shutdowns in connection with the protests that began on 16 September 2022
1141. Social media platforms and messaging services were widely used throughout the country in connection with the protests that started on 16 September 2022 and the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement. The hashtag â#MahsaAminiâ in Persian went rapidly viral on social media platforms both inside and outside Iran, in September 2022. The hashtag was tweeted and retweeted more than 250 million times in Persian and more than 50 million times in English in the first month after her death. The start of street protests on 16 September outside the Kasra Hospital in Tehran and their expansion countrywide, witnessed the increasing use of social media platforms by protesters to mobilise, express solidarity and support, and to report on the protests and the Stateâs response to them including by publishing videos and photos of the security forcesâ violent repression of protesters. Social media platforms were also used to commemorate those killed including during mourning rituals held on 40th day since, or anniversary of their death. From November and December 2022, when, respectively, the first death sentences and executions of individuals in connection with the protests were announced by the authorities, online campaigns were launched to raise the alarm with the aim of halting the execution of protesters. With the growing number of women and girls appearing in public spaces without the mandatory hijab, images of their acts of defiance multiplied online.
1142. Messaging services were used to organize protests. One witness, who was âa leaderâ in a messaging application group with 20 others, stated that the messaging group was used to coordinate the time and location to gather for protests. He noted that users discussed the need to coordinate with other Iranians across the country âfor their mothers and for their sisters [âŠ] the protest was a joint responsibility of allâ.
1143. The Mission notes that the Government has not denied the application of restrictions on the Internet. The Minister of Communications indicated that restrictions were imposed, at certain hours when security agencies decided. Furthermore, in January 2023, the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Iran, Ali Nikzad, referred to the Internet being used âincorrectlyâ by users to participate in protests as the reason for imposing restrictions.
1144. According to reliable information on data connectivity reviewed by the Mission there has been no blanket Internet shutdown in the entire country in connection with the protests that began on 16 September 2022, either on the day or since. Instead, however, and as acknowledged by the Government, the authorities have implemented targeted shutdowns, as mobile communication networks and home broadband connections experienced deliberate disruptions. Fifteen witnesses interviewed by the Mission, who were present at protest sites, noted the lack of availability or slowness of the Internet during peaceful protests. One witness noted that the Internet disruptions were so frustrating that they merited their own slogan during the protests, with protesters shouting: âInternet Shoda 3G â Lanat Ba Basijâ which means Internet is 3G and a curse to Basij. The Mission established the following patterns of disruptions:
1145. While one region was without Internet connectivity, in general another region at the same time had full connectivity. This being said, the shutdowns affected vast parts of the territory of the country and at key times connectivity was reduced âsimultaneouslyâ in several provinces where protests were ongoing.
1146. Regular and localized shutdowns were implemented in some areas and times, hindering connectivity before the start of protests (usually linked to the time when afternoon prayers ended, possibly because protestors would traditionally take to the streets after the prayers ended).
1147. Some shutdowns were implemented for a relatively short time period of several hours each day, or each week. However, disruptions could and did last from four hours to several days, including eight days.
1148. Disruptions lasted longer than individual protests in specific locations. Internet connectivity was not reinstated until the protests had receded.
1149. Some minority regions, Sistan and Baluchistan and Kurdistan, reveal a disparate impact, as explained in further detail below.
3. Shutdowns in individual provinces
Sistan and Baluchistan province
1150. Internet connectivity was severely restricted, and almost shut down in Zahedan on 30 September 2022 during the Friday prayer, and in the lead-up to the âBloody Fridayâ events. As the graph below shows, Internet connectivity was disrupted for a total of eight and a half days between 1 pm on 30 September and 1 am on 9 October 2022. The Mission notes another severe Internet disruption coinciding with the commemoration of the 40th day following the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, around the 27 October 2022, when protests increased and lasted for about one week.
1151. Moreover, connectivity data shows a clear pattern of Internet disruptions in Zahedan in 2023, almost every Friday, coinciding with the Friday prayers, the most important weekly ritual for many Muslims. According to credible information, the disruptions lasted around three to four hours, usually taking place from 10:am to 1:00 or 2:00 pm, starting before and extending shortly past the prayersÂŽ timeframe. These weekly disruptions began in February 2023, and have been ongoing until at least November 2023.
1152. Making the Internet unavailable requires coordinated drops from different service providers. The below data obtained by the Mission indicates that there was a near total coordinated drop across three ISPs (Iran Telecom, Telecom Iran, Zahedan), with no apparent change in the fourth ISP, Shatel Network.
Kurdistan province
1153. Internet disruptions also took place in Kurdish-populated regions. A witness noted that some mobile phone network operators shut down the Internet access during Jina MahsaÂŽs burial ceremony at the Saqqez cemetery, in Kurdistan province, while others did not comply. The witness explained that this was the way audio-visual material on the events was shared in real time. Another witness explained how the connection âworked one minute and then for one hour, [it] did not workâ.
1154. Connectivity data in the below graph corroborate the pattern highlighted by witnesses. It shows that Internet connectivity in Kurdistan province was severely restricted during the days that followed the burial of Jina Mahsa Amini, coinciding with the protests that were taking place in Saqqez. Similarly, another Internet disruption occurred on the 40th day after the death of Jina Mahsa, around the 27 October 2022, when protests had again increased in Saqqez.
Tehran province
1155. Witnesses noted that whenever there were protests in Tehran, the Internet was unavailable or significantly slow. Connectivity data does not however suggest major disruptions in Internet connectivity in Tehran, and the lack of connectivity experienced by witnesses may have been the result of the generally low service speed in the region.
4. Impact of Internet shutdowns
1156. Internet disruptions impacted protesters in a wide variety of ways. Some were prevented from communicating with each other, including to inform each other of imminent threats by security forces. The disruptions not only hindered the coordination of protestors but also obstructed simultaneous reporting on the events, including instances of human rights violations being committed. Major internet providers were shut down, often leaving operational only those with alleged links the security forces. More broadly, it seriously affected business transactions. As noted by one witness:
âBecause there was so much violence, the Government did not want that journalists outside of Iran find out about the protests (âŠ) They did not want for the protests to be in the media, and this is why they cut off access to Instagram, WhatsApp and other social media platforms. People who had internet businesses, who sold items on the social media (through for example market groups like Facebook market), lost income when they lost access to the internet. People then had to buy VPN accounts to access media platforms, so they also had to pay. Another solution was to use the Government applications, which were free, but they belong to SEPAH/IRGC. This is what the Government wanted people to use, because then they can monitor their internet activity.â.
1157. Beyond restrictions of individual freedom of expression, including restricting access to information, Internet shutdowns also impacted on the livelihoods of people, including those who were not involved in the protests. The Computer Trade Union Organization of Tehran reported that due to continued Internet disruptions, approximately 53 per cent of businesses suffered daily losses of 50 million tomans. Around 21 per cent lost between 50 to 100 million tomans daily, and nearly 8 per cent endured daily damages exceeding 500 million tomans. The price was paid primarily by small businesses Iranian website Jobvision reported that one in five Iranian online workers became unemployed within the four months following the protests due to ongoing Internet restrictions. A separate study estimated that Iranian Internet outages in 2022 resulted in a cumulative loss of $773 million.
1158. Internet shutdowns and disruptions are not gender-neutral and have a particularly negative impact on women. Against the backdrop of a worsening economic situation., and the COVID-19 pandemic forcing women to work from home, many women turned to the informal economy and self-entrepreneurship and launched businesses online.
5. Restrictions with respect to social media and other sites
1159. On 21 September 2022, the Iranian authorities blocked popular social media apps, WhatsApp and Instagram, having already blocked Facebook, Skype and Twitter in 2009. Telegram, which is also widely used in Iran, was also restricted. Iranâs High Council for Human Rights in an October 2022 report acknowledged that access to Instagram and WhatsApp was blocked, observing that this was in response to their use by certain groups to incite violence. At the same time, Iranians found ways to circumvent these restrictions through the use of VPNs and proxies to access websites and bypass any filters to allow free access to the Internet. There was a reported surge in demand for and downloads of VPN services in the country, bordering on a three thousand percent increase in the weeks following the start of the protests on 16 September 2022.
1160. The Mission has taken note of the Government of Iranâs concerns raised regarding published content on social media platforms, including allegations that it had requested Meta to remove 3 million posts related to the sale of firearms. Assessing the examples highlighted by the authorities related to content from protesters, the Mission notes that the examples do not constitute prohibited speech under international human rights law, but rather aimed at coordinating strategies to protect protesters from security forces. The Mission recognizes that restricting such online expression on the basis of maintenance of public order (ordre public) may be permissible in certain circumstances. However, the banning of Instagram for the totality of Iranâs population cannot be considered a necessary and proportionate response. The Mission further notes that META has global policies to address harmful content on Instagram, which are articulated in their Community Guidelines. These policies cover a range of areas, including inciting violence and content facilitating the sale of weapons. While Meta does not engage with the Iranian authorities, it has stated that content deemed to contravene its community standards is removed whenever Meta becomes aware of it. In this respect, Meta has put in place a process for a legal and human rights review with respect to alleged harmful content.
1161. Apart from the effects the blocking of social media platforms had on Iraniansâ right to freedom of expression and access to information, including on those not taking part in the protests, it also impacted on the right to livelihoods and employment. This is particularly the case with respect to women. A total of 64 per cent of Iranian businesses on Instragram are reportedly women-owned.
E. Surveillance and criminalisation of online expression
1162. In response to online mobilisation, State authorities summoned, arrested, detained, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced persons in connection with content posted on social media platforms. State officials repeatedly blamed social media platforms for supporting what they referred to as âriotsâ and warned protesters not to be âdeceived and trappedâ by them.
1163. According to United Nations bodies and mandate holders, human rights organizations, as well as witnesses interviewed by the Mission, State authorities have a long history of arresting and prosecuting persons in connection with their online activities, including on social media platforms. While not all protest-related, according to the non-governmental organization, Human Rights Defenders in Iran, from January 2011 to the end of August 2023, at least 1,315 individuals were reportedly arrested in relation to content posted on social media. In some cases, this resulted in severe punishments including the death penalty.
1. The use of social media platforms to incriminate protesters
(a) Monitoring and surveillance of social media activities
1164. The Mission established that State authorities, including agents from the IRGC and the Ministry of intelligence, confiscated electronic devices, including laptops and mobile phones, belonging to persons detained in connection with the protests. In some cases, they asked detainees to provide them with their passwords facilitating access to their social media accounts and communication applications. Furthermore, the practice of summons and arrests connected with social media content shows that the authorities monitored individualsâ social media activity and conducted arrests, in particular when content was posted by persons with large followings and/or persons with social standing and/or fame or by persons of interest to the authorities, such as journalists, lawyers and human rights defenders; injured protesters; and where content went âviralâ and received significant media attention.
1165. In a case investigated by the Mission, State authorities summoned and threatened a person who had posted content on a social media platform, indicating their availability to provide medical treatment to those injured during the protests. The post received significant attention and was repeatedly republished. The following day, agents from the IRGC contacted the person and some colleagues by phone and told them that by offering assistance to protesters they were âhelping the riotersâ and that if they did not want to âface any problemsâ they should remove the post. In another case, a journalist was arrested the day after posting a photo perceived to show her solidarity with detained person. A protester blinded in one eye by the security forces during the protests, who has been using her social media accounts to speak out about her injuries, said that her family members have been harassed and threatened because of her online activism.
1166. Witnesses detained in connection with the protests stated that their interrogators from security and intelligence bodies had printed pages from their social media accounts and questioned them on the content during the interrogation. A journalist who was arrested in connection with his social media posts and his participation in the protests, stated that his interrogators confronted him with printouts and screen shots from his social media accounts. He was asked to provide explanations for every.
1167. Several women narrated similar experiences of surveillance, attempts to hack their accounts, coordinated inauthentic behaviours such as attempts to flood accounts by fake followers to discredit or shut down the account, âshadow bansâ and accounts disabled following mass reporting, impersonation, as well as smear campaigns online attacking their morality and questioning their loyalty to Iran or their links with foreign states, most notably the USA and Israel. Such experiences lead in many instances to women self-censoring, turning their accounts private if not shutting them down.
1168. Women witnesses arrested since September 2022 recounted their arrest and how security officers would confiscate all mobile phones, tablets and computers in the household. One woman described how, during a raid by security forces at a relativeâs house, a woman agent rushed into the room where the witness was dressing and seized her mobile phone. Women described being pressured to give their passwords for such agents to access all their information. They also described how during interrogation, their interrogators questioned them about their posts on social media and then used these evidence against them.
1169. Another witness described how she was pressured by her interrogators from the Intelligence Ministry into disclosing the passwords of her social media handles and asked by an official of the Intelligence Ministry to disable the comment function on her social media to prevent expressions of support from members of the public. All her posts about her slain relative on social media were deleted. She also had to disclose her email password; her phone was confiscated by Ministry of Intelligence officers for a week and she was told that spyware had been installed and that her communications would be monitored. She believed that spyware was installed on her phone to track her phone conversations. During her trial, she was threatened with immediate imprisonment if she did not unlock her phone.
1170. The authorities have not only used content available publicly on social media accounts to incriminate protesters, but have also resorted to surveillance on private messaging apps. In a case investigated by the Mission, a witness whose eye was injured during the protests, used her social media accounts to document her injuries and their impact on her. Within a short period of time, she gained a large following and her case was publicised by the media and by human rights defenders outside of the country. The witness stated that less than two months after her arrest, agents belonging to the Ministry of Intelligence came to her home. They confiscated her phone and asked her to provide them the PIN number for her phone, which she refused. She was then told to report to the Office of the Prosecutor shortly after. There, she was asked why she was following well-known human rights defenders outside the country and was shown printouts of her posts on social media accounts and her private messages. Prosecutorial officials ordered her to stop her activism and to close her Instagram account. She was further forced to sign an undertaking that she would stop her activities on Instagram.
1171. In the case of a woman-lawyer, interrogators from the Ministry of Intelligence showed her printouts and screenshots of her posts on social media platforms, which focused on womenâs rights and questioned her about them. She stated that her account had been âprivateâ prior to her arrest and that it was deleted immediately after the arrest. The witness believed that this showed that the authorities had been monitoring her activities on social media platforms. Another witness expressed her surprise that her interrogator appeared to have knowledge of her private conversation online, including on the WhatsApp service.
1172. In one case, a journalist outside the country, whose family members were subjected to harassment and intimidation due to their work, stated that during interrogations, the phone and password of a family member was taken by the authorities. The authorities were reported to regularly check not just the content of the phone but also the social media accounts of the relative to see if the person had âlikedâ any of the content including the Instagram stories posted by the journalist.
(b) Arrests, detentions and prosecution on the basis of social media content
1173. On 22 September 2022, the IRGC called on the judiciary to prosecute âthose who spread false news and rumoursâ. The Mission established that State authorities threatened, intimidated, summoned arrested, convicted and sentenced persons in connection with content they posted on social media platform in connection with the protests and that they used social media content posted by protesters and others such as human rights defenders and lawyers as evidence of criminal charges against them. Such content included those that expressed solidarity with protesters, reported on violations committed by the State, and offered legal and medical assistance to protesters and their families, all of which fall within the scope of protected conduct under the right to freedom of expression.
1174. Injured protesters who spoke about their injuries, including on social media platforms, have been among those arrested in connection with their online expression. A witness, an injured protester, who was blinded by security forces during the protests, stated that he was arrested by agents belonging to the Ministry of Intelligence after he posted a story on Instagram on how he had been injured during the protests. His arrest warrant listed the reasons for his arrest as âspreading propaganda against the systemâ and âdisturbing public orderâ. He reported that his interrogators subjected him to torture with the aim of coercing him into stating that it was protestors and opposition groups, not State agents who had shot and blinded him.
1175. A man who was arrested after he posted a WhatsApp story critical of the Supreme Leader was charged with âinsulting the Supreme Leaderâ and âspreading propaganda against the systemâ. The Mission has analysed the indictment issued in the case which states that the security forces âwhile conducting surveillanceâ had âencountered [name withheld] on the cyber space who had published content against the Islamic Republic’s system and insulting material against the Supreme Leader.â The detainee reported that he was accused by prosecutorial officials of having called the Supreme Leader âignorant and brainlessâ by saying that he âlistened to grievances but did not understandâ. He further reported that he was ordered to not post any stories on WhatsApp.
1176. Content posted on social media platforms was used by courts as âevidenceâ of charges such as âpropaganda against the systemâ, âspreading liesâ and âinsulting the Supreme Leaderâ. A lawyer was arrested following the publication of a post on Twitter (now X) in which he commented on the arrests in the context of the protests and announced that a group of lawyers were ready to take on protest related cases and provide legal aid to the families of detainees. He was subsequently charged and tried on charges of âspreading propagandaâ and âspreading liesâ in two parallel legal proceedings before a Revolutionary Court and a Criminal Court. The judgment of the Criminal Court states that the lawyer through his social media post âhad acted to provide sustenance for the enemy media and in particular foreign anti-revolutionary media and in order to exert pressure, publish lies and portray a dark image of the sacred system of the Islamic Republic in the sensitive period following the death of Ms. Mahsa Amini and the surrounding incidents.â Several months later, the same lawyer was once again charged with âspreading propaganda against the systemâ and âspreading liesâ in connection with a Twitter post in which he had criticised a judge presiding over a case in which several protesters were sentenced to death.
1177. On 1 February 2023, the Judiciaryâs news agency, Mizan, reported that a couple, a young woman and a young man, had been sentenced to five years in prison on the charge of âgathering and colluding against national securityâ for running an Instagram page with a large following which the authorities said had been used to publish âillegal callsâ for protests and invited people to âriotingâ and âoverthrowing the systemâ. According to the report, the couple was arrested on 1 November 2022 after they used their Instagram account to publish a call for protests despite âwarnings by intelligence officialsâ. According to human rights organizations, the couple was arrested after publishing a video of themselves dancing together in one of the capitalâs main squares and then sentenced to ten years in prison, prohibited from online activities and subjected to a travel ban. The judge presiding over the trial, in flagrant violation of international human rights law, also reportedly equated the young womanâs activities on social media platforms with âprostitutionâ.
1178. On 19 November 2023, Fars News reported that a well-known actor, Hanieh Tavassoli had been sentenced by Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court to a six month prison sentence, suspended for a period of three months and a fine after the court convicted her of âpublishing false content with intent to disturb the public opinionâ. Fars News reported that she was among six artists who had been indicted for âspreading lies though a computerâ and âpublishing content without documentationâ. Hanieh Tavaasoli was arrested on 16 September 2023, on the anniversary of Jina Mahsaâs death in custody, a few hours after she published a post on her Instagram account referring to Jina Mahsa as an âeternal legendâ. Also emblematic in this regard, is the case of Iranian actor Mohammad Sadeghi, who in December 2023, was sentenced to five years in prison for posting a video on his Instagram critical of his treatment in detention after being arrested and detained in July 2023, inter alia, for criticising the mandatory hijab.
1179. In another case, Hamshahri Online reported on 9 March 2023, that amid the âconfrontation with celebrities and cyber horns [influencers] who spread rumoursâ in the context of school poisonings, an influencer had been arrested by the intelligence bodies. Media outlets outside the country reported that the detained influencer was a young blogger in Oroumieh, West Azerbaijan province. The report included two screenshots of posts apparently belonging to the detained personâs social media account. One depicted an image of children with chemical masks with a caption saying, âour children have not seen war, but they have tasted chemicals.â Another said: âmum, I cannot breatheâ.
F. Use of surveillance technologies against the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement
1180. As noted above, surveillance technology was used to identify and arrest persons participating in the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement. The Government also used surveillance drones to identify protesters. Surveillance drones were reportedly used for the first time by the IRGC’s intelligence agency, the Ministry of Intelligence, as well as law enforcement units during 2022 protests in at least fifteen cities. The use of drones for the identification of protesters was reported in the cities of Kermanshah, Kerman, Kashan, Mashhad, Fardis, and Sanandaj. On 30 October 2022, Mehr News published a video showcasing the use of drones for surveillance purposes. The video also showed a man confessing that he had made a mistake and would not go to the streets again. A programme on the use of drones was broadcast on the channel Gerdab, on 26 September 2022. In this programme, the Ministry of Intelligence publicly acknowledged using drones to identify protesters. In December 2022, the Keyhan newspaper reported that the Intelligence Organization of the Qom Provincial Guard announced the arrest of several âriotersâ in Qom and indicated that not only âinstigators of illegal gatheringsâ in Qom but also some of the âmain riotersâ had been identified through drone surveillance.
1181. Since 2021, ARTICLE 19 has tracked the advances in technology being developed to disable VPNs, including Deep Packet Inspection. The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) has also detected blocking of certain protocols that aid in disabling circumvention tools in Iran. While the Apple App store was censored and eventually reopened, the Google Play store remains blocked to this day. Googleâs Android operating system takes up a share of 90 per cent of mobile users in Iran. The censorship of this app store has added an additional hurdle for acquiring safe and secure VPNs for the majority of Iranian users. Most recently, there have been unconfirmed reports that state-produced VPNs have been distributed for potentially malicious purposes.
1182. First noticed in 2020, âBouldspyâ is surveillance-ware attributed to FARAJA by researchers. Physically installed on devices by inserting code into legitimate applications, law enforcement forces can then activate a number of capabilities. In addition to recording voice calls over a number of applications, this technology has the capacity to monitor device information, all files on the device, log inputs, store locations, extract SMS, record audio, and take photos and screenshots. Based on exfiltrated data from servers for the spyware, at a minimum, there is credible information that this constituted more than 66,000 call logs, 100,000 contacts, 9,000 key logs, 400,000 text messages, and 2,500 photos. Typically, device users would not be aware of this surveillance. Researchers noticed a spike in use in September 2022, which has steadily increased until at least February 2024. Victims include device users inside and outside Iran. Researchers found the highest level of use in the autumn of 2022 were in Tehran, West Azerbaijan, and Kurdistan provinces. Credible information shows that 536 women and men were affected and victims included minorities such as Iranian Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris, and possibly Armenian Christian groups.
1183. FARAJA has reportedly developed an application called Nazer which enables security officers and vetted volunteers to report offenders of mandatory hijab laws. The authorities had previously set up a phone line and messaging service for members of the public to report offenders. The Mission was able to access the application and review its functionalities which may be expanded to members of the public to report hijab-related offenders in light of Article 36 of the Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab.
1184. The Mission reviewed publicly available information regarding allegations that numerous foreign countries and companies had been involved in exporting equipment that is used for digital surveillance in Iran. Additional inquiries into the supply chains and compliance with human rights due diligence are necessary to have a complete assessment.
G. Digital rights and gender
1185. As highlighted by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, âDigital technology is a double-edged sword, amplifying opportunities for expression, participation and the sharing of information in ways unimaginable in the past but also multiplying online risks and threats. Gendered disinformation is not a new phenomenon, but, fuelled by new technologies and social media, it has gained traction, threatening, intimidating, harming and silencing women and gender nonconforming persons. The negative consequences go far beyond the targeted individuals and undermine human rights, gender equality, inclusive democracy and sustainable development.â
1186. This is particularly true in Iran, where women have been affected by the repression of freedom of expression, association and assembly for decades, but have also faced additional restrictions due to their gender and the mandatory hijab laws in particular, in accessing public space and participating in public life. The Internet offered new spaces for women and girls to express themselves, shape public discourse, including against the mandatory hijab, demand their rights, seek and receive information, including on sexual and reproductive rights, and organize themselves.
1187. Women activists have seized the digital space to launch breakthrough campaigns for gender equality and against violence against women in Iran. Social media has also become an essential tool to amplify the voices of Iranian women who publicly protest mandatory hijab with campaigns such as My Stealthy Freedom and its related campaign #White Wednesdays ŰłÙÛŰŻ_ÙۧÛ_ÚÙۧ۱ێÙŰšÙ# and ,ۧÙÙۧÙŰš_ŰźÛۧۚۧÙ_ŰŻŰźŰȘ۱ۧÙ# (#GirlsOfRevolutionStreet) in relation to women removing their headscarves while standing on an electricity box on Tehranâs Enghelab (Revolution) Street.
1188. Online expression also offered the possibility to break social taboos. In August 2020, scores of women shared on social media their stories of sexual harassment and assault, protected by the anonymity provided by the Internet and campaigns and initiatives such as Harasswatch and #me_too_Iran provided platforms for women to share their experience of sexual harassment or rape. Women have used technology to mitigate the restrictions imposed by the authorities on women and avoid the morality police through a phone application called Gershad through which they can signal the presence of âmorality policeâ forces in areas and users avoid them.
1189. Digital space has also offered a platform for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer people in a country where consensual same-sex relations are criminalized and those deemed in breach of the Islamic Penal Code provisions may incur a death sentences. The digital space allows LGBTQI people to seek and receive information on their rights and offers some visibility and a relatively anonymous space to discuss LGBTQI+ rights. It has also facilitated connecting between and among LGBTQI people, receiving and sharing information, organizing and advocating.
1190. Despite these promises, as discussed above, these very same online spaces and digital technology expose women to new dangers and threats, such as online surveillance, defamation, smear campaigns questioning their morality or personal and sexual lives in breach of their right to privacy, in the form of âdoxingâ, âtrollingâ and online harassment as explained below, which have inter alia led to self-censorship.
1191. This phenomena is not novel in the context of the âWoman, Life, freedomâ movement, In May 2022, shortly before the 2022 protests, feminists and activists linked to the #metoo movement in Iran had come under coordinated attacks from bots and trolls on Instagram mainly. According to a report published by the organization Qurium, the activists were suddenly inundated by a large number of fake followers flooding their accounts on social media. Qurium estimated that 3,000 new followers had been added on a daily basis for several weeks to the @me_too_movement_iran account. Research by digital forensics and security organization Qurium traced the fake followers to companies paid to generate these followers based in Pakistan. Qurium estimated that thousands of US dollars had been invested in this coordinated unauthentic behaviour campaign. In an open letter published by prominent members of the MeToo movement in Iran, but based abroad and addressed to META, the women explained that fake followers bombarded some 20 accounts and pages of known feminists, womenâs rights activists as well as feminist and womenâs rights advocacy pages such as âme_too_movement_iranâ âAwakeningâ, âEight Hundred Womenâ, âEveryday Feminism,â âCheragh Academyâ and âHarassment watchâ. Not only were they flooded with negative and harassing comments but the attack also damaged the credibility of the accounts they targeted, resulting in a significant loss in engagement, likes and viewership.
1192. The Iranian authorities, far from combatting online violence against women, are suspected to be orchestrating some of these online attacks against prominent journalists, activists, women human rights defenders, and government critics.
1193. Women journalists, including those reporting from outside Iran, faced serious threats with attacks ranging from death threats to invasive comments targeting their personal live
1194. While the practice of online violence against women and threats of violence, including against their family members, and smear campaigns started several years ago, such attacks appear to have increased since the 2022 protests. One witness received threats of rape, death threats and sexually graphic messages insulting her slain sister and calling her a âwhoreâ on social media. BBC Persian journalist were subject to threats including death threats and their families were sent offensive material concerning the journalists.
1195. LGBTQI+ were also targeted online and subjected to hate speech. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee in its November 2023 concluding observations on Iran noted that while the Charter of Citizenship Rights bans spread of hatred [âŠ] it is particularly concerned by multiple reports of hate speech by public officials, instigating prejudice against LGBT persons (articles 2, 20, 26 and 27).
1196. A prominent defender of LGBTQI+ rights referred to homophobia emanating from the State as illustrated by several statements by Iranian officials. They also described the deluge of attacks online from both State-affiliated media and opposition outlets and social media accounts after they suggested that some of the key actors of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement identified as queer or gay. The activist expressed frustration with social media platforms for insufficiently ensuring that their platforms are safe and free from harassment, intimidation, and threats including death and rape threats.
H. Findings
1197. The Mission finds that the Iranian authorities have made use of a variety of digital means to prevent protests and punish protesters and those in support of the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement, including through Internet shutdowns and disruptions and various forms of online surveillance. The gradual closing of the digital space over the last two decades, has increasingly become part of the Governmentâs armoury of tools and tactics for silencing and punishing those protesting or acting in solidarity as well as shielding themselves from accountability. The consequences include the unwarranted restriction of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, the right to privacy, but also encroach on the rights to physical and mental integrity, life, and a range of economic, social and cultural rights, that are the collateral damage of these aggressive measures by the State.
1198. Iranâs domestic legal framework allows a wide range of Government security institutions the exercise of unchecked control over Iraniansâ access to cyber space as well as regulating content. The restrictions of online expression imposed by the Computer Crimes Law and its criminalization of content protected by international human rights law, violate article 19 of the ICCPR. Grounds such as âchastityâ and âpublic moralityâ, âpropaganda against the systemâ or content against officials and governmental and public institutions do not constitute legitimate grounds for restrictions under article 19 (3). This is further exacerbated by the lack of opportunities for appeal or independent oversight of decisions related to such restrictions.
1199. The Mission has established a pattern of Internet shutdowns to restrict connectivity at protest times and locations, especially in the minority-populated region of Sistan and Baluchestan where Internet disruptions were particularly consistent. The blocking of social media platforms and messaging services, were such that they could not be accessed but via VPNs. The reasons given by the Government for the restrictions, namely that they were imposed to prevent incitement to violence does not alone constitute legitimate grounds as provided for by Article 19 of the ICCPR. Given the largely peaceful nature of the protests, as discussed in previous sections, the maintenance of public order, should have been accomplished through measures targeting those engaged in violence, rather than imposed through blanket restrictions on all protesters as well as the population at large, through Internet shutdowns, disruptions and the blocking of social media platforms and other sites.
1200. Even if there were legitimate grounds to impose some shutdowns, namely to prevent incitement to violence, these restrictions do not meet the tests of lawfulness, necessity and proportionality and non-discrimination. As established above, Internet shutdowns affected vast parts of the territory, took place over prolonged periods of time or a specific area on a regular basis. Due to their effect, these restrictions were tantamount to complete shutdowns, which is not necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. Given their indiscriminate and widespread impact, including on the livelihoods of protesters and the wider population, especially women, the shutdowns were also not proportionate and do not constitute the least intrusive instrument to achieve any legitimate purpose.
1201. In addition, the shutdowns and other restrictions described above were also discriminatory. Based on the accounts of witnesses and connectivity data, the Mission is satisfied that Internet disruptions occurred predominantly in minority areas, such as Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan provinces. The available information confirms that cities where Internet has been most disrupted have also been subjected to brutality, including the Kurdish and Baluch ethnic minorities populated areas, where use of force resulting in injuries and the largest protestersÂŽ fatalities were reported. The Internet restrictions also had the effect of impairing the capacity to report on open media on the use of force by law enforcement during the protests, for example by posting audio-visual material about the ongoing events. When accompanied by additional repressive measures, these restrictions also interfere with the right to peaceful assembly. The timing and geographic scope of the Internet disruptions and the unavailability of messaging and social media applications appear to have been aimed at preventing people from organizing and attending protests, in violation of the right to peaceful assembly.
1202. Based on the above, the shutdowns and the restrictions on social media and other sites, constitute an undue restriction of Article 19 of the ICCPR and thus a violation of the right to freedom of expression and opinion. Moreover, shutdowns and restrictions on social media and other sites, seem to be intended or have the effect of limiting accountability for human rights violations.
1203. The use of online expression, especially on social media platforms as evidence for purposes of incriminating protesters, served to intimidate and prevent protesters from expressing dissent or organizing support to the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement, and are in violation of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Women protesters, human rights defenders, and journalists were particularly affected. At the same time, the authorities appear to have condoned, if not actively participated in doxing, smear campaigns and other demeaning forms of online harassment of women, minorities and LGBTQI community, for their support or involvement in the protests.
VIII. Repression of women and girls defying the mandatory hijab laws
âThe intensified oppression of women through the mandatory hijab â a disgraceful State policy â will not force us to conform because we believe that the mandatory hijab imposed by the government is neither a religious obligation nor a cultural tradition. Rather, it is a means to maintain authority and submission throughout society. The abolition of the mandatory hijab is equivalent to the abolition of all roots of religious tyranny and the breaking of the chains of authoritarian oppression.â
Excerpt of the speech of Kiana Rahmani, daughter of Narges Mohammadi,
accepting the Nobel Peace Prize on her behalf
during the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2023
Oslo, Norway, December 2023.
âWhether I have had any issues with the âmorality policeâ? It is impossible to find one woman in Iran who hasnât had an issue with the âmorality policeâ throughout her life.â
Woman, Tehran province, 2023
1204. The protests that began in Iran in September 2022 were largely marked by images of women and girls removing and/or burning their hijab as they chanted âWoman, Life, Freedomâ. For many of them, the custodial death of Jina Mahsa Amini was a stark reminder of the deep-rooted discrimination, in law and in practice, and violence against women and girls in Iran. It was also a reminder of women and girlsâ denial of choice, which the mandatory hijab embodies. Shortly after her death, the news of the rape of a 15-year-old Baluchi girl by a police official in Sistan and Baluchistan province began spreading, triggering large protests across minority regions. These events reverberated deeply across all Iranians, of all ages, sex, and gender, bringing a unique gender and ethnic intersectional angle to the protests. Women and girls across the country played a prominent role in the protests, placing demands for womenâs rights, equality, and non-discrimination at the centre of the broader struggle for accountability and for human rights in Iran. The protests received widespread social support, from men and boys across the country, LGBTQI+ persons, calling for respect of equality, human rights, and dignity for all. Professional groups such as lawyers, medical professionals, teachers, students, as well as members of the Iranian creative community actors, singers, and writers, also expressed support and denounced broader impunity and oppression within the context of the movement.
1205. As acts of defiance of the mandatory hijab rules by women and girls multiplied during and after the September 2022 protests, so did pre-existing patterns of violence, including physical violence and beatings, by security forces against them. In parallel, State authorities sought to cement the already existing discriminatory legal framework against women and girls, through enhancing the role of the judiciary in enforcing the mandatory hijab. The State also enlisted private entities and individuals to supplement, on occasions coercively, compliance with the mandatory hijab. This led to further restrictions on womenâs rights, including enforced institutionalized discrimination and elements of segregation against women and girls. Despite years of tireless activism for their rights by Iranian women and girls, Government authorities have failed to address their relentless demands for equality, to end of discrimination, and have prevented women and girls from exercise self-determination, choice, and autonomy in their lives. Instead, as evidenced below, the authorities have escalated the repression against women and girls across the country and those acting in solidarity with them.
A. Lack of protection under domestic law
1206. Since late December and early January 2023, when public or street protests had largely subsided, State officials began calling for a joint coordinated response by responsible institutions, including ministries, the police, and the judiciary, to âfulfill their legal obligationsâ and enforce implementation of the mandatory hijab laws. On 6 March 2023, the Chief of the Judiciary announced that âall officials are endeavoring with support from the judiciary and the executive, to use all resources to confront individuals who, in order to assist the enemy, commit this sin (of not wearing the hijab) which violates public decency and orderâ. Later that month, on 30 March 2023, the Ministry of Interior warned that âNo form of retreating or tolerance with regards to [breaches] of traditional principles, rules, and values has taken place and shall take placeâ, and promised that the judiciary, law enforcement, and other relevant bodies would take joint action âagainst those breaking the normsâ.
1207. Reports suggesting that the âmorality policeâ had been disbanded after Jina Mahsa Aminiâs death in their custody, were promptly refuted by official media. Amid conflicting narratives, State officials began referring to the use of âup to-date smart methods and technologyâ and âintelligent confrontationâ to force women and girls into compliance with the mandatory hijab laws. In addition, on 15 March 2023, a member of the Cultural Commission of Parliament confirmed the introduction of ânew intelligence measuresâ instead of âphysical confrontationâ to enforce the hijab laws, suggesting an apparent shift towards increased use of technology which later became the crux of the âHijab and Chastityâ draft law. This notwithstanding, on 16 July 2023, the FARAJA spokesperson announced the deployment of foot and car patrols adding that the âmorality policeâ will not return to the streets. As noted below, however, âmorality policeâ patrols returned to the streets shortly after the statement was issued.
1208. State officials also consistently called for the increased role of the judiciary in enforcing compliance with the mandatory hijab laws. Already on 5 March 2023, and therefore prior to the introduction of the âHijab and Chastityâ draft law into Parliament on 30 May 2023, the prosecutor of Bojnourd in Northern Khorasan province re-emphasized the role of the judiciary in prosecuting women who did not comply with mandatory hijab laws. In the statement of 16 July 2023, the FARAJA spokesperson warned that âlegal actionâ would be taken against women and girls who transgressed these laws. On 17 July 2023, official media reported the forthcoming deployment of âstandby judgesâ along with the âfoot patrolsâ to adjudicate directly on the spot as to whether women who did so would be detained or released with a warning. In January 2024, Qomâs police commander announced that the referral to the judiciary of cases of women found to be violating the mandatory hijab laws âhas increased more than six times compared to last yearâ.
1209. State officials also announced that women would be deprived of their fundamental rights if found to be in violation of the mandatory hijab laws Official statements called for bans on such womenâs access to public services, including bank services, and threatened to rescind their national identity cards. For example, on 25 December 2022, an official from the Southern Khorasan governorate announced that, across the province, public and private institutions would no longer provide services to women without a hijab, and that managers would also be held accountable if they provided services to women violating the mandatory hijab laws.
1210. Official statements also encouraged responses by State institutions and the larger public which appeared to incite violence or other sanctions against women and girls and those acting in solidarity. On 7 December 2022, a spokesperson before the Majles said those who violated the law âmust be held accountableâ or âface social exclusionâ. On 10 January 2023, the judiciary announced a decree ordering the countryâs police forces to âfirmly confront the removal of the veil by women and girlsâ. On 31 December 2023, State official media called on those who âoppose the hijabâ to âjust leave Iranâ, and referred to the Hijab and Chastity law as the âsolution of the hijab problemâ.
1. New legislative processes regulating the mandatory hijab
1211. Two bills, namely (i) the draft bill on Discretionary Punishments and (ii) the bill on Protection of Culture of Hijab and Chastity (renamed in the Majles, the Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab), were tabled for consideration before the Parliament, in November 2022 and May 2023, respectively.
(a) The Draft Bill on Discretionary Punishments
1212. A draft bill on Discretionary Punishments (which, if enacted, will replace the existing Book Five of the Islamic Penal Code â for analysis of relevant provisions of Book Five, see Chapter IV) was reportedly prepared in November 2022 by the Judiciaryâs Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Deputy Office and was sent to the Government for review in December 2022. The bill on Discretionary Punishments seeks to expand the scope of offences and penalties for women not wearing the mandatory hijab, including for example, by suspending them of holding a driverâs license or holding certain positions. It also proposes criminalising women who advocate against the mandatory hijab by subjecting them to paying a fine or being imprisoned for up to five years or being flogged.
1213. Article 178 of the draft bill would grant the power to judicial bodies to take into custody women and girls who are first âoffendersâ in not adhering to mandatory hijab, to compel them to sign a written undertaking to not repeat the âoffenceâ. Women who refuse to sign this or to wear the mandatory hijab after signing would be considered ârepeat offendersâ and could face a âsocial punishmentâ, which includes fines and mandatory community service for up to 270 hours as well as mandatory residence in certain locations, exclusion from governmental or public positions, bans on travel, or holding a driving licence, and mandatory educational, religious or moral courses among other measures.
1214. Article 179 of the draft bill would target âany individual who, online or offline, incites bi-hijabi [nonadherence to mandatory hijab] in any mannerâ and subject them to punishments such as imprisonment between 91 days to six months, flogging of between 11 to 30 lashes, a fine, dismissal from governmental or public positions; a ban on practising law, holding certain positions in the media or travel . Repeat âoffendersâ may face more severe punishments such as imprisonment for up to two years and 31 to 74 lashes.
1215. At the time of writing, the draft Bill on Discretionary Punishments was still under governmental review and had not been formally introduced before Parliament. Some of the measures outlined in the draft Bill on Discretionary Punishments appear to have also been included in the Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab.
(b) The Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab
1216. At the time of writing, a Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab (âthe Billâ) was sent to the Guardian Council for the third time for its assessment of the conformity of the Bill with the Constitution and Sharia. The Mission has strong concerns about the Bill which is draconian and broad in its scope. Several of its provisions reviewed and analyzed by the Mission are contrary to Iranâs international human rights obligations.
The Billâs far-reaching scope
1217. The Bill is framed as a measure to protect the family against nudity, immodesty, lack of hijab and improper dressing, all of which, the Bill alleges, lead to âencouraging late marriages, expanding divorce rates, causing societal harm, and diminishing the value of the familyâ, among other consequences. It places the emphasis on protection of the family and marriage.
1218. The Bill is far-reaching in that it seeks to mobilize the entire state apparatus in support of enforcing the mandatory hijab and chastity and directs all executive agencies to promote and enforce a culture of chastity and hijab, including by developing plans, policies, laws and regulations as well as guidelines for that purpose.
1219. For example, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) organization is requested to âproduce and broadcast television programs that introduce and promote symbols and models of an Islamic family-centred lifestyle and the culture of modesty and hijabâ. It is also required in the Bill to âcreate awareness and shed light on movements that operate against the family foundation or promote individualism, nudity, slander, homosexuality, or other corruptions that compromise the family foundationâ. The IRIB is prohibited from âinviting or contracting with individuals who promote nudity, immodesty, being unveiled, dressing inappropriately, or opposing hijab and chastity, or whose lifestyle is contrary to the culture of hijab and modestyâ. It must also produce and broadcast movies and series in the field of Islamic family-centric lifestyle and the culture of modesty and hijab (article 8).
1220. The Mission is particularly concerned about the obligations the Bill seeks to impose on the Ministry of Education and its possible impact on teachersâ employment and studentsâ right to education. If the Bill is adopted, the Ministry would have to devise regulations for âchaste attire based on the Iranian-Islamic cultureâ which would be mandatory not only for students but also for teachers, and other employees of educational institutions. The Bill will subject employment by the Ministry of Education for all teachers, trainee teachers, and employees, to their adherence to the culture of modesty and hijab. The Ministry would be required to devise disciplinary regulations for teachers, administrators, and teacher students for breaches of the law (article 10).
1221. The Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology would be subjected to similar obligations. The Mission is concerned that this Ministry would be required to prepare guidelines for âsocial attireâ in university environments and establish a system of imposing negative points on offenders under the purview of the universityâs disciplinary committee (article 11). As a result, students who acquire a certain number of points may face disciplinary measures and even suspension or exclusion from university for not adhering to mandatory hijab and chastity measures.
Discrimination and elements of gender segregation
1222. While most provisions of the Bill may appear to be gender-neutral, targeting âanyoneâ who does not adhere to the prescribed conduct, the focus on the hijab means that the Bill primarily affects women, in breach of Iranâs international human rights obligations, notably the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex and gender, gender equality and equality before the law. Article 47 of the Bill is however the only provision that is explicit about its application to both men and women with differentiated definitions of what constitutes indecent attire, while article 49 is only applicable to women.
1223. The Bill aims at furthering gender segregation in institutions such as universities, public offices, parks, and specific sections of hospitals.
1224. In its General Comment on Article 3 on the equality of rights between men and women, the Human Rights Committee stated that: âStates parties should provide information on any specific regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public. The Committee stress[ed] that such regulations may involve a violation of several rights guaranteed by the Covenant, such as: article 26, on non-discrimination; article 7, if corporal punishment is imposed in order to enforce such a regulation; article 9, when failure to comply with the regulation is punished by arrest; article 12, if liberty of movement is subject to such a constraint; article 17, which guarantees all persons the right to privacy without arbitrary or unlawful interference; articles 18 and 19, when women are subjected to clothing requirements that are not in keeping with their religion or their right of self-expression; and, lastly, article 27, when the clothing requirements conflict with the culture to which the woman can lay a claimâ. It further stated in its General Comment No. 34 on freedom of opinion and expression that âdress falls under freedom of expressionâ.
1225. In November 2023, the Human Rights Committee expressed its serious concerns about the bill on supporting the family by promoting the culture of chastity and hijab, which imposes severe punishments on women and girls for breaches of the dress code, including sentences of flogging and up to 10 years in jail; and about the redeployment of the morality police to monitor the dress code in public (arts. 2, 3, 6, 7 and 26) and called the Iranian authorities to amend or repeal laws and policies that criminalize non-compliance with compulsory veiling, in particular, Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab and disband the morality police. The Committee also expressed its concerns about the use of surveillance technology envisaged for the enforcement of the Bill (art. 17) and called on Iran to amend the Bill, to ensure that any surveillance activity complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity, in full conformity with the Covenant, in particular with articles 17 and 19 thereof.
1226. The Mission is deeply concerned that the Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab is in breach of the rights to non-discrimination, gender equality and equality before the law as guaranteed in international law. The Bill negates the right of women to exercise their bodily autonomy, including their choice of dress, and rights to freedom of expression and religion and belief.
Harsher punishments
1227. The Bill not only seeks to consolidate many measures already in place to enforce mandatory hijab but also imposes additional severe penalties for violations of the mandatory hijab, such as exorbitant financial fines, longer imprisonment sentences and restrictions on job and educational opportunities as well as bans on travel and on public activities on the Internet. The Bill also seeks to provide for the closure of businesses for not enforcing mandatory hijab.
1228. Under article 36, anyone who promotes the culture of nudity, immodesty, lack of hijab or improper hijab in collaboration with foreign entities, including media and other groups, or does so systematically can be sentenced to 5 to 10 years of imprisonment. Under article 37, anyone who insults or mock the principle of hijab or promotes the culture of nudity, immodesty and improper hijab or inappropriate dressing, online or offline, will be sentenced to heavy financial fines, and bans on travel or on social media activities for up to two years. Repeat offenders may face up to two to five years of imprisonment. Business owners who promote the culture of nudity, immodesty, and bi-hijab, online or offline, also face substantial fines and bans on travel and on social media activities. Again, repeat offenders may face two to five years imprisonment (article 39). They are also liable for the behaviour of their employees (article 40). Article 41 targets famous people and influencers and their conduct online and offline. They may face not only a fine but a ban on their professional activities of up to five years, on travel for two-years, and also on public online activities. In addition, the national broadcasting company is prohibited from inviting or including such people on any broadcasts. The Bill would also enable the traffic police to fine âAnyone driving a motor vehicle, including taxis and ride-hailing services, who commits indecency, reveals their hijab, is without a hijab, or is improperly dressed, or has a passenger who commits the aforementioned offencesâ (article 52).
1229. The Bill punishes any person who harasses veiled women in public places or streets with arrest and the maximum punishment stipulated in Article 619 of the Islamic Penal Code. In addition, if adopted, Article 59 of the Bill will punish with at least a sixth-degree penalty of imprisonment, which entails âsix months to two years imprisonment, and 31 to 74 lashes, and up to 90 lashes for crimes against chastityâ. According to the same Article, any interference, rebellion, disturbance, or disruption during the implementation of the provisions of the Bill is also prohibited, providing protection to those enforcing the provisions rather then women from violations by enforcers. The Bill states that âpromoting virtue and preventing vice verbally, especially in the areas of attire and hijab, is a societal obligation for everyone and no one can be held accountable for performing religious dutiesâ. It only foresees a sixth-degree monetary fine if someone enforces these religious duties with violence or quarrel whereas it foresees a (more severe) fifth degree fine for âanyone who, in the face of promoting virtue and preventing vice related to modesty and hijab, acts unconventionally or commits insults or violenceâ. Even though women and girls have been subjected to harassment and violence by those enforcing mandatory hijab laws, in particular the morality police, the Bill fails to mention the conduct of law enforcement agents.
1230. International human rights law guarantees the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom to manifest oneâs religion or belief, the two rights that are the most impacted by mandatory dress codes. International human rights law also guarantees an array of other relevant rights such as the right to be free from discrimination, womenâs right to autonomy, the right to be free from torture and other ill-treatment, and the right liberty and to security, freedom of movement, access to justice, and freedom of assembly. The enjoyment of human rights is affected by compulsory dress codes if adhering to a strict dress code is a condition to access rights such as access to public services, right to education, right to work and the right to health.
1231. Rights such as freedom of expression and the right to manifest oneâs religion are not absolute and can be subjected to derogations, limitations, and restrictions as long as they are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. However, limitations and restrictions to rights are strictly regulated as highlighted by the Human Rights Committee in several General Comments.
1232. Special Procedures mandate holders have also expressed concerns about the imposition by law of restrictive garments or âmodestâ dress codes based on religious beliefs and the impact of such measures on womenâs and girlsâ ability to enjoy their human rights. They reiterated âIn connection with the right to decide on hijab observance and the compulsory veiling lawsâ, that: âarticle 18 of the ICCPR guarantees everyoneâs right to freedom of religion or belief that includes the freedom not be exposed to any pressure of performing religious or belief activities against oneâs own will (A/HRC/16/53, para. 39). They also noted that this becomes particularly relevant âin a context where women and girls are coerced to wear religious symbols that they consider not essential or even contrary to their convictions.â Furthermore, a womanâs choice in manifesting or expressing her identity, including her convictions, is also protected under freedom of expression provided by article 19 of the ICCPRâ.
1233. The Bill proposes introducing a number of criminal offences that are vaguely worded and do not meet the criteria of foreseeability and precision of criminal law. The Bill would allow for arbitrariness, including because of its lack of predictability. The invocation of road and ill-defined offences such as the promotion of indecency, immodesty, bad hijabž inappropriate dressing, semi-nakedness, promoting nudity, inappropriate dressing, interference, rebellion, disturbance, or disruption may amount to the criminalization of the peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion and belief. Individuals held solely for such offences would be considered arbitrarily detained.
1234. The Mission is particularly concerned that the Bill seeks to impose the punishment of flogging although that is in clear breach of the absolute prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, provided for in the ICCPR to which Iran is a party. In November 2023, the Human Rights Committee expressed its concerns at the continued practice of flogging among others and called on the Iranian authorities to take all steps necessary to put an end to all forms of corporal punishment, including flogging, in all settings.
Enforcement of the Bill
1235. The Bill would expand the powers of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to enforce mandatory hijab rules. Article 24 tasks the Ministry of Intelligence, the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Intelligence Unit of the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FATA) with monitoring and gathering intelligence on organized crimes and preventing the spread of nudity culture, immodesty, non-hijab, and inappropriate dressing. They would be required to identify individuals who, in collaboration with foreign governments, networks, media groups, or hostile organizations, or in an organized manner, promote nudity culture, immodesty, non-hijab, or inappropriate dressing, through activities in virtual or real spaces, sending videos, pictures, or images.
1236. The Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA) is tasked with developing and enhancing intelligent identification systems such as fixed and mobile cameras to identify those in breach of hijab laws, and training and deploying officers and other trusted individuals in public places, including in transportation and online (article 28). Furthermore, all ministries and public entities as well as private companies, businesses and individuals providing services to the public, such as banks, passenger transport companies, shops, business owners, and managers of city complexes, are obligated to provide their security camera footage to the FARAJA to identify offenders.
1237. The Bill also provides that ordinary citizens would receive training from the FARAJA, in order to report cases of non-compliance with the mandatory hijab by sending photos of the offending individuals to a dedicated system, set up by FARAJA. The Bill also envisages citizens reporting on violations to FARAJA by business owners, professionals, and institutions (articles 31 and 34).
1238. In addition, the Bill would require the Judiciary to allocate specialized branches for hearings and expedite proceedings related to hijab and chastity-related offences (article 29).
1239. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief, in her 2010 report to the General Assembly, stressed the importance of safeguarding both the positive freedom to voluntarily display religious symbols and the negative freedom of not being forced to display religious symbols. She added that: â the use of coercive methods and sanctions applied to individuals who do not wish to wear religious dress or a specific symbol seen as sanctioned by religionâ indicates âlegislative and administrative actions which typically are incompatible with international human rights laws.â The Rapporteur also explained that â[t]he first component of freedom of religion or belief is freedom to positively express and manifest oneâs own religion or belief, while its (negative) flip side is freedom not to be exposed to any pressure, especially from the State or in State institutions, to perform religious or belief activities against oneâs own willâ.
1240. The Bill, which provides for enforcement of the hijab not only by the police, but also private actors, would further jeopardize the rights of women and girls to their bodily integrity, to be free from torture and to security, free of violence and harassment. It would do so against the backdrop of âa long series of extreme violence against women and girls committed by the Iranian authorities, the obligatory wearing of the hijab and its enforcement by State authorities being emblematic of this violence and of the denial of fundamental womenâs human rights and dignity for decadesâ.
1241. The Mission is alarmed at the envisaged use of surveillance technology for enforcement of the bill and concerned that it would result in breaches of womenâs and girlsâ rights to privacy.
Impact on rights
1242. The rights of women and girls would be further eroded if the Bill is passed by the Parliament. In addition to provisions expanding gender segregation, the Bill also criminalizes the exercise by women and girls of their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion and belief. The Bill makes adherence to the hijab a prerequisite to exercising a range of rights such as the rights to education, work, freedom of movement, public participation and equal access to public services. For example, lawyers not wearing the hijab would be prevented from entering courthouses and prosecutor office (article 29). Adherence to the hijab offline and online is also a condition for recruitment, employment, appointment, and promotion in the public sector and in educational and research centres (article 32). Individuals who promote nudity, immodesty, being unveiled, dressing inappropriately, or opposing hijab and chastity, or whose lifestyle is contrary to the culture of hijab and modesty are barred from being invited or contracted by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) organization, a provision that can severely impact the livelihood of actors and journalists.
1243. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern that the mandatory hijab requirement for girls as young as seven years of age, irrespective of their religious affiliation, constitutes a serious breach of article 14 of the Convention and has recommended that Iran review its hijab laws and regulations and ensure that the right of girls whether to wear, or not to wear, the hijab is fully respected. It has added that it is concerned that girls are severely limited in their right to take part in cultural, artistic and sports activities both within and outside schools, partly due to the enforcement of the hijab on girls from the age of 7 years. It has also expressed concern that women and girls are forbidden to enter sports stadiums as this is considered to lead to âimmoral consequencesâ, which is in violation of article 31 of the Convention.
1244. In September 2023, a group of UN experts expressed their grave concern at the Bill noting that existing de facto restrictions are inherently discriminatory and may amount to gender persecution. They added that âthe draft law could be described as a form of gender apartheid, as authorities appear to be governing through systemic discrimination with the intention of suppressing women and girls into total submissionâ.
1245. The High Commissioner for Human Rights criticized the Bill as both repressive and demeaning and warned that women and girls must not be treated as second-class citizens.
B. Intensified crackdown on women and girls defying the mandatory hijab laws
âWhat we wanted was to be able to wear what we like and feel comfortable, and not to be forced by the law and others to change our appearance and our looks. â
Woman, 2022.
1246. Though the protests largely subsided by December 2022, online and offline acts of defiance markedly increased. In response, State authorities took concerted measures to suppress, humiliate, and punish women and girls, and those acting in solidarity, including through cementing, and expanding restrictions on womenâs access to fundamental rights, exacerbating previously established patterns of violence, and increasing monitoring of hijab compliance, in both the public and private space, including through CCTV cameras and artificial intelligence. This, in turn, led to increased arrests, detention, and criminal prosecution of women and girls who were found to have violated the mandatory hijab laws. Women public figures and those using social media to defy these laws were targeted with harsher punishments, including State-sanctioned flogging.
1. Freedom of expression
(a) Identification through CCTV cameras on streets and in cars
1247. In April 2023, according to official statements, over one million text messages were sent to women, who had been identified through CCTV cameras, warning them that their vehicles would be confiscated for having allegedly violated the mandatory hijab laws. The FARAJA spokesperson announced on 14 June 2023, that, as of 15 April, 108,211 reports had been received, nearly one million text messages sent, and 301 women arrested for violating the hijab mandate. He added that 133,147 women received messages for transgressing the hijab laws for a second time, while 4,000 women had been brought to court. In June 2023, official media referred to President Raisiâs approval to increase the number of CCTV cameras across the country in order to identify women who did not comply with the hijab mandate. Subsequently, between March and August 2023, 145 cases of women were reported to have been prosecuted in Southern Khorasan province. In January 2024, the police commander of Qom announced that 74,000 text messages were sent to women over the last 10 months for non-compliance. He added that 53,000 warnings to women had been sent, and 7,000 vehicles impounded of women not adhering with the mandatory hijab laws.
1248. The Mission obtained text messages that had been sent by the police to women between September and November 2023. In one case, the police sent a warning message to the victim in which it explained that she had been identified as being without a hijab while in her vehicle. She was then asked to present herself before the Morality Security Police (see Section IV) within 10 days, with her ID and the title and registration of her vehicle. In another such message, a woman was informed that, having received four warnings for not wearing the hijab in her car, her car had been impounded, and she was also asked to present herself at the Morality Security Police.
1249. Moreover, one witness explained that the identification of women without the hijab was done through âplatformsâ, which allowed officials from the FARAJA, Basij, IRGC, and the intelligence service to enter car plate numbers into the system manually when seeing a woman driving without a hijab. Once the car plate number had been entered, the system then reportedly generated a text message, in real time and when the violation was alleged to have occurred, to the person registered as the owner of the vehicle. Security officers would take pictures of women not adhering to the mandatory hijab laws which showed the frame of the womenâs face, and thus did not depict their faces fully. The witness described seeing judicial files in which, through the use of artificial intelligence, pictures of women had been matched with their photos on their passports or driverâs licenses or on other documents on file with the State registration services. If the woman in question had a SANA account, then a warning or a summons would be delivered to her mobile phone through the SANA system. Otherwise, once the address was identified, a written summon order would be sent to the concerned womanâs home.
1250. The use of technology to monitor compliance in vehicles, including reported artificial intelligence, as well as compliance monitoring in public transport, seriously impact the ability of women who have chosen not to wear the mandatory hijab, restricting their movement and access to services, as well as employment.
(b) Physical violence
1251. Though women appearing in public without a hijab were already perceived to be engaging in individual acts of protest, not carrying a hijab on them at all was seen as a much bolder act of defiance. In one such example, a woman described how she was beaten, pepper-sprayed, and tasered by one uniformed IRGC agent in late 2022 in Tehran municipality. The victim detailed how, while walking on a side street towards a protest site, she was suddenly surrounded by 12 uniformed IRGC officers, one of whom screamed at her to âput on a hijabâ. As she froze out of fear, he grabbed her, pushed her, pinned her to a wall, and then pepper-sprayed her eyes. Realizing that she was not carrying a hijab, he told her: âyou donât even carry a scarf to cover yourselfâ while the rest of the IRGC officers were shouting âbeat her, beat her, if she doesnât have the hijab.â The agent who had pinned her to the wall then said: âjust shoot herâ. The rest of the IRGC offices then proceeded with shooting at her with plastic bullets, injuring her arms and legs. While she was pinned to the wall, the same IRGC officer rubbed his genitals on her body and said: âWasnât that that what you wanted when you went out without a hijab, here it is, take itâ. Forensic analysis of pictures of the victimâs injuries confirmed the use of plastic bullets.
1252. Likewise, a witness described seeing how one plainclothes agent screamed at a woman to âput her hijab onâ while she was sitting on a bench in late October in 2022. When she refused, he put a gun to her head and repeated âput your hijab on nowâ. In another case in November 2022, a witness described how two plainclothes agents attacked a man who was walking on the street with a woman who was not wearing a hijab. The witness recalled how the agents shouted at the man to âtell her to put her hijab onâ, to which the man responded that wearing a hijab was her choice. In response, the agents beat the man.
1253. Open-source material reviewed, verified, and analysed by the Mission showed instances in which women were harassed, intimidated, dragged, and beaten by security forces and/or the âmorality policeâ for not wearing the mandatory hijab. In one video published in September 2023, a woman officer of the morality police was shown pulling the hair of a young woman who appears not wearing the hijab. Several uniformed police officers were shown surrounding the two women, preventing men bystanders from helping the victim.
(c) Emblematic case: Armita Garavand
1254. On 1 October 2023, a young woman student, Armita Garavand, fell into a coma after reportedly being pushed, following an altercation with female hijab enforcers in a metro carriage in Tehran. She died in Air Force Farj military hospital on 28 October 2023, where she had been admitted after the incident.
1255. On 2 October 2023, official media broadcasted a CCTV footage from inside the metro station which showed Armita Garavand and two other girls entering a metro carriage at the Shohada metro station in Tehran city. Seconds later, the two schoolgirls were shown pulling Ms. Garavandâs limp body out of the carriage. The CEO of Tehran Metro Operations commented on the footage noting that they had reviewed it and found that âno conflict was recorded.â
1256. On 3 October 2023, State media aired an interview with Armita Garavandâs parents. Her mother told the media that she thought her âdaughter was under pressure when they went there [metro]. I think they said now that her blood pressure had dropped. Then her head hit the edge of the subway.â She further notes that âit was all a coincidenceâ and asked âpeople to pray for her daughterâ. Another woman, interviewed with the family and introduced as a ârelativeâ to Ms. Garavand, stated that family has been allowed to review all the CCTV footage and said that âit was all okâ. Armita Garavandâs mother is then heard interrupting the woman noting that the family had not viewed all the footage. On 4 October 2023, another woman introduced by official media as Armita Garavandâs school friend, said that she had been with the victim that morning, and that she lost consciousness shortly after she got onto the metro wagon and, as a result, fell and hit her head on the edge of the metro. On 28 October 2023, 28 days after she fell into a coma, State media announced the death of Armita Garavand, due to a drop in blood pressure which led to her collapsing and, in turn, hitting her head on the ground.
1257. In mid-March 2024, the HCHR, in its official response, informed the Mission that, following orders of the Tehran Prosecutor, the Tehran Prosecutor Office (District 27) conducted an investigation into the death of Armita Garavand. The HCHR informed the Mission that this investigation found âno conflictâ, and that, on the basis of an autopsy performed on 29 October, her death was ânot caused by a blow or an injuryâ, and âhad nothing to do with the hijabâ.
1258. The Mission was informed that, reportedly, Armita Garavand was pushed by a woman following an altercation over the mandatory hijab, which caused her to fall to the ground and hit her head. One media report cited two sources who reportedly witnessed how Armita Garavand was verbally assaulted by a woman hijab enforcer for not wearing the mandatory hijab. According to this document, an altercation reportedly ensued between Armita Garavand and the woman, which led to the former falling to the ground and hitting her head. A media outlet was allowed to inspect the metro wagon though without being able to confirm whether it was the same wagon where the incident occurred.
1259. In actions reminiscent of Jina Mahsa Aminiâs case, the State authorities took similar measures to conceal the circumstances leading to Ms. Garavandâs death. Preliminary information collected by the Mission indicated that security officers were deployed shortly after Ms. Garavandâs admission to the ICU at the Farj military hospital. The security officers reportedly controlled of medical staff to the entire ICU, while her father was reported to have visited her once. Security officers also reportedly visited the school where Ms. Garavand went to, and threatened pupils to not speak about her case. One journalist was briefly arrested on 2 October 2023 after reportedly speaking to Ms. Garavandâs mother, while another was sentenced in December 2023 for posting on social media in relation to her death. To date, State authorities have not released the footage from inside the metro carriage or made public medical reports, or other information including in regards to the above-mentioned investigation, to clarify the cause(s) of her death.
1260. During Armita Garavandâs funeral in Tehran on 29 October 2023, security forces present at the gravesite, intimidated, and harassed mourners, and arrested 23 men and 23 women, including prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh. The Missionâs investigations into the case of Armita Garavand are on-going.
2. Right to education
1261. The Ministry of Education is responsible for ensuring that women and girls adhere to the mandatory hijab when attending classes at schools and universities. The Ministry may also provide âcoursesâ to parents and students to ensure that regulations are followed. In November 2022, the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council issued a directive on disciplinary actions against students, including regarding wearing the mandatory hijab in educational establishments. According to the directive, students found to be in violation may face disciplinary measures, including reduced class grades (in the class in which the incident occurred), a ban on accessing services, including dormitories for at least one month, as well as suspension for a period up to 28 months.
1262. On 2 April 2023, the Ministry of Science and Technology announced that students who do not comply with the mandatory hijab will be banned from receiving education and other services such as accommodation. This was re-emphasized by the Ministry of Education on 3 April 2023. On 30 June 2023, the Minister of Science and Technology once again emphasized the importance of the mandatory hijab as well as the legal implications for non-compliance. In December 2023, the Director-General of Cultural and Artistic Affairs of the Ministry of Education raised concerns relating to the âchastity, hijab, fashion, and clothingâ amongst students, calling for additional programs for students to become more familiar with the âIslamic-Iranian clothing.â
1263. Consistent with official statements as noted above, women students interviewed by the Mission expressed that they feared suspension if found to be in violation of mandatory hijab laws because of the long-term implications this could have on their future. One interviewee from a university in Tehran province explained having been threatened by the Herazzat security forces with disciplinary measures and arrest for not wearing the mandatory hijab during classes. Another interviewee recalled how women teachers in Mazandaran province have been forced to wear a chador to be able to take up a new position despite successfully completing the recruitment process, or denied a permanent work contract for failing to adhere with the mandatory hijab laws.
1264. Open-source material verified and analysed by the Mission further indicated that women students in Tehran were barred from sitting their final exams after protesting against the mandatory hijab in universities. In May 2023, 35 students were reported to have been suspended in one university in Tehran for not complying with the mandatory hijab. Reports also indicated that, in July 2023, women students in Tehran were threatened with âzero gradesâ, suspended or expelled from classes, or expelled from dormitories for not adhering to the mandatory hijab. In November 2023, one student in Tehran was suspended after she defended her masterâs thesis without a hijab.
1265. Discriminatory practices restricting access to education for women and girl students placed many at risk of falling behind by one year or more. Such measures negatively impact the prospects of women and girls to continue their education, and in turn, adversely affect their ability to access employment, and to meaningfully participate in society.
3. Right to health
1266. The Ministry of Health is tasked by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution to supervise medical establishments, both public and private, to ensure that medical staff as well as patients adhere to the mandatory hijab. In February 2023, the Minister of Health underlined the need to observe the mandatory hijab laws in public and private medical establishments, noting that the license of private medical facilities would be withdrawn if found to be non-compliant.
1267. Consistent with the above, one witness described how the âmorality policeâ officers visit public hospitals and private clinics to monitor compliance with the mandatory hijab of women medical staff. They explained that if found in violation of the mandatory hijab, women medical staff could be âharmed in 100 different waysâ, including through disciplinary measures and, in extreme cases, terminating employment. On occasion, doctors would ask women medical staff to âadjust the hijab, so you donât get in troubleâ and warn that âif they arrest you, there is nothing we can do to help you.â
1268. In an emblematic example, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, who remains detained in Evin prison (Tehran) for her activism was denied access to medical care on at least two occasions because she refused to wear the mandatory hijab. In a post on Instagram published on 30 October 2023 she announced that, despite being called in for medical test, she was not allowed to leave the prison premises, on the basis of a prosecutorial order âthat she should be sent to the hospital under any circumstances without a hijabâ. In another post on Instagram published on 6 November, Narges Mohammadi announced that she had gone on hunger strike to protest the denial of medical care by prison authorities. On 8 November 2023, official media reported that she had been transferred to the hospital where she underwent medical examination. She announced however that she did not wear the hijab.
1269. Open-source material reviewed and analysed by the Mission indicated that pharmacies in Tehran and Amol were closed in late January 2023 after women employees were reported to be working without the mandatory hijab. Another pharmacy offering 24 hour services in Tehran was also reportedly closed on 23 December 2023 for providing medicine to clients without the mandatory hijab. Separately, in October 2023, in Mazandaran province, the medical licence of a woman doctor was reportedly revoked after she appeared in a public award ceremony without the mandatory hijab.
4. Individuals and private entities
Private companies
1270. As public support towards the âWoman, Life, Freedomâ movement increased, the Government imposed fines and closed numerous private businesses, including cafes, restaurants, pharmacies, doctorsâ offices, travel agencies, and companies for not adhering to the mandatory hijab laws. On 5 March 2023, the Prosecutor of Bojnourd in Northern Khorasan Province, warned business owners that their businesses would be closed and their business licences revoked if they were found to be in violation of the mandatory hijab laws. On 31 July 2023, an insurance company was reportedly closed and its license suspended after a photograph was published showing women staff without hijab. Also in July, a large e-commerce company was reportedly sealed off by the Ministry of Culture. More recently, in December 2023, a prominent bookstore in Tehran was also reportedly closed for allowing women without hijab to participate in a cultural event.
1271. Moreover, in a letter to commercial aviation companies dated 17 May 2023, the Prosecutorâs Office requested airlines and pilots, to act as âjudicial officersâ and reprimand women who do not observe the mandatory hijab on planes and deny boarding to those who refuse to do so.
âHijab enforcersâ
1272. In November 2023, pictures and video footage emerged on social media depicting women in black chadors and green sashes lined up in corridors and at the entrance of metro stations in Tehran city, in a manner that some users dubbed âhorror tunnels for womenâ. On 22 November 2023, official media reported the presence of âpopular groupsâ or âguidance ambassadorsâ who had been deployed to metro stations in Tehran city to give âkind and politeâ warnings to women and girls not complying with the mandatory hijab laws. On the same day, the Minister of Interior announced that these were âspontaneous citizensâ groups who carried out their Islamic dutiesâ and noting that they were not organized, and bore no relationship with the State security forces. On 22 December 2023, the Secretary of the Supreme Cultural Council confirmed that the hijab enforcers were part of the Councilâs âhijab and chastity taskforceâ which operates in coordination with the Ministry of Interior.
1273. Information obtained by the Mission also indicated that financial incentives were created to attract women from economically disadvantaged backgrounds to join the hijab enforcers. One interviewee described how many impoverished women had no other choice but to work with the âmorality policeâ and denounce women who did not comply with the mandatory hijab laws.
5. Arrests and criminal prosecution
âUnveiling causes social ills and the fall of the human character of women. It causes increase in mental and psychological tension in society (..) and leads to trampling faith and moral virtues of the society, spread of social corruption, increase in sexual violence against women and the destruction of the Iranian Islamic culture.â
Extract from a court ruling, 2023
(a) Arrests
1274. In April 2023, the FARAJA spokesperson announced that 301 arrests of women had taken place for non-compliance with the mandatory hijab laws, after they were identified through CCTV cameras. One survey published by Iran Open Data found that between 29 September and 16 October 2022, 1,563 out of 9,681 women reported they had been arrested by the âmorality policeâ, while nearly 6,000 people reported that one member of their family had been arrested by the âmorality policeâ during the same period. In January 2024, the police in Qom announced that 13,000 arrests took place over the past year in Qom.
1275. Open-source material verified and analysed by the Mission confirmed the arrest of women who were non-compliant with the mandatory hijab laws. For example, in October 2022, one woman was reportedly arrested after a picture of her having breakfast in a café in Tehran was published on social media.
1276. Open-source material also showed a notable spike in arrests of women and those acted in solidarity, in particular following announcements of the return of the âmorality policeâ to the streets in Tehran in July 2023. In addition, as acts of defiance by women and girls increased online, arrests of women who published picture of video footage of themselves without the mandatory hijab also peaked. In one example, a woman was reportedly arrested after a video of her was posted on 23 July 2023 on X (formerly Twitter) in which she argued with another person over her not wearing a hijab in Karaj. She was filmed saying âYou donât scare me. I stand by my beliefs. The time when we were afraid of you is over.â In another case, the arrest of a man actor on 16 July 2023 was streamed live on X after he openly criticized the return of the âmorality policeâ to the streets earlier in July 2023. His post was in response to another video published on 15 July 2023 showing a woman officer of the âmorality policeâ in Tehran city harassing and pulling a woman without a hijab from the street towards a white van parked nearby. In another case, a woman and her spouse, both activists against the mandatory hijab, were allegedly arrested on 18 July 2023 after the woman posted a picture of herself without the hijab on social media in 2022. Another video posted on 15 January 2024 showed a woman being assaulted and subsequently shoved into a morality police van allegedly for not adhering to the mandatory hijab laws. More recently, on 14 February 2024, a video published on X (formerly Twitter) showed a woman who was violently dragged and forced into a white van of the âmorality policeâ in Tehran city.
(b) Criminal prosecution
1277. Women were also subjected to criminal prosecution for not complying with the mandatory hijab laws. As arrests notably peaked criminal prosecution of women found in violation also correspondingly increased. Indeed, one reported a surge in hijab-related cases before criminal courts after the protests decreased, particularly in or around May 2023, when the hijab and chastity bill was first introduced before Parliament. The witness told the Mission that, as a legal service provider, they would receive â30 to 60 requests for legal assistance a monthâ for hijab-related court cases from women countrywide, with estimated âthousandsâ of cases dealt with between September 2022 and January 2024, a number they deemed much higher compared to previous years. This increase was confirmed by another witness who explained that, in the past, only a handful of hijab-related cases would result in prosecution. The witness noted that, in one court, the caseload had gone up to âover two to three thousand hijab-related cases per monthâ since the protests began in September 2022. Separately, one victim confirmed having seen ânumerousâ women, including students and pregnant women, in a criminal court in Tehran province who had all been summoned to court for hijab-related violations. Credible information obtained by the Mission indicated that, reminiscent to the surge in violence in the summer of 2022 (see Section IV), around 60 women had been summoned in or around February 2024 to one criminal court in one province in Iran for violating the mandatory hijab laws.
1278. The Mission analysed court documents and judgments rendered in the aftermath of the protests. These documents were provided by primary sources, as well as through submissions and open-source material deemed credible. On the basis of information contained therein, the Mission established that court judgments against women found to be in violation of the mandatory hijab laws have been rendered by criminal courts, including those part of the Ershad Judicial Complex such as Branch 2 District 38 âmorality courtâ in Tehran city. Court documents showed that, in most cases, women had been convicted and sentenced following identification by CCTV cameras while on the street or in a car. Others were convicted after appearing in public events without the mandatory hijab. Though charges varied, women were systematically sentenced to pay a fine or banned to travel outside of the country. Women actors, human rights defenders, influencers, and others who used social media to advocate against the mandatory hijab received harsher punishments, such as flogging or court-mandated psychiatric treatment, compared to women who defied the hijab in a less public manner.
1279. In an emblematic example, in late 2023, prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin Sodouteh was sentenced to a fine, travel ban, had her passport revoked, and banned from using social media for two years for having appeared in a picture published on the internet without the hijab during the funeral of an Iranian film maker in October 2023. On 12 November 2023, Nobel Peace Prize Laureat Narges Mohammadi announced that she had been summoned to the Evin court for a hearing on new charges. She was banned from attending, however, following her refusal to wear the mandatory hijab.
1280. Hours after their release on bail on 14 January 2024, the judiciary opened a new case against journalists Niloufar Hamedi and Elaheh Mohammadi (See Section III on Jina Mahsa Amini). The new charges were introduced following the publication of pictures and video footage on the social media which showed them without hijab hugging each other and their loved ones after 17 months in detention.
1281. Open-source information reviewed and analysed by the Mission indicated that on 5 January 2024, a woman activist was reportedly sentenced to two years imprisonment for publishing a photograph of herself without wearing the mandatory hijab. A man actor who live-streamed a video of himself criticizing the âmorality policeâ return to the streets in the summer of 2023, was also sentenced to five years of imprisonment in December 2023 for âencouraging people to war and killing against national securityâ by an Islamic Revolutionary Court in Tehran.
(c) Flogging
1282. In one example in early January, a woman activist was sentenced by a criminal court in Tehran province to 12 years and six months imprisonment on charges of âencouraging/promoting corruption and promiscuity/prostitutionâ, 74 lashes on the charge of âdisturbing public chastityâ, and one year and three months imprisonment and 74 lashes and a monetary fine on the charges of âproduction and release of material that disturb the public chastityâ. The latter stemmed from her having published a picture of herself on social media without the mandatory hijab. On appeal, the Appeal Court quashed the prison sentence, upheld the monetary fine of 1,250,000 tomans imposed for the charges of âpresence in public without hijabâ as well as the 74 lashes for the charge of âdisturbing public chastityâ. She was also tried in a parallel proceeding before Branch 26 of Revolutionary Court on the charges of âpropaganda against the systemâ, which appeared to stem from the same alleged conduct, and was sentenced to one year imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years. In a story shared by the victim on 6 January 2024, she described how she refused to wear the hijab during the flogging which was carried out on 3 January 2024. However, she was handcuffed by a woman court officer who forcibly placed a hijab over her head preventing her from moving it. She then chanted: “In the name of woman, in the name of life, the clothes of slavery are torn, our black night will dawn, and all the whips will be axed…”â as she was lashed 74 times.
1283. In another case, a woman was tried by one court for âdisturbing public decency,â after she had appeared at a public event without the mandatory hijab. Her actions were deemed âdeliberateâ given that she âplayed with her hairâ in front of an audience; in turn, she was sentenced to flogging on the basis of Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code. The judgment was suspended for five years after she pledged not to violate the hijab laws again.
1284. Open-source material verified and analysed by the Mission indicated that, Mehdi Yarrahi, a well-known singer in Iran was arrested in August 2023, and sentenced in ealry 2024 by a criminal court in Tehran to 74 lashes and two years and eight months imprisonment on the charges of ” disturbing the public mindâ and âmaking and publishing films against public modestyâ. His sentence was in connection with a song he wrote criticising the mandatory hijab and advocating for womenâs rights including their right to choose what to wear. Another woman was reportedly sentenced to flogging and imprisonment after a video of her was published showing her walking towards a bank without hijab.
(d) Psychiatric treatment to âheal anti-socialâ behaviour of women
1285. Judges also associated womenâs refusal to wear the hijab with âanti-socialâ behaviour which they deemed required psychiatric intervention. In one case, a court sentenced a woman actor to two months imprisonment, a six month ban from social media platforms, and imposed mandatory visits to a mental health institution so she could âheal [her] anti-social personalityâ. The actor was also banned from appearing in media broadcasts in Iran or abroad for two years.
1286. In another case, a woman was ordered to undergo therapy for six months in order to âheal her anti-social behaviorâ on the basis of Article 638 of the Iranian Penal Code. Additionally, the judge ordered her to work as a cleaner for 70 hours, seized her car for a year, and revoked her driverâs license for two years. Likewise, another judge compared the removal of the hijab to an âanti-social actâ and a form of âpsychological diseaseâ regarding a woman who had been filmed without a hijab on the street by CCTV camera. She was sentenced to six months of mandatory counselling to heal her âanti-social personalityâ on the basis of Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code.
1287. Similarly, in another case, a womanâs refusal to wear the mandatory hijab was equated to a âsocial illâ deemed to have contributed to âtrampling faith and moral virtues of the society and the spread of social corruption.â She was ordered to research and then publish on her own social media account examples of the âimpact of hijab in individual and social lifeâ. Moreover, she was ordered to disseminate this message through her social networks to hundreds individuals within several months. The judgment stated that failure to do so, would result in an increase in âsupplementary punishmentsâ in the first instance and ultimately a prison term or fine. As in the case above, the woman had been filmed by a CCTV camera without a hijab while in public.
1288. In response to these judgments, the heads of several psychiatric associations issued a letter on 23 July 2023 addressed to the Head of the Judiciary, stating that such diagnoses were strictly within the purview of psychiatrists and cannot be imposed by judges.
(e) Other court sentences that humiliated, degraded, and punished women for not wearing the mandatory hijab
1289. In one case, a woman was ordered by a criminal court to serve as a janitor and clean the offices of the Ministry of Interior for 70 hours. The judgment confirmed the use of CCTV to identify the woman and refers to the hijab as a tenet of the Islamic Republic. Similarly, a woman was sentenced to serve as a janitor for 70 hours in another public building and a fine.
1290. Another woman was sentenced by a criminal court to payment of a fine and washing corpses for a period of one month, after she was identified by a CCTV camera while driving in her car without a hijab. The sentence was rendered without any possibility of appeal given that this was considered 8th degree crime.
(f) Gendered insults during trial proceedings
1291. As in the case of women in detention, judges used gendered insults and threatened women with measures to deprive them from access education or employment for refusing to wear the hijab. A woman witness, who was arrested for removing her hijab in 2017, described how after she was brought to the Public Prosecutorâs Office in Tehran, the judge said to her âDo you drive? I am not going to let you drive anymore, I will revoke your license. Do you work? You will be fired. Do you have custody over your children? You will not be able to raise your child. A crazy, psychotic, corrupt person like you is not qualified to raise and nurture a daughter.â
1292. Likewise, a criminal court judge in Tehran told a woman arrested for her anti-mandatory hijab activism in 2019, that she could âwork as a prostitute, sell drugs, and ruin the Iranian youth, this is all fine. But the hijab is our red line and if found in violation, you will get the most serious punishment.â
6. Gendered harms
âThe mandatory hijab alienates women from their own bodies: it is as if we occupy a body that does not belong to us. Everybody would give opinions and reprimand your body, starting from family to the Government.â
1293. Beyond the Missionâs findings above, measures taken by the State to enforce the mandatory hijab also caused physical and emotional suffering for women and girls on the basis of their gender. The harms caused have often gone unrecognized despite the long-lasting effects they have had on the mental and physical health of countless women and girls who had tirelessly advocated for equality and womenâs rights, whether through individual acts of defiance, or collectively within the context of the September 2022 protests.
1294. Studies have shown that women who had experienced gender discrimination were more likely to experience depression and, depending on the situation, higher anxiety and psychological trauma. In the context of Iran, women described feelings of anger and a sense of injustice which they associated with the Stateâs imposition of the hijab. Many noted how a womanâs clothing must be of her own choosing and that it was a womanâs right to decide on how she wished to present and express herself publicly. Some women noted that after the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini, they âcould no longer bring themselves to wear the hijabâ. Others also described witnessing how their mothers or other women relatives were harassed and threatened with violence by the âmorality policeâ for not conforming to the mandatory hijab laws, which prompted the witnesses not to wear the hijab as adults.
(a) Fear and anxiety
1295. Others stated that previous violent encounters as young adults with the âmorality policeâ rendered them so fearful that for years after one witness would change her itinerary to avoid any potential interactions with the âmorality policeâ street patrols. One woman, who was arrested for her participation in protests in Western Azerbaijan province, described the panic she felt every time she saw a police car in her new country of residence to which she had relocated in early in 2023. She recalled how, subconsciously, she searched for hijab in her purse until she would realize that she was ânow safe and they donât want to harmâ her. Another woman described having continuous panic attacks and recurrent nightmares one year after she fled Iran. She recalled feeling terrified upon seeing bearded men on the street and how her âheart beats fasterâ when she sees police cars or hears police sirens. She also described how, every morning before she leaves her home, she agonizes over not knowing if her chosen attire is âappropriate enoughâ. Another witness described similar fears and the anxiety she felt every time she had to leave her home, fearing her clothing may be too ârevealingâ. She explained that this was due to constantly having to wonder âhow to cover up to avoid an argument with your father, brother or the policeâ while still in Iran.
1296. Indeed, women interviewed by the Mission described experiencing constant anxiety not knowing which aspect of their clothing could result in a violent response by the âmorality policeâ. In one case, a woman described an overwhelming feeling of panic every time she prepared to go outside because âyou never know what the problem could be â your manteau, your shawl, the type of your trousers, even your socks; everything could be a problem, but you just donât know what it could be until the âmorality policeâ tell you.â Likewise, another witness noted that âeven if we wear the hijab, and a string of hair becomes visible, this alone puts you at risk.â
(b) âSecond-class citizensâ
1297. Closely related to the climate of fear described above, is the impact that the mandatory hijab had on womenâs dignity and identity. In describing what the mandatory hijab laws meant for them, women spoke about feeling âdegradedâ and being âsecond-class citizens.â Many witnesses noted the sentiment that âJina Mahsa could have been [any] of us,â while others saw a real risk for the safety of their young daughters. Such statements reflected a perception of deeply rooted discrimination, a lack of accountability for violations committed against women and girls who, as noted above, transgressed gender constructs and criteria that formed gender roles, as established by the tenets of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and a broader sense of impunity
C. Findings
1298. Based on the above, the Mission finds that mandatory hijab laws,